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ALBERT  SHAW  LECTURES  ON 
DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 


1899.  John  H.  Latane.     The  Diplomatic  Relations 

of  the  United  States  and  Spanish  America. 
1900.     (Out  of  print.) 

1900.  James  Morton  Callahan.     The  Diplomatic 

History  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.    1901 . 
(Out  of  print.) 

1906.  Jesse  Siddall  Reeves.    American  Diplomacy 

under  Tyler  and  Polk.     1907.     ^1.50. 

1907.  Elbert  Jay  Benton.    International  Law  and 

Diplomacy   of  the  Spanish-American  War. 
1908.     ^1,50. 

1909.  Ephraim  Douglas  Adams.  British  Interests 
and  Activities  in  Texas,  1838-1846.  1910. 
$1.50. 

191 1.  Charles  Oscar  Paullin.    Diplomatic  Nego- 

tiations of  American  Naval  Officers,  1778— 
1883.     1912.     $2.00. 

1912.  Isaac  J.  Cox.    The  West  Florida  Controversy. 

1798-1813.     1918.    $3.00. 

1913.  William    R.    Manning.      Early    Diplomatic 

Relations   between   the   United  States    and 
Mexico,     1916.     $2.25. 

1914.  Frank  A.  Updyke.     The   Diplomacy   of   the 

Warofi8i2.     1915.     $2.50. 

1916.  Payson  Jackson  Treat.  The  Early  Diplo- 
matic Relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Japan,  1853-1865.     1917.     $2.50. 


THE  WEST  FLORIDA 
CONTROVERSY,  1798-1813 


THE  ALBERT  SHAW  LECTURES 
ON  DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 


By  the  liberality  of  Albert  Shaw,  Ph.D.,  of  New 
York  City,  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  has  been 
enabled  to  provide  an  annual  course  of  lectures  on 
Diplomatic  History.  The  lectures  are  included  in  the 
regular  work  of  the  Department  of  History  and  are 
published  under  the  direction  of  Professor  John  H. 
Latane. 


THE  ALBERT  SHAW  LECTURES  ON 
DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY,  1912 


THE  WEST  FLORIDA 
CONTROVERSY,    1798-1813 

A  STUDY  IN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMACY 


BY 

ISAAC  JOSLIN  COX 

ASSOCIATE  PROFESSOR   OF   HISTORY,   UNIVERSITY   OF   CINCINNATI 


BALTIMORE 

The  Johns  Hopkins  Press 

1918 


Copyright,  19 18 
By  The  Johns  Hopkins  Press 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY 

LANCASTER,  PA. 


TO  MY  MOTHER 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 
The  Definition  and  Delimitation  of  West 

Florida    i  ,-^ 

CHAPTER  H 
The  Occupation  of  the  Natchez  District 32 

CHAPTER  HI 
The  Louisiana  Purchase  and  the  Floridas  . .     64    ^ 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Failure  of  Monroe's  Special  Mission.  . .   102 

CHAPTER  V 
Frontier  Problems  and  Personalities 139 

CHAPTER  VI 
The  Burr  Conspiracy  and  the  Embargo 188 

CHAPTER  VII 

American  Bickering  and  French  Bargaining  227 

CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Shadow  of  the  Corsican 266 

CHAPTER  IX 
The     Movement     for     Self-Government    at 
Baton  Rouge  312 

vii 


Viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  X 
Drifting  toward  Insurrection 358 

CHAPTER  XI 
Baton  Rouge — Insurgent  and  Militant 388 

CHAPTER  XII 
Filibustering  Operations  on  the  Mobile.  . . .  437 

CHAPTER  XIII 
American  Intervention  in  West  Florida  . . .  487 

CHAPTER  XIV 
In  Defense  of  Intervention 530 

CHAPTER  XV 
Incorporation  and  Adjustment 572 

CHAPTER  XVI 
Mobile  and  the  Aftermath  609 

CHAPTER  XVII 
The  Conclusion  of  the  Controversy 645 

MAPS 

1.  Darby's  Map  of  the  State  of  Louisiana 

facing       I 

2.  Map    to    Illustrate    the    Acquisition    of 

West  Florida  facing      2 

3.  The  District  of  Baton  Rouge facing  312 

4.  The  District  of  Mobile facing  438 


PREFACE 


It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  title,  scope,  and  subject- 
matter  of  this  study  will  be  self-explanatory,  and  that 
the  notes  will  prove  clear  and  detailed  enough  to  sup- 
ply the  place  of  a  formal  bibliography.  But  neither 
text  nor  notes  show  definitely  my  indebtedness  to  the 
courteous  and  efficient  aid  of  a  number  of  individuals 
who  have  assisted  in  gathering  material  for  the  volume 
and  in  preparing  it  for  the  press.  To  most  of  these 
persons  I  can  render  only  a  general  acknowledgment; 
of  a  few  I  must  make  special  mention. 

No  detailed  study  such  as  is  here  attempted  would 
be  possible  were  it  not  for  the  series  of  helpful  guides 
published  during  the  last  ten  years  by  the  Carnegie 
Institution  of  Washington.  In  addition  to  these 
printed  aids,  I  have  had  access  to  the  notes,  cards,  and 
manuscript  reports  belonging  to  the  Bureau  of  His- 
torical Research  of  that  institution,  and  have  been 
furnished  with  extensive  excerpts  from  these  sources, 
and  with  proof  sheets  of  reports  in  process  of  publica- 
tion. For  these  and  many  other  evidences  of  helpful 
interest  in  my  work,  I  wish  to  express  my  personal 
thanks  to  the  director  of  the  Bureau,  Dr.  J.  Franklin 
Jameson,  and  to  his  efficient  associate,  Mr.  Waldo  G. 
Leland. 

While  working  over   the  Papeles  Procedentes  de 


X  PREFACE 

Cuba,  in  the  Archive  General  at  Seville,  I  experienced 
the  usual  courteous  attention  and  assistance  of  Senor 
Don  Pedro  Torres  Lanzas,  the  chief  of  the  archive, 
and  of  the  assistant  chief,  the  late  Senor  Don  Jose 
Gonzalez  Verger.  It  was  also  my  good  fortune  to 
meet  there  Professor  Roscoe  R.  Hill,  now  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  New  Mexico,  who  was  then  engaged  in 
preparing  for  the  Carnegie  Institution  his  monumental 
"Descriptive  Catalogue"  of  the  Papeles  .  .  .  de  Cuba. 
By  making  use  of  Mr.  Hill's  notes,  which  he  freely 
turned  over  to  me,  I  was  able  to  avoid  much  unnec- 
essary labor  in  what  proved  the  most  fertile  collection 
of  material  for  my  purpose  and  also  to  make  my 
search  infinitely  more  fruitful.  Moreover,  Mr.  Hill 
has  made  me  doubly  his  debtor  by  reading  the  proofs 
of  the  present  work. 

Several  volumes  of  transcripts  from  the  Papeles 
are  to  be  found  in  the  State  Department  of  Archives 
and  History  at  Jackson,  Mississippi.  It  was  my  privi- 
lege to  examine  these  before  going  abroad,  with  the 
aid  of  Mr.  J.  A.  Robertson's  valuable  "  List  of  Docu- 
ments" (also  published  by  the  Carnegie  Institution), 
and  to  find  that  this  preliminary  work  measurably 
curtailed  my  labors  at  Seville.  Moreover,  the  deposi- 
tory at  Jackson  contains  the  original  letter  books  of 
Governor  W.  C.  C.  Claiborne  and  other  valuable  docu- 
mentary sources  for  the  territorial  period  of  Missis- 
sippi history.  The  letter  books,  in  part  duplicated  at 
Washington,  have  recently  been  edited  and  published 


PREFACE  XI 

by  the  director  of  the  Department,  Dr.  Dunbar  Row- 
land. This  timely  publication,  of  more  than  local  sig- 
nificance, will  readily  supplement  my  references  to  the 
manuscript  sources.  In  addition  to  courteous  assist- 
ance in  his  own  Department,  I  am  also  indebted  to  Dr. 
Rowland  for  many  practical  suggestions  regarding  the 
local  archives  in  his  vicinity. 

To  the  keepers  of  these  archives,  and  to  the  officials 
in  charge  of  other  local,  state,  and  national  reposi- 
tories, including  the  archives  of  the  State  and  War 
departments  at  Washington  and  the  manuscript  col- 
lections in  the  Library  of  Congress,  space  forbids 
more  than  a  general  acknowledgment.  But  I  wish  to 
reiterate  the  customary  expression  of  obligation  that  a 
growing  list  of  American  scholars  gladly  render  to 
these  helpful  and  courteous  custodians.  In  the  same 
manner  I  must  express  my  indebtedness  to  the  officials 
of  historical  societies,  and  to  numerous  private  indi- 
viduals, who  have  opened  their  libraries  and  manu- 
script collections  to  me  in  unstinted  measure.  For 
the  archives  at  Washington,  the  guides  prepared  by 
Messrs.  Van  Tyne  and  Leland  and  D.  W.  Parker  for 
the  Carnegie  Institution  were  very  helpful. 

The  guide  of  Messrs.  Paullin  and  Paxson,  or  rather 
notes  prepared  for  their  guide,  afforded  me  a  service- 
able survey  of  the  collections  in  the  British  Public 
Record  Office.  The  notes  of  Mr.  Leland  rendered 
the  diplomatic  correspondence  in  the  Archives  des 
Affaires   fitrangeres  at   Paris   immediately  available. 


xii  PREFACE 

Professor  W.  R.  Shepherd's  guide  was  of  assistance 
in  the  Archive  Historico  Nacional  at  Madrid.  At  all 
these  archives  the  officials  in  charge  gave  substantial 
aid,  but  I  must  mention  in  particular  the  helpfulness 
of  Senor  Don  Ignacio  Olavide,  who  was  temporarily 
in  charge  of  the  Archivo  Historico  Nacional  at  the 
time  of  my  visit  there. 

The  preparation  of  this  book  is  due  in  a  peculiar 
manner  to  the  cooperation  of  three  universities.  The 
greater  part  of  the  necessary  research  was  carried  on 
during  a  leave  of  absence  from  the  University  of  Cin- 
cinnati. Subsidies  afiforded  by  a  Harrison  Research 
Fellowship  at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania  and  the 
Albert  Shaw  Lectureship  at  Johns  Hopkins  University 
enabled  me  to  employ  this  leisure  most  advantageously. 
My  colleagues,  Professor  Merrick  Whitcomb,  Dr. 
Reginald  C.  McGrane,  and  Professor  Clyde  W.  Park, 
have  still  further  exemplified  this  spirit  of  academic 
cooperation  by  a  careful  reading  of  manuscript  and 
proof  sheets.  Mr.  Carl  E.  Otto  and  Mr.  K.  W.  Bron- 
son,  students  in  my  classes,  have  assisted  in  preparing 
the  maps.  In  the  drudgery  of  compositio'n  and  proof 
reading  my  wife,  as  might  be  expected,  has  been  my 
constant  mentor  and  indispensable  partner. 

Isaac  Joslin  Cox. 

University  of  Cincinnati, 
December,  1917. 


CHAPTER  I 
The  Definition  and  Delimitation  of  West  Florida 

During  the  first  six  decades  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, Spain,  France,  and  Great  Britain  asserted  over- 
lapping claims  in  what  is  now  the  southeastern  part  of 
the  United  States.  Their  uncertain  spheres  of  influ- 
ence, to  borrow  a  modern  term,  comprised  coastal 
plains  on  the  Gulf  and  the  Atlantic,  indented  by  shal- 
low bays  and  inlets  and  drained  by  rivers  of  moderate 
size,  together  with  an  indefinite  hinterland.  This  re- 
gion was  peopled  by  numerous  aborigines,  largely 
grouped  in  imposing  confederacies,  mutually  hostile 
but  generally  unfriendly  toward  intrusive  Europeans. 
Position,  physical  characteristics,  and  native  popula- 
tion thus  jointly  served  to  give  an  immense  strategic 
value  to  the  entire  region,  and  these  same  basic  con- 
ditions likewise  suggested  that  political  control  and 
development  therein  must  be  unified. 

For  nearly  two  hundred  years  after  its  discovery 
the  region  attracted  but  casual  international  attention. 
Then,  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  a 
series  of  factors — physical,  racial,  colonial,  interna- 
tional— began  in  more  thorough  measure  to  exert  their 
influence  in  blocking  out  a  part  of  the  region  for  fu- 
ture diplomatic  and  border  controversies.    This  period, 


2      DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF    WEST    FLORIDA 

which  may  not  inaptly  be  called  the  period  of  defini- 
tion, ended  in  1763.^  West  Florida,  first  named  and 
tentatively  defined  in  that  year,  was  the  residuary 
legatee  of  the  international  claims  and  controversies 
that  had  hitherto  characterized  the  history  of  the  en- 
tire region. 

Xireat  Britain,  now  possessing  all  the  territory  lying 
between  the  Atlantic,  the  Gulf,  and  the  Mississippi, 
except  the  Island  of  New  Orleans,  was  in  a  position 
to  establish  that  unified  control  so  necessary  to  its 
complete  development.  Her  first  step  to  this  end,  the 
Royal  Proclamation  of  1763,  gave  West  Florida  a 
name  and  a  northern  boundary,  the  thirty-first  parallel. 
This  line,  derived  from  the  early  Carolina  grants,  was 
destined  to  play  an  important  part  in  the  succeeding 
history  of  the  region.  The  attempt  to  prescribe  defi- 
nite limits  for  the  new  province,  an  attempt  repeated 
by  the  British  and  their  successors  during  the  next 
thirty-five  years,  began  what  we  may  term  its  period 
of  delimitation.  Shortly  after  1763  the  English  au- 
thorities themselves  modified  the  boundaries  that  they 
had  first  prescribed,  because  they  found  that  it  was 
advisable  to  extend  the  jurisdiction  of  West  Florida 
to  include  all  white  settlements  below  the  junction  of 

1  For  a  description  of  the  terms  "  definition  "  and  "  delimi- 
tation "  as  used  in  this  chapter,  consult  my  article  on  "  The 
Significance  of  the  Louisiana-Texas  Frontier  "  in  Proceedings 
of   the  Mississippi   Valley  Historical  Association,    1909-1910, 

I98r-2I5. 


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DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA       3 

the  Yazoo  with  the  Mississippi.  During  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution  Spain  conquered  the  English  holdings 
and  retained  them  under  the  Treaty  of  1783.  But 
that  power  was  immediately  involved  in  a  territorial 
controversy  with  the  United  States  and  in  1795  was 
obliged  to  yield  to  her  rival  the  portion  of  the  prov- 
ince above  the  thirty-first  parallel. 

By  the  early  part  of  1798  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty  of  the  Escorial,  by  which  Spain  made  this  ces- 
sion to  the  United  States,  were  in  process  of  adjust- 
ment. The  thirty-first  parallel  was  reestablished  as 
the  boundary  of  West  Florida,  this  time  becoming  an 
international  line  in  the  area  east  of  the  Mississippi. 
We  may,  therefore,  take  1798  as  the  closing  date  for 
what  we  have  called  the  period  of  delimitation  in  West 
Florida.  The  territory  of  Mississippi  and  the  prov- 
ince of  West  Florida,  the  frontier  jurisdictions  of 
their  respective  nations,  were  separated  by  a  definite 
limit,  as  well  marked,  in  the  course  of  the  next  two 
years,  as  their  needs  required.  But  such  a  settlement 
violated  the  essential  unity  of  the  region  and  the 
quarrel  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  that  had 
lasted  fifteen  years  was  soon  renewed.  In  this  dual 
dispute  Great  Britain  and  France,  two  of  the  parties 
to  the  original  controversy  that  was  settled  in  1763 
and  still  bitter  commercial  and  political  rivals,  threat- 
ened to  intervene  whenever  it  should  suit  their  indi- 
vidual purposes.     The  United  States,  ambitious  heir 


4      DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA 

of  the  former,  desired  to  acquire  both  the  Floridas, 
and  after  1803  claimed  that  portion  of  the  western 
province  lying  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Per- 
dido  as  part  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase.^  This  claim, 
which  was  largely  responsible  for  the  bitter  territorial 
disputes  in  which  the  United  States  was  immediately 
involved,  and  the  measures  taken  by  its  officials  dur- 
ing the  succeeding  decade  to  establish  the  claim  and 
occupy  the  disputed  area,  form  the  subject  of  the  pres- 
ent study. 

The  American  claim  included  that  portion  of  the 
Mississippi  delta  and  its  back  country  of  which  Baton 
Rouge  is  the  natural  center,  the  alluvial  bottoms  of  the 
Pearl  and  the  Pascagoula,  and  the  area  around  Mobile 
Bay.  The  western  portion  resembled  the  Natchez  dis- 
trict, with  which  it  made  a  common  physiographic 
unit.  Here  was  found  the  larger  part  of  West  Flor- 
ida's scattered  population,  gathered  into  considerable 
communities  along  the  lakes  and  streams  as  far  east- 
ward as  the  Pearl.  There  were  isolated  habitations 
at  Bayou  St.  Louis  and  Pass  Christian,  the  Bay  of 
Biloxi,  and  the  mouth  of  the  Pascagoula.  The  group 
of  settlements  second  in  importance  was  that  scattered 
around  Mobile  Bay.  For  these  the  town  of  that  name 
formed   a  military  and  business   center.     Pensacola, 

~  Cf.  Chambers,  "  West  Florida  in  its  Relation  to  the  His- 
torical Cartography  of  the  United  States,"  in  J.  H.  U.  Studies, 
Ser.  XVI,  No.  5. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST    FLORIDA       5 

beyond  the  Perdido,  lay  outside  the  disputed  area,  but 
was  the  capital  of  West  Florida  under  both  British 
and  Spanish  rule.  The  only  unity  to  this  artificial 
jurisdiction  was  afforded  by  the  chain  of  lakes  and 
bays  through  which  its  rivers  discharged  their  waters 
into  the  Gulf. 

The  significant  part  of  West  Florida  was,  therefore, 
merely  a  strip  of  the  Gulf  coast  possessing  little  in- 
trinsic value,  but  rendered  temporarily  important 
through  international  rivalry.  It  had  even  greater 
claims  to  distinction.  Its  creation,  development,  occu- 
pancy, and  division  determined  the  destiny  of  the 
whole  region  of  which  it  was  a  part.  It  afforded  at 
once  an  epitome  and  a  prophecy  of  territorial  expan- 
sion in  the  Southwest.  The  American  pioneer  in  his 
varying  aspects — turbulent  squatter,  domiciled  subject, 
covert  revolutionist — found  it  an  adequate  stage  for 
his  unconscious  propaganda  in  behalf  of  democracy. 
Small  as  it  was  it  bulked  large  enough  in  contem- 
porary diplomacy  to  modify  Napoleon's  commercial 
system  and  to  further  Jefferson's  Pan-American  views. 
Frontier  turbulence,  foreign  and  domestic  wrangling, 
and  evasive  treaty  provisions  marked  each  phase  of 
its  brief  history  and  afforded  a  warning  or  an  incentive 
for  subsequent  diplomatic  procedure.  Foreign  inva- 
sion and  filibustering  left  their  marks  upon  its  soil. 
After  West  Florida  had  thus  put  its  sinister  impress 
on   nearly  every   important   contemporary   issue,   the 


6      DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA 

single  star,  emblem  of  its  short-lived  independence, 
disappeared  and  the  territory  was  quietly  absorbed 
by  the  neighboring  commonwealths. 

It  was  fitting  that  the  first  historical  event  connected 
with  the  region  should  arouse  controversy.  The  Span- 
iard Pifieda  discovered  what  he  called  the  Bay  and 
River  of  Espiritu  Santo.  Whether  this  was  the  Mis- 
sissippi or  the  Mobile  was  long  in  dispute,  but  mod- 
ern scholarship  is  inclined  to  think  the  latter.*  De 
Vaca  skirted  its  shores,  and  De  Soto  visited  upon  its 
leading  Indian  community  his  most  signal  act  of 
cruelty.  More  significant  still  is  the  interest  mani- 
fested in  its  occupation  by  the  Mexican  viceroys,  Men- 
doza  and  Velasco.  The  latter's  representative  touched 
at  Mobile  Bay  in  1558  and  made  such  a  favorable 
report  that  the  viceroy  sent  De  Luna  the  following 
year  to  establish  a  definite  settlement.  He  selected 
the  nearby  Pensacola  Bay  as  his  headquarters,  but 
after  two  years  of  discouraging  hardships  his  surviv- 
ing followers  found  refuge  in  Hispaniola  and  Cuba.* 
For  the  next  century  and  a  quarter  the  region  re- 
mained unnoticed  except  for  random  mention  such  as 
that  by  Father  Alonso  Benavides  f  but  the  early  Span- 

3  Hamilton,  Colonial  Mobile  (ed.  1910),  10. 

4  Lowery,  Spanish  Settlements  within  the  Limits  of  the 
United  States  to  1562,  356-375. 

5  The  Memorial  of  Fray  Alonso  de  Benavides,  1630,  64-66. 
Translated  by  Mrs.  Edward  E.  Ayer,  Chicago,  1916.  Pri- 
vately printed. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA       7 

iards  had  indicated  a  connection  with  Mexico  and 
Cuba  that  was  to  characterize  in  large  measure  the 
later  stages  of  their  control. 

In  the  closing  years  of  the  seventeenth  century  the 
Spaniards  were  destined  to  a  rude  awakening  from 
their  apathy.  The  intrepid  La  Salle,  seconded  by 
his  lieutenant  Tonty,  narrowly  missed  becoming  the 
first  French  colonizer  of  the  region.*'  He  did  link  it 
with  Texas,  likewise  to  be  associated  in  a  future 
boundary  controversy.  The  English  also  claimed  it 
under  the  Carolina  and  subsequent  grants ;  and,  shortly 
after  the  Peace  of  Ryswick,  a  certain  Daniel  Coxe 
dispatched  a  vessel  to  explore  the  mouth  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. This  prospective  rivalry  led  La  Salle's  suc- 
cessor, the  Sieur  dTberville,  to  favor  some  point  east 
of  the  Mississippi  for  his  settlement.  He  preferred 
Pensacola  Bay.  But  when,  early  in  1699,  he  reached 
its  vicinity  and  found  the  jealous  Spaniards  already 
established  there,  he  led  his  garrison  of  eighty  men 
to  old  Biloxi,  During  this  period  his  brother,  Bien- 
ville, encountered  Coxe's  captain  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi,  but  succeeded  in  persuading  him  to  de- 
part.''    Thus  by  the  opening  of  the  eighteenth  century 

^  The  most  complete  collection  of  La  Salle  material  is  in 
Margry,  Decouvertes  et  fitablissements  des  Frangais,  Vols.  II 
and  III,  passim.  For  a  brief  sketch  consult  the  introduction 
to  my  Journeys  of  La  Salle  in  "  The  Trail  Makers'  Series." 

^  Margrj^  Decouvertes  et  fitablissements,  IV,  53,  229,  393. 


8      DEFINITION    AND  DELIMITATION   OF   WEST   FLORIDA 

the  future  West  Florida  was  involved  in  a  tripartite 
dispute  which  was  to  continue  for  six  decades. 

Iberville  wished  to  combine  French  and  Spanish  in- 
terests against  the  English,  and  for  the  purpose  sug- 
gested that  Spain  should  cede  Pensacola,  or  possibly 
all  Florida,  to  France  in  return  for  a  guarantee  of  its 
possessions  in  Mexico.  A  century  later  a  more  fa- 
mous Frenchman  made  a  similar  proposal.  The  Council 
of  the  Indies  then  resented  the  presence  of  the  French 
in  Louisiana,  and  rejected  Iberville's  proffer.^  Their 
representatives  at  Pensacola  even  protested  when 
Bienville  moved  his  fort  from  Biloxi  to  the  shores  of 
Mobile  Bay,  and  later  to  the  present  site  of  Mobile, 
but  they  were  powerless  to  do  more.  The  ensuing  re- 
lations between  their  respective  frontier  garrisons 
were  generally  friendly,  although  during  a  few  weeks 
in  1 71 9  Pensacola  was  captured  by  the  French,  recap- 
tured by  the  Spaniards,  retaken  by  the  French,  and 
finally  restored  to  its  original  occupants.  By  this  time 
the  French  had  established  their  headquarters  at  New 
Orleans,  but  they  still  retained  Mobile  for  the  sake  of 
controlling  the  Indians.  From  that  date  the  frontier 
commanders  at  that  post  and  at  Pensacola  agreed  to 
observe  the  Perdido  as  the  limit  of  their  respective 
jurisdictions.^  By  their  silence  the  home  governments 
tacitly  accepted  this  boundary. 

8  Margry,  Decouvertes  et  fitablissements,  IV,  539-568. 

^  Margry,  Decouvertes  et  fitablissements,  IV,  381-385,  503. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST    FLORIDA       9 

Above  the  coast  the  French  government,  in  the  grant 
to  Crozat  and  to  the  Western  Company,  vaguely  spoke 
of  Carolina  as  limiting  their  claims  on  the  east.  The 
English  peril,  threatening  from  the  first,  became  more 
pronounced  with  the  founding  of  Georgia  in  1732. 
Its  leader,  Oglethorpe,  brilliantly  defended  the  new 
colony  against  the  Spaniards  and  in  addition  en- 
deavored to  extend  his  influence  among  the  western 
Indians.  From  the  Carolinas  and  the  colonies  to  the 
north  English  traders  also  visited  the  Choctaws  and 
the  Chickasaws.  To  maintain  French  prestige  over 
his  former  allies,  Bienville,  in  1736  and  1740,  under- 
took expeditions  against  the  Chickasaws,  which  re- 
sulted disastrously  and  still  further  weakened  the  al- 
lied Bourbon  defense.^" 

On  the  eve  of  the  decisive  contest  for  territorial 
supremacy  in  North  America,  Spanish  Florida,  extend- 
ing over  the  peninsula  and  up  to  the  Perdido,  was 
guarded  by  Saint  Augustine  and  Pensacola.  The 
French  settlements  at  Mobile  and  at  New  Orleans  had 
as  their  eastern  outposts  Fort  Natchez,  Fort  Tombecbe, 
and  Fort  Toulouse.  English  Carolina,  now  divided, 
was  protected  by  the  buffer  colony  of  Georgia.     The 

539-541,  561,  577-580;  V,  426,  461 ;  Historia,  Vol.  43,  Opiisculo 
I,  par.  31,  54.  63-67,  MS.,  Archive  General  y  Publico  de  la 
Nacion,  Mexico ;  French,  Historical  Collections  of  Louisiana, 
III,  63-65 ;  ibid.,  new  series,  I,  147. 

i'^  Hamilton,  Colonial  Mobile,  126-130;  Gayarre,  History  of 
Louisiana,  The  French  Domination,  470-488,  503-517. 


10  DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF    WEST    FLORIDA 

capital  of  the  latter,  Savannah,  was  flanked  by  forts 
Augusta  and  Frederica.  The  conflicting  claims  are 
summed  up  by  Du  Pratz,  who  mentions  the  Perdido 
as  the  limit  between  the  French  and  Spaniards ;  and  by 
De  Lisle,  who  on  his  map  draws  an  irregular  line  be- 
tween the  British  and  French  possessions  from  that 
stream  to  the  mountains,  and  so  to  the  northward. 
Montcalm,  in  1758,  suggested  about  the  same  line  as 
the  limit  between  the  English  and  the  French.^^  The 
decision  in  the  Valley  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  later  reg- 
istered in  the  preliminary  treaty  at  Versailles,  brought 
the  contested  area  between  the  mountains,  the  Missis- 
sippi, and  the  Gulf  into  the  hands  of  the  English.  At 
the  same  time  Spain  surrendered  the  Florida  Penin- 
sula in  exchange  for  Cuba.  By  this  double  transfer 
the  English  sphere  of  influence  was  enlarged  to  in- 
clude all  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi  except 
the  Island  of  New  Orleans.  The  first  Bourbon  com- 
bination failed  to  check  the  English  advance  predicted 
by  Iberville. 

West  Florida  now  passed  from  the  period  of  defi- 
nition to  that  of  delimitation,  in  which  the  diplomat 
plays  a  more  important  part  than  the  discoverer  or 
settler.  The  first  paper  marking  this  period  is  the 
treaty   which  closed  the   Seven   Years'   War.     Inci- 

1^  Le  Page  du  Pratz,  Histoire  de  la  Louisiana,  I,  160;  Win- 
sor,  The  Mississippi  Basin,  63,  74;  Thwaites,  France  in 
America,  156. 


DEFINITION   AND  DELIMITATION   OF  WEST  FLORIDA    II 

dentally  this  document  partially  delimited  West  Flor- 
ida by  a  "line  drawn  along  the  middle  of  the  Missis- 
sippi ...  to  the  river  Iberville,  and  from  thence  by  a 
line  drawn  along  the  middle  of  this  riv^r,  and  the  lake 
Maurepas  and  Pontchartrain  to  the  sea."  In  order  to 
carry  out  this  provision,  the  French  king  ceded  to 
"His  Britannic  Majesty,  the  river  and  port  of  Mobile 
and  everything  which  he  possesses  or  ought  to  possess 
on  the  left  side  of  the  river  Mississippi,  except  the 
town  of  New  Orleans  and  the  island  in  which  it  is  situ- 
ated." The  remainder  of  this  seventh  article  pro- 
vides for  the  free  navigation  of  the  entire  Mississippi 
by  the  subjects  of  both  nations.  The  twentieth  ar- 
ticle of  the  treaty  calls  for  the  cession  by  Spain  to 
Great  Britain  of  "  Florida,  with  the  Fort  Augustine 
and  the  Bay  of  Pensacola,  as  well  as  all  that  Spain  pos- 
sessed on  the  continent  of  North  America  to  the  east 
or  the  southeast  of  the  river  Mississippi."^^    , 

Following  the  transfer  of  the  territory  thus  desig- 
nated, the  English  sovereign  proceeded  to  organize 
his  new  possessions.  His  proclamation  for  this  pur- 
pose bears  the  date  of  October  7,  1763.  It  contem- 
plates four  new  colonial  governments,  of  which  the 
second  and  third  are  of  immediate  concern.  East 
Florida,  the  second  mentioned  in  the  proclamation, 
was  "bounded  to  the  westward  by  the  Gulph  of  Mex- 
ico and  the  Appalachicola  river."     The  third  colony, 

12  The  Annual  Register,  1762,  233-247. 


12    DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF    WEST   FLORIDA 

West  Florida,  was  to  be  "bounded  to  the  Southward 
by  the  Gulph  of  Mexico,  including  all  islands  within 
six  leagues  of  the  coast,  the  river  Appalachicola  to 
Lake  Pontchartrain,"  and  to  the  westward  by  the  line 
laid  down  in  the  treaty.  Its  northern  limit  was  a 
"  line  drawn  due  East  from  that  part  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, which  lies  in  the  31st  degree  of  North  latitude, 
to  the  river  Appalachicola,  or  the  Catahouchee,"  which 
was  its  eastern  limit. ^^ 

From  this  time  the  colony  of  West  Florida  is  fairly 
defined  except  to  the  northward,  where  lay  the  Indian 
country  marked  out  by  the  same  proclamation.  It 
shortly  appeared  that  the  line  of  the  thirty-first  paral- 
lel would  pass  below  extensive  settlements  at  Nat- 
chez, and  possibly  below  some  on  the  Mobile.  These 
communities  were  not  important  enough  for  an 
independent  government,  and  they  could  not  be  at- 
tached without  great  difficulty  to  distant  Georgia.  Ac- 
cordingly, by  a  supplemental  royal  order  issued  in  1764, 
the  territory  of  West  Florida  was  enlarged  to  include 
all  white  settlements  below  a  line  drawn  due  east  from 
the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  river.     This  extension  was 

13  Ibid.,  1763,  209-213.  C.  E.  Carter  states  that  the  selection 
by  the  British  of  the  thirty-first  parallel  was  wholly  arbitrary, 
because  this  was  "  as  far  north  as  the  Settlements  can  be 
carried,  without  interfering  with  lands  claimed  or  occupied 
by  the  Indians."  But  it  seems  to  me  that  it  was  by  no  mere 
coincidence  that  they  hit  upon  the  line  that  had  already  ap- 
peared in  the  Carolina  grants.  Cf.  Mississippi  Valley  His- 
torical Review,  I,  365. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    13 

repeated  in  the  commissions  issued  to  the  various 
British  governors  from  1764  onward.^*  Very  little 
of  the  territory  was  actually  occupied  by  white  settlers, 
till  at  a  conference  with  Colonel  John  Stuart  in  1770 
the  Chickasaws  and  Choctaws  agreed  to  sell  a  portion 
of  their  land  to  the  west  and  south  of  what  was  called 
the  Chaterpe  line.  This  limit  began  on  the  Tombig- 
bee,  about  135  miles  above  Mobile,  and  ran  to  the 
Yazoo  some  15  miles  above  its  junction  with  the  Mis- 
sissippi, and  included  territory  along  the  Alabama, 
Tombigbee,  and  Pascagoula  rivers,  which  the  Choc- 
taws had  previously  agreed  to  sell.^^  These  cessions 
may  be  regarded  as  establishing  a  provisional  line  be- 
tween the  Indians  and  the  whites  under  British  rule. 
Some  thirty  years  later  the  American  government  in 
new  treaties  negotiated  by  General  Wilkinson  gained  \ 
substantially  the  same  territory. 

The  revolt  of  the  English  colonies  checked  the  run- 
ning of  Indian  boundaries,  and  brought  another  set 
of  interests  to  the  front.  The  new  American  govern- 
ment desired  to  carry  on  commerce  with  the  Spaniards 
at   New   Orleans,   and   to   intimidate   or   occupy   the 

1*  American  State  Papers,  Public  Lands,  I,  57. 

1^  Hamilton,  Colonial  Mobile,  242-246;  Farrand,  "The  In- 
dian Boundary  Line,"  in  American  Historical  Review,  X,  782 ; 
Gayarre,  History  of  Louisiana,  The  Spanish  Domination,  412; 
Ellicott  to  Pickering,  Sept.  20,  1797,  Ellicott  and  the  Southern 
Boundary,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library,  Department  of 
State. 


14   DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST    FLORIDA 

British  settlements  at  Natchez,  Mobile,  and  Pensa- 
cola.  Patrick  Henry  favored  such  a  scheme.  Oliver 
Pollock,  the  American  agent  at  New  Orleans,  and  his 
associate,  James  Willing,  tried  to  carry  it  out ;  but  the 
Tory  element  at  Natchez,  led  by  Anthony  Hutchins,  a 
retired  British  officer,  proved  too  much  for  them,  even 
when  their  efforts  were  secretly  aided  by  Bernardo 
de  Galvez,  governor  of  Spanish  Louisiana.^^  In  the 
course  of  a  few  years  diplomatic  complications  in 
Europe  forced  the  Americans  to  moderate  their  west- 
ern ambitions.  Accordingly,  in  1779,  their  representa- 
tive to  Spain  was  instructed  to  ask  for  the  thirty-first 
parallel  as  the  southern  boundary.  In  this  they  fol- 
lowed the  early  Carolina  grants  as  did  the  Proclama- 
tion of  1763 ;  but  in  claiming  to  the  Mississippi,  they 
disregarded  a  very  essential  part  of  that  proclamation. 
They  likewise  demanded  the  right  to  navigate  this 
river  and  to  use  a  suitable  port  of  entry  below  the  des- 
ignated boundary.  The  instructions  furthermore  show 
that,  while  they  abandoned  all  hope  of  conquering  the 
Floridas  for  themselves,  they  were  ready  to  assist 
Spain  to  do  so,  provided  that  power  would  grant  a 
substantial  subsidy.^^ 

16  Winsor,  The  Westward  Movement,  147-149,  155 ;  Enclo- 
sure No.  6  in  Ellicott  to  Pickering,  Nov.  14,  1797,  Ellicott  and 
the  Southern  Boundary,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library; 
James  Dallas  to  Colonel  John  McGillivray,  July  3,  1778,  MS., 
Bancroft  Collection,  University  of  California. 

17  Foreign  Affairs,  Secret  Journal,  1775-1781,  132,  138,  139, 


DEFINITION   AND  DELIMITATION   OF  WEST   FLORIDA    1 5 

In  1779  war  broke  out  between  Spain  and  Great 
Britain,  and  the  latter  power  planned  to  strengthen 
Pensacola,  and,  with  the  aid  of  southern  Indians,  to 
push  the  Spaniards  away  from  New  Orleans.  But 
George  Rogers  Clark  and  his  men  prevented  coopera- 
tion between  Hamilton  at  Detroit  and  Campbell  at 
Pensacola.  This  indirect  aid  from  the  Americans  en- 
abled Galvez,  in  September,  1779,  to  reduce  the  British 
establishments  on  the  Mississippi.  In  the  following 
March  he  occupied  Fort  Charlotte  at  Mobile,  and  in 
1 781  forced  the  English  to  surrender  Pensacola.^* 

Galvez  was  friendly  to  the  Americans,  but  the  Span- 
ish government  at  home  already  regarded  their  terri- 
torial ambitions  with  jealousy.  Consequently  Pollock 
at  New  Orleans  was  unable  to  gain  needed  assistance 
for  Clark  and  other  American  leaders,  while  John  Jay 
at  Madrid  vainly  tried  to  negotiate  a  loan  of  five  mil- 
lions of  dollars.  The  Spanish  representative,  Diego 
de  Gardoqui,  plainly  told  him  that  this  loan  was  con- 
tingent upon  abandoning  the  claim  to  the  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi.  Owing  to  the  lack  of  military 
success   during    1780,   Congress   was   more   ready  to 

149,  226,  262;   Winsor,  Westward   Movement,   160;   Phillips, 
The  West   in  the   Diplomacy  of   the   American   Revolution, 

53.  55. 

18  Winsor,  Westward  Movement,  162, 181,  189;  Manuel  Ser- 
rano y  Sanz  in  Revista  de  los  Archivos,  Madrid,  Mar.-Apr., 
1914,  167. 


l6   DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA 

yield  this  point;  but  even  so,  Jay  was  unable  to  take 
advantage  of  the  concession. ^^ 

After  he  was  transferred  to  Paris,  Jay  discovered 
that  the  Spanish  government  wished  to  retain  the  ter- 
ritory above  the  thirty-first  parallel  that  Galvez  had 
conquered,  and  also  insisted  upon  absolutely  con- 
trolling the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  The  French 
minister,  Vergennes,  tried  to  maintain  an  unsatisfying 
neutrality  towards  both  Spanish  and  American  preten- 
sions, but  his  secretary,  Rayneval,  supported  Spain. 
Under  the  circumstances,  Jay  and  John  Adams  per- 
suaded Franklin  to  make  a  separate  provisional  treaty 
with  Great  Britain,  despite  their  instructions,  and  thus 
secured  from  the  mother-country  a  recognition  of  their 
territorial  claims  and  of  the  right  to  navigate  the  Mis- 
sissippi.^°  A  secret  article,  however,  called  for  the  Yazoo 
line,  in  case  Great  Britain  recovered  the  Floridas ;  in 
case  Spain   retained  them,   the  thirty-first   parallel.^^ 

19  Revista  de  los  Archives,  Mar.-Apr.,  1914,  201 ;  Johnston, 
Correspondence  and  Public  Papers  of  John  Jay,  I,  460. 

20  Johnston,  John  Jay,  II,  388;  Foreign  Afifairs,  Secret  Jour- 
nal, IV,  Ti\  Annual  Register,  1782,  322-324. 

21  Foreign  Affairs,  Secret  Journal,  1781-86,  338;  Revista  de 
los  Archives,  Mar.-Apr.,  1914,  174.  In  1802  Lord  Lansdowne 
told  Rufus  King  that  twenty  years  before  he  wished  to  obtain 
the  Floridas,  New  Orleans,  and  some  of  the  West  Indies  in 
exchange  for  Gibraltar,  but  that  popular  outcry  prevented. 
He  also  stated  that  Jaj^  and  Franklin  were  willing  for  Great 
Britain  to  seize  the  Floridas,  after  the  provisional  treaty,  if 
they  could  avoid  the  appearance  of  collusion.  King,  Life  and 
Correspondence  of  Rufus  King,  IV,  93. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    1 7 

This  provisional  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  was  not  modified  in  the  later  general 
peace.  But  when  the  latter  ceded  the  Floridas  to 
Spain  she  mentioned  no  definite  limits.^^  Obviously 
here  was  a  chance  for  dispute,  and  possibly  Great 
Britain  intended  that  there  should  be.  Nor  was  the 
prospect  of  trouble  removed  when  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties shortly  afterward  learned  of  the  secret  article. 
The  territory  involved  was  a  strip  about  a  hundred 
miles  wide,  extending  from  the  Mississippi  to  the 
Chattahoochee,  but  the  strip  itself  was  not  the  most 
significant  factor.  Spain  insisted  upon  this  territory 
largely  because  it  strengthened  her  assumed  right  to 
the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  This  in 
turn  involved  the  control  of  the  Indians  in  the  region 
west  of  the  mountains  and  south  of  the  Ohio.  For 
the  next  two  decades  these  three  factors  constituted 
the  leading  issues  in  southwestern  diplomacy. 

In  this  struggle  the  Creek^,  under  the  astute  Alex- 
ander McGillivray,  entered  into  an  alliance  with  the 
Spanish  governor,  June  i,  1784,  and  agreed  to  protect 
his  territory  from  encroachment.  This  led  to  a  border 
war  with  Georgia  which  continued,  in  spite  of  the  in- 
tervention of  the  national  government  under  Washing- 
ton, until  the  death  of  the  great  half-breed  removed 
the  principal  stumbling-block  to  peace  in  the  South- 
west.    The  Spaniards  gained  some  temporary  advan- 

22  Annual  Register,  1783,  331-338. 
3 


1 8   DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA 

tage  from  their  connection  with  him,  as  well  as  from 
their  treaties  with  the  Chickasaws  and  Choctaws.  They 
also  exerted  some  influence  over  the  Cherokees,  who 
carried  on  hostilities  with  the  Watauga  and  Cumber- 
land settlements.^*  For  a  generation  to  come  Mobile 
and  Pensacola,  and  for  a  shorter  time,  New  Orleans, 
in  Spanish  hands,  continued  as  recruiting  centers  for 
the  Southwestern  Indians. 

Aside  from  Indian  affairs  the  most  significant  event 
in  the  Southwest  during  this  decade  was  the  attempt 
by  Georgia  to  organize  Bourbon  County  in  the  Natchez 
district.  Thomas  Green,  the  leader  in  this  project, 
failed  to  cooperate  with  his  associates.  The  greater 
part  of  the  inhabitants  at  Natchez  probably  sympa- 
thized with  him,  but  feared  to  take  a  definite  stand 
that  might  result  in  their  total  ruin.  The  Spanish 
authorities  absolutely  refused  to  yield  the  territory  in 
question,  and  Georgia  was  too  far  away  to  conduct  a 
military  campaign  to  advantage.  At  the  same  time 
the  Indians  defeated  another  attempt  by  Georgia  to 
organize  a  county  in  the  bend  of  the  Tennessee 
River.2* 

In  this  failure  of  Georgia  to  uphold  its  own  terri- 
torial claims  against  Spain  we  have  evidence  that  the 

23  Pickett,  History  of  Alabama,  II,  6i,  T2>^  141 ;  cf.  article  by 
Jane  M.  Berry  in  Mississippi  Valley  Historical  Review,  March, 
1917. 

2*  American  Historical  Review,  XV,  66-171,  297-353. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    1 9 

problems  of  the  Southwest  were  too  much  for  a  single 
State.  But  under  the  Confederation  it  was  doubtful 
if  the  national  government  could  succeed  any  better. 
Shortly  after  the  Revolution,  La  Fayette  undertook 
without  success  to  initiate  diplomatic  relations  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States.  Ill  success  likewise  ac- 
companied the  efforts  of  Jay  and  Gardoqui,  in  1785- 
1786,  at  Philadelphia.  The  diplomatic  duel  which 
they  there  resumed  over  the  boundaries  and  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi  led  to  no  other  result  than 
a  tentative  proposal  to  forego  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  for  twenty-five  years.  Jay  submitted  the 
proposal  to  Congress ;  but,  influenced  by  western  op- 
position, that  body  refused  even  to  consider  it.-^  Ne- 
gotiations were  then  suspended  during  the  continuance 
of  the  government  under  the  Confederation. 

Meanwhile  Spain  retained  possession  of  the  east  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  as  far  north  as  the  present  Mem- 
phis. To  strengthen  her  hold  there  her  officials  opened 
intrigues  with  certain  leaders  in  the  Blue  Grass  region 
of  Kentucky  and  in  the  Cumberland  district  of  Ten- 
nessee. In  time,  however,  the  element  that  was  loyal 
to  the  American  government  was  reinforced  by  the 
promise  of  a  "  more  perfect  union  "  under  a  new  consti- 
tution, and  checkmated  the  plans  of  Wilkinson  and 
other  western  disunionists.'^     Their  communities  suf- 

25  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I,  248-251. 

26  Shepherd,  "  Wilkinson  and  the  Beginning  of  the  Spanish 


20    DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF    WEST    FLORIDA 

fered  many  genuine  grievances  that  encouraged  speci- 
ous advances  from  Spain  and  half  hearted  intrigues  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain.  The  situation  was  further 
compHcated  by  the  desire  of  France  to  regain  posses- 
sion of  Louisiana.  But  despite  these  untoward  cir- 
cumstances, the  genuine  loyalty  of  the  West  was 
clearly  demonstrated  when  separatism  received  a 
check  in  Kentucky  and  North  Carolina  resumed  con- 
trol over  the  western  counties.  The  West  preferred 
to  seek  a  remedy  by  regular  means  under  the  new  gov- 
ernment, rather  than  attempt  the  uncertainties  of  re- 
bellion or  the  restrictions  of  a  Spanish  colonial  sys- 
tem. The  French  traveler,  Brissot  de  Warville,  indi- 
cated another  possible  solution  when  he  predicted  the 
success  of  an  American  campaign  against  New  Or- 
leans.^''' 

The  "  Nootka  Sound  Affair,"  the  first  serious  diplo- 
matic question  under  the  new  government,  threatened 
American  neutrality.  The  Venezuelan  revolutionist, 
Francisco  de  Miranda,  urged  Great  Britain  to  occupy 
New  Orleans.  The  trader  and  adventurer,  W.  A. 
Bowles,  offered  to  conquer  for  her  the  Floridas  and 
lower  Louisiana.  Hamilton  and  even  Jefferson  inti- 
mated to  a  British  agent  that  American  acquiescence, 
if  not  complicity,  might  be  secured  by  ceding  New 

Conspiracy,"    in   American    Historical   Review,    IX,   490-506, 
748-766. 
27  American  Historical  Review,  X,  258. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    21 

Orleans  and  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States.  Later 
Jefferson  veered  round  and  refused  to  welcome  Great 
Britain  as  a  neighbor  west  of  the  Mississippi.  In- 
stead he  hoped  to  gain  New  Orleans  or  some  other 
suitable  port  through  the  good  offices  of  the  French 
government.  He  also  instructed  William  Carmichael 
at  Madrid  to  propose  the  cession  of  New  Orleans  and 
the  Floridas  to  the  United  States  in  return  for  a  guar- 
antee of  Spanish  possessions  west  of  the  Mississippi. 
In  neither  case  did  he  gain  his  point.  France  herself 
had  designs  on  the  desired  territory,  and  his  instruc- 
tions to  Carmichael  arrived  too  late  for  use.  Jeffer- 
son's attitude,  however,  reminds  us  of  his  course  just 
before  the  purchase  of  Louisiana.-^ 

The  following  ten  years  presented  many  diplomatic 
episodes  equally  perilous  to  the  Spanish  hold  on  the 
Floridas.  But  a  more  insidious  peril  was  developing 
in  the  very  region.  The  original  French  and  Spanish 
elements  in  its  population  were,  after  1763,  joined  by 
British  immigrants  largely  from  the  Carolinas  and 
Georgia.  There  was  also  some  infiltration  from  the 
movement  that  was  peopling  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 
Originally  this  Anglo-American  element  was  mostly 
Tory  in  sympathy ;  but  after  the  independence  of  the 
former  British  colonies,  it  naturally  sided  with  the 
Americans   rather   than   with   the   Spaniards.     After 

28  Manning,  "  The  Nootka  Sound  Episode,"  in  American 
Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1904. 


22   DEFINITION   AND  DELIMITATION   OF   WEST  FLORIDA 

1783  a  renewed  migration  from  Georgia  and  the  Caro- 
linas  poured  into  the  Mobile  and  Natchez  districts.^' 
These  newer  immigrants,  whether  loyahst  or  Whig, 
were  for  the  most  part  people  of  character  and  sub- 
stance, and  met  with  an  unexpected  welcome  from 
the  Spaniards.  This  attitude  arose  from  a  desire  to 
erect  buffer  colonies  against  future  illegal  immigra- 
tion. Gardoqui  joined  with  Colonel  Morgan  of  New 
Jersey  to  found  a  settlement  at  New  Madrid,^"  This 
project  was  largely  neutralized  by  the  opposition  of 
Wilkinson  and  the  jealousy  of  Governor  Miro,  who 
wrote  to  Judge  Sebastian  of  Kentucky,  under  date  of 
September  16,  1789,  that  Wilkinson  had  mentioned 
him  as  one  who  expected  to  leave  Kentucky.  Miro 
assured  Sebastian  that  he  would  welcome  him  and 
his  companions  with  pleasure,  and  permit  them  to 
locate  "  in  any  part  of  Louisiana,  or  anywhere  on  the 
East  side  of  the  Mississippi  below  the  Yazoo  river." 
Such  settlers  should  receive  a  liberal  land  grant,  in- 
troduce their  personal  property  free  of  duty,  and  dis- 
pose of  their  surplus  tobacco  in  the  general  market. 
They  might  practice  their  religion  without  molestation, 
and  enjoy  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  His  Majes- 
ty's subjects. ^^ 

29  Pickett,  History  of  Alabama,  II,  25,  28,  124. 

^^  Ogg,  Opening  of  the  Mississippi,  449. 

31  Miro  to  Sebastian,  N.  O.,  Sept.  16,  1789,  enclosed  in  Bev- 
erly Randolph  to  Washington,  May  31,  1790,  Miscellaneous 
Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  3,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  Depart- 
ment of  State;  Revista  de  los  Archivos,  May-June,  1914,  356. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    23 

As  a  general  criticism,  we  may  say  that  these  Span- 
iards were  playing  with  fire,  and  they  ought  to  have 
known  it.  The  prediction  of  John  Sullivan,  a  resident 
of  Charleston,  affords  a  case  in  point.  After  assur- 
ing his  friend.  Major  William  Brown,  that  there  was 
work  cut  out  for  him  in  the  western  country,  he 
added :  "  Take  my  word  for  it,  we  will  speedily  be  in 
possession  of  New  Orleans."  The  American  authori- 
ties afifected  to  believe  that  this  letter  represented  Sul- 
livan's personal  views  only ;  but  he  may  have  had  some 
connection  with  Dr.  James  O'Fallon,  who  was  agent 
for  the  Yazoo  Land  Company  of  South  Carolina.  If 
so,  this  letter  has  added  significance.  O'Fallon  pro- 
posed to  plant  a  colony  of  Americans  on  the  site  of 
modern  Vicksburg.  He  attempted  to  allay  the  fears 
of  Governor  Miro  by  representing  his  company  as 
made  up  of  disaffected  westerners  ready  to  ally  them- 
selves with  the  adjoining  Spanish  authorities  and  to 
serve  as  a  rampart  against  future  irruptions.  He  was 
to  organize  his  settlers  into  a  semi-military  battalion, 
under  the  command  of  George  Rogers  Clark.  The 
latter  had  been  unjustly  treated  both  by  the  State  of 
Virginia  and  by  the  American  government,  and  was 
ready  to  enter  Spanish  service  in  return  for  a  land 
grant.  Washington's  proclamation  rather  than  Span- 
ish reluctances  led  the  prospective  colonizers  to  await 
a  more  favorable  opportunity.^^ 

^^  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I,  281 ;  Pick- 


24   DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST    FLORIDA 

Similar  encouragement  given  by  the  governor  of 
East  Florida  led  Jefferson  to  predict  the  natural  re- 
sult of  this  policy.  Under  date  of  April  2,  1791,  he 
wrote  Washington:  "This  [invitation]  is  meant  for 
our  people.  Debtors  will  take  advantage  of  it  and  go 
off  with  their  property.  Our  citizens  have  a  right  to 
go  where  they  please,  and  it  is  the  business  of  the 
states  to  stop  them  till  their  debts  are  paid.  This 
done,  I  wish  100,000  of  our  inhabitants  would  accept 
the  invitation.  It  may  be  the  means  of  delivering  to 
us  peaceably  what  may  otherwise  cost  a  war.  In  the 
meantime  we  may  complain  of  this  seduction  of  our 
inhabitants,  just  enough  to  make  them  believe  we  see 
it  a  very  wise  policy  for  them,  and  confirm  them  in  it, 
this  is  my  idea  of  it."^^ 

In  1793  it  seemed  possible  to  combine  the  commer- 
cial and  territorial  demands  of  the  Americans  with  the 
universal  revolutionary  propaganda  of  Brissot  de  War- 
ville  and  his  fellow  Girondists.  The  new  French  min- 
ister Genet  was  the  agent  selected  to  make  the  com- 
bination. Thomas  Paine  in  the  name  of  recently  nat- 
uralized French  citizens ;  Pierre  Lyonnet  for  his  fel- 
low Creoles  of  Louisiana ;  Clark  and  O'Fallon  in  be- 
half of  the  western   frontiersmen,  assured  him  that 

ett,   History  of  Alabama,   II,   114;   Revist'a  de  los  Archivos, 
May-June,  1914,  359-361. 

33  Jefiferson  to  Washington,  Apr.  2,  1791,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  5,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    2$ 

they  were  ready  to  cooperate  in  overthrowing  Spanish 
rule  in  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas.  Hoping  to  secure 
the  latter  from  France  as  a  reward  for  quiescence,  Jef- 
ferson now  directed  our  minister,  Carmichael,  not  to 
guarantee  the  Spanish  colonies  west  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  in  his  personal  relations  with  Genet  failed  to  main- 
tain the  rigid  neutrality  that  Washington  prescribed.^** 
He,  too,  was  playing  with  fire  to  gain  his  coveted  end. 
Lacking  resources  and  the  ability  to  organize  his 
heterogeneous  volunteers,  even  with  Jefferson's  clan- 
destine aid,  Genet  at  Philadelphia  failed  to  overcome 
the  administration's  neutral  policy.  In  the  West,  Wil- 
kinson opposed  his  projects  and  thereby  measurably 
justified  the  continuance  of  his  Spanish  pension.  But 
from  New  Orleans  Governor  Carondelet,  distrusting 
denizen  and  defenses  alike,  vainly  attempted  to  revive 
among  the  Kentuckians  the  project  of  separating  the 
West  from  the  Union. ^^  They  were  beginning  to  feel 
an  increased  respect  for  the  new  national  government 
and  hoped  to  realize  their  aspirations  through  its  reg- 
ular channels.      Fauchet's   proclamation,^^    therefore, 

3*  Turner,  "  The  Policy  of  France  toward  the  Mississippi 
Valley  in  the  Period  of  Washington  and  Adams,"  in  Ameri- 
can Historical  Review,  X,  261-264. 

3^  Gayoso  to  Alcudia,  Sept.  19,  1794,  in  American  Historical 
Association,  Annual  Report,  1896,  p.  1081 ;  Carondelet  to  Al- 
cudia, July  30,  1794,  ibid.,  1069. 

3^  Quoted  in  Mangourit  Correspondence,  No.  39,  in  Ameri- 
can Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1897,  629. 


26   DEFINITION   AND  DELIMITATION   OF  WEST  FLORIDA 

disavowing  his  predecessor's  filibustering  projects,  fell 
upon  receptive  ears. 

The  diplomatic  relations  of  the  United  States  with 
Spain  had  advanced  but  little  during  the  preceding 
decade.  The  so'uthern  boundary  was  still  unsettled  and 
the  western  settlers  were  without  the  privilege  of  navi- 
gating the  Mississippi.  By  this  time  the  Indian  situa- 
tion had  become  acute.  Washington,  out  of  patience 
with  the  double-dealing  McGillivray,  was  on  the  point 
of  declaring  war  against  the  Creeks.  Before  doing  so 
he  determined  to  make  one  more  attempt  to  settle  all 
outstanding  questions  with  Spain.  For  this  purpose 
he  made  use  of  a  significant  feature  of  our  early  diplo- 
macy— the  special  mission.  William  Short,  our  min- 
ister to  Holland,  was  associated  with  Carmichael  in  a 
fresh  attempt  to  overcome  Bourbon  hostility  and  delay. 
The  American  claim  to  the  Natchez  district,  Jefferson 
informed  the  joint  envoys,  was  based  on  the  prelim- 
inary treaty  with  Great  Britain ;  that  of  Spain,  on  con- 
quest. The  inchoate  right  of  the  latter  nation  was  not 
confirmed  by  formal  treaty  until  some  months  after 
the  American  pact  with  Great  Britain.  Hence  the 
American  claim  took  precedence.  He  also  naively  in- 
structed his  representatives  to  deny  the  secret  article 
in  the  preliminary  treaty  by  which  the  Americans  had 
agreed,  under  certain  conditions,  to  accept  the  Yazoo 
line,  or  to  discuss  it  only  hypothetically.  What  the 
United  States  might  do  for  Great  Britain  after  a  long 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    27 

war  could  not  be  used  as  a  precedent  for  her  action 
toward  Spain  under  more  favorable  circumstances. 
Moreover,  the  new  constitution  of  the  United  States 
guaranteed  the  territory  of  each  State,  and  only  a  dis- 
astrous war  could  change  this  fact.  He  based  the 
American  territorial  claim  on  the  Carolina  Charter  of 
1663,  the  Royal  Proclamation  of  1763,  and  the  prelim- 
inary and  final  treaties  with  Great  Britain.  But  in 
connection  with  the  proclamation  he  disregarded  one 
very  essential  point — the  source  line  limiting  the  east- 
ern colonies. 

Jefiferson  founded  the  American  claim  to  navigate 
the  Mississippi  on  the  treaties  of  1763  and  1783  and 
on  natural  right.  Under  the  earlier  treaty  the  British 
colonists  had  the  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi. 
They  had  now  become  American  citizens,  but  had  not 
relinquished  this  right,  nor  had  Spain  conquered  it 
from  the  United  States,  with  whom  she  had  never 
been  at  war.  Great  Britain  yielded  the  Floridas  to 
Spain,  it  is  true,  but  she  did  not  thereby  yield  a  privi- 
lege which  belonged  to  the  United  States.  Aside  from 
our  treaty  rights,  Jefferson  asserted  that  the  inhabi- 
tants on  the  upper  course  of  the  river  had  the  right  to 
pass  in  and  out  of  its  mouth.  In  support  of  this  view 
he  cited  the  case  of  Antwerp  on  the  Scheldt  and 
those  rivers  of  Spain  which  flowed  through  Portugal.^'^ 

37  This  principle  was  not  definitely  recognized  in  European 
diplomacy  until  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815.  Cf.  W.  E. 
Hall,  International  Law  (sixth  edition),  131-140. 


28   DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA 

An  additional  argument  in  favor  of  the  American 
claim  was  the  fact  that  our  population  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  its  tributaries  surpassed  that  of  Spain.  He 
quoted  from  Roman  law  to  prove  that  the  navigation 
of  rivers  was  a  public  privilege.  The  right  to  navi- 
gate also  implied  the  means  to  exercise  it,  and  this 
meant  a  place  to  deposit  and  transship  goods  from 
river-craft  to  ocean-going  vessels.  These  rights  of 
navigation  and  deposit,  as  well  as  our  claim  to  the 
thirty-first  parallel,  were  to  be  regarded  as  a  sine  qua 
non,  for  which  Spain  could  not  expect  compensation.^* 
When  Short  reached  Madrid  in  February,  1793, 
Spain,  at  war  with  France  and  allied  with  Great 
Britain,  was  unwilling  to  treat  with  our  envoys.  Her 
own  representative  was  the  inflexible  Gardoqui,  now 
secretary  of  finance,  and  he  was  as  little  inclined  to 
yield  upon  the  points  at  issue  as  he  had  been  with  Jay 
some  years  before.  Nor  were  the  Americans  more 
successful  with  Godoy,  the  Duke  of  Alcudia.  After 
some  months  of  fruitless  endeavor,  Carmichael  quitted 
Madrid  in  disgust.^®  Short  continued  as  charge,  al- 
most unnoticed.  The  Spaniards  tried  through  him  to 
reopen  negotiations  with  France,  but  to  no  purpose. 
He  then  suggested  a  descent  of  the  Mississippi  or  an 

38  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I,  252-255. 

39  Ibid.,  259  ff. ;  Dispatches  of  William  Short,  MS.,  Ill,  No. 
168,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    29 

invasion  of  the  Floridas  to  bring  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment to  terms.*° 

About  this  time  the  Spanish  representatives  in  Phila- 
delphia intimated  that  the  United  States  needed  in 
Madrid  a  minister  of  the  requisite  "  character,  conduct, 
and  splendor,  with  full  powers  to  treat  on  all  subjects 
at  issue."  Edmund  Randolph,  then  secretary  of  state, 
was  thoroughly  impressed  with  the  idea,  and  secured 
the  appointment  of  Thomas  Pinckney,  our  minister  at 
London,  as  special  envoy .*^  Both  Monroe  and  Thomas 
Paine,  who  had  been  instrumental  in  bringing  Spain 
and  France  together,  believed  that  the  French  Direc- 
tory was  ready  to  assist  in  pressing  the  American 
claims.  But  all  evidences  of  French  friendliness  dis- 
appeared on  news  of  Jay's  treaty  with  England.  Marks 
of  open  displeasure  followed  when  Pinckney  passed 
through  Paris  without  giving  the  Directory,  or  even 
Monroe,  any  inkhng  of  its  terms.*^ 

Nevertheless  the  fates  were  working  to  favor  the 
Americans.  Spain  could  not  become  friendly  with 
France  without  incurring  the  hostility  of  Great  Britain. 
Accordingly  their  officials  did  not  wish  to  add  the 
United  States  to  the  number  of  their  avowed  enemies. 

4"  Dispatches  of  Short,  MS.,  Ill,  No.  183,  Bureau  of  In- 
dexes and  Archives. 

*i  Randolph  to  Washington,  Oct.  10,  1794,  Miscellaneous 
Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  17,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

42  Monroe,  A  View  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Executive,  203; 
American  Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1903,  II,  580. 


30  DEFINITION   AND  DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA 

Yet  for  a  time  they  resorted  to  their  customary  meth- 
ods of  delay,  among  which  the  periodical  migration 
of  the  Spanish  court  to  the  Escorial  was  not  the  least 
trying.  Pinckney  also  found  himself  handicapped  by 
a  lack  of  definite  instructions.  When  Godoy  began  to 
review  the  questions  at  issue  Pinckney  refused  to  dis- 
cuss them  in  detail  or  treat  of  them  separately.  The 
only  point  that  seemed  to  cause  serious  difficulty  was 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  Finding  that  Godoy 
was  again  inclined  to  temporize,  Pinckney  promptly 
asked  for  his  passports.  This  forced  the  Spaniard  to 
yield  to  his  demands.*^  By  so  doing,  as  his  enemies 
later  charged,  Godoy  sacrificed  all  the  advantages 
gained  from  Great  Britain  in  1783.  Yet  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, it  is  hard  to  see  what  else  Godoy  could  do. 
It  was  impossible  to  restrain  the  Americans  any 
longer;  and  if  they  had  once  begun  hostilities  against 
Spain,  New  Orleans  and  all  of  the  Floridas  must  have 
passed  into  their  possession  so  much  the  earlier.  Un- 
der these  circumstances  the  treaty  of  1795  was  signed^ 
Spain  accepted  the  thirty-first  parallel  as  the  northern 
boundary  of  the  Floridas,  conceded  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  with  New  Orleans  as  a  place  of  de- 
posit, and  agreed  to  restrain  the  Indians  within  her 
jurisdiction. 

Godoy's  signature  was  no  assurance  that  he  would 
be  prompt  in  carrying  out  the  terms  of  the  treaty.     In 

43  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I,  542-546. 


DEFINITION    AND   DELIMITATION    OF   WEST   FLORIDA    3I 

the  course  of  a  few  months  he  perceived  that,  despite 
the  Jay  treaty,  the  United  States  and  England  were 
not  likely  to  become  allies.  By  this  time  he  had 
brought  about  that  agreement  with  France  which 
gained  for  him  his  most  significant  title — the  Prince 
of  the  Peace.  France  desired  to  regain  Louisiana, 
and  with  it,  as  much  of  the  territory  formerly  included 
in  that  jurisdiction  as  could  be  forced  from  the  United 
States.  Godoy,  therefore,  vainly  attempted  to  gain 
French  favor  by  retaining  certain  posts  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Mississippi.  For  more  than  two  years 
after  signing  the  treaty  he  found  one  pretext  after 
another  for  delaying  its  fulfilment.  But  when,  early 
in  1798,  French  influence  temporarily  forced  him  from 
office,  he  issued  the  necessary  orders  for  carrying  out 
the  treaty.  By  this  act  he  completed  the  period  of 
delimitation  in  West  Florida. 


CHAPTER  II 
The  Occupation  of  the  Natchez  District 

Nearly  a  score  of  years  before  the  treaty  signed  at 
San  Lorenzo  el  Real  in  1795  the  Americans  had  cast 
envious  eyes  upon  the  Floridas.  Later  military  re- 
verses and  financial  necessities  caused  them  to  moder- 
ate their  desires  to  the  limits  of  the  former  British 
grant  and  proclamation.  The  mother-country  acqui- 
esced in  this  modified  claim,  possibly  with  the  inten- 
tion of  embroiling  her  former  colonists  with  the  Span- 
iards and  profiting  from  the  ensuing  conflict.  But, 
fortunately,  the  trend  of  affairs  in  Europe  after  1789 
and  the  waxing  power  of  Washington's  administra- 
tion combined  to  favor  the  new  nation.  However  un- 
acceptable their  cause,  Pinckney  at  the  Escorial  and 
Jay  at  the  Court  of  St.  James  scored  distinct  triumphs  ; 
and  of  the  two  Pinckney 's  was  by  far  the  more  strik- 
ing. His  treaty  guaranteed  the  possession  of  certain 
posts  and  probably  immunity  from  Indian  warfare,  as 
did  Jay's,  and  in  addition  carried  with  it  the  formal 
acknowledgment  of  a  territorial  claim  and  the  coveted 
privilege  of  navigating  the  Mississippi. 

It  is  reasonable  to  assert  that  this  treaty  did  more 
than  the  military  demonstration  against  the  whiskey 

32 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  33 

insurgents  to  reconcile  the  West  to  the  national  admin- 
istration and  to  overthrow  the  intrigues  of  the  Span- 
ish conspirators.  While  it  did  not  render  acceptable 
their  remaining  limited  commercial  subserviency  to  a 
foreign  nation,  the  men  of  the  western  waters  were 
content  to  put  up  with  it  for  a  term  of  years,  being 
fully  persuaded  that  the  Natchez  district  represented 
but  the  first  step  toward  New  Orleans  and  the  Flor- 
idas.  It  was  because  Godoy  feared  this  that  he  de- 
layed the  carrying  out  of  the  treaty.  But  his  formal 
protest  was  directed  against  a  possible  invasion  by  his 
recent  allies — the  British — reinforced  by  the  American 
frontiersmen. 

Per  contra  the  American  government  hastened  to 
secure  the  advantages  now  opened  to  its  citizens. 
After  the  formal  ratification  of  the  treaty,  April  26, 
1796,  Andrew  Ellicott  and  Thomas  Freeman  were 
appointed  to  represent  the  United  States  in  running 
the  southern  boundary.^  But  Ellicott's  task  was  by  no 
means  restricted  to  the  stipulated  line  of  demarcation. 
In  addition  to  his  formal  instructions  he  was  verbally 
advised  to  watch  Wilkinson,  whose  intrigues  had  long 
since  given  rise  to  damaging  reports.^  Conditions  at 
Natchez  might  cause  him  to  assume  indefinite  political 
functions.     Thus  his  was  a  semi-diplomatic  mission, 

1  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  21,  Bureau  of  Indexes 
and  Archives. 

2  Annals  of  Eleventh  Congress,  First  and  Second  Sessions, 
Pt.  2,  2306. 

4 


34  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

destined  to  exert  considerable  influence  in  the  South- 
west. As  such  it  may  be  compared  to  Casa  Calvo's 
career  in  New  Orleans  after  the  Louisiana  Purchase.^ 
The  Quaker  certainly  rivalled  the  Marques  in  finesse, 
while  the  fates  were  much  more  propitious  toward 
him. 

The  Spanish  authorities  in  Louisiana  displayed  no 
intention  of  assisting  EUicott  in  his  ostensible  mission. 
The  Baron  de  Carondelet  attempted  another  intrigue 
with  Wilkinson,  although  he  believed  the  latter  was 
ready  to  turn  against  the  Spaniards  in  order  to  gain 
favor  with  the  American  authorities.*  More  impor- 
tant than  this  tampering  with  the  loyalty  of  the  Amer- 
ican commander  was  Carondelet's  determination  to  de- 
lay the  evacuation  of  the  posts  above  the  thirty-first 
parallel.  If  it  was  necessary  to  yield  these  posts  he 
suggested  the  possibility  of  moving  the  inhabitants 
below  the  new  boundary  line,  where  they  might  serve 
to  guard  the  other  royal  possessions  against  both  the 
Americans  and  Indians.  For  the  present,  however,  if 
the  people  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  were  allowed 
to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  they  would  not  become 
impatient  over  the  delay  in  surrendering  the  posts,  nor 

3  See  p.  147. 

4  See  my  article  on  "  Wilkinson's  First  Break  with  the 
Spaniards,"  in  Eighth  Annual  Report  of  the  Ohio  Valley  His- 
torical Association,  49,  51 ;  printed  in  Biennial  Report  of  the 
Department  of  Archives  and  History  of  the  State  of  West 
Virginia,  1911-1914. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  35 

would  they  assist  their  government  in  capturing  them. 
Furthermore  he  expected  them  within  a  few  years  to 
separate  from  the  Union,  and  then  they  would  be 
glad  to  have  these  forts  in  possession  of  the  Spaniards, 
rather  than  of  the  Americans. 

According  to  the  Spanish  governor,  the  treaty  af- 
forded many  pretexts  for  disputes,  each  of  which 
would  require  months  for  settlement.  Thus  His  Maj- 
esty would  have  an  opportunity  to  temporize  for  two 
or  three  years  over  the  evacuation  without  exposing 
Spain  to  any  disadvantage.^  A  few  days  later,  his 
subordinate  at  Natchez,  Gayoso  de  Lemos,  told  Daniel 
Clark  that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties intended  to  carry  out  the  treaty  with  the  United 
States.  Evidently  Gayoso's  utterance  was  inspired, 
for  like  his  chief  he  expressed  a  belief  in  an  early  dis- 
solution of  the  Union.^  The  Indians  objected  to  the 
presence  of  the  Americans,  and  this  afforded  the  Span- 
ish officials  a  strong  pretext  for  disregarding  the  pro- 
posed boundary  line. 

s  Carondelet  to  Alcudia,  reservado  No.  70,  June  12,  1796, 
Legajo  178,  Papeles  de  Cuba.  This  collection,  the  most  im- 
portant single  source  for  this  work,  is  located  in  the  Archivo 
General  de  Indias,  Seville.  For  a  description  of  the  papers 
in  this  collection  relating  to  the  United  States,  see  Roscoe  R. 
Hill's  "  Descriptive  catalogue  of  the  Documents  relating  to  the 
History  of  the  United  States  in  the  Papeles  Procedentes  de 
Cuba  deposited  in  the  Archive  General  de  Indias  at  Seville  " — 
Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington,  1916. 

^  Annals  of  Tenth  Congress,  First  Session,  II,  App.  2730. 


36  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

Some  two  months  later,  Carondelet  sent  Gayoso  a 
very  secret  dispatch  in  which  he  said  that  it  was  in- 
dispensable to  seek  pretexts  for  deferring  until  De- 
cember the  evacuation  of  the  posts.  By  that  time  they 
might  learn  the  king's  resolution  in  regard  to  the 
Natchez  settlers  and  the  complaints  of  the  Indians. 
Gayoso  must  act  so  as  to  afiford  the  Americans  no 
opportunity  for  complaint,  and  while  expressing  the 
greatest  desire  to  carry  out  the  treaty,  find  obstacles 
to  prevent  it.  If  the  American  commissioner  arrived 
by  way  of  the  Ohio,  the  military  authorities  along  the 
Mississippi  were  to  detain  him.  If  he  came  by  sea  to 
New  Orleans  Carondelet  himself  would  do  so,  under 
pretense  of  preparing  his  escort.  Having  delayed 
him  until  September  or  later,  they  could  then  point  out 
the  impossibility  of  evacuating  the  upper  forts  on  ac- 
count of  low  water.  While  this  condition  lasted,  he 
could  not  withdraw  the  garrisons  from  the  lower  posts 
and  leave  the  upper  ones  defenseless.  This  would 
provide  a  plausible  reason  for  not  evacuating  the  forts 
until  January.  Then  Carondelet  planned  to  question 
the  ability  of  the  United  States  to  pacify  the  Indians 
within  its  limits.  This  task  presented  so  many  diffi- 
culties that  Spain  would  be  justified  in  not  ceding  the 
territory  without  more  explicit  assurances.  Gayoso, 
prompt  to  take  the  cue  from  his  superior,  feared  that 
he  would  be  unable  to  equip  a  party  for  the  work  of 
surveying.     The  people  of  the  Natchez  district  had 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  37 

been  permitted  to  extend  the  period  of  payment  for 
their  lands.  The  approaching  transfer  might  inter- 
fere with  this  arrangement,  and  cause  some  inconveni- 
ence. He  wrote  in  November  that  the  Indians  near 
Fort  Confederation'^  were  greatly  excited  over  the 
prospect  that  Americans  might  run  a  line  through  their 
territory.  They  knew  what  this  had  meant  for  other 
Indians,  and  objected  to  the  Spaniards'  taking  any 
part  in  the  survey  or  delivering  the  territory  to  the 
Americans.^  These  officials  certainly  found  no  dearth 
of  pretexts  for  delaying  to  execute  the  treaty. 

Contemporary  events  in  the  West  favored  their  de- 
signs. The  British  authorities  in  Canada  began  to 
cultivate  cordial  relations  with  the  western  settlers  and 
with  the  Indians,  with  a  view  to  using  them  in  an 
expedition  against  upper  Louisiana.  At  the  same  time 
Senator  William  Blount  of  Tennessee  planned  to  in- 
vade the  Floridas  and  Louisiana.  He  feared  the  loss 
of  his  extensive  land  holdings  should  the  French  be- 
come established  in  New  Orleans,  and  expected  to  in- 
duce the  western  frontiersmen  and  the  Indians  to  co- 
operate with  a  British  fleet  in  attacking  the  Spanish 
posts  on  the  Gulf.     But  the  mutual  antagonism  of 

^  On  the  site  of  the  French  Ft.  Tombecbe  on  the  Tombig- 
bee  River. 

s  Carondelet  to  Gayoso,  Aug.  23,  1796,  Gayoso  to  Caronde- 
let,  Aug.  31,  1796,  Gayoso  to  Carondelet,  Nov.  14,  1796,  Legajo 
43,  Papeles  de  Cuba ;  Houck,  The  Spanish  Regime  in  Mis- 
souri, II,  139. 


38  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

his  prospective  forces  rendered  such  an  undertaking 
extremely  problematical. 

John  D.  Chisholm,  long  a  resident  in  the  Indian 
country,  was  Blount's  chief  agent.  The  British  min- 
ister, Liston,  stated  that  Chisholm  had  promised  to 
deliver  the  Floridas  to  Great  Britain  through  the  aid 
of  his  friends  near  the  border.  The  premature  reve- 
lation of  the  plot  caused  the  British  government 
promptly  to  disavow  all  responsibility  for  Liston's 
statement.  Chisholm's  employer  resigned  his  seat  in 
the  United  States  Senate,''  following  a  demand  of  the 
Spanish  minister  for  his  punishment,  and  thus  escaped 
impeachment.  Before  this  event,  however,  he  seems 
to  have  interested  Vice-President  Jefferson  and  Gen- 
eral Wilkinson  in  his  scheme,  and  to  have  involved 
them  so  thoroughly  that  Jefferson  was  long  subject  to 
Wilkinson's  influence."  Aside  from  this  incident,  the 
main  result  of  this  conspiracy  was  to  arouse  the  Span- 
ish authorities  to  unwonted  activity  in  protecting  their 
dominions,  and  to  justify  them  in  retaining  the  forts 
above  the  thirty-first  parallel. 

Timothy  Pickering,  the  secretary  of  state,  regarded 
the  whole  affair  as  part  of  the  French  plan  to  regain 
Louisiana.  The  French  ministers,  Fauchet  and  Adet, 
certainly  did  nothing  to  disprove  the  charge.     Both 

^American  Historical  Review,  X,  576,  582;  Quarterly  of  the 
Texas  State  Historical  Association,  X,  65. 

10  Eighth  Annual  Report  of  the  Ohio  Valley  Historical  As- 
sociation, 53. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  39 

opposed  war  with  the  United  States,  but  beheved  that 
by  possessing  Louisiana,  France  could  exert  the  proper 
influence  on  American  affairs.  Adet  employed  a 
French  officer,  Victor  Collot,  to  visit  the  western 
country  and  plan  its  military  defense.  Collot's  visit 
took  place  during  the  Blount  conspiracy,  against  which 
he  warned  the  various  Spanish  commandants.  More- 
over he  assured  Adet  that  the  same  nation  must  pos- 
sess both  banks  of  the  Mississippi."  In  view  of  the 
French  plan  to  reoccupy  Louisiana,  this  suggestion 
had  a  sinister  meaning  for  the  American  holdings  in 
the  West. 

Other  French  agents  besides  Collot  aroused  Ameri- 
can distrust.  One  Samuel  Fulton,  an  American  in  the 
service  of  the  Directory,  visited  George  Rogers  Clark, 
confirmed  him  in  his  French  sentiment,  and  enlisted 
him  against  the  British  project.^^  Fulton  also  endeav- 
ored to  enlist  the  Creek  Indians  in  the  French  serv- 
ice. At  the  same  time  another  French  adventurer, 
Milfort,  representing  the  former  McGillivray  faction, 
was  planning  to  organize  the  Creeks  against  the  Amer- 
icans and  to  use  their  country  as  a  foothold  from 
which    the    French    might    later    regain    Louisiana.^^ 

^^  Collot,  A  Journey  in  North  America,  etc.,  II,  230-245, 
257;  American  Historical  Review,  X,  272,  577-582.  Wilkinson 
later  emphasizes  this  same  idea  in  his  letter  of  July  6,  1803,  to 
Secretary  Dearborn,  Letters  Received,  MS.,  War  Department. 

12  American  Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1903, 
II,  1098. 

13  American  Historical  Review,  X,  271. 


40  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ   DISTRICT 

Thus  while  the  Spaniards  delayed  in  delivering  the 
Natchez  district  to  the  Americans,  English  and  French 
agents  in  the  Southwest  were  plotting  against  each 
other  and  against  the  United  States ;  and  our  own  offi- 
cials, such  as  Blount  and  Wilkinson,  tried  to  turn  the 
general  turmoil  and  uncertainty  to  their  personal  ad- 
vantage. 

In  his  journey  to  Natchez,  Ellicott  encountered 
many  evidences  of  the  forces  working  against  the 
treaty.  Philip  Nolan  joined  him  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Ohio.  The  Spanish  commandants  at  New  Madrid, 
Chickasaw  BlufTs,  and  Walnut  Hills  affected  ignor- 
ance of  the  treaty  and  attempted  to  detain  him.  Elli- 
cott nowhere  indicates  that  these  two  circumstances 
bore  any  relation  to  each  other.  Yet  Nolan  was  the 
confidential  agent  of  Wilkinson,  against  whom  Ellicott 
had  been  warned.  On  this  occasion,  however,  Nolan 
proved  extremely  useful  in  dealing  with  the  Spanish 
officers  along  the  route  and  in  approaching  Gayoso.^* 
Within  two  days  after  arriving  at  Natchez,  where 
the  commandant  received  them  with  a  great  show  of 
cordiality,  Ellicott  learned  that  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties had  no  intention  of  evacuating  the  posts  as  stipu- 
le The  source  for  Ellicott's  career  at  Natchez  is  his  Journal 
(Phila.,  1803),  supplemented  by  his  correspondence  with  the 
State  Department,  in  Ellicott  and  the  Southern  Boundary, 
MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library.  For  the  relations  of  Elli- 
cott and  Nolan  with  the  Spaniards,  cf.  Quarterly  of  the 
Texas  State  Historical  Association,  X,  53-55. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  4I 

lated.  At  the  same  time  they  seemed  disposed  to  graYit 
free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  This  concession 
was  Hkely  to  prove  illusory,  for  if  Louisiana  soon 
passed  under  control  of  the  French,  as  seemed  certain, 
the  latter  might  use  their  superior  resources  to  close 
that  river  and  bring  about  the  separation  of  the  western 
communities  from  the  Union. 

It  was  precisely  because  he  feared  such  a  result  that 
Ellicott  insisted  on  beginning  the  boundary  survey  at 
once.  Failing  to  persuade  Gayoso,  he  strove,  as  he 
later  confessed,  so  "to  embarass  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment "  as  to  force  the  abandonment  of  the  Natchez  dis- 
trict. Although  not  a  Houston  or  a  Fremont,  he 
played  a  similar  part  in  American  expansion.  Find- 
ing himself  upon  disputed  territory  which  his  govern- 
ment greatly  desired ;  surrounded  by  an  unsettled  pop- 
ulation, most  of  whose  elements  were  eager  for  Amer- 
ican control ;  facing  officials  of  an  expiring  regime,  de- 
termined to  make  a  last  despairing  effort  to  hold  the 
coveted  territory,  he  furthered  every  effort  to  stimu- 
late a  revolt  against  the  Spaniards.  The  resulting  in- 
surrection was  a  bloodless  one,  but  it  was  none  the  less 
effective.  Thus  the  Natchez  district  served  as  a  proto- 
type for  West  Florida,  as  that  region  in  turn  did  for 
Texas  and  California. 

In  furthering  his  design  Ellicott  from  the  first  dis- 
played the  American  flag  over  his  camp,  contrary  to 
the  request  of  the  Spaniards.     Against  their  wish  he 


42  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

brought  the  mihtary  escort  under  Lieutenant  Pope  to 
Natchez,  and  united  it  with  his  own  company  in  a  for- 
tified camp  of  considerable  strength.  He  encouraged 
visits  from  the  "  inquiet  spirits  "  of  the  neighborhood, 
among  them  Thomas  Green,  already  a  marked  man 
because  of  his  part  in  the  attempt  to  organize  Bourbon 
County ;  and  encouraged  those  who  were  dissatisfied 
to  petition  for  leave  to  migrate  to  the  upper  American 
territory.  By  arousing  undue  expectations  among  the 
Choctaws,  he  detached  them  from  Spanish  allegiance, 
so  that  they  gave  him  no  difficulty  when  he  ran  the 
line  through  their  territory.  In  all  of  this  he  exceeded 
his  instructions  and  created  the  impression  with  some 
American  officials  that  he  was  a  blundering  busybody. 
Doubtless  he  magnified  his  services,  but  honest  mo- 
tives inspired  them,  and  in  the  end  crowned  with  a 
modest  measure  of  success  his  "  Quaker  conquest." 

His  opponent,  Gayoso,  was  not  backward  in  his  at- 
tempts to  retaliate ;  but  he  represented  a  losing  cause. 
He  tried  to  separate  Ellicott  from  his  escort  and  get 
him  down  the  river,  but  the  surveyor  refused  to  be 
enticed  away  from  his  point  of  vantage.  He  sug- 
gested to  the  landed  proprietors  that  their  titles  would 
be  unsettled  under  American  control,  especially  where 
there  was  a  conflict  between  former  English  and  Span- 
ish grants  and  the  claim  of  Georgia.  He  also  at- 
tempted to  attract  the  debtor  class  by  promising  the 
remission  of  crop  liens.     His  proclamation  of  March 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  43 

29  mentioning  these  points,  as  well  as  his  attitude  to- 
ward religious  worship  and  the  Indians,  repelled  as 
many  as  it  attracted.  Those  who  had  been  "impru- 
dently warm"  in  declaring  their  preference  for  the 
American  government  felt  that  they  had  thereby  fa- 
tally compromised  themselves.^' 

At  this  time,  reinforced  by  a  royal  order  of  October 
29,  1796,  Gayoso  began  to  ask  whether  the  forts  be- 
low the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  were  to  be  demolished 
or  delivered  intact.  This  v/as  obviously  another  pre- 
text to  delay  the  evacuation,  but  he  quoted  Caronde- 
let's  order  to  retain  possession  until  their  governments 
should  settle  this  point.  Ellicott  believed  that  the 
other  did  not  intend  to  give  them  up  at  all.  Yet  he 
rejected  Green's  offer  to  raise  a  hundred  men  and  cap- 
ture the  forts,  and  Anthony  Hutchins's  proposal  to 
make  a  hostage  of  Gayoso.  Hutchins  seemed  too  in- 
timate with  one  of  Blount's  agents  and  too  closely  iden- 
tified with  British  interests  to  gain  Ellicott's  confidence. 

In  April,  1797,  Carondelet  instructed  Gayoso  to  as- 
sume a  firmer  tone  in  his  dealings  with  Ellicott,  should 
he  find  that  the  Spanish  party  at  Natchez  was  more 
powerful  than  the  American.  He  should  refuse  to 
evacuate  the  forts,  restrict  the  number  of  Ellicott's 
escort,  and  forbid  the  approach  of  the  remaining 
American  soldiers.     In  case  Ellicott  continued  his  in- 

15  Riley,  "  Transition  from  Spanish  Rule,"  in  Publications 
of  the  Mississippi  Historical  Society,  III,  261  ff. 


44  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

trigues  or  attempted  to  exercise  private  jurisdiction 
while  the  territory  was  under  Spanish  control,  Gayoso 
was  to  escort  him  courteously  to  New  Orleans,  and  re- 
press with  force  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  resi- 
dents or  soldiers  to  prevent  this  act.  If,  however,  the 
American  party  should  prove  the  stronger,  Gayoso 
was  not  to  risk  an  attack  at  Natchez.  He  should  de- 
stroy the  fort  there  and  abandon  that  at  Walnut  Hills, 
after  withdrawing  the  artillery  from  both.  This  ac- 
tion would  establish  a  basis  for  later  claims  against 
the  American  government.  As  Ellicott  was  now  act- 
ing with  greater  caution,  Gayoso  replied  that  if  Caron- 
delet  could  secretly  send  more  troops,  he  would  be  able 
to  delay  the  evacuation  and  keep  order  in  the  district. 
Early  in  May  Gayoso  brought  Blount's  conspiracy 
and  the  allied  Canadian  expedition  against  Upper  Lou- 
isiana to  Ellicott's  attention.  These  afforded  other 
reasons  for  holding  the  forts  along  the  Mississippi  and 
suspending  the  boundary  survey.  It  would  be  neces- 
sary to  await  assurance  from  the  American  govern- 
ment that  it  would  not  permit  the  British  to  violate  its 
neutrality.  Ellicott  worded  his  protest  against  this 
decision  so  as  to  convey  the  impression  that  Gayoso 
and  his  colleagues  hoped  by  delay  to  court  favor  with 
the  French,  the  prospective  owners  of  Louisiana.  This 
would  compromise  the  Spaniard  with  the  people  of 
Natchez.  But  Gayoso  repelled  the  charge  with  dig- 
nity.    At  the  same  time  Ellicott  advised  the  secretary 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  45 

of  war  that  there  could  be  no  lasting  peace  as  long 
as  the  Spaniards  remained  east  of  the  Mississippi. 

Meanwhile  at  New  Orleans  Carondelet  was  telling 
Nolan  that  he  was  determined  to  suppress  the  trouble 
brewing  up  the  river  by  a  judicious  use  of  lead  and 
hemp.  For  the  purpose  he  had  already  issued  orders 
to  assemble  twelve  hundred  men  at  Baton  Rouge. 
He  now  asked  Nolan,  who  was  a  favorite  of  his,  if  he 
wished  to  take  part  in  the  expedition,  and  received 
positive  assurance  that  he  did.  Yet  the  American 
kept  Ellicott  informed  of  these  proceedings,  through 
the  younger  Clark,  and  thus  enabled  the  commissioner 
to  counteract  Carondelet's  plans  and  "turn  his  weap- 
ons upon  himself."  By  this  course  the  double-deal- 
ing Nolan  exposed  himself  to  great  peril;  but  his  as- 
sociates carefully  concealed  his  agency,  and  Ellicott 
at  least  conceived  a  high  opinion  of  his  ability  and 
patriotism. 

President  Adams's  determined  attitude  toward 
France  so  aroused  the  American  contingent  at  Natchez 
that  they  formed  a  plan  to  add  to  the  Union  "  the  two 
Floridas  with  the  Island  of  New  Orleans,"  in  case  the 
Spaniards  began  hostilities,  or  permitted  the  French  to 
move  through  their  territory.  From  the  caution  with 
which  this  affair  was  managed,  together  with  the  num- 
ber, character,  and  resources  of  its  leaders,  Ellicott  be- 
lieved that  it  would  have  met  with  instant  success.  In 
a  letter  he  states :  "  Nothing  was  left  undone  through 


46  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

confidential  channels  to  embarrass  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment in  this  country  till  the  military  authority,  (which 
was  all  they  had)  was  aboHshed  in  the  district  of 
Natchez,  after  which  it  was  not  worth  holding ;  and  if 
Baron  de  Carondelet  had  persevered  in  his  calling  to- 
gether the  mihtia  at  Baton  Rouge,  our  plans  were  in 
such  forwardness  that  the  whole  country  east  of  the 
Mississippi  would  certainly  have  been  in  our  posses- 
sion in  less  than  six  weeks. "^® 

Aside  from  military  preparations  to  checkmate  the 
Americans,  Carondelet  determined  to  make  a  final  ap- 
peal to  Wilkinson  and  the  other  disunionists.  Ac- 
cordingly on  the  26th  of  May,  1797,  he  commanded 
Thomas  Power  to  carry  a  message  to  Wilkinson  in  re- 
gard to  postponing  the  delivery  of  the  forts.  This 
was  the  ostensible  motive  for  Pov/er's  journey,  but 
his  true  purpose  was  to  stir  up  the  separatists  in  Ken- 
tucky. In  conferring  with  the  various  leaders  of  that 
State  and  with  Wilkinson,  he  was  to  offer  them  $100,- 
000  immediately,  and  another  $100,000  together  with 
twenty  field  guns  and  other  munitions,  as  soon  as  they 
began  the  projected  revolution.  Carondelet  had  not 
written  to  Wilkinson  for  fear  of  compromising  him 
since  Power's  unsatisfactory  interview  of  the  previous 
year.     Now  the  threatening  perils  led  him  once  more 

I''  Ellicott  to  Secretary  of  State,  Jan.  10,  1799,  Ellicott  and 
the  Southern  Boundary,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  47 

to  appeal  to  Wilkinson's  former  Spanish  predilection." 
Power  accordingly  left  New  Orleans  and  reached 
Natchez  early  in  June,  1797.  There  Gayoso  furnished 
him  with  money  for  his  expenses,  and  with  additional 
letters  for  Wilkinson.  The  agent  endeavored  to  per- 
suade Elhcott  to  come  down  to  New  Orleans,  and 
assured  him  that  the  difficulty  over  the  treaty  would 
be  settled  within  a  month  or  so.  But  Ellicott  already 
knew  of  Power's  mission  through  Daniel  Clark,  and 
determined  to  thwart  it.^^  He  charged  some  of  his 
friends  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  to  use  their  best 
efforts  to  the  same  end.  Power  reached  Kentucky 
with  great  difficulty  and  reported  Carondelet's  project 
to  Sebastian.     He  promised  complete  indemnity  for 

"  The  details  of  this  mission  are  given  in  Gayoso  to  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  June  5,  1798,  No.  20,  sumamente  reser- 
vado,  Legajo  43,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

18  Ellicott's  own  testimony  in  regard  to  Power's  mission  is 
conflicting.  In  a  deposition  years  afterward  (Annals  of 
Eleventh  Congress,  First  and  Second  Sessions,  Pt.  II,  2307  ff.) 
he  stated  that  he  supposed  it  had  reference  only  to  Wilkin- 
son's finances  and  not  to  the  treaty.  Yet  in  November,  1797, 
he  informed  the  secretary  of  state  that  the  object  of  Wilkin- 
son and  his  friends  was  to  detach  Tennessee  and  Kentucky 
from  the  Union,  unless  the  treaty  were  carried  out.  He  also 
reported  a  more  extensive  plan  in  which  Wilkinson  was  to 
combine  with  Gayoso  and  Carondelet  in  revolutionizing  Span- 
ish America.  The  administration  regarded  the  latter  as  highly 
improbable,  and  thus  missed  the  real  danger  involved  in  the 
intrigue — the  possibility  that  Wilkinson  and  his  confederates 
might  be  bribed  to  undertake  a  western  revolt.  Cf.  Wilkin- 
son, Memoirs,  II,  170. 


48  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

any  loss  the  conspirators  might  suffer.  He  mentioned 
the  Yazoo  as  the  possible  southern  limit  of  the  pro- 
posed independent  state,  and  informed  Sebastian  that 
it  was  not  the  purpose  of  the  Spaniards  to  deliver  the 
posts  on  the  Mississippi.  Sebastian  believed  the  project 
untimely,  but  promised  to  communicate  it  to  his 
friends. 

Power  then  went  to  Wilkinson's  headquarters  at 
Detroit,  and  endeavored  to  persuade  him  to  head  the 
new  revolution  and  become  the  Washington  of  the 
western  country.  Wilkinson,  however,  refused  to  con- 
sider the  matter,  for  he  felt  that  the  treaty,  conceding 
the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  had  destroyed 
the  efforts  of  himself  and  his  companions  for  the  past 
ten  years.  Never  again  would  the  western  settlers  en- 
tertain a  proposition  for  separation  from  the  Federal 
Government.  His  own  honor  and  employment  would 
not  permit  him  to  continue  his  correspondence  with 
the  Spaniards.  He  had  destroyed  his  cipher  and  the 
previous  letters,  so  that  he  was  relieved  of  this  in- 
trigue, but  he  speedily  showed  that  he  was  not  will- 
ing to  make  this  relief  permanent.  He  counseled  the 
Spanish  officials  to  fulfill  the  treaty ;  then  perhaps  his 
own  government  would  place  him  in  command  of  the 
Natchez  district,  where  he  might  have  many  oppor- 
tunities for  new  projects.  The  general  also  displayed 
his  ruling  passion  when  he  asked  Power  if  he  had 
brought  him  the  $640  which  was  due  on  the  last  in- 
stalment of  his  pension. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  49 

So  filled  with  fear  was  Wilkinson  that  he  went 
through  the  form  of  arresting  Power  and  sending  him 
under  guard  to  New  Madrid.  Therefore  Power  had 
no  opportunity  for  another  interview  with  Sebastian 
and  his  friends.  Some  months  afterward  Sebastian 
went  down  the  river  to  confer  with  Gayoso,  who  by 
this  time  had  succeeded  Carondelet  at  New  Orleans. 
He  told  the  governor  that  the  time  was  unfavorable 
for  secession.  If  they  should  ever  become  convinced 
that  their  affairs  demanded  a  separation  from  the  Fed- 
eral Government,  they  would  be  able  to  undertake  it 
alone,  and  then  could  treat  securely  with  the  Span- 
iards for  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.^^  Thus 
Carondelet  failed  in  his  last  appeal  to  western  disloy- 
alty, Ellicott  believed  that  the  Spaniards  greatly  over- 
rated the  advantage  to  be  derived  from  such  intrigues. 
The  time  had  passed  when  such  a  course  promised  suc- 
cess, but  Ellicott's  own  reports  were  too  greatly  exag- 
gerated to  arouse  the  governmental  authorities  against 
the  real  peril. 

So  far  the  people  at  Natchez  had  a  very  indefinite 
knowledge  of  the  controversy  between  the  American 
commissioner  and  the  Spanish  officials.  In  the  latter 
part  of  May  Carondelet  issued  a  proclamation  warn- 
ing them  against  the  "improper  measures"  of  cer- 
tain evil-disposed  persons.  He  explained  that  the  sus- 
pension of  the  treaty  was  due  to  the  threatened  British 

IP  Cf.  note  17. 
5 


50  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

invasion.  His  explanation  offended  all  British  sym- 
pathizers, of  whom  there  were  many  in  the  district. 
With  these  and  the  leading  landowners  largely  against 
him,  the  days  of  Spanish  jurisdiction  were  numbered. 

EUicott  now  endeavored  to  organize  his  adherents 
by  encouraging  a  general  meeting  at  which  they  should 
declare  themselves  American  citizens.  With  only  a 
feeble  garrison  of  fifty  men,  Gayoso  dared  not  resist 
the  circulation  of  petitions  for  this  purpose.  The  sit- 
uation was  so  tense  that  the  least  opposition  threat- 
ened to  precipitate  an  outbreak.  This  occurred  on 
June  9,  when  Gayoso  arrested  a  Baptist  preacher  who 
had  personally  menaced  him.  The  people  at  once 
rose,  threatened  to  seize  the  commandant,  and  forced 
him  and  his  fellow  officials  with  their  families  to  take 
refuge  within  the  fort. 

This  virtual  abdication  of  authority  caused  a  gen- 
eral loosening  of  all  restraint  throughout  the  district. 
Ellicott  sought  to  turn  the  situation  to  the  advantage 
of  the  United  States  by  assisting  those  who  wished 
to  become  American  citizens  to  organize  for  protec- 
tion and  the  maintenance  of  order.  He  circulated 
lists  to  be  signed  by  these  prospective  citizens,  and  at 
the  same  time  Pope  promised  to  protect  all  those  above 
the  thirty-first  parallel,  which  he  tentatively  placed  at 
twenty-nine  miles  below  Natchez.  They  must,  how- 
ever, assist  his  soldiers  in  repelHng  any  attempt  to 
strengthen  the  Spanish  garrison. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  5 1 

Gayoso  instructed  his  men  to  defend  themselves  to 
the  last  extremit\'.  Pope's  actions,  which  measurably 
justified  his  nickname  "craz>',"  seemed  designed  to 
exasperate  them.  A  clash  between  the  rival  patrols 
was  narrowdy  averted.  Exerting  himself  to  prevent 
hostilities,  Stephen  ]Minor,  a  naturalized  Spanish  sub- 
ject acting  as  Gayoso's  secretar}',  brought  the  latter 
to  an  interview  with  Pope  and  Ellicott.  Gayoso  blamed 
the  Americans  for  the  outbreak  and  threatened  to 
bring  the  Indians  down  on  the  settlement.  Pending  a 
final  adjustment  he  agreed  to  regard  as  neutral  the 
people  living  in  the  territory  above  the  designated 
boundary. 

Meanwhile  a  meeting  of  the  leading  citizens  of  the 
district  had  selected  seven  men  to  serve  with  Ellicott 
and  Pope  as  a  temporarv'  committee  of  safet}^  This 
committee  secured  Gayoso's  reluctant  consent  to  meas- 
ures for  securing  neutralit}'  and  for  the  selection  of 
local  officials.  The  agreement  brought  the  tumult  to 
a  close.  Carondelet  ratified  the  action,  because  he 
could  not  help  himself,  but  he  complained  of  the 
course  pursued  by  Pope  and  Ellicott,  and  through 
Casa  Yrujo  requested  the  American  government  to  re- 
strict them  to  their  proper  functions.  Early  in  July 
a  permanent  committee,  appointed  jointly  by  the  tem- 
porary' body  and  Gayoso,  assumed  charge  of  affairs. 
In  November  the  inhabitants  put  an  end  to  Spanish 
control  in  the  district  bv  refusing  to  receive  Colonel 


52  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

Carlos  de  Grand  Pre  as  commandant.  In  the  follow- 
ing month  Captain  Isaac  Guion  definitely  established 
American  jurisdiction  there. 

These  changes  were  not  accomplished  without  arous- 
ing the  opposition  of  Anthony  Hutchins  and  his 
friends,  who  attempted  to  organize  a  committee  of  their 
own.  Their  purpose  was  to  elect  a  territorial  delegate 
before  Congress  organized  the  district  and  secure  their 
individual  land  claims.  By  its  delay  in  authorizing  a 
territorial  government,  Congress  created  the  impres- 
sion that  the  treaty  would  never  be  carried  out.  Many 
were  thus  led  to  ally  themselves  with  the  Spanish 
party.  In  emphasizing  their  personal  claims,  Hutchins 
and  his  adherents  ignored  the  American  right  to  the 
whole  district.  In  a  similar  manner  the  residents  of 
West  Florida  later  desired  American  intervention 
without  giving  up  the  vacant  lands. 

In  September,  1797,  Ellicott  learned  of  Blount's  con- 
spiracy, and  with  the  permanent  committee,  devised 
measures  against  it  in  the  district  and  among  the  In- 
dians. By  this  time  he  had  become  extremely  cen- 
sorious of  colleague  as  well  as  of  opponent.  He  sus- 
pected that  the  conspiracy  might  be  part  of  the  larger 
plan  to  revolutionize  Spanish  America,  in  which  he 
implicated  Wilkinson.  He  also  reported  that  the  gen- 
eral was  tampering  with  Indian  agents  in  an  attempt 
to  break  up  the  boundary  survey.  This  made  him 
anxious  to  proceed  with  it  as  soon  as  the  Spanish  gar- 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  53 

rison  should  withdraw  from  Natchez.  At  the  same 
time  the  Spaniards  thought  that  he  and  Pope  were 
accompHces  of  Blount,  for  such  friends  of  the  latter 
as  came  to  Natchez  rallied  around  them.  Their  sus- 
picions were  heightened  by  the  reports  that  Wilkinson 
was  gathering  troops  around  the  lakes  and  Guion  en- 
trenching himself  at  Chickasaw  Blufif,  both  with  evi- 
dent hostile  intent  against  the  Spaniards.  Ex-Gov- 
nor  Matthews  and  Judge  Miller  of  Georgia,  agents 
for  one  of  the  groups  of  Yazoo  grantees,  not  only 
stimulated  land  disputes  in  the  locality,  but  suggested 
possible  complicity  with  Blount.  For  a  brief  period 
the  Tennessee  leader  rivalled  Burr's  later  reputation 
as  the  bogie  of  frontier  disturbance. 

In  the  following  year  David  Humphreys,  American 
minister  to  Spain,  used  the  Blount  incident  as  evi- 
dence that  his  country  was  unwilling  to  profit  at 
Spain's  expense.  He  assured  Saavedra,  Godoy's  nom- 
inal successor,  that  republican  neighbors  were  not  so 
bad,  after  all.  His  countrymen  had  no  desire  to  ex- 
pand by  conquest,  or  to  interfere  in  the  domestic  af- 
fairs of  other  nations.  Sound  policy  and  common 
sense  must  lead  the  United  States  to  develop  its  vacant 
territory,  preserve  neutrality,  and  encourage  commerce 
with  His  Catholic  Majesty,  rather  than  plan  hostile 
expeditions  against  his  dominions.-** 

20  Letters  of  D.  Humphreys,  Apr.  20,  1798,  MS.,  Bureau  of 
Indexes  and  Archives,  Department  of  State. 


54  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

Humphreys  could  well  afford  to  assume  this  vir- 
tuous tone.  Before  French  influence  had  forced 
Godoy  into  temporary  retirement,  he  had  definitely 
ordered  his  subordinates  to  carry  out  the  treaty  with 
the  United  States.  By  this  concession  he  completed 
the  service  begun  some  two  years  before  in  signing 
the  treaty.  He  had  no  assurance  that  his  tardy  action 
would  long  content  American  ambition ;  but  he  knew 
that  because  of  it,  the  French  would  derive  less  satis- 
faction from  the  retrocession  of  Louisiana. 

After  the  Spaniards  had  determined  to  deliver  the 
Natchez  district  to  the  Americans,  the  next  step  was  to 
run  the  boundary  line.  On  January  lo,  1798,  Gayoso 
wrote  Ellicott  that  he  was  ready  to  begin  this  work, 
but  the  Quaker  surveyor  expressed  little  confidence  in 
his  declaration,  and  during  the  next  two  months  found 
many  reasons  to  justify  his  lack  of  faith.  The  ques- 
tion of  military  escort  for  the  surveying  party,  the 
delay  in  withdrawing  the  garrisons  from  Walnut  Hills 
and  Natchez,  the  fear  that  the  Spaniards,  by  stirring 
up  the  Indians,  were  trying  to  prevent  the  survey, — 
all  of  these  matters,  coupled  with  his  past  experiences, 
forced  Ellicott  to  doubt  Gayoso's  sincerity.  Wilkin- 
son's protest  against  the  delay  and  the  reported  Indian 
intrigues  did  not  give  him  any  more  confidence. 

In  the  middle  of  March  Ellicott's  friend,  Stephen 
Minor,  was  appointed  as  Spanish  commissioner  on  the 
boundary  survey.      The  ill-feeling  between  him  and 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  55 

Gayoso,  however,  threatened  still  further  to  retard 
proceedings.  Moreover  Gayoso  lacked  scientific  men 
and  the  necessary  instruments.  This  lack  was  met  in 
a  measure  by  the  appointment  of  William  Dunbar  as 
temporary  representative  for  the  Spaniards,  and  the 
purchase  of  his  instruments.  Yet  this  gave  Ellicott 
little  assurance  that  the  Spaniard  was  in  earnest.  On 
March  23,  however,  the  Spanish  garrison  evacuated 
Walnut  Hills.  Three  days  later  Jose  Vidal,  Minor's 
secretary,  informed  Guion  that  he  lacked  the  neces- 
sary transports  to  convey  the  rest  of  his  men  down 
the  river.  Guion  pointedly  told  him  that  the  dignity 
of  his  country  could  no  longer  brook  evasions,  and  gave 
him  a  peremptory  order  to  evacuate  Natchez  before 
the  31st.  On  the  last  Wednesday  of  the  month  the 
Spanish  officers  waited  on  Ellicott  and  Guion  in  a 
formal  leave-taking,  and  two  days  later,  without  any 
definite  ceremony,  abandoned  the  fort. 

Following  the  departure  of  the  Spaniards,  Ellicott 
conducted  his  party  down  the  river  and  began  opera- 
tions to  mark  the  thirty-first  parallel ;  but  the  nature 
of  the  country  and  the  condition  of  the  river  delayed 
him  for  nearly  a  month.  On  the  21st  of  May,  Minor 
and  a  party  of  laborers  joined  him,  and  Dunbar  ap- 
peared on  the  26th.  Gayoso  had  protested  against 
their  beginning  before  his  arrival  and  did  not  join 
them  until  May  31.  Ellicott  believed  that  if  he  had 
not  proceeded  without  him,  the  Spaniard  would  not 
have  appeared  during  the  whole  season. 


56  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

Gayoso  had  to  cut  short  his  interview  with  Sebastian 
in  order  to  join  the  boundary  commission.  On  his 
way  up  the  river  he  met  John  Montgomery  Brown, 
bearing  letters  from  the  governor  of  Kentucky  and 
from  Wilkinson.  The  general  briefly  mentioned  the 
vigilance  of  his  enemies,  spurred  on  by  Humphrey 
Marshall's  bitter  attacks,  and  warned  Gayoso  not  to 
trust  the  western  people  any  longer.  This  advice,  so 
contrary  to  Wilkinson's  former  views,  aroused  the 
Spaniard's  suspicions.  He  believed  that  the  general, 
having  abandoned  his  Spanish  connection,  was  deter- 
mined to  keep  Sebastian  or  any  of  the  other  conspira- 
tors from  continuing  them. 

By  this  time  Gayoso  had  entirely  lost  confidence  in 
the  western  people,  whom  he  regarded  as  mercenary 
or  seditious,  and  was  equally  suspicious  of  the  Amer- 
ican government.  He  commented  to  his  superior  on 
the  forces  already  gathered  in  Natchez,  and  these,  ac- 
cording to  rumor,  were  to  be  greatly  increased.  Wil- 
kinson was  even  to  move  his  headquarters  there.  The 
most  favorable  interpretation  that  he  could  put  on 
these  movements  was  that  the  American  government 
intended  them  against  France,  in  case  that  power  de- 
clared war  and  attempted  to  use  Spanish  territory  for 
hostile  operations.  As  Wilkinson  had  sufficient  forces 
to  prevent  this,  Gayoso  determined  not  to  break 
with  him  but  await  a  more  favorable  turn  in  condi- 
tions.    Yet  he  fancied  that  with  adequate  resources  he 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  57 

could  Still  control  a  large  party  among  the  Amer- 
icans, or  repel  any  hostilities  on  their  part.-^ 

Meanwhile  the  party  on  the  boundary  line  was  much 
disturbed  by  threats  of  the  Choctaws  to  break  up  the 
survey.  This  menace  was  greatly  exaggerated  by  the 
agent,  Samuel  Mitchell.-^  With  this  task  once  well 
under  way  and  with  the  difficulties  in  the  Natchez  dis- 
trict settled  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  Spanish  garri- 
son, Gayoso  reported  general  conditions  to  Saavedra. 
He  felt  that  the  treaty  now  being  carried  out  gave  the 
United  States  the  balance  of  power  in  North  America. 
Ultimately  that  nation  planned  to  control  the  whole 
continent.  Its  rapid  advance  and  unconcealed  ambition 
rendered  this  very  probable.  The  Spanish  sovereign 
would  profit,  then,  if  at  the  next  general  treaty  in 
Europe  he  could  substitute  the  Yazoo  for  the  thirty- 
first  parallel.  The  Americans  could  not  justly  com- 
plain of  this  enforced  retrocession  if  they  still  re- 
tained the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 

The  Spanish  government  had  gained  nothing  by 
granting  concessions  in  the  treaty  of  1795,  for  the 
American  government  still  maintained  friendship  with 
Great  Britain,  failed  to  restrain  the  Indians,  and 
wished  to  push  trade  with  them  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. By  holding  Natchez  the  Americans  could  cut 
the  communication  between  upper  and  lower  Louisi- 

21  Cf.  note  17. 

22  Ellicott  to  Pickering,  Feb.  20,  1798,  Ellicott  and  the  South- 
ern Boundary,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 


58  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

ana,  especially  if  working  in  harmony  with  the  British 
in  Canada.  Such  a  combination  would  gain  control 
of  the  highway  to  the  Pacific,  and  with  it  the  mastery 
of  North  America.  The  only  thing  that  kept  them 
out  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas  was  the  jealousy 
between  the  eastern  and  western  portions  of  the 
United  States.  Gayoso  believed  that  this  would  even- 
tually lead  to  a  separation  which  would  force  the  West 
into  an  alliance,  either  with  Spain  or  with  England. 
He  referred  to  the  earlier  attempts  to  bring  this  about, 
and  the  more  recent  efforts  which  had  been  suspended 
by  the  treaty,  yet  he  was  determined  to  maintain  a 
good  understanding  with  the  Kentuckians,  so  as  to 
attract  them  in  another  crisis.-^  Thus  with  true  Bour- 
bon insistence  he  persevered  in  a  policy  already  out- 
worn. 

In  this  same  letter  Gayoso  suggested  a  method  by 
which  he  might  counteract  American  advance.  The 
Spanish  land  system  was  much  more  liberal  than  the 
American,  and  this  would  lead  many  to  emigrate  from 
the  United  States  to  the  Spanish  dominions.  Gayoso 
was  not  inclined  to  permit  this  too  freely,  especially 
in  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi,   for  he  pre- 

23  Gayoso  to  Saavedra,  Nov.  22,  1798,  Spanish  Transcripts, 
Missouri  Historical  Society;  Robertson,  No.  4665  in  List  of 
Documents  in  Spanish  Archives,  Relating  to  the  History  of 
the  United  States,  Carnegie  Institution,  Washington,  1910. 
The  documents  thus  listed  will  hereafter  be  referred  to  by 
number  only. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  59 

ferred  to  settle  French  Canadians  there.  Numbers 
from  the  Natchez  district  wished  to  move  below  the 
line.  Among  them  were  Anthony  Hutchins  and  his 
friends,  but  Gayoso  excluded  them  because  they  had 
seemed  unfriendly  during  the  recent  crisis.  More- 
over Hutchins  still  received  half  pay  from  the  British 
government.-*  Gayoso  permitted  others  to  settle  in  the 
Feliciana  district  and  still  others  to  form  a  commun- 
ity on  the  Pearl  River.  He  was  suspected  of  aiding 
Zachariah  Cox/^  in  order  to  attract  discontented  Amer- 
ican citizens.  Gayoso  assured  Daniel  Clark  that  his 
purpose  was  not  so  much  to  entice  immigrants  from 
Mississippi  Territory  as  to  encourage  a  progressive 
population  in  the  Floridas  and  Louisiana.-®  Within 
a  decade  his  successors  were  to  find  these  settlers  alto- 
gether too  progressive. 

The  prospect  of  Wilkinson's  arrival  in  the  Natchez 
district  aroused  much  interest,  Daniel  Clark  the  elder 
was  especially  gratified  to  learn  of  it.  They  were 
both  good  republicans,  he  wrote,  who  loved,  honored, 
and  served  their  country.  Evidently  Wilkinson's  com- 
ing was  heralded  by  ugly  rumors,  for  Clark  stated 
that  he  had  not  heard  that  the  general  had  ever  held 
a  commission  in  the  Spanish  service,  and  no  Anglo- 

24Ellicotf,  Journal,  182. 

2°  For  Cox's  plans  see  Quarterly  of  the  Historical  and  Phil- 
osophical Society  of  Ohio,  1913,  29-114. 

26  D.  Clark,  Jr.,  to  Wilkinson,  Nov.  30,  1798,  Letters  Re- 
ceived, MS.,  War  Department. 


60  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

American  in  the  district  would  be  more  likely  to  know 
than  himself.  He  advised  Wilkinson  not  to  be  dis- 
turbed by  these  reports,  which  only  proved  the  worth 
of  republican  institutions.  Under  a  despotism  no  one 
would  dare  utter  them.  He  mentioned  the  fact  that 
the  line  of  demarcation  was  still  in  statu  quo.  Pa- 
tience had  been  characteristic  of  the  United  States 
from  the  days  of  Fabius  [Washington]  to  the  present 
time,  but  he  hoped  that  Wilkinson  was  now  coming 
with  a  sufficient  force  to  cause  the  treaty  to  be  car- 
ried out.^'^ 

Wilkinson's  arrival  at  Natchez,  about  the  middle  of 
August,  1798,  caused  considerable  stir  below  the  line, 
and  induced  Gayoso  to  organize  his  militia.  This  led 
EUicott  later  to  write  to  the  secretary  of  state  that 
"the  fears  and  jealousies  of  the  Spanish  nation" 
would  shortly  result  in  its  losing  all  the  country  on 
this  side  of  the  Mississippi.^*  Clark  himself  expressed 
a  wish  to  eat  his  Christmas  dinner  in  New  Orleans 
with  "  Governor  Wilkinson."  To  bring  this  to  pass 
he  offered  the  assistance  of  his  entire  family.  "  I  tell 
you,  General,"  he  wrote,  "  you  must  take  New  Orleans 
ere  permanent  tranquility  can  reign  in  the  United 
States,  or  agriculture  and  commerce  flourish.     These 

27  D.  Clark  to  Wilkinson,  Mar.  18,  1798,  Letters  Received, 
MS.,  War  Department. 

28  Ellicott  t&  Pickering,  Nov.  8,  1798,  Wilkinson,  Memoirs, 
II,  184  n. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  6 1 

objects  I  am  anxious  to  see  accomplished  ere  I  attain 
my  three  score  and  ten,  to  which  you  know  I  have  but 
two  or  three  years  to  run."^® 

In  January,  1799,  ElHcott  was  in  New  Orleans  on 
a  visit,  partly  official  and  partly  social  in  character. 
While  there  Daniel  Clark,  Jr.,  furnished  him  with  con- 
clusive evidence  that  the  Spanish  authorities  had  not 
intended  to  carry  out  the  treaty  in  1797.  Clark  felt, 
however,  that  recent  British  naval  victories  and  the 
tone  of  the  last  presidential  address  had  induced  them 
to  pursue  a  different  course.  Ellicott's  report  on  the 
Spanish  tenure  in  Louisiana  was  prophetic.  He  had 
thought  their  hold  on  Natchez  very  weak,  but  that  on 
New  Orleans  still  more  so.  ''I  am  convinced,"  he 
wrote,  "  the  present  government  might  be  abolished  by 
the  materials  within  itself,  and  that  with  but  little  risk 
to  those  who  might  undertake  it,  and  what  contributes 
considerably  to  this  weakness  is  the  general  opinion 
of  the  inhabitants  that  it  will  unquestionably  before 
many  years,  be  annexed  to  the  United  States.  The 
arrival  of  Gen.  Wilkinson  has  greatly  strengthened 
that  opinion.  For  my  own  part,  I  cannot  see  any 
advantages  that  the  United  States  might  derive  from 
owning  this  province  at  present."  He  believed  that 
the  Americans  would  profit  more  from  its  trade  and 
commerce  while  in  Spanish  possession  than  if  in  their 

29  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  II,  122. 


62  OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT 

own,  and  he  favored  its  occupation  by  the  United 
States  should  any  European  nation  threaten  it.^" 

From  this  point  on,  Ellicott's  work  has  but  inci- 
dental bearing  on  West  Florida.  In  due  course  of 
time  the  surveying  party  established  the  Hne  on  the 
Mobile,  when  the  Spaniards  to  their  regret  learned 
that  Fort  St.  Stephens  came  above  it.  Despite  rumors 
of  Indian  hostility,  encouraged  in  a  measure  by  the 
"  crooked  talks  "  of  Vizente  Folch,  the  commander  at 
Pensacola,  Ellicott  also  surveyed  along  the  Appalachi- 
cola.  Beyond  this  point  the  attitude  of  the  Creeks 
became  so  threatening  that  Ellicott  did  not  attempt 
to  run  the  line  overland.  After  reaching  the  St. 
Mary's  River,  Ellicott  completed  his  task  on  April 
ID,  1800,  more  than  three  years  after  he  had  first 
reached  Natchez.  During  this  time  he  had  been  much 
more  than  a  surveyor,  but  he  firmly  believed  that  his 
varied  services  more  than  justified  his  large  expense 
account.^^  With  our  present  information  this  claim 
seems  reasonable. 

Events  in  the  Natchez  district  during  these  critical 
years  of  transition  afford  many  points  of  comparison 
with  later  developments  in  West  Florida.  There  was 
the  long-drawn  dispute  with  Spain  over  the  terms  of 
a  treaty,  finally  decided  more  by  the  exigencies  of 

30  Ellicott  to  Pickering,  Jan.  13,  1799,  Ellicott  and  the  South- 
ern Boundary,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 
21  Ellicott,  Journal,  passim. 


OCCUPATION    OF    THE    NATCHEZ    DISTRICT  63 

European  politics  and  by  happenings  on  the  frontier 
than  by  the  skill  of  the  American  diplomats  or  the  es- 
sential justice  of  their  contention.  The  Spaniards 
were  attempting  to  control  a  pioneer  population,  alien 
in  spirit,  custom,  and  political  training,  but  land  hungry 
and  unscrupulous  in  appeasing  their  appetite.  It  was 
inevitable,  then,  that  charge  and  countercharge,  in- 
trigue and  evasion,  should  finally  result  in  revolt. 
Fortunately  the  period  of  disturbance  was  brief  and 
bloodless ;  the  neighboring  savages  were  not  drawn 
into  it,  or  outside  nations  involved.  Yet  it  estab- 
lished a  precedent,  and  led  the  United  States  to  pursue 
a  similar  course,  deviously  but  without  intent,  through 
the  neighboring  West  Florida  into  Texas  and  distant 
California. 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Louisiana  Purchase  and  the  Floridas 

Diplomatic  success  at  the  Escorial  and  the  subse- 
quent occupation  of  Natchez  did  not  afford  complete 
security  to  our  southern  border.  Although  Spain  still 
possessed  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  there  were  per- 
sistent rumors  that  these  coveted  possessions,  along 
with  the  whole  of  Louisiana,  were  about  to  pass  un- 
der the  control  of  the  French.  Washington  had  re- 
garded the  latter  as  "  unpleasant "  prospective  neigh- 
bors to  our  Trans-Allegheny  possessions,  and  Secre- 
tary Pickering  thought  that  Spain  should  be  equally 
concerned  for  Mexico.^  The  American  alliance  with 
France  had  been  "a  mere  scrap  of  paper"  since 
Genet's  mission,  so  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  exert 
pressure  elsewhere  to  prevent  the  transfer.  Our  min- 
isters to  England  and  Spain  were  so  instructed.  King 
in  London  elicited  little  sympathy  from  British  offi- 
cials, who  were  evidently  unwilling  to  intervene  with- 
out a  definite  alliance  with  the  United  States;^  but 
Humphreys,   after   a   special   trip   from   Portugal   to 

1  Washington  to  Pickering,  Feb.  14,  1797,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  22,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Picker- 
ing to  R.  King,  Feb.  14,  1797,  King,  Rufus  King,  II,  147. 

2  King,  Rufus  King,  III,  572. 

64 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         65 

Madrid,  secured  from  Godoy's  rival,  Urquijo,  an  as- 
surance that  France  would  never  get  Louisiana  while 
he  was  in  office.^ 

Scarcely  a  year  elapsed  before  the  assurance  of  the 
Spanish  minister  was  shown  to  be  worthless.  The 
Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso  provided  for  the  retroces- 
son  of  Louisiana,  while  the  new  American  agreement 
with  Bonaparte  removed  such  protection  as  the  for- 
mer alliance  gave.*  The  French  were  evidently  pre- 
paring to  limit  American  holdings  by  the  Appalachians 
rather  than  by  the  Mississippi,  as  Collot  had  advised 
them  to  do.^  Their  agents,  Milfort  and  Fulton,  were 
already  at  work  among  the  Creeks,  and  to  the  great 
concern  of  Ellicott  and  Governor  Sargent  were  plan- 
ning closer  connections  with  Clark  and  other  western 
filibusters.^  Aroused  by  this  Gallic  propaganda,  the 
attorney-general  advised  more  definite  military  pre- 
cautions in  the  Southwest.  Wilkinson  should  oppose 
the  passage  of  French  troops  up  the  Mississippi,  even 
if  under  the  Spanish  flag,  and  if  necessary  he  might  in- 
vade the  Floridas  to  attack  them.''     In  the  following 

3  D.  Humphreys  to  Secretary  of  State,  Aug.  6,  1794,  Letters 
of  D.  Humphreys,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

*  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  I,  365. 

5  Ibid. ;  King,  Rufus  King,  III,  414. 

^  Turner  in  American  Historical  Review.  X,  270,  271 ;  Ameri- 
can Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1903,  II,  1097. 

7  Steiner,  The  Life  and  Correspondence  of  James  McHenry, 
439- 
6 


66         LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

year  Hamilton,  as  the  active  head  of  the  American 
army,  planned  a  series  of  military  campaigns  begin- 
ning on  the  Florida  border  that  were  ultimately  to 
include  all  Spanish  America.  Fortunately  Adams  pre- 
ferred diplomacy  to  militarism,  and  thus  prevented 
the  Floridas  from  becoming  either  the  Belgium  or  the 
Balkans  of  America. 

Jefferson  openly  maintained  a  friendly  attitude  to- 
ward France  and  Spain,  but  he  still  was  apprehensive 
in  regard  to  the  proposed  cession.  His  first  concern 
was  to  learn  if  it  provided  for  American  privileges 
under  existing  treaties ;  his  next,  to  secure  an  exten- 
sion of  these  privileges.  The  most  obvious  method 
was  the  purchase  of  part  or  all  of  the  territory  in  ques- 
tion east  of  the  Mississippi,  where  the  navigation  of 
the  Mobile  was  presenting  a  problem  secondary  only 
to  that  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 

Shortly  after  arriving  at  his  station,  Charles  Pinck- 
ney,  our  new  minister  to  Spain,  essayed  this  double 
task.  The  Spanish  secretary,  Cevallos,  who  was  so 
long  to  prove  the  bete  noir  of  the  American  diplomats, 
gave  him  little  satisfaction  about  the  rumored  treaty 
or  existing  guarantees.  Finally  Cevallos  told  the 
American  that  if  the  "  King  His  Master  "  should  think 
proper  to  cede  Louisiana  to  another  power,  he  would 
preserve  all  the  rights  of  the  United  States.  Pinck- 
ney  advised  that  Livingston  should  attempt  to  secure 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS  67 

a  more  definite  pledge  from  the  French  government.^ 
In  his  second  object  Pinckney  was  even  less  success- 
ful, although  he  was  authorized  to  tempt  the  Spanish 
government  to  part  with  the  Floridas  by  offering  a 
guarantee  of  the  remaining  Spanish  colonies  west  of 
the  Mississippi.  This  was  the  offer  that  Jefferson, 
as  secretary  of  state,  had  empowered  Carmichael  to 
make  a  decade  before.  To  make  it  with  effect  Pinck- 
ney assumed,  as  he  then  fully  believed,  that  the  Flor- 
idas did  not  form  part  of  the  Louisiana  Province,  al- 
though New  Orleans  did.  Moreover  he  represented 
the  desired  cession  as  an  act  of  mutual  helpfulness, 
"essential  to  [his  nation]  and  not  at  all  injurious  to 
the  other."  If  granted  it  would  "  fix  forever  such  a 
great  Natural  Boundary  between  the  dominions  of 
Our  Good  Friend,  His  Catholic  Majesty  and  the 
United  States,  as  will  leave  no  possible  room  for  dif- 
ference hereafter,  with  the  Nation  for  whom  the 
United  States  cherished  so  much  affection." 

The  American  minister  also  pointed  out  the  fact 
that  the  Floridas  had  never  been  productiv-e,  and  with 
Louisiana  in  the  hands  of  France,  would  be  still  less 
valuable  to  Spain.  On  the  other  hand  the  navigation 
of  the  Mobile  and  other  streams  was  necessary  to 
those    Americans    residing    on    their    upper    courses. 

8  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  481,  482. 
The  manuscript  copy  in  Spanish  Dispatches,  MS.,  VI,  Bu- 
reau of  Indexes  and  Archives,  contains  some  significant  pas- 
sages omitted  in  the  folio  edition. 


68        LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

Aside  from  their  commercial  advantage  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  natural  boundary  like  the  Mississippi 
(which  he  mistakenly  called  a  "barrier"),  he  had  no 
material  motive  in  pressing  for  the  cession.  "  Our 
government,"  he  emphatically  asserted,  "being  one 
without  ambition,  never  wishing  to  extend  its  territory 
except  in  so  similar  a  case  as  this,  and  never  having 
the  least  idea  or  desire  to  possess  colonies  or  more 
than  they  own,  except  in  this  single  instance,  they  trust 
that  His  Majesty  will  on  this  occasion  consent  to  the 
sale  and  transfer  upon  such  reasonable  terms  as  may 
be  agreed  upon  by  the  two  nations."^ 

Notwithstanding  the  "  affectionate  terms  "  in  which 
Pinckney  had  proffered  his  request,  he  did  not  expect 
the  Spanish  officials  to  receive  it  with  favor.  They 
were  already  enraged  over  the  recent  forcible  cession 
of  Trinidad  to  Great  Britain,  and  might  hesitate  to 
introduce  another  power  into  the  Mexican  Gulf.  Nor 
were  they  free  to  act  without  the  consent  of  the 
French.  Moreover,  the  American  diplomat  perceived 
a  domestic  difficulty.  How  could  the  Floridas,  having 
never  formed  part  of  the  original  States,  be  constitu- 
tionally received  into  the  American  Union?  "We 
shall  however,"  he  added  comfortingly,  "  have  full 
time  to  consider  the  question,  as  the  Spanish  court 
moves  slowly  in  important  negotiations. "^° 

9  Pinckney  to  Cevallos,  Mar.  24,  1802,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

10  Pinckney  to  Madison,  Apr.  20,  1802,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         69 

Evidently  they  would  have  full  time,  for  Cevallos 
guardedly  replied  that  the  proposal  for  the  sale  of  the 
Floridas  was  of  such  great  importance  that  his  gov- 
ernment must  consider  it  with  the  utmost  circumspec- 
tion.^^ Bonaparte  himself  afforded  an  additional 
reason  for  this  circumspection.  Determined  to  gain 
the  Floridas  along  with  Louisiana,  in  November,  1802, 
he  proffered  Parma  in  exchange.  Godoy,  once  more 
in  power,  affected  to  dicker  with  the  French  represen- 
tative, Beurnonville,  and  thought  that  on  this  basis  the 
First  Consul  ought  to  be  satisfied  with  West  Florida 
alone.  The  Frenchman  peremptorily  asked  for  a  defi- 
nite answer  to  his  offer,  and  Godoy  informed  him  that 
the  king  was  unwilling  to  sacrifice  any  further  terri- 
tory in  America  for  a  new  monarchy  in  Europe.^^ 
From  a  later  statement  of  Beurnonville,  Pinckney  be- 
lieved that  his  own  offer  to  buy  the  Floridas  was 
largely  instrumental  in  defeating  the  French  attempt, 
but  the  concurrent  opposition  of  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  was  doubtless  even  more  potent.^^     Certainly 

11  Cevallos  to  Pinckney,  Apr.  7,  1802,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

12  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  Louisiane  et  les  Flori- 
des,  1792-1803,  MS.,  Supplement,  Vol.  7,  232-287,  passim,  Min- 
istere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  Paris.  Talleyrand  also  ad- 
vised Napoleon  to  content  himself  with  West  Florida.  Cf. 
page  74. 

13  Pinckney  to  Madison,  Jan.  24,  1804,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Livingston  to 
Madison,  Feb.  5,  1803,  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, II,  532. 


70         LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

Pinckney  obtained  no  satisfaction  when,  in  response 
to  a  petition  from  residents  on  the  upper  Mobile,  he  re- 
quested the  Spanish  government  to  put  that  stream  on 
the  same  footing  as  the  Mississippi.^*  While  waiting 
for  the  response  of  the  Spanish  authorities,  he  made 
a  leisurely  trip  to  Italy.  His  secretary,  John  Graham, 
thus  had  the  opportunity  to  write  Madison  that  if 
American  rights  on  the  Mississippi  were  preserved, 
they  might  expect  similar  privileges  on  the  Mobile ; 
otherwise,  not.  They  could  expect  little  from  the 
evasive  policy  of  the  Spaniards.  With  regard  to  the 
inclusion  of  West  Florida  in  Louisiana,  Graham 
learned,  probably  from  the  French  minister,  that  the 
boundaries  were  those  laid  down  in  the  Treaty  of 
1763,  but  his  informant  added  significantly,  "We  have 
not  yet  taken  possession  of  it."^^ 

Despite  the  hope  or  threat  implied  in  these  words, 
it  is  evident  that  none  of  the  diplomats  at  the  court 
of  Spain  believed  that  power  ready  to  alienate  the  Flor- 
id Hunt,  Writings  of  James  Madison,  VI,  448,  449.  This 
was  doubtful  in  view  of  Morales'  recent  action.  Cf.  page  75. 
IS  John  Graham  to  Madison,  Nov.  29,  1802,  Spanish  Dis- 
patches, MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives.  Perhaps 
Graham's  attitude  was  determined  by  the  wishes  of  his  supe- 
riors. He  may  have  been  sent  to  Madrid  to  check  the  erratic 
Pinckney  and  to  give  Madison  inside  information  of  that 
minister's  actions.  If  so,  it  is  an  interesting  commentary  on 
the  mutual  lack  of  confidence  existing  between  the  South 
Carolinian  and  the  Virginia  statesmen.  The  same  distrust 
characterized  the  relations  between  the  latter  group  and  the 
incumbent  in  the  Paris  ministry. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS  7 1 

idas,  and  certainly  none  of  them  regarded. the  aliena- 
tion as  already  accomplished.  In  London  Rufus  King 
reported  the  British  authorities  as  indifferent.  Lord 
Hawkesbury  seemed  to  think  it  immaterial  whether 
Louisiana  included  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  or 
not.  As  a  wilderness  area  the  whole  region  would  be 
valueless  for  years  to  come.  Later,  when  war  with 
France  seemed  probable,  the  British  became  more  in- 
terested in  the  region  and  planned  to  occupy  it  provi- 
sionally or  to  permit  the  United  States  to  do  so.  But 
this  change  did  not  indicate  any  marked  friendliness 
for  the  latter  nation.^*^ 

Paris  was  the  real  center  of  diplomatic  pressure  dur- 
ing this  eventful  year,  and  after  his  arrival  there  as 
minister,  in  December,  1801,  Robert  R.  Livingston 
did  not  intermit  his  efforts  to  aid  his  colleague  Pinck- 
ney.  Talleyrand  told  him  that  the  cession  of  Louisi- 
ana had  been  merely  a  subject  of  conversation  between 
France  and  Spain.  Another  minister,  probably  Barbe- 
Marbois,  said  that  Louisiana  was  not  theirs  to  use  even 
partially  for  paying  their  debts.^^  Stirred  up  by  re- 
ports from  the  frontier,  Jefferson  affected  to  regard 
the  prospective  danger  from  French  neighbors  as  suf- 
ficient to  justify  a  British  alHance.  As  usual  his  sec- 
ond thought  was  less  belligerent,  for  he  preferred  to 

16  King,  Rufus  King,  IV,  17-19,  146-148. 
1"  Livingston  to  Secretary  of  State,  Dec.  10,  1801,  Dec.  12, 
1801,  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  512. 


72  LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

buy  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas  from  France,  if 
that  power  now  possessed  them  and  was  ready  to  sell 
on  favorable  terms.^^  At  the  same  time  he  wrote  Du- 
pont  de  Nemours  that  such  a  cession  would  be  only  a 
"  palliation  "  for  the  "  vicinage  "  of  France.  But  even 
so,  if  the  United  States  should  secure  it,  the  boundary 
of  our  country  would  then  be  sufficiently  extensive, 
and  the  "chain  of  the  American  Union  rendered  too 
strong  to  be  weakened  for  several  centuries."^^ 

Although  the  Americans  hoped  to  gain  the  Floridas 
through  the  influence  of  the  French,  Livingston  pur- 
sued a  course  little  calculated  to  enlist  their  sympathy. 
While  Napoleon,  incensed  at  the  earlier  failure  to  ex- 
tort the  Floridas  from  Spain,  along  with  Louisiana, 
was  striving  to  obtain  them  by  proferring  Parma,  or 
Parma  and  Placencia  together,  the  American  minister 
assumed  that  France  did  not  yet  possess  them  and 
proceeded  to  make  sure  that  she  should  not.  Aware 
that  the  two  governments  were  disputing  on  this  point, 
he  told  De  Azara,  the  Spanish  ambassador  in  Paris, 
that  Spain  ought  to  keep  the  Floridas  as  security  for 
South  America.^"  What  she  should  do  to  counter- 
act American  possession  of  the  Floridas  he  did  not 
state.     He  disputed  with   Collot  and  Adet  over  the 

18  Jefferson  to  Livingston,  Apr.  i8,  1802,  Ford,  Writings  of 
Jefferson,  VIII,  143. 

1^  Jefferson  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,  ibid.,  203. 

20  Livingston  to  De  Azara,  May  28,  1802.  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  518. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         73 

possible  inclusion  of  Mobile  and  Pensacola  in  the 
cession  to  France.^^  He  contended  that  the  territory- 
east  of  the  Mississippi  was  of  little  economic  value  to 
France  or  Spain,  but  of  great  strategic  importance  to 
the  United  States.  He  even  hinted  that  Great  Britain 
might  join  his  country  in  protesting  against  an  increase 
of  French  power  on  the  Gulf .^-  By  such  "  short 
hints  "  he  pursued  with  little  success  his  double  object : 
to  keep  the  Floridas  from  France  and  to  gain  them, 
wholly  or  in  part,  for  the  United  States.  France  did 
not  get  the  desired  provinces,  but  her  failure  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  obstinacy  of  Charles  IV  and  his 
advisers  far  surpassed  Livingston's  persistence  as  a 
diplomatic  factor.  The  American  also  retarded  his 
cause  by  associating  commercial  claims  with  it.  Hav- 
ing once  made  this  unacceptable  combination,  it  seemed 
impossible  for  American  diplomats  to  dissociate  the 
claims  and  the  Floridas. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  Livingston  also  presented 
another  characteristic  phase  of  the  future  negotiation. 
Failing  to  awaken  a  response  by  his  offers  to  purchase 
the  entire  Florida  area,  he  expressed  a  willingness  to 

21  Livingston  to  Secretary  of  State,  June  8,  1802,  ibid.,  519. 
Thomas  Sumpter,  who  acted  as  secretary  of  the  legation, 
charged  that  Livingston  was  planning  with  Daniel  Parker 
and  others  to  make  a  real  estate  speculation  out  of  the  Florida 
negotiation.  Cf.  Sumpter  to  Monroe,  Oct.  i,  1803,  Monroe 
Papers,  MS.,  X,  1219,  Library  of  Congress. 

22  Livingston  to  Minister  of  Exterior  Relations,  Jan.  10, 
1803,  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  531. 


74        LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

content  himself  with  West  Florida  alone.  This  would 
give  the  United  States  control  of  the  eastern  bank  of 
the  Mississippi  and  the  shores  of  Mobile  Bay,  New 
Orleans  and  East  Florida  would  enhance  the  value  of 
this  limited  area;  but,  if  they  were  unattainable,  the 
Americans  might  construct  a  channel  to  the  sea  by  way 
of  Manchac  and  the  Iberville  and  thus  render  their 
upper  settlements  independent  of  the  future  Crescent 
City.^^  The  United  States  would  also  be  able  to  dis- 
regard any  feeble  colonies  that  France  could  maintain 
west  of  the  Mississippi,  and  even  acquiesce  in  her 
possession  of  Pensacola  and  St.  Augustine.  This  em- 
phasis upon  the  strategic  and  commercial  value  of 
West  Florida  may  account  for  his  later  insistence,  con- 
trary to  his  earlier  views,  that  West  Florida  formed 
part  of  Louisiana. 

Another,  even  more  influential  than  he,  held  a  simi- 
lar opinion.  In  November,  1802,  Talleyrand  wrote  Na- 
poleon :  "  West  Florida  suffices  for  the  desired  en- 
largement of  Louisiana.  It  completes  the  retrocession 
of  the  French  colony,  such  as  had  been  given  to  Spain. 
It  carries  the  eastern  boundary  back  to  the  river 
Appalachicola.     It  gives  us  the  port  of  Pensacola  and 

23  The  British  had  considered  the  feasibility  of  such  a  chan- 
nel, while  possessing  West  Florida.  Knowledge  of  this  fact 
may  account  for  the  similar  views  of  Jefferson  and  Gallatin. 
Cf.  Jefferson  to  Dr.  Hugh  Williamson,  Apr.  30,  1803,  Works 
of  Jefferson  (Memorial  Edition),  X,  385;  Gallatin  to  Madison, 
Feb.  7,  1803,  Hunt,  James  Madison,  VH,  32. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         75 

the  population  which  forms  more  than  half  that  of 
the  two  Floridas.  By  leaving  East  Florida  to  Spain 
we  much  diminish  the  difficulties  little  felt  today  but 
which  some  day  may  become  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance."^* Talleyrand  did  not  persuade  the  other  to 
abate  his  demand  for  both  the  Floridas.  In  that 
same  month  the  First  Consul  offered  to  exchange 
Parma  for  them,  but  without  result.  With  Talleyrand 
advising  Napoleon  to  accept  West  Florida,  in  lieu  of 
a  better  bargain,  and  with  Decres  counseling  him  to 
"  think  well "  before  taking  Louisiana  without  Mo- 
bile,^^  Livingston's  efforts  to  gain  the  same  region 
were  likely  to  be  futile. 

On  October  16,  1802,  Juan  Ventura  Morales,  the 
intendant,  definitely  suspended  the  American  right  of 
deposit  at  New  Orleans.  This  unexpected  act,  arous- 
ing the  entire  West  and  galvanizing  Federalist  opposi- 
tion, demanded  some  immediate  diplomatic  achieve- 
ment. A  special  mission  seemed  the  most  promising 
method.  Monroe  was  asked  to  associate  himself  with 
Livingston  and  Pinckney  in  the  endeavor  to  secure 
the  Floridas  and  settle  once  for  all  the  vexatious  ques- 
tions of  western  navigation.  If  he  failed  to  secure 
the  coveted  territory,  the  administration  hoped  that 
he  would  at  least  obtain  an  "  enlargement "  of  the  right 

24  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  I,  401,  402. 

25  Minuit  de  Decres,  13  Vendemiaire  An  XI,  Archives  des 
Affaires  fitrangeres,  Louisiane  et  les  Florides,  MS.,  Vol.  7, 
supplement. 


76        LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

of  deposit,  to  include  all  rivers  passing  from  Amer- 
ican territory  to  the  Gulf  through  the  Floridas.^^  In 
the  combined  diplomatic  and  domestic  problem  thrust 
upon  them  Jefferson  and  Madison  thought  half  a  loaf 
better  than  none. 

For  a  time  it  seemed  likely  that  Livingston,  spurred 
into  redoubled  activity,  would  fail  to  secure  even  this 
modest  concession.  Having  found  Talleyrand  a  doubt- 
ful channel  for  his  communications  to  Napoleon,  he 
availed  himself,  as  before,  of  such  intermediaries  as 
the  friendly  Lebrun  and  even  Joseph  Bonaparte.  Fi- 
nally a  suggestion  to  use  the  American  claims  against 
France  in  the  proposed  exchange  drew  from  Talley- 
rand the  crushing  declaration :  "  It  is  entirely  opposed 
to  the  maxims  of  Government,  adopted  by  the  Repub- 
lic, to  mingle  important  and  delicate  political  relations 
with  calculations  of  account  and  mere  pecuniary  inter- 
ests."^^ After  assuming  this  virtuous  tone  it  must 
have  been  doubly  bitter  for  Talleyrand,  a  few  weeks 
later,  to  offer  the  whole  of  Louisiana  to  the  persistent 
American. 

Livingston  could  interpret  this  offer  only  in  keep- 
ing with  his  obsession  for  the  Floridas.  France  did 
not  expect  to  obtain  them,  along  with  Louisiana,  and 
so  regarded  the  latter  as  of  little  worth.     He  told  Tal- 

26  Madison  to  Pinckney  and  Monroe,  Feb.  17,  1803,  Ameri- 
can State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  533. 

27  Talleyrand  to  Livingston,  I  Ventose  An  XI  (Feb.  19), 
1803,  ibid.,  546. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         77 

leyrand  that  the  Americans  did  not  want  Louisiana; 
but  at  once  wrote  Madison  that  if  they  should  get  it, 
they  should  exchange  all  that  portion  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi for  the  Floridas.-^  This,  to  paraphrase  his 
own  words,  seemed  like  disposing  of  the  skin  before 
he  had  killed  the  bear ;  but  it  showed  that  after  months 
of  vacillation  he  fully  believed  that  France  had  not 
acquired  the  coveted  territory.  Yet  when  the  con- 
scienceless Napoleon  performed  this  act  of  slaughter 
for  him,  he  completely  reversed  himself,  and  in  the 
process  carried  with  him  his  unacceptable  colleague, 
Monroe,  and  the  entire  administration,  with  the  pos- 
sible exception  of  Gallatin.^'' 

In  Spain,  Pinckney  not  only  protested  against  the 
suspension  of  the  deposit,  and  with  success,  but  re- 
newed his  previous  proposal  to  purchase  the  Floridas. 
To  render  this  more  acceptable  he  now  ofifered  for  the 
first  time  to  guarantee  the  Spanish  possessions  west  of 
the  Mississippi.^'*  What  he  or  his  superiors  hoped  to 
accomplish  by  this  offer,  after  the  failure  to  carry  out 
a  similar  guarantee  with  France,  under  the  Treaty  of 
1778,  does  not  clearly  appear,  but  it  indicates  their 
anxiety  to  gain  the  Floridas. 

After  allowing  the  Spanish  minister  a  month  to  re- 

28  Livingston  to  Madison,  Apr.  11,  1803,  ibid.,  552. 

29  Cf.  pages  Id,  228. 

30  Pinckney  to  Cevallos,  Feb.  17,  1803,  Letters  of  C.  Pinck- 
ney and  R.  Livingston,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives, 
Department  of  State. 


78         LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

fleet  upon  his  generous  offer,  he  reverted  to  the  sub- 
ject from  a  different  standpoint.  The  number,  re- 
sources, position,  and  spirit  of  the  western  Americans 
rendered  it  problematical  how  much  longer  they  would 
submit  to  Spanish  exactions  upon  their  commerce. 
Should  they  take  affairs  in  their  own  hands  the  Span- 
iards could  not  resist  their  onset,  nor  could  the  eastern 
States  check  them,  granted  that  they  cared  to  do  so. 
He  wished  this  statement  to  be  taken  as  an  evidence 
of  sincere  friendship,  rather  than  of  threatening  ambi- 
tion. His  country  desired  a  lasting  peace  with  His 
Catholic  Majesty,  and  to  ensure  it  was  willing  to  pur- 
chase the  Floridas  at  a  fair  price  and  obligate  them- 
selves to  defend  the  Spanish  possessions  near  them. 
If  Spain,  however,  should  persist  in  her  restrictive 
commercial  policy,  war  would  be  inevitable.  "  We 
must  have  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi " 
(and  he  might  have  added  "  of  the  Mobile  ")  "  or  we 
will  take  it  by  force. "^^ 

This  vigorous  memoir  preceded  by  one  day  his  an- 
nouncement of  Monroe's  special  mission.  At  the  same 
time  he  asked  Cevallos  if  there  was  anything  in  the 
treaty  between  France  and  Spain  that  affected  the 
existing  rights  of  the  United  States,  or  prevented 
compliance  with  his  proposition  to  buy  Florida.  In 
answer  to  his  first  question  Cevallos  sent  him  the  third 
article  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso,  which  Pinckney 

31  Pinckney  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  Mar.  21,  1803,  ibid. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         79 

at  once  forwarded  to  Pans.  It  may  be  that  this  ar- 
ticle was  inserted  verbatim  in  the  subsequent  treaty 
between  France  and  the  United  States,  because  Mon- 
roe and  Livingston  had  this  official  copy  before  them. 
If  so,  the  Spanish  minister  unwittingly  rendered  the 
Americans  a  service  that  was  to  prove  extremely  em- 
barrassing to  himself. 

In  answer  to  his  second  question  Cevallos  sent  a 
brief  but  pointed  reply :  "  The  system  adopted  by  His 
Majesty  not  to  alienate  any  of  his  estates  deprives  him 
of  the  pleasure  of  agreeing  to  the  concession  which 
the  United  States  wished  to  obtain  by  purchase."  Af- 
ter stating  that  France  was  to  regain  Louisiana  "  with 
the  same  limits  it  had,  saving  the  rights  accruing  to 
other  powers,"  he  advised  Pinckney  that  the  United 
States  would  be  able  "to  direct  itself  to  the  govern- 
ment of  France  to  negotiate  for  the  acquisition  of  the 
territories  which  may  be  conducive  to  their  interests. "^- 

In  all  probability  the  Spanish  minister  merely  wished 
to  end  an  unpleasant  discussion  with  the  Americans. 
He  felt  reasonably  sure  that  France  would  be  un- 
willing to  negotiate  in  their  behalf  when  she  had  not 
been  able  to  gain  the  region  for  herself.  Casa  Yrujo 
was  instructed  to  inform  Madison  of  this  decision. 
In  doing  so,  he  added  that  the  Spanish  king,  by  thus 
alienating  his  dominions  contrary  to  the  Treaty  of 

32  Cevallos  to  Pinckney,  May  4,  1803,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


80         LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

Utrecht,  would  injure  his  reputation  and  arouse  com- 
plaints among  the  great  powers  of  Europe.  Besides, 
such  action  would  be  discourteous  to  France  after 
Spain's  recent  refusal  to  accept  her  advantageous  of- 
fers.^^  Both  Casa  Yrujo  and  Cevallos  speedily  learned 
that  Napoleon  was  by  no  means  equally  scrupulous  in 
his  dealings  with  them.  On  May  2  his  minister 
signed  with  Livingston  and  Monroe  the  treaty  that 
conveyed  Louisiana  to  the  United  States. 

The  recipients  of  Napoleon's  vast  and  unexpected 
gift  prospered  beyond  their  dreams,  but  not  in  the 
pathway  of  their  instructions.  This  led  east  of  the 
Mississippi,  while  they  had  wandered  far  to  the  west- 
ward. Despite  the  success  that  had  overtaken  them, 
they  must  still  direct  their  efforts  toward  the  Flori- 
das,  which  for  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  had  been 
the  goal  of  their  countrymen.  Moreover  the  defense 
of  their  new  acquisition  imperiously  led  them  thither. 
West  Florida  intervened  between  New  Orleans  and 
the  rest  of  the  United  States  and  still  gave  the  Span- 
iards a  chance  to  close  the  Mississippi.  Thus  the  great 
problem  of  its  commerce  was  by  no  means  perma- 
nently settled,  although  with  Louisiana  in  their  posses- 
sion, the  Americans  were  in  much  better  shape  to  in- 
sist upon  a  favorable  solution. 

At  first  neither  American  diplomat  perceived  the 

33  Casa  Yrujo  to  Madison,  July  2,  1803,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
I,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         8 1 

solution  afforded  by  the  indefinite  article  that  consti- 
tuted the  only  description  of  their  purchase.  Each 
worked  independently  to  secure  for  himself  all  the 
advantage  that  might  be  gained  by  further  acquisition. 
Monroe,  anxious  to  avoid  additional  expense,  at  first 
proposed  to  exchange  the  territory  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi for  the  Floridas.^*  Even  this  required  French 
assistance.  Napoleon  vaguely  promised  his  aid ;  but 
when  Spain  presented  her  inevitable  but  unavailing 
protest  against  the  alienation  of  Louisiana,  he  deter- 
mined to  protect  her,  at  least  from  other  aggressors 
than  himself.  He  intimated  to  the  special  envoy  that 
it  was  not  a  favorable  time  to  negotiate  at  Madrid, 
and  afterwards  repeated  this  declaration  so  decidedly 
that  Monroe  withdrew  to  his  new  post  in  London  to 
await  developments.^^ 

Livingston  was  equally  unsuccessful  in  attempting 
to  get  a  clearer  definition  of  the  acquisition.  Napo- 
leon's cynical  threat  to  render  the  territorial  article 
obscure,  if  it  were  not  already  so ;  Talleyrand's  mock- 
ing encouragement  to  make  the  best  possible  bargain 
out  of  the  treaty;  and  Barbe-Marbois'  evasion  over 
the  claim  to  Mobile^® — all  of  these  pointed  to  but  one 
conclusion :  the  Americans  might  interpret  the  treaty 

3*  Monroe  to  Madison,  May  i8,  1803,  Hamilton,  Monroe, 
IV,  24. 

35  Monroe  to  Secretary  of  State,  July  20,  1803,  ibid.,  44. 

36  Livingston  to  Madison,  May  20,  1803,  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  561. 

7 


82         LOUISIANA    PUECHASE    A^~D    THE    FLORIDAS 

to  suit  themselves.  Evidently  Napoleon  had  intended 
to  do  so ;  at  least  the  Spaniards  later  accepted  this  as 
the  most  ob\*ious  interpretation  of  the  puzzling  third 
article  in  the  Treat}-  of  San  Ildefonso  :^"  "  His  Catho- 
lic ^Nlajest}-  promises  and  engages  in  his  part,  to  retro- 
cede  to  the  French  Republic  the  colony  or  province  of 
Louisiana  with  the  same  extent  that  it  now  has  in  the 
hands  of  Spain,  that  it  had  when  France  possessed  it ; 
and  such  as  it  should  be  after  the  treaty  subsequently 
entered  into  between  Spain  and  other  states."^ 

It  is  true  that  the  instructions  to  the  French  envoys 
at  Madrid,  and  to  General  Victor,  who  was  to  take 
possession  of  the  pro-vince.  expressly  follow  the 
Treaty  of  1763,  and  thus  exclude  West  Florida  from 
the  cession.  All  documents  relating  to  the  transfer 
are  to  the  same  effect.^^  Yet  Napoleon's  general  at- 
titude toward  Louisiana,  to  say  nothing  of  other  phases 
in  his  career,  lead  one  to  conclude  that  he  would  not 
have  hesitated  to  use  this  article  to  force  the  cession 
of   West   Florida,   whenever  it   suited   his   purpose. 

3'  See  the  Memoir  dated  Dec.  2^  1S14.  in  the  manuscript 
volume.  Papers  in  Relation  to  Burr's  Conspiracy.  Bureau  of 
Rolls  and  Library.  Department  of  State. 

3^  De  Qercq^.  Reaieil  de  Traites  de  la  France,  L  411. 

3»  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  II.  5-10.  The  doca- 
ments  gathered  by  Mr.  Adams  from  the  French  archives  and 
deposited  in  the  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library  of  the  State 
Department  give  additional  evidence  to  support  this  position. 
The  correspondence  of  the  Spanish  colonial  authorities  in  the 
Archivo  General  de  Indias,  Seville,  is  to  the  same  effect 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS  83 


Whether  he  intended  to  incite  the  Americans  to  the 
same  end  is  immaterial.  They  were  bound  to  get 
into  a  controversy  with  Spain  over  the  article,  and 
both  parties  must  submit  their  quarrel  to  him  as  ar- 
Jbiter. 

Previous  to  ^May,  1803,  Livingston  had  contended 
that  West  Florida  formed  no  part  of  Louisiana.  It 
might  be  awkward  to  reverse  himself  so  quickly,  but 
few  knew  of  his  previous  contention,  and  the  public 
credit  for  obtaining  the  territory  would  far  outweigh 
their  disfavor.  The  ambiguous  article  lent  itself  to 
his  purpose,  although  he  had  to  adopt  an  interpreta- 
tion that  France  had  not  asserted  nor  Spain  allowed. 
Less  than  three  weeks  after  the  treaty  he  was  ready 
to  urge  his  belief  upon  ^^ladison.  "  Now  sir,"  he 
wrote,  "the  sum  of  this  business  is  to  recommend  to 
you,  in  the  strongest  terms,  after  having  obtained  the 
possession,  that  the  French  commissary  will  give  you, 
to  insist  upon  this  as  part  of  your  right;  and  to  take 
possession  at  all  events,  to  the  river  Perdido.  I  pledge 
myself  that  your  right  is  good,  and  after  the  explana- 
tion that  has  been  given  here,  you  need  apprehend 
nothing  from  a  decisive  measure."  Eight  days  later 
he  wrote  Pinckney  that  West  Florida,  including  Mo- 
bile, was  regarded  as  part  of  the  purchase  and  that 
he  should  act  accordingly.^*'  The  conception,  clever 
enough  for  the  Corsican  himself,  proved  irresistible 

*'^  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  68-73. 


84        LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

to  Monroe  and  later  to  his  fellow-statesmen  from  Vir- 
ginia. Their  only  regret  was  that  they  had  not  thought 
of  it  before  it  had  occurred  to  the  gentleman  from 
New  York. 

Early  in  June  Livingston  persuaded  his  colleague 
to  join  him  in  advising  A^adison  to  act  just  as  if  West 
Florida  formed  part  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans.*^ 
On  the  19th  of  the  month  Monroe  wrote  to  Madison 
that  his  opinion  on  the  southeastern  boundary  of  Lou- 
isiana was  "too  clear  to  admit  of  a  doubt."*^  Ha 
evidently  intended  by  definiteness  of  expression  to 
neutralize  what  Livingston  had  gained  by  priority.  He 
then  elaborated  his  opinion  in  a  memoir,  which  forms 
the  most  complete  statement  that  we  have  of  subse- 
quent American  opinion  upon  the  boundaries  of  Lou- 
isiana.*^ He  affirmed  that  the  Spanish  government 
held  views  similar  to  his  own,  or  at  any  rate  that  it 
would  acquiesce  in  the  occupation  of  the  territory  to 
the  Perdido. 

Monroe  made  a  detailed  examination  of  each  clause 
in  the  puzzling  third  article.  He  interpreted  the  first 
— that  the  cession  should  comprise  Louisiana  "  with 
the  same  extent  that  it  actually  has  in  the  hands  of 
Spain" — as  if  Spain  since  1783  had  considered  West 
Florida  as  a  part  of  Louisiana.     At  any  rate  if  Spain 

41  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  563-565. 

42  Hamilton,  Monroe,  IV,  38,  39. 

43  Ibid.,  Appendix  11. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS  85 

had  governed  the  areas  together,  she  had  thus  re- 
stored the  former  limit  to  the  Perdido.  The  second 
clause — that  "  Louisiana  shall  comprise  the  same  ex- 
tent that  it  had  when  France  possessed  it " — he  thought 
sufficiently  obvious.  It  had  only  served  to  render  the 
first  clause  clearer.  Otherwise  the  fact  that  Great 
Britain  had  owned  a  part  of  the  territory  for  twenty 
years  under  a  different  name  might  be  confusing.  The 
third  clause — "and  such  as  it  ought  to  be  after  the 
treaties  passed  subsequently  between  Spain  and  other 
powers" — referred  to  the  treaties  of  1783  and  1795, 
and  was  designed  to  safeguard  the  rights  of  the  United 
States.  This  clause,  then,  simply  gave  effect  to  the 
others,  as  was  shown  by  some  corroborative  evidence 
from  French  sources. 

According  to  Monroe,  France  never  dismembered 
Louisiana  while  it  was  in  her  possession.  On  Novem- 
ber 3,  1762,  she  conveyed  New  Orleans  and  the  ter- 
ritory west  of  the  Mississippi  to  Spain,  and  on  the 
same  day  transferred  the  Floridas  to  Great  Britain, 
After  1783  Spain  reunited  West  Florida  to  Louisiana, 
thus  completing  the  province  as  France  possessed  it, 
with  the  exception  of  those  portions  controlled  by  the 
United  States.  By  a  strict  interpretation  of  the  treaty, 
therefore,  Spain  might  be  required  to  cede  to  the 
United  States  such  territory  west  of  the  Perdido  as 
once  belonged  to  France.  Such  was  Livingston's  con- 
clusion, as  elaborated  by  Monroe  and  later  reinforced 
by  Jefferson  and  Madison. 


86         LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

A  few  weeks  later  in  London,  Monroe  informed 
Lord  Hawkesbury  that  the  Perdido  was  the  eastern 
Hmit  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase.  His  lordship  seemed 
favorably  impressed  with  the  idea,  and  thought  that 
East  Florida  would  likewise  soon  belong  to  the  United 
States.*^  From  Madrid,  however,  Pinckney  reported 
that  the  Spanish  authorities  naturally  held  the  opposite 
view;  but  if  the  United  States  made  good  its  claim 
there  would  be  little  difficulty  in  getting  East  Florida 
on  its  own  terms.  Cevallos  and  Godoy,  however, 
were  more  disturbed  by  the  prospective  transfer  of 
Louisiana  than  by  any  mere  question  of  its  limits. 
Unless  the  Americans  could  induce  France  to  assist 
them  in  gaining  the  Floridas,  they  were  liable  to  have 
trouble  over  this  unexpected  interpretation  of  the 
treaty.  Only  through  the  exigencies  of  European 
diplomacy  could  they  bring  the  Spanish  king  to  ac- 
cept it.*^ 

Jefferson  and  Madison  needed  no  urging  from  Paris 
to  show  them  the  desirability  of  claiming  part  of  West 
Florida.  They  had  an  even  stronger  sense  of  the  do- 
mestic value  of  such  a  claim  than  had  their  diplomatic 
representatives.  Despite  their  meagre  archival  data 
and  lack  of  touch  with  international  affairs,  they  were 
determined  to  push  their  bargain  to  the  uttermost.     At 

**  Hamilton,  Monroe,  IV,  70. 

4^  Pinckney  to  Madison  (Private),  Aug.  30,  1803,  Spanish 
Dispatches,  MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS  87 

separate  times  during  the  negotiation  both  Livingston 
and  Monroe  had  advised  the  administration  to  ex- 
change part  of  the  territory  west  of  the  Mississippi 
for  the  Floridas.  Madison  now  warned  them  to  en- 
tertain no  proposition  of  the  sort,  but  to  collect  the 
proofs  necessary  to  substantiate  their  claim  to  the  Per- 
dido.*^  Jefferson  had  already  included  all  the  waters 
of  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri  in  the  purchase.*^ 
Upon  perusing  the  arguments  of  Livingston  and  Mon- 
roe he  was  ready  to  extend  it  to  the  Perdido,  "  the 
ancient  boundary  of  Louisiana,"  and  confidently  ex- 
pected to  possess  the  whole  Florida  region,  "all  in 
good  time,"  without  sacrificing  "  one  inch  of  the 
waters  of  the  Mississippi."*^  Two  weeks  later  he  as- 
sured his  secretary  of  state  that  their  right  to  the  Per- 
dido was  "  substantial "  and  could  be  opposed  "  by  a 
quibble  on  form  only."*^  In  the  autumn  he  embodied 
his  views  in  a  pamphlet  entitled  "  The  Limits  and 
Bounds  of  Louisiana,"  and  this  pamphlet,  distributed 
in  manuscript  form,  determined  the  future  attitude 
of  the  administration  and  its  adherents.^" 

Jefferson  had  asked  some  gentlemen  on  the  border 
to  give  .him   their  views   on  Louisiana   cartography. 

^*^  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  627. 

^^  Jefferson  to  Horatio  Gates,  July  11,  1803,  Ford,  Jefferson, 
VIII,  249. 

^s  Jefferson  to  John  Breckenridge,  Aug.  12,  1803,  ibid.,  242. 

49  Ibid.,  245. 

^^  Published  in  Documents  Relating  to  the  Purchase  and 
Exploration  of  Louisiana,  Boston,  1904. 


88        LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

Daniel  Clark,  the  best  informed  of  them,  did  not  be- 
lieve the  cession  extended  beyond  the  line  laid  down 
in  the  Treaty  of  1763,  and  Dunbar  coincided  with  his 
view.  The  latter  seemed  to  favor  the  exchange  of  ter- 
ritory west  of  the  Mississippi  for  the  Floridas.  Clark 
thought  the  question  must  be  settled  by  negotiation 
and  concession.  Claiborne  and  John  Sibley  of  Natchi- 
toches were  inclined  to  favor  the  claim  to  the  Per- 
dido,  but  their  views  were  evidently  determined  by 
policy  rather  than  precise  information.  The  substance 
of  their  replies  afforded  the  president  little  comfort, 
but  in  summarizing  them  he  still  insisted  on  placing 
the  boundary  at  the  "  Perdigo  which  enters  into  the 
Gulf  east  of  Mobile." 

Across  the  border  Governor  Manuel  Salcedo  was 
not  at  all  certain  about  the  territorial  limits  of  Louisi- 
ana. He  had  earlier  asked  for  instructions  to  guide 
him  in  regard  to  Mobile  and  contiguous  territory. 
His  associate,  Vizente  Folch,  and  his  superior,  Cap- 
tain-General Someruelos,  both  told  him  that  Spain 
retroceded  to  France  exactly  the  territory  that  it  had 
received  forty  years  before.  Therefore  Louisiana  did 
not  include  West  Florida,  which  Spain  had  acquired 
from  Great  Britain.  Occasionally  the  governor  of 
Louisiana  had  exercised  a  personal  control  in  West 
Florida,  but  this  did  not  mean  a  merger  of  the  two 
provinces.^^ 

51  Salcedo  to  Someruelos,  Oct.  22,  1802,  Folch  to  Salcedo, 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         89 

Notwithstanding  these  explicit  statements  Salcedo 
persisted  in  his  confusion.  On  December  13,  1803, 
he  referred  to  Manchac  and  Baton  Rouge  as  "that 
part  of  Louisiana  which  still  remains  to  us,"  although 
in  the  same  missive  he  reported  that  the  transfer  on 
November  30  to  the  French  "  included  Louisiana  only." 
In  January  he  and  his  associate,  the  Marques  de  Casa 
Calvo,  asked  the  French  commissioner  to  support  their 
contention  that  "beyond  doubt  the  limits  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Mississippi  remain  fixed  by  the  treaty 
of  Paris."  He  made  an  acknowledgment  to  this  ef- 
fect, and  furthermore  told  the  American  commission- 
ers, General  Wilkinson  and  Governor  Claiborne,  that 
Spain  had  peremptorily  refused  to  include  Mobile  in 
the  transfer.  After  a  silence  of  some  two  months  the 
Americans  protested  against  any  statement  that  might 
seem  to  infringe  upon  their  full  claim  to  Louisiana.^- 

By  this  time  the  passage  of  the  Mobile  Act,  assert- 
ing jurisdiction  over  the  disputed  region,  raised  the 
question  to  one  of  international  importance.  The 
Spanish  commissioners  then  asked  Laussat  to  endorse 
their  protest  against  American  pretensions.     Laussat 

Nov.  22,  1802,  Someruelos  to  Salcedo,  Nov.  10,  1802,  Feb.  28, 
1803,  Mar.  12,  1803,  Spanish  Transcripts,  Department  of  Ar- 
chives and  History,  Jackson,  Miss.  Cf.  Robertson,  4874,  4877, 
4882,  4895,  4896. 

52  Robertson,  4935-4937,  4949,  49So,  4961 ;  Claiborne  and 
Wilkinson  to  Madison,  Dec.  27,  1803,  Louisiana  Purchase, 
MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library,  Department  of  State. 


90         LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

complied,  although  he  pursued  a  contrary  policy  in  re- 
gard to  Texas.^^  Perhaps,  as  Wilkinson  then  charged, 
he  designed  to  start  a  controversy  between  the  Span- 
iards and  the  Americans,  from  which  his  country 
alone  might  profit. 

The  American  general,  one  of  the  chief  actors  in 
the  transfer,  evidently  aspired  to  be  its  evil  genius 
also.  Despite  his  prominence  as  one  of  the  American 
representatives,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  act  as  mercen- 
ary adviser  for  the  Spaniards.  Folch,  the  new  gov- 
ernor of  West  Florida,  and  Casa  Calvo,  now  an  ac- 
credited Spanish  boundary  commissioner,  were  so  im- 
pressed by  his  specious  representations  that  they  paid 
him  a  munificent  sum  outright  and  advised  their  su- 
periors to  secure  his  allegiance  by  additional  largesses. 
In  return  he  gave  them  some  obvious  suggestions  about 
frontier  defense  that  Folch  himself  combated  in  his 
accompanying  letter.^* 

Wilkinson  endeavored  to  impress  Folch  by  claiming 
to  know  "  thoroughly  what  was  in  the  heart  of  the 
president."  The  executive  was  not  always  fortunate 
in  selecting  his  bosom  companions,  but  on  this  occasion 

S3  Robertson,  Louisiana  under  Spain,  France,  and  the  United 
States,  1785-1807,  II,  16S  ff. 

°*  For  the  details  of  the  intrigue,  cf.  Cox,  "  General  Wilkin- 
son and  his  Later  Intrigues  with  the  Spaniards,"  in  American 
Historical  Review,  XIX,  794-812.  For  the  memoir  printed  by 
Robertson  (Louisiana,  II,  325-347)  but  wrongly  ascribed  to 
Folch,  cf.  ibid.,  798,  note  11. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         9 1 

the  general  either  greatly  abused  the  confidences  of  his 
great  friend  or  was  using  them  with  extraordinary 
finesse  to  advance  his  own  fortunes.  Jefferson,  as 
we  have  seen,  accepted  the  claim  to  West  Florida  and 
encouraged  his  supporters  in  Congress  to  declare  it 
openly.  Wilkinson  advised  Folch  to  protest  against 
this  and  to  enlist  the  aid  of  the  French  government 
to  the  same  end.  The  president  proposed  to  gain 
the  Floridas  without  any  material  sacrifice  elsewhere. 
His  protege,  absolutely  dependent  upon  his  favor,  did 
not  hesitate  to  point  out  to  the  Spaniard,  in  return  for 
a  bribe  already  in  hand,  that  the  Floridas  formed  the 
key  to  the  New  World.  With  them  in  her  possession 
Spain  could  still  control  American  commerce  on  the 
Gulf  and  the  ^Mississippi,  exert  a  powerful  influence 
over  the  neighboring  Indians,  and  check  every  attempt 
of  the  United  States  to  press  its  claims  to  the  west- 
ward. By  yielding  them  as  a  result  of  Monroe's  pro- 
jected mission,  she  could  unlock  the  heritage  of  the 
Indies,  and  the  western  frontiersmen,  "  like  the  an- 
cient Goths  and  Vandals  would  precipitate  themselves 
upon  the  weak  defenses  of  ^Mexico,  overturn  every- 
thing in  their  path,  and  propagate  in  their  course  the 
pestilent  doctrines  that  had  desolated  the  most  valu- 
able part  of  Europe  and  deprived  whole  kingdoms  of 
their  foundations."  Yet  Spain  would  do  well  to  ex- 
change the  Floridas  for  the  entire  western  bank  of  the 
Mississippi.     She  could  even  be  generous  in  the  pro- 


92        LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

cess  and  assume  the  existing  public  debt  of  the  United 
States. 

Perhaps  Wilkinson  depended  upon  this  last  sug- 
gestion to  appease  the  economical  Jefferson  should  he 
ever  hear  of  this  intrigue.  He  was  anxious  to  make 
one  great  financial  strike  that  would  place  him  in  easy 
circumstances  for  the  rest  of  his  life,  and  this  proposal 
would  certainly  have  accomplished  his  purpose  had  the 
Spanish  authorities  seriously  entertained  it.  In  the 
interim  he  sagely  advised  them  how  to  defend  West 
Florida,  as  well  as  Texas,  and  urged  them  to  encour- 
age the  American  policy  of  removing  the  Indians  west 
of  the  Mississippi.  Those  so  removed  would  become 
bitter  enemies  of  the  United  States  and  would  be 
more  ready  to  assist  Spain  in  protecting  her  western 
frontier. 

Folch  had  some  faith  in  Wilkinson,  but  doubted  his 
accuracy.  So  he  advised  his  superiors  to  keep  the 
Floridas  as  a  rampart  for  Cuba,  and  to  gain  the  west 
bank  of  the  Mississippi  as  well.  Perhaps  they  might 
immediately  cede  some  territory  on  its  eastern  bank. 
He  was  willing  to  repay  what  the  United  States  had 
actually  expended  for  Louisiana,  but  it  would  be  po- 
litical heresy  to  do  more.  More  to  the  point  was  Casa 
Calvo's  payment  of  twelve  thousand  dollars  on  ac- 
count. Wilkinson,  then  and  thereafter,  offered  vari- 
ous explanations  of  his  ill-gotten  store  of  Mexican 
silver,  and  despite  the  inconsistency  of  his  excuses, 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         93 

succeeded  only  too  well  in  concealing  the  transaction 
that  produced  it.  Other  dealings  of  equally  shady 
character  were  to  mark  the  renewal  of  his  intrigues 
with  the  Spaniards. 

In  the  meantime,  in  connection  with  the  ratification 
of  the  Louisiana  treaty,  the  American  Congress  had 
so  acted  as  to  give  point  to  Wilkinson's  advice.  In 
the  Senate  Pickering  of  Massachusetts  voiced  his  op- 
position, because  the  limits  of  the  purchase  were  so 
"unintelligible,"  especially  on  the  side  of  Florida. 
Dayton,  of  New  Jersey,  with  some  inside  information 
acquired  during  his  recent  sojourn  in  Louisiana,  as- 
sured his  fellows  that  the  French  prefect  had  no  inten- 
tion of  being  restrainedby  the  Iberville,  after  his  troops 
should  arrive.^^  The  suggestion  was  clearly  too  un- 
scrupulous for  his  hearers.  Congress  rather  preferred 
to  follow  the  advice  that  Mitchell  of  Georgia  gave  the 
House :  ratify  the  treaty,  take  possession  of  the  terri- 
tory, and  then  settle  the  disputed  boundaries  by  joint 
commissions.  John  Randolph  warned  the  House  that 
if  they  waited  to  adjust  limits  before  ratifying  the 
treaty,  they  might  never  secure  any  of  the  territory. 
Acting  as  the  spokesman  for  the  administration,  he 
stated  definitely  that  the  United  States  had  gained  con- 
trol of  the  "  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  the  Mobile,  and 
of  every  river  of  note  except  the  Appalachicola,  rising 

"5  Annals  of  Eighth  Congress,  First  Session,  I,  47,  48. 


94        LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

within  the  United  States  and  falling  into  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico."^" 

To  support  his  assertion  Randolph  briefly  reviewed 
the  French  and  Spanish  claims  to  the  Floridas.  Es- 
saying an  interpretation  of  the  perplexing  third  ar- 
ticle in  the  Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso,  he  reached  the 
seemingly  inevitable  American  solution:  the  Perdido 
bounded  the  Louisiana  Purchase,  below  the  thirty- 
first  parallel.  It  was  against  this  interpretation  that 
Wilkinson  warned  Folch  and  advised  him  to  enlist 
French  assistance.  A  few  Americans  opposed  this 
view, — Rufus  King,  who  at  first  seemed  to  favor  it, 
his  friend  Pickering,  and  Ellicott,  whose  book  ap- 
peared that  year.^^  About  a  decade  later  Stoddart 
and  H.  M.  Brackenridge  strongly  championed  the  Jef- 
fersonian  view  and  aroused  most  scathing  criticism, 
especially  from  Benjamin  Vaughn  of  Boston.^^  In 
general  these  controversialists  were  too  partisan  to  be 
convincing. 

Madison,  who  had  independent  leanings  toward  the 
Monroe-Livingston  interpretation  of  the  Louisiana 
Purchase,  told  Pichon,  the  French  minister,  how  de- 

5*  Annals  of  Eighth  Congress,  First  Session,  I,  401,  415, 
439,  486. 

^^  For  the  position  of  King  and  Pickering,  cf.  King,  Rufus 
King.  IV,  329-332,  363,  554,  555,  and  Jefferson  Papers,  Series 
2,  Vol.  66,  No.  36,  MS.,  Library  of  Congress.  For  Ellicott's 
opinion  cf.  Preface  of  his  Journal,  pp.  V  and  VI. 

•''^  A.  Stoddart,  Sketches  ...  of  Louisiana,  131-149;  Vaughan, 
Remarks  on  a  Dangerous  Mistake,  etc.,  Boston,  1814.  Copy 
of  latter  consulted  in  the  Library  of  Congress. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS  95 

sirable  it  was  to  define  Louisiana  with  greater  ac- 
curacy before  delivering  it  to  the  Americans.  Else, 
he  observed,  the  treaty  of  cession  would  be  subject 
to  "  every  legitimate  interpretation  and  inference  "  the 
Americans  might  care  to  make.^^  But  Laussat  made 
the  delivery  with  no  public  statement  about  West 
Florida  or  the  boundaries  in  general.  It  would  be  an 
easy  matter,  the  secretary  wrote  Monroe,  "to  take 
possession  according  to  our  idea.  The  mode  alone 
can  beget  a  question."*"* 

The  Spanish  minister,  Casa  Yrujo,  warned  the 
colonial  authorities  that  the  Americans  would  prob- 
ably occupy  West  Florida  at  once — a  course  to  which 
the  weakness  of  the  garrisons  there  invited  them ;  or, 
by  withholding  part  of  the  purchase  money,  force  the 
French  to  get  it  for  them."^  Evidently  he  did  not 
know  either  party  as  thoroughly  as  he  imagined.  The 
French  autocrat,  already  regretting  his  munificent  do- 
nation to  the  Americans,  was  not  inclined  to  augment 
it,  while  the  president  would  hesitate  before  attempt- 
ing to  force  his  generosity.  Rather,  Jefiferson  ex- 
pected to  gain  that  part  of  West  Florida  bordering 
on  the  Mississippi  through  the  voluntary  action  of  its 

59  Madison  to  Pichon,  Oct.  21,  1803,  Domestic  Letters,  MS., 
Vol.  14,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  Department  of 
State. 

60  Hunt,  Madison,  VII,  78. 

61  Casa  Yrujo  to  Someruelos,  Feb.  12,  1804,  Legajo,  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


96         LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

inhabitants,  and  that  right  soon.  As  for  the  rest  of 
it,  he  could  await  some  "  favorable  conjunction 
abroad."  An  attempt  to  restrict  American  commerce 
on  the  Mobile  might  likewise  avail  to  bring  Spain  to 
a  "just  and  liberal  settlement."^^  He  was  soon  given 
a  chance  to  test  both  these  possibilities. 

Despite  the  president's  optimism,  Anthony  Merry, 
the  new  British  minister  at  Washington,  noted  a  dis- 
appointment in  administration  circles  because  of  this 
failure  to  secure  West  Florida.  The  unsympathetic 
attitude  of  the  prefect,  Laussat,  increased  their  disap- 
pointment, which  was  rendered  still  more  poignant  be- 
cause certain  explanations  at  Paris  had  led  them  to 
claim  the  region  publicly.  But  the  Englishman  felt 
that  they  would  employ  diplomacy  rather  than  arms  to 
gain  it,  and  they  would  at  the  same  time  instruct 
Monroe,  who  was  to  conduct  the  negotiation,  to  essay 
East  Florida  as  well.  The  British  minister  interpreted 
American  irritation  as  due  in  some  measure  to  a  fear 
that  Great  Britain  might  occupy  the  disputed  territory, 
should  Spain  ally  herself  with  France.  This  would 
revive  all  the  dread  of  western  separation.  To  offset 
this  the  United  States  might  seek  closer  relations  with 
France.^^ 

In  view  of  what  followed  we  cannot  credit  Merry 

82  Jefferson  to  Monroe,  Jan.  8,  1804,  Ford,  Jefferson,  VIII, 
289. 

63  Merry  to  Hawkesbury,  Jan.  16,  1804,  MS.,  British  For- 
eign Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  41,  London. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS  97 

with  a  very  good  guess.  Back  in  November  John 
Randolph  had  introduced  into  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives a  bill  to  carry  into  effect  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  within  the  new  acquisition.  On  Feb- 
ruary 24,  1804,  it  received  the  president's  signature. 
Notwithstanding  the  importance  of  the  measure  as  a 
whole,  it  was  its  fourth  and  eleventh  sections  that  gave 
it  its  popular  name,  "  The  Mobile  Act." 

The  fourth  section  provided  for  the  annexation  to 
the  Mississippi  revenue  district  of  "all  navigable 
waters,  rivers,  creeks,  bays,  inlets,  lying  within  the 
United  States  which  empty  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
east  of  the  Mississippi  river."  But  if  the  Iberville 
was  the  eastern  limit  of  American  territory,  there  were 
no  such  navigable  waters  wholly  within  the  United 
States.  Section  eleven  was  still  more  explicit,  for  it 
authorized  the  president,  whenever  he  should  deem  it 
expedient,  to  form  "the  shores,  waters  and  inlets  of 
the  bay  and  river  of  Mobile,  and  of  other  rivers,  creeks, 
inlets,  and  bays  emptying  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  east 
of  the  said  river  of  Mobile,  and  west  thereof  to  the 
Pascagoula,"  into  a  separate  revenue  district,  and  to 
designate  suitable  ports  of  entry  and  delivery.  These 
two  sections  placed  a  full  legislative  interpretation  on 
the  theories  of  Livingston,  Monroe,  and  Jefferson,  and 
there  remained  only  the  open  or  tacit  acquiescence  of 
Spain  to  make  good  the  title  of  the  United  States  as 
far  as  the  Perdido. 


98  LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

In  a  violent  personal  interview  which  Casa  Yrujo 
held  with  him,  Madison  speedily  learned  that  Spain 
would  by  no  means  consent  to  this  interpretation. 
The  incensed  Spaniard  demanded  the  annulment  of 
these  offending  sections,  and  gave  at  great  length  the 
Spanish  interpretation  of  the  obscure  territorial 
clauses.  Moreover,  Yrujo  refused  to  ratify  the  pend- 
ing claims  convention  which  the  administration  hoped 
to  use  in  negotiating  for  the  Floridas.  Madison,  of 
course,  could  not  comply  with  Yrujo's  peremptory 
demand,  nor  could  he  allege  that  the  other  held  a  mis- 
taken view  of  the  objectionable  clauses.  In  a  com- 
munication to  Livingston  he  intimated  that  the  act  was 
passed  to  prevent  smuggling  through  West  Florida, 
but  this  seems  an  afterthought.  As  neither  he  nor 
Jefferson  had  demanded  possession  of  the  territory  at 
the  time  Louisiana  was  transferred,  the  situation  was 
an  awkward  one  for  both  of  them. 

It  promised  to  become  more  awkward  from  the  fact 
that  Casa  Yrujo  persuaded  Merry  to  make  common 
cause  with  him.  Through  his  foreign  office  and  the 
London  press  the  British  minister  was  to  inform  his 
people  that  Spain  had  not  evacuated  West  Florida 
and  did  not  propose  to  do  so,  however  much  the 
Americans  sought  to  create  the  contrary  impression. 
Moreover  Spain  would  not  sell  any  territory  that 
would  assure  them  control  of  the  Gulf  to  the  detri- 
ment of  her  own  interests  and  those  of  Great  Britain. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS         99 

In  a  later  memoir  the  British  minister  showed  how 
important  this  region  was  in  the  commercial  develop- 
ment of  the  western  country.  Its  harbors  were  espe- 
cially valuable  in  view  of  the  difficulties  in  navigating 
the  lower  Mississippi. 

As  Madison  rendered  him  no  adequate  explanation 
of  the  administration's  course,  Yrujo  withdrew  from 
Washington  in  anger.  The  president  then  cleared  the 
situation  by  his  proclamation  of  May  30,  1804,  in 
which  he  stated  that  "  all  the  above  mentioned  shores, 
waters,  inlets,  creeks,  and  rivers,  lying  within  the 
boundaries  of  the  United  States,  should  form  a  sepa- 
rate district  under  the  name  of  Mobile,  with  Fort 
Stoddart  as  its  port  of  entry  and  delivery."  Thus  he 
virtually  annulled  the  act,  and  that  too  in  face  of  the 
general  public  interpretation.  Merry  reported  this 
course  as  "  perfectly  satisfactory "  to  Casa  Yrujo.®* 
If  so,  the  Spaniard  did  not  permit  the  president  to 
know  it,  but  despite  a  later  conciliatory  explanation  by 
Madison,  continued  to  harp  upon  it  as  a  characteristic 
example  of  American  duplicity.  Monroe  was  to  find 
Casa  Yrujo's  superiors  equally  obdurate. 

That  Jefferson's  concession  was  but  temporary  is 
evident  from  his  previous  statement  to  Dunbar :  "  how- 
ever much  we  may  compromise  on  our  western  limits, 

^*  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States.  II,  260-263 ;  Merry 
to  Hawkesbury,  Mar.  13,  1804,  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office, 
America,  II,  5,  Vol.  41. 


100      LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS 

we  never  shall  on  our  eastern."''^  He  had  evidently 
permitted  Congress  to  pass  the  act  in  order  to  test 
Spanish  resistance  to  our  claim.  When  this  proved 
unexpectedly  strong,  he  wavered,  suggested  a  specious 
explanation  that  made  him  appear  more  liberal  than 
Congress,  and  by  implication  threw  upon  Randolph, 
whom  he  tutored  in  regard  to  West  Florida,  the  major 
part  of  the  blame  for  the  unfortunate  legislation.  The 
testy  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means 
did  not  forget  the  affront,  as  the  shifty  executive  was 
to  discover. 

Monroe's  special  mission  constituted  another  reason 
for  conciliating  the  Spaniards.  By  this  negotiation, 
with  Pinckney's  casual  aid,  the  administration  hoped  to 
finish  with  its  great  problems  of  European  diplomacy, 
and  acquire  East  Florida,  perfect  its  title  to  West 
Florida,  and  fix  upon  a  satisfactory  western  boundary. 
On  April  15,  1804,  Madison  sent  Monroe  his  instruc- 
tions, embodying  the  opinion  of  the  united  cabinet. 
By  insisting  that  the  strip  to  the  Perdido  formed  part 
of  the  Louisiana  Purchase,  he  would  avoid  acknowl- 
edging the  recent  land  grants  that  Morales  had  made 
there.  He  was  to  offer  two  million  dollars  for  the 
remainder  of  West  Florida  and  East  Florida,  together 
with  the  renunciation  of  certain  commercial  claims. 
In  the  following  July  he  was  informed  that  the  right 

o'^  Jefferson  to  Dunbar,  Mar.  13,  1804,  Washington,  The 
Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IV,  537. 


LOUISIANA    PURCHASE    AND    THE    FLORIDAS       lOI 

to  the  Perdido  was  a  sine  qua  non,  and  that  he  must 
contend  still  more  strongly  for  the  whole  of  Texas. 
To  this  program,  however,  Gallatin  did  not  wholly 
give  his  consent.^® 

With  this  statement  we  may  conclude  the  American 
position  in  regard  to  West  Florida,  Political,  com- 
mercial, and  strategic  motives,  as  well  as  personal 
views,  led  Livingston,  Monroe,  Madison,  and  Jeffer- 
son to  insist  upon  including  it  in  the  Louisiana  Pur- 
chase. West  Florida  was  necessary  for  the  defence 
of  New  Orleans  and  the  navigation  of  the  Mobile,  It 
had  been  desired  for  more  than  twenty  years.  Its  ac- 
quisition formed  the  main  purpose  of  Monroe's  special 
mission.  East  Florida,  though  more  extensive,  was  of 
less  immediate  importance.  Both  territories,  however, 
were  necessary  to  the  proper  rounding  out  of  Ameri- 
can dominions.  The  next  decade  was  to  determine 
the  status  of  West  Florida.  Within  five  years  more, 
even  Spain  recognized  that  she  must  yield  East  Florida. 
The  methods  by  which  she  was  brought  to  acknowledge 
these  truths  constitute  the  main  features  of  the  ensu- 
ing discussion. 

66  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  628,  630, 


CHAPTER   IV 
The  Failure  of  Monroe's  Special  Mission 

In  the  quadrennium  following  the  renewal  of  war- 
fare in  Europe,  Napoleon's  crushing  victories  gave  him 
the  mastery  from  the  Tagus  to  Tilsit.  Outside  these 
limits  his  diplomacy  was  potent,  if  not  wholly  supreme. 
Its  most  direct  manifestations  in  the  United  States 
centered  about  the  problems  of  neutral  commerce; 
but  the  controversy  over  West  Florida,  involving 
East  Florida  as  well,  and  damages  for  commercial 
spoliations,  played  an  important  if  insidious  part  in 
the  diplomatic  game.  Through  it  Napoleon  hoped  to 
gain  a  substantial  subsidy,  as  he  had  done  in  the  case 
of  Louisiana,  even  if  he  did  not  bring  the  United 
States  into  an  alliance  against  the  Mistress  of  the 
Seas.  Neither  the  American  nation  nor  Spain  was 
able  wholly  to  resist  his  machinations,  but  the  latter, 
because  of  her  proximity,  was  to  be  the  greater 
sufferer. 

Far  from  being  moved  to  compassion  by  Spain's 
plight,  and  distinctly  repelled  by  what  it  regarded  as  her 
obstinate  pride,  the  American  administration  proposed 
to  make  her  lot  still  harder  by  forcing  the  long  desired 
cession  of  the  Floridas.     For  this  purpose  Jefferson 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  103 

and  his  advisers  armed  their  representatives  with  the 
plausible  claim  to  West  Florida  and  with  questionable 
commercial  demands,  which  their  unfortunate  southern 
neighbor  could  not  meet  unaided. 

Doubtful  as  these  claims  were,  they  depended  upon 
the  modern  Caesar  to  push  them  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion. But  unwilling  to  match  his  ruthless  methods, 
Jefferson  and  Madison  undertook  a  diplomatic  bout 
that  resembled  the  famous  attack  on  the  windmill. 
Monroe  was  their  champion ;  his  task  the  purchase  of 
the  Floridas — the  same  that  brought  him  to  Europe  the 
year  before.  Napoleon  had  then  refused  to  counte- 
nance his  efforts,  but  as  Spain  was  soon  to  number 
England  among  her  enemies  the  time  now  seemed 
favorable  for  the  United  States  to  press  its  demands. 

Again,  as  in  the  previous  year,  Monroe's  commission 
aroused  a  jealous  rival.  Charles  Pinckney  had  been 
instructed  to  await  his  coming;  but  as  early  as  July, 
1803,  when  he  learned  that  Monroe  would  not  come 
on  at  once,  he  had  begun  to  pave  the  way  for  him.  By 
reviving  former  claims  against  Spain  for  spoliations 
and  urging  these  in  an  offer  to  purchase  the  Floridas, 
he  hoped  to  avoid  any  controversy  over  the  claim  to  the 
Perdido.  Now  that  Napoleon  had  abandoned  his  ter- 
ritorial aspirations  in  America,  Pinckney  counted  on 
French  assistance.  The  price  offered  was  too  small 
and  the  method  of  payment  was  objectionable,  but  as 
the  United  States  was  the  only  possible  purchaser,  he 


104         FAILURE    OF    MONROE^'s    SPECIAL    MISSION 

prophesied  an  easy  acquisition.  His  secretary,  Gra- 
ham, as  before,  did  not  share  in  his  confidence,  but 
hoped  that  Monroe's  mission  would  create  the  proper 
impression  on  the  Spanish  officials.^ 

Graham  was  not  the  only  American  to  express  little 
confidence  in  Pinckney's  efforts.  Jefferson  and  Madi- 
son advised  him  to  do  nothing  about  the  Floridas, 
pending  Monroe's  arrival,  unless  the  Spaniards  first 
broached  the  matter.  But  in  keeping  with  his  earlier 
course,  Pinckney  encouraged  the  Spanish  secretaries 
to  make  such  advances.  He  reminded  Godoy  that  he 
had  once  "  done  much  for  the  United  States  in  a  spirit 
of  conciliation."  The  minister  knew  this  only  too  well 
and  doubtless  little  relished  the  seductive  reference. 
A  hint  that  the  French  might  favor  the  cause  of  the 
Americans,  or  that  Great  Britain,  when  Spain  should 
be  at  war  with  her,  would  make  an  alliance  with  them, 
pleased  him  as  little.-  None  of  these  unwelcome  hints 
moved  him  or  the  obdurate  Cevallos.  Both  acknowl- 
edged that  the  Floridas  were  economically  worthless 
and  that  the  United   States   must  inevitably  possess 

1  Pinckney  to  Secretary  of  State,  Nov.  20,  1803,  Spanish 
Dispatches,  MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  same 
to  Madison,  Aug.  30,  1803,  Letters  of  C.  Pinckney  and  R. 
Livingston,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Graham 
to  Monroe,  Nov.  18,  1803,  Lenox  MSS.,  New  York  PubHc 
Libra''y. 

2  Pinckney  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  Dec.  30,  1803,  Letters 
of  C.  Pinckney  and  R.  Livingston,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Indexes 
and  Archives. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROE  S    SPECIAL    MISSION  I05 

them,  but  neither  covert  threat  nor  proffered  friend- 
ship could  induce  the  Spaniards  to  hasten  this  achieve- 
ment. 

Undeterred  by  their  failure  to  respond  to  his  ad- 
vances, Pinckney  pursued  his  chosen  course,  inform- 
ing Madison  and  Jefferson,  to  their  discomfiture,  that 
"  we  must  he  moderate  and  patient.  The  game  we  are 
playing  is  not  a  trifling  one  and  appears  now  to  he 
more  within  our  power  than  ever."  At  the  same  time 
he  warned  them,  "  I  have  already  mentioned  to  you  in 
many  of  my  letters  the  improbability  of  my  doing  any- 
thing with  the  sum  limited  as  to  Florida  and  now  I 
repeat  it  as  a  thing  almost  impossible  with  that  sum." 
Livingston,  whom  he  counselled  to  enlist  the  aid  of  the 
French,  shared  his  view.^ 

The  man  who  would  not  keep  his  hands  off  a  nego- 
tiation when  explicitly  instructed  to  do  so  was  hardly 
likely  to  further  it  to  the  exclusive  advantage  of  a 
prospective  rival.  No  one,  then  or  thereafter,  charged 
that  Pinckney  consciously  attempted  to  bungle  the 
delicate  task  in  which  he  was  simply  to  introduce  the 
chief  agent,  Monroe;  but  he  was  so  anxious  to  antici' 
pate  honors  for  himself  that,  copying  Livingston  in 
like  circumstances,  he  spent  months  in  meddling  with 

3  Pinckney  to  Madison,  Jan.  24,  1804,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  same  to  same, 
Apr.  8,  1804,  Letters  of  C.  Pinckney  and  R.  Livingston,  MS., 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives.  The  italicized  portions  of 
the  above  dispatch  were  written  in  cipher. 


I06        FAILURE    OF    MONROE^S    SPECIAL    MISSION 

a  question  that  above  all  needed  to  be  left  alone.  It 
was  a  case  that  seemed  to  call  for  "watchful  waiting" 
rather  than  unwelcome  insistence,  but  the  former 
course  promised  little  public  renown. 

At  length  the  report  of  the  Mobile  Act  gave  Cevallos 
a  chance  to  still  the  American's  unwelcome  urging.  His 
vigorous  protest  aroused  the  anger  of  Pinckney,  who 
retaliated  by  asking  Cevallos  to  explain  why  his  sov- 
ereign had  failed  to  ratify  the  claims  convention  of 
August,  1802,  which  played  a  substantial  part  in  the 
administration's  program.  On  receiving  a  conditional 
reply,  that  demanded  among  other  points  the  revoking 
of  the  Mobile  Act,  Pinckney  threatened  an  immediate 
rupture.*  The  puzzled  and  frightened  Cevallos,  faced 
with  the  necessity  of  yielding  to  American  encroach- 
ment or  becoming  more  subservient  to  France,  chose 
the  latter  alternative.  His  country  had  long  borne  the 
burden  of  this  subserviency,  and  despite  the  costly 
concessions  that  it  entailed,  his  colleague  Godoy,  the 
victim  of  one  of  the  most  shameful  of  concessions, 
could  suggest  nothing  better.^  They  first  appealed  to 
Beurnonville,  the  French  ambassador.  Pinckney  also 
turned  to  him  in  his  difficulties,^  although  he  urged 

*  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  279. 

5  Pinckney  to  Madison,  Aug.  26,  1804,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

6  Beurnonville  to  Minister,  18  Prairial,  An  XII  (June  7, 
1804),  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  fispagne,  MS.,  Vol. 
666,  294. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROE  S    SPECIAL    MISSION         107 

Livingston  to  busy  himself  with  the  very  source  of 
authority.  The  Spanish  ministers  hkewise  instructed 
their  representative,  Admiral  Gravina,  to  enlist  the 
aid  of  the  French  emperor,  for  such  Napoleon  had 
now  become.  If  war  with  the  United  States  should 
materialize,  that  country  was  Hable  to  form  an  alliance 
with  Great  Britain,  invade  Mexico,  and,  aided  by  the 
British  army,  cut  Spain  off  from  her  most  productive 
colonies.  This  prospect  touched  Napoleon  at  a  tender 
point,  for  he  had  scarcely  less  interest  in  the  Mexican 
treasury  than  had  Spain  herself.  Accordingly  he  lent 
a  ready  ear  to  Gravina's  request  and  bade  Talleyrand 
instruct  the  new  envoy  to  the  United  States,  General 
Louis  Marie  Turreau,  to  aid  Casa  Yrujo  in  preventing 
hostilities  and  in  curbing  the  territorial  pretensions  of 
the  Americans.'^ 

In  answer  to  Beurnonville's  request  for  specific  in- 
structions about  West  Florida,  Talleyrand  vaguely  in- 
formed him  that  France  sold  to  the  United  States  only 
such  territory  as  it  actually  received  from  Spain. 
Having  repossessed  Louisiana  only  momentarily,  with 
no  opportunity  to  determine  its  rights,  his  government 
was  now  unwilling  to  enter  into  the  dispute.  But  it 
hoped  for  a  friendly  settlement  between  the  interested 
parties.®     Perhaps  Talleyrand  distrusted  the  French 

^  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  294,  295. 

8  Talleyrand  to  Beurnonville,  16  Messidor,  An  XII  (July  5, 
1804),  Archives  des  Aflfaires  Etrangeres,  fifats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol. 
57,  160. 


I08         FAILURE    OF    MONROe's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

ambassador's  ability  to  still  the  tumult  then  raging  at 
the  Spanish  court  and  to  control  both  Pinckney  and  the 
Spanish  ministers.  He  felt  better  able  to  guide  the 
controversy  from  the  home  office. 

At  the  same  time  Livingston  explained  to  Talley- 
rand how  the  first  sight  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso 
removed  all  doubts  about  the  eastern  limit  of  Louisiana 
and  overcame  his  hesitation  at  exceeding  his  powers 
in  purchasing  it.  Under  French  possession  that 
province  had  extended  to  the  Perdido,  both  when 
France  originally  owned  it  and  after  Spain  retroceded 
it  to  her,  and  the  United  States  was  entitled  to  all  that 
France  had  acquired.  This  last  statement  almost  para- 
phrased Talleyrand's  dictum  to  Beurnonville,  but  to  the 
American  it  meant  something  far  different.  ]\Iore- 
over,  he  alleged  that  Talleyrand,  the  year  before,  had 
assented  to  his  claim  that  Louisiana  extended  to  the 
Perdido.  He  alluded  to  the  "  excessive  delicacy " 
that  kept  the  Americans  from  taking  possession  of  the 
disputed  area,  pending  more  definite  explanations. 
Talleyrand  doubtless  appreciated  both  these  references. 

With  this  ingratiating  introduction  Livingston 
passed  to  an  explanation  of  the  Mobile  Act.  His  gov- 
ernment had  expected  the  Spanish  authorities  to  accept 
the  American  interpretation  of  the  cession  and  grant 
the  claim  to  the  Perdido.  As  this  concession  might 
occur  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress,  that  body 
had  judged  it  expedient  to  pass  certain  regulations  for 


FAILURE    OF    MONROE  S    SPECIAL    MISSION         J 09 

establishing  custom-houses  in  that  region.  Unfor- 
tunately the  Spanish  minister  misinterpreted  this  ac- 
tion, and  his  heated  remonstrances  thereon  threatened 
to  disrupt  friendly  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain.  Hostihties  once  begun,  the  safety  of  the 
western  country  would  lead  the  frontiersmen  to  occupy 
the  disputed  territory.  At  the  same  time  the  United 
States  would  join  Great  Britain  in  an  attempt  to  free 
the  Spanish  colonies.  On  the  other  hand,  by  promptly 
intervening  the  emperor  would  assure  the  United 
States  its  just  claims,  and  enable  that  nation  to  pur- 
chase East  Florida  before  another  maritime  power 
could  seize  it.  The  other  colonies  would  then  con- 
tinue under  Spanish  control  as  best  suited  French  and 
American  interests.^ 

With  both  disputants  appealing  to  him.  Napoleon 
was  free  to  use  the  quarrel  to  his  own  advantage.  By 
yielding  for  the  moment  to  the  protests  of  injured 
pride,  he  might  atone  for  the  hurt  inflicted  upon  Spain 
when  he  alienated  Louisiana.  The  unseemly  haste  of 
the  Americans  in  claiming  a  region  that  he  had  vainly 
attempted  to  purchase,  the  inopportune  passage  of  the 
Mobile  Act,  and  the  vigorous  insistence  on  commercial 
claims  further  impelled  him  to  favor  the  outraged 
Spaniards.  Under  his  direction,  therefore,  Talley- 
rand instructed  Turreau  to  inform  the  American  gov- 

9  Livingston  to  Talleyrand,  Aug.  23,  1804,  Archives  des 
Affaires  fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS.,  Supplement,  Vol.  8. 


no         FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION 

emment  in  a  thoroughly  conciHatory  manner  that  the 
eastern  limit  of  Louisiana  was  undoubtedly  the  Missis- 
sippi, the  Iberville,  and  the  lakes,  as  laid  down  in  the 
Treaty  of  1762 ;  and  that  the  double  cession  since 
afforded  no  basis  for  a  more  extensive  claim.  The 
United  States  should  also  modify  some  objectionable 
features  of  its  commercial  claims.^" 

This  yielding  to  Spanish  susceptibilities  promised  to 
be  only  temporary.  If  war  should  break  out  between 
Spain  and  Great  Britain  the  latter,  as  mistress  of  the 
seas,  might  prevent  the  Spanish  treasure  ships  from 
reaching  Europe  and  thus  cut  France  off  from  a 
million  or  more  dollars  per  month,  which  Spain  paid 
as  a  secret  subsidy  to  her  imperial  plunderer.  The 
political  libertine  would  then  be  forced  to  seek  com- 
pensation elsewhere.  Another  cherished  possession 
of  his  helpless  mistress  would  afford  the  means,  and 
with  the  Louisiana  Purchase  still  fresh  in  mind,  he 
did  not  doubt  that  the  Americans  stood  ready  to  pay 
his  price."  The  mere  pride  of  despoiled  Spain  would 
weigh  but  little  against  the  needs  of  his  treasury.  He 
could  afford  to  await  the  moment  of  hostilities  between 
Spain  and  England,  for  delay  would  enhance  the  value 
of  the  Floridas  in  the  eyes  of  the  Americans. 

The  disputants  were  not  forced  to  wait  long.     Spain 

^^  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  295-300. 
11  Livingston  hinted  at  this  in  his  communication  to  Madi- 
son, Sept.  21,  1804;  Hamilton,  Monroe,  IV,  305,  n. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  III 

was  assembling  an  armament  at  Ferrol,  possibly  to  use 
against  the  United  States.  The  British  minister,  seek- 
ing a  pretext  for  hostilities  in  order  to  cut  off  Spain's 
subsidy  to  Napoleon,  demanded  an  explanation  of  this 
armament.  The  Spanish  government  was  unwilling 
to  give  it,  whereupon  the  British  fleet  seized  the 
Spanish  treasure  ships  and  Spain  immediately  de- 
clared war.  Pinckney,  who  had  not  yet  recovered  from 
the  humiliation  of  his  failure, , wrote :  "We  ought  to 
get  what  we  want  now."^^  Possibly  so,  but  his  su- 
periors preferred  to  substitute  another  agent.  Casa 
Yrujo  had  asked  for  his  recall  and  Jefferson  yielded. 
Madison  expected  him  to  return  in  very  bad  humor. 
"  I  could  not  permit  myself  to  flatter  him,"  the  secre- 
tary wrote,  "  and  the  truth  will  not  permit  me  to  praise 
him.  He  is  well  off  in  escaping  reproof  for  his  agency 
has  been  very  faulty  as  well  as  feeble."^'  At  the 
present  time  a  calm  review  of  the  whole  Florida  nego- 
tiation must  convince  one  that  Monroe,  Livingston, 
and  the  administration  at  home  must  share  the  blame 
that  the  secretary  then  visited  upon  the  unfortunate 
Pinckney. 

From  across  the  Atlantic  came  conflicting  reports 
concerning  the  attitude  of  the  American  government. 

12  Pinckney  to  Madison,  undated  but  probably  some  time  in 
December,  1804,  Letters  of  C.  Pinckney  and  R.  Livingston, 
MS.,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

13  Madison  to  Monroe,  Nov.  9,  1804,  Letters  and  other  Writ- 
ings of  James  Madison,  II,  208. 


112         FAILURE    OF    MONROE^S    SPECIAL    MISSION 

Merry  thought  that  it  might  take  advantage  of  hostili- 
ties between  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  should  the  two 
nations  come  to  blows,  to  get  the  Floridas  and  initiate 
a  revolt  in  South  America ;  but  he  did  not  believe  Jef- 
ferson would  risk  his  popularity  just  before  election 
by  forcing  a  war  on  the  issue.  The  American  execu- 
tive evidently  expected  the  French  government  to  aid 
him  in  gaining  his  ends.^*  Casa  Yrujo  did  not  directly 
disprove  this  assumption  of  Merry,  and  assured  him 
that  his  own  government  would  not  carry  the  issue  to 
a  crisis.  At  the  same  time  the  Spaniard  wrote  home 
that  the  administration  did  not  countenance  Pinckney's 
course,  due  in  a  measure  to  Livingston's  promptings, 
and  that  it  was  not  strong  enough  in  Congress  to  bring 
about  a  declaration  of  war  in  behalf  of  its  commercial 
and  territorial  pretensions.  It  had  given  a  "sort  of 
satisfaction"  in  regard  to  the  objectionable  Mobile  Act, 
so  that  now  with  a  firm  and  moderate  diplomatic 
policy,  and  with  three  thousand  effective  men  at  Mo- 
bile, Spain  could  hold  her  own  in  any  further  contro- 
versy. She  could  lose  only  if  a  "  certain  neighboring 
power  "  forgot  its  interests  and  came  to  the  support  of 
the  untenable  American  claims.  He  did  not  believe 
Napoleon  would  make  such  a  false  move,  and  with 
nothing  to  fear  from  him,  Cevallos  could  meet  and 
discomfit  Monroe  as  he  had  Pinckney.^^ 

1*  Merry  to  Harrowby,  Oct.  i,  1804,  same  to  Hammond,  Oct. 
I,  1804,  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  42. 
15  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Oct.  22.,  26,  1804,  Adams  Tran- 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  II 3 

The  latter's  blundering  course  made  some  action  at 
Madrid  necessary,  but  the  time  and  the  man  did  not 
seem  in  favorable  conjunction.  Monroe  was  needed 
in  London ;  the  administration  also  desired  to  use  him 
in  Louisiana ;  and  Livingston  was  unwilling  to  cooperate 
with  him  from  Paris.  The  French  government  was 
less  favorable  to  his  mission  than  it  had  been  the 
year  before,  but  Monroe's  Paris  correspondent  did  not 
know  the  full  extent  of  its  opposition.  The  only 
promising  feature  of  the  situation  was  the  prospect  of 
immediate  hostilities  between  England  and  Spain. 

In  October,  1804,  Monroe  reached  Paris  on  his  way 
to  Madrid.  Here  he  met  Livingston,  and  the  latter's 
brother-in-law  and  successor,  John  Armstrong,  who 
was  to  continue  the  New  York  tradition  at  the  Paris 
legation.  Neither  welcomed  his  presence  and  both 
doubted  the  efficacy  of  his  proposed  effort.  Monroe 
desired  to  remind  Talleyrand  of  Napoleon's  promise 
the  year  before  to  assist  the  United  States  in  procur- 
ing the  Floridas.  Both  Livingston  and  Armstrong 
officially  supported  his  representation  to  that  minister, 
but  in  later  years  he  charged  them  with  encouraging 
the  French  government  to  expect  some  twelve  or  four- 
teen millions  from  the  transaction.^"  Some  ugly  charges 
of  the  sort  were  current  in  Paris,  then  and  thereafter, 

scripts,  Spanish  State  Papers,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library, 
Department'  of  State  (Robertson,  5007). 
1*5  Monroe  to  Skipwith,  July  31,  1823,  Lenox  MSS. 

9 


114         FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

but  it  is  probable  that  the  disappointed  Monroe  exag- 
gerated them  and  attributed  to  the  irregularities  he  sus- 
pected a  preponderant  share  in  his  subsequent  failure. 

Monroe  preserved  a  conciliatory  tone  in  his  note  to 
Talleyrand,  although  he  strongly  intimated  that  war 
might  follow  a  diplomatic  rupture  at  Madrid.  He  dis- 
cussed in  some  measure  the  American  claim  to  West 
Florida,  and  explained  that  the  president,  although 
authorized  by  Congress  to  take  possession  of  the  an- 
cient boundaries  of  Louisiana,  had  preferred  to  defer 
this  step  to  give  time  for  necessary  explanations  and 
adjustments.^^  Notwithstanding  his  evident  good-will 
and  patience  (for  he  tarried  several  weeks  in  Paris) 
his  letter  remained  unanswered.  His  friend  Marbois, 
however,  told  him  that  it  was  a  financial  affair.  M. 
Hauterive  tersely  stated  the  conditions :  "  Spain  must 
cede  territory,  the  United  States  must  pay  money."^^ 
France,  he  clearly  learned,  was  to  reap  all  the  profit 
from  the  transaction. 

It  seemed  apparent  that  Monroe  could  escape  a  mor- 
tifying diplomatic  failure  only  by  abandoning  his  mis- 
sion at  the  outset  or  submitting  to  the  terms  offered. 
Neither  alternative  appealed  to  his  personal  pride  or 
was  in  keeping  with  what  he  chose  to  consider  na- 
tional honor.     Even  at  that  time  Madison  was  assur- 

17  Monroe  to  Talleyrand,  Nov.  8,  1804,  American  State  Pa- 
pers, Foreign  Relations,  II,  634. 

18  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  305. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROe's    SPECIAL    MISSION         II5 

ing  him,  in  additional  instructions,  that  he  could  not 
"too  earnestly  press  upon  Spain  the  necessity  of  clos- 
ing all  the  differences  between  the  two  countries." 
The  Mississippi  and  the  Mobile  were  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  the  United  States,  while  "  Spain  must  sooner  or 
later  swallow "  the  commercial  claims  against  her.^® 
Some  similar  feeling,  heightened  by  his  nearer  view 
of  Spain's  helplessness  before  England,  doubtless  led 
Monroe  to  persevere  in  his  task.  He  must,  at  any 
rate,  straighten  out  the  muddle  into  which  Pinckney 
had  brought  affairs. 

Some  three  weeks  before  Monroe  left  Paris,  Tal- 
leyrand advised  the  emperor  to  disapprove  of  the 
American  commercial  claims  as  insincere  and  as  at- 
tacking his  good  faith.  Moreover  the  Americans  had 
displayed  little  civility  toward  France  in  devising  an 
untenable  claim  to  West  Florida,  after  that  power  had 
vainly  negotiated  for  the  same  region ;  and  they  had 
displayed  still  less  generosity  toward  Spain  in  push- 
ing that  claim  when  she  was  helpless.  Talleyrand 
intimated,  however,  that  the  Floridas  were  of  little 
use  to  Spain,  but  very  essential  to  the  military  se- 
curity and  commercial  development  of  the  United 
States.  If  that  power  should  adopt  a  more  courteous 
policy  Napoleon  might  well  favor  the  views  of  the 
Federal  Government,  and  Spain,  through  financial 
necessity,  yield  to  them.     Napoleon  took  no  action  on 

18  See  note  13. 


Il6         FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION 

these  suggestions  until  Monroe  had  left  Paris.  Then 
he  directed  Talleyrand  to  declare  the  American  claim 
to  West  Florida  absolutely  unfounded  and  to  express 
a  sarcastic  interest  in  the  outcome  of  so  unusual  a 
negotiation.-" 

This  declaration  probably  reached  Madrid  before 
Monroe  himself,  and  in  connection  with  other  previous 
statements  did  much  to  insure  the  failure  of  his  mis- 
sion. Before  leaving  Paris  he  received  some  intima- 
tion that  Talleyrand's  report  to  the  emperor  was  not 
favorable.  After  a  period  of  uncertainty  he  deter- 
mined to  continue,  hoping  to  accomplish  something 
single-handed  by  working  upon  the  fears  of  Spain 
for  her  colonies.  His  colleagues  regarded  his  cause 
as  hopeless,  and  his  long  review  of  conditions,  sent  to 
Madison  from  Bordeaux  on  December  i6,^^  reflected 
this  feeling.  Nevertheless  he  wrote  his  Parisian  cor- 
respondent and  friend,  Skipwith,  "  I  shall  pursue  the 
object  intrusted  to  me  with  zeal  and  diligence,  and  I 
trust  with  success."^^ 

The  administration  in  Washington  did  not  need  the 
discouraging  reports  from  Paris  and  Bordeaux  to  con- 
vince it  that  Monroe  must  fail  in  his  mission.  In 
January,  1805,  Turreau  and  Casa  Yrujo,  in  an  em- 
barrassing interview  with  Madison,  informed  him  that 

20  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  II,  310-314. 

21  Hamilton,  Monroe,  IV,  294. 

22  Monroe  to  Skipwith,  Dec.  18,  1804,  Lenox  M5S. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  II7 

their  governments  had  come  to  the  joint  conclusion 
that  the  American  claims  to  West  Florida  were  un- 
tenable and  the  commercial  claims  unjustifiable.  Tur- 
reau's  predecessor  had  been  too  friendly  to  the  United 
States.  The  present  minister  was  not  likely  to  repeat 
this  mistake.  He  even  quoted  the  Treaty  of  1762  as 
the  determining  factor  in  the  territorial  dispute. 
When  Madison  referred  to  maps  that  showed  the  Per- 
dido  as  the  eastern  limit  of  Louisiana,  Turreau  pointed 
out  that  the  same  maps  included  Tennessee  and  Ken- 
tucky within  that  province.  As  the  desire  of  these 
two  States  to  obtain  a  commercial  outlet  by  way  of 
the  Mobile  formed  an  important  domestic  raison  d'etre 
for  the  West  Florida  claim,  Madison  little  relished  this 
reference.  At  times  he  tried  to  cajole  Turreau,  while 
that  minister  attempted  to  reconcile  him  with  Casa 
Yrujo.  But  the  Spaniard,  despising  Madison  for  his 
ungenerous  course  toward  his  nation,  was  only  too 
anxious  to  humiliate  him.  The  whole  interview,  there- 
fore, was  but  another  of  those  distressing  but  enlight- 
ening scenes  in  which  the  two  had  recently  appeared 
as  principals.-^  Its  only  result  was  a  request  for 
Yrujo's  recall — a  request  that  was  to  constitute  the 
only  successful  point  in  the  program  entrusted  to 
Monroe.  Even  this  was  not  made  humiliating  to 
Casa  Yrujo,  whose  superiors  graciously  "gave  him 
permission  to  retire  "  from  an  unpleasant  situation. 

23  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Feb.  7,  1805,  Adams  Transcripts, 
Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library  (Robertson,  5021). 


Il8        FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

Warned  by  the  reports  from  abroad,  the  president 
now  expected  his  envoys  to  break  off  the  hopeless  nego- 
tiation and  merely  attempt  to  secure  the  privilege  of 
navigating  the  Mobile.  Madison  was  ready  to  aban- 
don the  American  claim  to  West  Florida  altogether.^* 
Nevertheless  Jefferson  and  his  secretary  of  state  united 
in  commissioning  James  Bowdoin  of  Massachusetts 
as  minister  to  Spain  in  Pinckney's  stead.  In  a  few 
weeks  suggestions  from  Paris  showed  that  the  nego- 
tiation was  about  to  assume  those  venal  phases  char- 
acteristic of  Talleyrand.  Madison  wrote  Armstrong 
with  becoming  indignation  that  "the  United  States 
owes  it  to  the  world  as  well  as  to  themselves  to  give 
the  example  of  one  government  at  least,  protesting 
against  the  prevailing  corruption.  .  .  .  If  her  [France's] 
object,  as  you  conjecture,  is  simply  to  make  money  out 
of  it,  this  will  finally  be  abandoned  in  despair."^^  His 
virtuous  protest  would  have  been  more  convincing  had 
he  expressed  it  as  clearly  when  France  was  inclined  to 
favor  American  claims. 

When  Monroe  reached  Madrid  he  learned  that  the 
Spanish  court  was  at  Aranjuez  and  thither  he  and 
Pinckney  proceeded.  Their  ensuing  negotiation  may 
arouse  some  additional  interest  on  the  part  of  the 
casual  American  tourist  in  this  garish  retreat  of  Span- 
ish royalty,  and  he  will  doubtless  enjoy  the  palace  with 

24  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  54,  55. 

25  Madison  to  Armstrong,  June  6,  1805,  Instructions,  MS., 
VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  Department  of  State. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  II9 

its  tawdry  interior,  formal  garden,  and  stately  avenue 
and  park  far  more  than  did  the  distressed  diplomats 
who  vainly  haunted  them  in  the  weary  months  that  fol- 
lowed. After  going  over  the  situation  with  Pinck- 
ney,  Monroe  agreed  that  his  colleague's  course  the 
previous  summer  had  been  the  only  possible  one,  and 
determined  to  have  him  sign  the  formal  notes  jointly 
with  himself.  Pinckney  seemed  duly  to  appreciate 
this  evidence  of  generous  confidence,  which  softened 
for  him  the  mortification  of  his  recall,  and  the  Span- 
iards acquiesced  in  the  arrangement  with  suspicious 
complacency."'^ 

After  the  ceremonious  presentation,  the  American 
commissioners  addressed  their  first  note  to  Cevallos 
on  January  28,  1805.-^  Although  they  continued  their 
formal  correspondence  with  him,  Monroe  immediately 
adopted  the  plan  of  supplementing  each  communica- 
tion by  one  or  more  personal  interviews  with  Godoy, 
the  real  negotiator.  It  was  his  custom  to  inform  the 
Spaniard  that  he  expected  to  call,  if  convenient,  and 
he  interpreted  silence  as  an  invitation  to  come.  Aside 
from  this  indication  of  indifference,  their  interviews, 
though  wholly  unprofitable,  were  not  unpleasant.     Mon- 

26  Monroe  to  Madison,  Jan.  19,  1805,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VII,  Journal  of  the  Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,  Spanish 
Dispatches,  MS.,  VIII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives.  In 
this  journal  Monroe  reviews  minutelj'  the  details  of  the  nego- 
tiation and  reveals  his  mental  reaction  to  each  shifting  phase. 

2^  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  dzi. 


120        FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

roe  often  had  to  urge  Godoy  to  prod  up  the  slow-moving 
Cevallos,  and  occasionally  gained  some  temporary  en- 
couragement only  to  find  it  wholly  illusory.  More 
than  once  he  suspected  an  intention  on  the  part  of  the 
two  men  to  keep  him  vainly  see-sawing  between  them. 
He  had  also  promptly  called  on  Beurnonville  and  told 
him  that  he  counted  on  his  assistance.  But  the  French 
minister  seemed  to  avoid  him  in  public.  To  this  neg- 
lect, manifestly  inspired  from  Paris,  Monroe  largely 
attributed  his  failure.  In  his  defense  the  other  said 
that  the  Spaniards  "would  give  so  little  and  Monroe 
asked  so  much."  This  was  true,  although  we  may 
doubt  if  the  Frenchman  was  sincere  in  later  claiming 
that  he  had  assisted  Monroe  "  as  much  as  possible."^® 
But  sincerity  is  the  last  thing  one  would  expect  to  find 
in  this  ill-judged  negotiation. 

The  American  commissioners  hoped  to  avoid  wordy 
discussion  and  push  the  questions  at  issue  to  a  speedy 
conclusion.  Accordingly,  after  a  brief  view  of  the 
commercial  claims  and  disputed  boundaries,  they  sub- 
mitted the  project  for  a  treaty,  based  upon  the  idea  of 
balancing  the  American  desire  for  the  Floridas  by  the 
Spanish  apprehension  over  the  western  advance  of 
the  United  States.  Some  minor  disturbances  then 
prevailing  on  the  Florida  frontier  gave  point  to  their 
expressed  hope  that  the  proposed  settlement  would 
prevent  similar  misunderstandings  elsewhere.  With 
this  in  mind  their  offer  to   assume  the   commercial 

28  G.  W.  Erving  to  Monroe,  Nov.  15,  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  121 

claims  of  their  own  citizens  seemed  to  them  very  gen- 
erous indeed. 

Godoy  speedily  charged  Monroe  with  being  even 
more  unreasonable  than  Pinckney  about  commercial 
claims.  As  for  the  controverted  limits  of  Louisiana  he 
thought  the  Americans  should  settle  them  with  France, 
from  whom  they  had  bought  the  territory.  Monroe 
said  that  France  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  question. 
His  country  had  simply  bought  the  French  right  and 
title  and  must  settle  all  boundary  disputes  with  its 
neighbor.  As  Godoy  stoutly  maintained  the  contrary, 
Monroe  intimated  that  he  did  not  expect  to  accom- 
plish much  at  Aranjuez.  Godoy  courteously  hoped 
that  he  would.  In  turn  the  Spaniard  referred  to  the 
hostility  that  France  and  Great  Britain  had  displayed 
toward  the  United  States  when  the  right  of  deposit 
at  New  Orleans  was  suspended.  Monroe  replied  by 
referring  to  a  British  proposal  to  cede  New  Orleans  to 
the  Americans  if  the  latter  acquiesced  in  its  seizure 
before  the  treaty  at  Amiens.  He  further  suggested 
that  his  country  could  more  readily  restrain  its  western 
citizens  if  it  had  the  Floridas.-^  But  bribe  or  bluff 
proved  equally  ineffective  in  eliciting  a  definite  answer 
from  Godoy. 

The  reply  of  Cevallos  to  the  joint  note  was  unusu- 
ally prompt  and  equally  unsatisfactory.  Ignoring  the 
expressed  desire  o'f  the  commissioners  for  a  categor- 

29  Journal  of  the  Negotiations  at  Aranjuez,  Jan.  30,  1805. 


122         FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

ical  answer,  that  minister  informed  them  that  Span- 
ish boundary  commissioners  were  then  at  New  Or- 
leans, awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  American  repre- 
sentatives. It  would  be  useless  to  discuss  the  limits 
of  Louisiana  before  hearing  from  them.  Having 
thus  brushed  aside  the  most  important  American  pro- 
posal, Cevallos  discussed  the  claims  convention  of 
August,  1802.^°  In  reply  the  Americans  observed 
that  the  boundary  commissioners  could  do  nothing 
until  their  respective  governments  should  settle  upon 
a  principle  to  guide  them,  and  they  were  in  Spain 
for  that  purpose.^^  Monroe  wrote  Madison  that  Ce- 
vallos evidently  intended  to  delay  the  negotiation,  but 
despite  this  and  other  discouraging  circumstances,  he 
believed  the  Spaniards  must  recognize  the  strength  of 
the  American  position,  "  with  due  discernment."^- 
Unfortunately  for  him  and  his  colleague  they  did,  and 
so  on  February  10  the  Americans  had  to  submit  to  a 
sharp  scolding  on  the  subject  of  the  Mobile  Act,^'  in 
lieu  of  the  wished-for  answer  to  their  project. 

It  was  now  high  time  to  break  off  the  negotiation, 
and  in  a  personal  interview  with  Godoy,  Monroe 
hinted  as  much.  He  had  already  learned  of  Talley- 
rand's views,  which  were,  as  Armstrong  wrote,  "  cal- 

30  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  640. 

31  Pinckney  and  Monroe  to  Cevallos,  Feb.  4,  1805,  ibid.,  641. 

32  Pinckney  and  Monroe  to  Madison,  Feb.  2,  1805,  Spanish 
Dispatches,  MS.,  VII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

33  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  641. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  1 23 

culated  to  put  the  court  at  Madrid  at  rest."  Monroe 
affected  to  believe  that  the  French  government  had 
broken  faith  with  him,  and  urged  Armstrong  to  make 
its  agents  understand  that  the  dispute  with  Spain  must 
be  settled  then  and  there.  "  The  United  States  must 
go  ahead  and  depend  less  on  other  nations."  His  hope 
lay  in  Spain's  necessity,  and  in  such  pressure  as  his 
country  could  exert  upon  her  and  France,  in  case  oi.  a 
diplomatic  rupture.  Yet  he  betrayed  great  reluctance 
to  force  an  issue  with  the  stronger  nation.  Not  wholly 
trusting  Armstrong,  he  wrote  his  friend  Skipwith  to 
send  him  some  documents  in  support  of  the  Amer- 
ican claim.  The  United  States  must  decide  upon  her 
rights,  but  "in  terms  of  suitable  respect  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  France."  At  the  same  time  he  cautioned 
Skipwith  to  conceal  his  request  from  Armstrong.^* 
If  Spain  failed  to  yield  to  necessity  or  France  to 
some  unmentioned  pressure,  there  still  remained  a  pos- 
sible British  alliance.  As  a  final  resort  this  might  gain 
for  them  "  the  respect  and  calculation  "  of  every  Euro- 
pean government  and  establish  their  relations  with 
Spain  "  on  a  footing  of  permanent  friendship."  But 
Monroe  preferred  to  continue  his  present  negotiation. 
On  February  i6  Godoy  intimated  that  Spain  might  ex- 
change the  Floridas  for  an  equivalent  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, although  the  presence  of  the  Americans  might 

34  Journal  of   the   Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,   Feb.  2,   1805; 
Monroe  to  Skipwith,  Feb.  [15?],  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 


124 


FAILURE    OF    MONROE  S    SPECIAL    MISSION 


draw  other  people  into  the  ceded  provinces  and  en- 
danger the  remaining  Spanish  possessions.  Monroe 
pointed  out  that  Louisiana  already  presented  this 
danger,  and  emphasized  the  fact  that  neither  the 
United  States  nor  Spain  should  permit  Great  Britain 
or  France  to  become  too  powerful  in  its  neighborhood. 
For  some  reason  Monroe  regarded  this  interview  as 
hopeful.  But  anticipations  of  a  speedy  end  to  his 
task  were  rudely  dispelled,  for  on  that  very  day  Ce- 
vallos  submitted  a  third  note,  this  time  treating  of  the 
right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans.  In  reply  to  Mon- 
roe's remonstrances  that  such  trifling  was  likely  to 
lead  to  a  rupture,  Cevallos  promised  to  refer  the  whole 
controversy  to  the  king.^^ 

When  eight  days  later  Cevallos'  note  proved  to  be 
a  lengthy  discussion  of  the  West  Florida  question, 
Monroe  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  other's  propo- 
sitions, when  finally  submitted,  would  prove  as  "un- 
just "  as  his  reasoning.  The  Spanish  minister  in- 
sisted that  his  government  could  not  "  retrocede  "  to 
France  in  1800  what  it  did  not  receive  from  her  in 
1762.  The  two  Floridas  were,  like  Louisiana,  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  captain-general  of  Havana,  but 
as  separate  provinces.  Thus  they  were  no  more  to  be 
included  in  Spanish  Louisiana  than  were  the  States 
of  Ohio,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee,  whose  territory 

35  Journal  of  the  Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,  Feb.  16,  1805; 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  643,  644. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  1 25 

before  1762  had  been  vaguely  covered  by  French 
claims.  Spain  received  the  Floridas  from  Great 
Britain  in  1783,  and  the  United  States  acknowledged 
their  separateness  in  the  Treaty  of  the  Escorial.  Ce- 
vallos  clinched  his  argument  by  quoting  the  opinion 
of  Andrew  EUicott,  who  ran  the  boundary  line  then 
established,  and  noted  that  France  had  been  content 
to  accept  Louisiana  without  West  Florida.^^ 

So  far  Monroe  had  treated  the  French  "very  deli- 
cately "  in  this  controversy,  but  now  he  instructed 
Armstrong  to  do  something  at  Paris  tov/ard  counter- 
acting Spanish  pretensions.  Talleyrand  had  formerly 
given  him  the  impression  that  West  Florida  was  part 
of  the  Louisiana  Purchase;  now  he  was  trying  to  es- 
tablish a  contrary  opinion.  He  must  be  made  to  un- 
derstand that  if  the  negotiation  broke  up  over  this 
point,  the  United  States  would  hold  France  responsible 
and  would  retaliate  by  seeking  a  British  alliance.  If 
the  French  government  thought  the  demands  of  the 
Americans  unreasonable,  they  might  make  some  con- 
cession as  to  commercial  claims  and  the  western  bound- 
ary, which  would  more  than  offset  the  Floridas.  But 
they  must  insist  upon  their  just  rights,  and  by  this 
Monroe  doubtless  meant  the  claim  to  West  Florida  and 
the  residue  of  their  commercial  claims. ^^ 

36  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  644. 
37^  Monroe  to  Armstrong,  Feb.  26,  1805,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VIII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


126        FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

In  addition  to  gaining  the  support  of  Talleyrand, 
the  Americans  must  convince  the  Spanish  government 
that  their  country  was  not  absolutely  bound  to  a  peace 
policy.  Monroe's  interview  with  Godoy  on  February 
28  did  little  to  advance  either  object.  The  Spaniard 
insisted  upon  discussing  thoroughly  every  point  in 
question  and  in  submitting  each  to  the  French  govern- 
ment. Monroe  asked  what  would  happen  if  the  French 
should  favor  Spain  while  the  United  States  continued 
to  insist  upon  its  rights.  Godoy  replied,  "We  shall 
see,"  but  evinced  no  disposition  to  show  him  what 
they  were  to  see.^^ 

Having  nothing  else  to  do,  Monroe  and  Pinckney 
attempted  to  reply  to  the  note  on  West  Florida.  Need- 
less to  say  they  found  the  word  "  retrocede  "  less  im- 
portant than  Cevallos  had  done,  and  saw  West  Flor- 
ida in  the  three  clauses  of  the  puzzling  article  as 
clearly  as  if  it  were  expressly  named.  Their  conten- 
tion must  be  right  because  not  expressly  contradicted. 
Any  doubt  should  militate  against  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment for  failing  to  express  itself  clearly.  But  Cevallos 
was  not  ready  to  abandon  his  position.  Invoking 
grammar,  rhetoric,  good  sense,  and  history,  he  showed 
that  his  interpretation  was  necessary  to  reconcile  the 
word  "  retrocede  "  with  the  subsequent  clauses  of  the 
crucial  third  article.  All  further  discussion  was  use- 
less, for  the  decision  rested  with  France  and  Spain, 

38  Journal  of  the  Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,  Mar.  2,  1805. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROE  S    SPECIAL    MISSION  I27 

and  these  powers  united  in  declaring  that  West  Flor- 
ida formed  no  part  of  Louisiana.  It  had  not  been 
mentioned  in  the  transfer  arranged  at  San  Ildefonso, 
and  no  nation  could  acquire  a  definite  province  by  a 
treaty  that  did  not  mention  it.^^ 

Once  more  the  negotiation  had  reached  a  good  stop- 
ping place.  The  West  Florida  dispute  was  the  crux 
of  the  whole  controversy,  and  if  France  supported 
Spain  upon  that  point  it  was  useless  to  continue  the 
discussion.  Monroe  objected  to  Talleyrand's  assum- 
ing the  position  of  umpire.  "  My  letter  to  him,"  he 
wrote  Armstrong,  "  was  not  for  that  purpose,  but 
simply  to  give  information  of  what  position  we  in- 
tended to  take."*"  Pinckney  expressed  himself  still 
more  bitterly  to  Madison.  Evidently  Bonaparte  and 
Talleyrand  thought  it  "  only  necessary  to  talk  in  high 
and  arrogant  terms  of  our  country's  aggressions  .  .  . 
and  we  would  shrink  into  nothing  and  give  up  claims 
and  meekly  receive  reprimand  for  having  dared  to 
make  them."  He  believed  that  if  he  had  received 
due  support  from  Paris  the  preceding  summer  the 
French  government  would  now  take  a  different  posi- 
tion.    Such  "  sycophantick  courses  "  as  had  been  pur- 

39  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  653-657. 
The  above  is  the  merest'  summary  of  the  lengthy  but  useless 
"  war  of  words,"  but  the  writer  believes  that  it  embraces  the 
essential  points  for  his  purpose. 

40  Monroe  to  Armstrong,  Mar.  17,  1805,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VIII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


128         FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

sued  there  tended  to  lower  America  in  the  eyes  of 
Europe.  As  for  himself  he  would  never  be  "  the  in- 
strument of  improper  submission  to  any  power  on 
earth. "*^  Had  Pinckney  received  this  support  and 
Monroe  secured  the  aid  of  Talleyrand  it  is  likely  that 
neither  would  have  censured  the  latter  and  the  em- 
peror so  strongly.  The  American  diplomats  tried  to 
use  Napoleon  and  Talleyrand  for  their  own  purpose 
and  then  protested  against  French  interference  when 
they  failed. 

Early  in  March  Armstrong  thought  that  he  had 
"  fallen  upon  a  plan  "  to  secure  some  important  papers 
that  might  establish  a  French  contention  for  the  Per- 
dido,  but  evidently  the  papers  did  not  materialize.^^ 
Late  in  the  month  his  messenger,  Dalton,  reached 
Monroe  with  despatches  which  stated  that  the  French 
had  lost  all  anxiety  about  the  negotiation.  In  regard 
to  the  boundary  Talleyrand  told  him,  "We  have  al- 
ready given  our  opinion  and  see  no  reason  to  change 
it."  When  questioned  about  the  action  France  might 
take  in  the  event  of  war  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States,  the  French  minister  answered,  "We  can  neither 
doubt  nor  hesitate,  we  must  take  part  with  Spain." 
Armstrong  found  it  difficult  to  explain  this  position, 
unless  France  wished  to  be  paid  to  serve  as  umpire 

41  Pinckney  to  Madison  (Mar.  7),  1805,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

42  Armstrong  to  Monroe,  Feb.  22,  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROE  S    SPECIAL    MISSION  129 

or  wished  to  gain  the  territory  for  herself.  "Be 
this  as  it  may,"  he  added,  "  our  course  lies  straight 
before  us — neither  dark  nor  doubtful,  nor  embarrassed 
— and  with  half  an  eye  one  may  see  to  the  end  of  it."*^ 
Monroe,  however,  was  not  ready  to  take  this  course, 
which  obviously  meant  to  abandon  the  commercial 
claims,  yield  the  dispute  over  West  Florida,  and  seize 
Texas.  He  had  adopted  the  idea  of  one  New  Yorker 
in  accepting  the  Perdido  claim,  and  he  would  not  now 
abandon  it  at  the  behest  of  another,  especially  after 
he  had  undertaken  to  rest  his  entire  negotiation  on  it. 
Yet  alternatives  were  unpromising  or  distinctly  re- 
pulsive. Ever  since  he  had  passed  through  Paris  he 
had  known  that  the  United  States  could  gain  the 
Floridas  by  an  indirect  payment  to  France  of  some 
fourteen  millions  of  dollars.  Pinckney  emphasized  two 
crucial  phases  of  the  policy  when  he  wrote  Madison : 
"  France  wants  to  make  money  out  of  the  Floridas  and 
Yrujo  has  convinced  Spain  that  she  has  nothing  to 
fear  by  sticking  out."**  In  view  of  Spain's  necessi- 
ties Monroe  believed  that  he  might  remove  this  impres- 
sion. To  hasten  this  result  he  urged  Armstrong  to 
make  sure  that  the  emperor  should  learn  the  American 
side  of  the  controversy.  He  must  approach  him 
through  Joseph  Bonaparte,  or  some  other  intermediary 

*3  Armstrong  to  Monroe,  Mar.  12,  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 

**  Cf.  note  41.  As  Monroe  records  in  his  Journal,  Casa 
Yrujo  had  assured  his  government  that  the  United  States 
would  never  go  to  war  for  "  desert  territory  or  old  claims." 

ID 


130         FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

than  Talleyrand,  who,  he  felt  sure,  gave  Napoleon 
only  a  partial  view.*^ 

This  desperate  but  unfounded  surmise  led  Arm- 
strong to  furnish  Talleyrand  with  Monroe's  whole  cor- 
respondence with  Cevallos.  The  Frenchman  returned 
it  with  the  comment :  "  The  more  our  thoughts  are 
turned  to  this  subject,  the  more  completely  convinced 
are  we  that  Spain  is  right  on  every  point  of  the  con- 
troversy." The  same  decision,  though  differently 
worded,  reached  Aranjuez  by  Spanish  conveyance. 
Santivanes,  the  charge  at  Paris,  had  complained  of 
Monroe's  pretensions.  In  answer  Talleyrand  assured 
him  that  France  had  received  no  territory  east  of  the 
Mississippi  from  Spain  and  had  transferred  none  to  the 
United  States.  This  should  settle  the  dispute,  for 
"  to  know  the  rights  of  France  is  likewise  to  know 
those  of  the  United  States."  On  April  9  Cevallos 
sent  this  statement  to  Monroe  in  response  to  repeated 
proddings  for  a  definite  reply  to  the  recent  notes.^® 

The  past  month  at  Aranjuez  had  been  a  trying  one 
for  the  American.  Nothing  could  spur  Godoy  or 
Cevallos  into  action.  The  former  vaguely  suggested 
some  sort  of  joint  agreement  with  Spain,  France,  and 
the  United  States  in  regard  to  Santo  Domingo.  Monroe 
eagerly  caught  at  this  opportunity  to  show  his  friend- 

*5  Monroe  to  Armstrong,  Mar.  31,  1805,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

*6  Armstrong  to  Monroe,  Mar.  18,  Apr.  i,  1805,  Lenox 
MSS. ;  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  659,  660. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION         I3I 

Hness,  but  in  vain.  Pinckney  gave  up  hope,  but  still 
praised  Monroe's  zeal.  The  latter  characterized  Tal- 
leyrand's interference  as  friendly  neither  to  Spain  nor 
to  the  United  States,  and  vaguely  thought  that  Godoy 
agreed  with  him.  Cevallos  repeated  the  indefinite 
statement  of  Godoy,  that  his  sovereign  would  exchange 
his  possessions  east  of  the  Mississippi  for  an  equiva- 
lent west  of  that  river,  but  the  Americans  ought  to 
give  up  their  claim  to  West  Florida.  Monroe  thought 
an  "impartial  world  would  judge  differently,"  and 
suggested  a  possible  alliance  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain.  Cevallos  retorted  that  this  would 
be  a  step  toward  British  conquest,  but  Monroe  thought 
it  would  enable  both  countries  to  divide  the  French 
and  Spanish  colonies  between  them.  The  nation 
would  gladly  support  the  president  in  such  a  policy. 

Cevallos  claimed  that  he  was  ready  to  make  propo- 
sitions in  a  conciliatory  spirit.  Monroe  welcomed  the 
suggestion,  and  thought  that  a  specific  allowance  for 
spoliations  might  be  used  as  part  payment  for  the 
Floridas.  Cevallos  was  unwilling  to  agree  to  this  be- 
fore he  had  discussed  the  western  limits.  When  Mon- 
roe charged  him  with  an  intention  of  prolonging  the 
negotiation  indefinitely  he  elicited  nothing  more  than 
a  promise  to  make  propositions  after  completing  the 
discussion.  Monroe,  deciding  that  Cevallos  was  not 
free  to  act,  resolved  to  continue  the  discussion.  If  it 
led  to  a  rupture,  he  still  hoped  to  receive  definite  propo- 


132        FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

sitions  on  his  return  to  Paris.  Thus  he  clung  to  the 
thought  of  aid  from  the  French,  though  refusing  to  be 
bound  by  their  restrictions,  and  continued  to  conduct 
himself  so  as  not  to  offend  their  sensibilities.*^ 

Another  powerful  reason  actuated  Monroe.  If  he 
broke  off  negotiations  suddenly  Napoleon  would  prob- 
ably show  his  displeasure  by  seizing  all  American 
vessels  within  his  reach.  The  severing  of  diplomatic 
relations  in  itself  would  not  warrant  such  action, 
but,  as  Monroe  had  had  abundant  opportunity  to 
learn,  ability  to  injure  rather  than  a  desire  to  do  jus- 
tice was  the  ruling  influence  in  Europe.  The  people 
respected  the  United  States  but  their  rulers  did  not, 
and  the  American  commercial  stake  of  four  or  five 
millions  was  too  great  to  be  lightly  risked.  Monroe's 
messenger,  Preble,  represented  the  prevailing  senti- 
ment upon  this  point.  Although  he  was  deeply  in- 
volved in  commercial  relations  with  France,  he  at 
first  hoped  that  Monroe  would  consider  national  honor 
rather  than  individual  interests.  Some  weeks  later, 
when  failure  seemed  unavoidable,  an  alliance  with 
England  unlikely,  and  a  war  with  Spain  unpopular,  he 
wrote:  "If  our  national  honor  should  not  receive  a 
blemish  by  an  arrangement  at  Madrid,  even  if  not  so 
favorable  as  we  ought  to  expect,  we  will  still  be  the 
gainers  in  the  end."*^ 

^^  Journal  of  the  Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,  entries  for  April, 
1805,  passim. 
48  H.  Preble  to  Monroe,  Mar.  14,  Apr.  24,  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROE  S    SPECIAL    MISSION         1 33 

Monroe  was  thus  learning  that  fear,  or,  as  he  chose 
to  call  it,  "  respect,"  was  the  foundation  of  contempor- 
ary diplomacy.  To  play  its  part  in  such  a  system, 
and  to  gain  its  share  of  commerce  in  the  West  Indies, 
the  United  States  needed  a  larger  navy,  a  respectable 
army,  adequate  fortifications,  and  a  fleet  of  despatch 
boats  between  the  Chesapeake  and  the  eastern  and 
southern  ports.  But  time  would  be  necessary  to  de- 
velop them,  granting  it  were  possible  to  overcome 
Jefferson's  natural  hostility  to  such  a  policy  of  pre- 
paredness, and  in  the  interim  Monroe  must  determine 
his  immediate  course  in  a  complicated  negotiation. 
The  cry  of  "  money,  plenty  of  money  "  from  the  diplo- 
matic jobbers  of  Paris  presented  one  alternative,  but 
it  was  questionable  how  much  would  satisfy  them, 
or  whether  yielding  to  their  demands  would  not  estab- 
lish a  dangerous  precedent.  If  he  allowed  them  to 
intervene  in  regard  to  the  eastern  boundary  of  Louis- 
iana, might  they  not  do  so  on  the  western  border  as 
well  and  reduce  the  whole  purchase  to  a  nullity?*^ 

On  the  other  hand,  if  he  continued  an  independent 
negotiation,  as  he  flattered  himself  he  was  doing,  pre- 
served a  dignified  and  courteous  bearing  toward 
France,  and  cautiously  employed  a  hypothetical  alliance 
with  Great  Britain  to  arouse  Spain's  fears  for  her 
colonies,  he  might  still  achieve  partial  success.  But 
the  prospect  was  not  flattering.     If  the  French  should 

*9  Journal  of  the  Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,  Apr.  22,  1805. 


134         FAILURE    OF    MONROE^S    SPECIAL    MISSION 

defeat  the  English  squadron  before  Brest  and  then 
undertake  the  invasion  of  Ireland,  his  efforts  would 
wholly  fail.  He  wrote  Madison  that  he  could  "give 
no  idea  of  the  vexation  of  the  whole  affair."^''  He 
confided  to  Skipwith  that  "  no  exertion  of  my  life  has 
been  more  laborious  to  me  in  point  of  difficulty  or 
duty."  Yet  his  task  seemed  to  be  "the  last  difficult 
business  which  we  have  to  settle  with  these  powers ; " 
and  this  fact,  plus  the  confidence  that  his  government 
and  his  countrymen  reposed  in  him,  kept  him  at  his 
unwelcome  post,  and  persuaded  him  to  play  his  part 
"  with  justice,  with  moderation,  and  the  dignity  be- 
coming their  best  character."^^  Monroe  was  both 
moderate  and  dignified,  even  in  an  unbecoming  situa- 
tion, but  even  he  must  occasionally  have  doubted  the 
justice  of  the  claim  to  West  Florida. 

Early  in  May  he  asked  Cevallos  if  he  might  call  to 
submit  a  final  offer.  His  earlier  one  remained  un- 
answered, but  he  believed  he  must  play  his  last  hand, 
and  force  an  acceptance  or  at  once  bring  the  negotia- 
tion to  a  close.  Two  days  later  he  submitted  his  pro- 
posal. He  wished  Spain  to  cede  her  territory  east  of 
the  Mississippi  and  arbitrate  part  of  the  commercial 
claims.  The  United  States  would  then  relinquish  the 
remaining  claims  and  accept  the  Colorado  as  its 
western  boundary.     He  regarded  these  claims  as  more 

s°  Journal  of  the  Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,  May  2,  1805. 
51  Monroe  to  Skipwith,  May  2,  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROES    SPECIAL    MISSION  1 35 

than  an  equivalent  for  the  territory  east  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. To  make  the  exchange  more  acceptable  he  was 
willing  to  abandon  the  claim  to  West  Florida  hitherto 
urged  by  the  Americans. ^^ 

In  offering  these  concessions,  particularly  the  last, 
Monroe  had  to  go  beyond  his  instructions,  and  their 
tenor  reveals  his  desperate  plight.  But  he  yielded  in 
vain.  The  testy  Cevallos  could  see  no  recompense  for 
Spain  in  the  proposition.  His  nation  was  not  re- 
sponsible for  the  spoliations  and  had  an  unquestion- 
able right  to  West  Florida.  The  Spaniard's  "high 
toned  and  peremptory  manner"  led  Monroe,  contrary 
to  his  intention,  into  a  spirited  rejoinder.  Cevallos 
remained  unmoved.  Upon  his  request  Monroe  com- 
mitted the  propositions  to  writing  and  Cevallos  re- 
jected them,  "  in  terms  the  most  explicit  and  at  the 
same  time  not  the  most  respectful. "^^  This  ended  his 
dealings  with  Cevallos.  On  May  21  Monroe  took 
leave  of  the  king,  and  two  days  later  in  a  final  interview 
he  and  Godoy  expressed  their  mutual  but  meaningless 
regrets  over  the  fruitless  discussion. 

About  this  time  Monroe  learned  from  Armstrong 
that  the  French  government  was  then  likely  to  do 
nothing  further.  Interest  would  lead  it  to  let  the  quar- 
rel proceed  until  interference  became  necessary;  then 
it  could  command  a  higher  price  for  its  arbitration. 

52  Journal  of  the  Negotiation  at  Aranjuez,  May  11,  1805. 
"  Ibid.,  May  15,  i6,  1805. 


136         FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

Spain  and  the  United  States,  according  to  the  Amer- 
ican minister,  were  two  oranges  which  the  emperor 
proposed  to  squeeze  together.  The  one  which  yielded 
more  juice  would  be  less  harmed.  Armstrong  did  not 
expect  any  commercial  difficulties  in  case  of  a  rupture 
with  Spain,  and  repeated  more  explicitly  his  former 
advice  to  abandon  West  Florida  and  the  commercial 
claims,  and  seize  Texas.  This  policy,  based  on  the  in- 
structions to  Laussat,  would  force  Spain  to  act,  but 
need  not  arouse  French  resentment.^* 

Monroe  and  Pinckney,  who  reviewed  at  length  their 
course  through  French  intrigue  and  Spanish  delay, 
were  not  inclined  to  stop  where  Armstrong  advised. 
Since  the  seizure  of  Texas  alone  would  compromise 
them,  they  favored  action  in  behalf  of  their  claims 
in  extenso, — West  Florida  as  well  as  Texas.  Such 
a  move  would  show  European  governments  that  the 
destiny  of  the  New  World  was  in  American  hands 
and  would  correspondingly  increase  their  respect  for 
the  United  States.  Then,  dismantling  all  fortifica- 
tions within  the  areas  occupied,  much  as  Jackson  did 
later,  they  could  negotiate  upon  their  own  terms.^" 

Perhaps  the  man  from  Virginia  and  the  man  from 
South  CaroHna  merely  desired  to  name  a  pohcy  that 
did  not  bear  an  impress  from  New  York.     If  this  was 

^*  Armstrong  to  Monroe,  May  4  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 

^'^  Pinckney  and  Monroe  to  Madison,  May  23,  1805,  Spanish 
Dispatches,  MS.,  VIII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives; 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  667. 


FAILURE    OF    MONROe's    SPECIAL    MISSION  137 

Monroe's  purpose  he  did  not  persevere  in  it  after  he 
reached  Paris  on  his  return  from  Spain.  Here  he 
fell  under  the  spell  of  Armstrong,  just  as  he  had 
yielded  to  Livingston  when  that  diplomat  conceived 
the  claim  to  West  Florida.  Monroe  now  advised  the 
administration  to  seize  Texas  at  once,  place  an  em- 
bargo on  its  trade  with  the  Spanish  colonies,  and 
threaten  offensive  operations  in  the  Floridas.  This 
would  force  France  to  act  but  without  any  expectation 
of  jobbery,  and  would  show  a  policy  fully  in  keeping 
with  national  honor.^® 

Koskiusko,  of  Revolutionary  fame,  was  then  in  Paris 
and  oiifered  his  services  for  any  emergency.  But  the 
administration  at  home  was  more  pacific;  and  while 
its  representatives  in  France  and  Spain  were  calling 
for  a  vigorous  program,  Madison  was  instructing  them 
to  accept,  for  the  time  being,  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  and  the  privilege  of  navigating  the  Mobile.^^ 
Monroe  had  to  content  himself  with  such  commenda- 
tion as  came  to  him  in  a  private  letter  from  Rich- 
mond :  "  It  may  be  consoling  to  you  to  know  that  as  to 
your  conduct,  but  a  single  sentiment  prevails  here.  It 
is  believed  that  you  have  made  every  exertion  con- 
sistent with  national  honor  and  dignity  to  accomplish 
the  object  of  your  embassy.     Nothing  is  charged  to 

86  Monroe  to  Madison,  June  30,  1805,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  VII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 
5"  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  54,  55. 


138         FAILURE    OF    MONROE's    SPECIAL    MISSION 

your  imprudence  or  a  want  of  diplomatic  skill  or  ex- 
perience."^^ For  five  weary  months  he  and  Pinckney 
had  exerted  themselves  to  make  the  worse  appear  the 
better  reason,  and  then  had  agreed  to  abandon  their 
main  contention — the  claim  to  West  Florida.  They 
vacillated  over  the  western  boundary  and  were  ready 
to  compromise  their  commercial  disputes,  but  without 
success.  When  Monroe  left  Spain  American  reputa- 
tion weighed  little  in  the  scales  of  European  diplomacy. 
But,  as  he  and  Pinckney  suggested,  the  western 
frontiersmen  were  in  a  favorable  position  to  redress 
the  balance. 

58  M.  Jones  to  Monroe,  Aug.  12,  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 


CHAPTER  V 
Frontier  Problems  and  Personalities 

The  occupation  of  Natchez  by  the  Americans  in 
1798  and  the  extension  of  their  control  to  New 
Orleans,  five  years  later,  did  not  end  their  frontier 
disputes  with  the  Spaniards.  These  two  events  simply 
intensified  such  administrative  problems  as  centered 
about  the  Indians,  the  recovery  of  fugitive  slaves,  the 
extradition  of  fugitives  from  justice,  and  commerce 
upon  the  streams  subject  to  joint  ownership.  Con^ 
temporary  diplomacy  did  little  to  settle  these  problems  ; 
the  acquisition  of  Louisiana  made  them  more  conspicu- 
ous. At  the  same  time  general  distrust  and  jealousy 
hampered  the  efforts  of  local  officials  on  both  sides  of 
the  border,  and  perplexed  their  distant  superiors  be- 
yond measure. 

Wilkinson  and  Daniel  Clark  in  their  relations  with 
the  Mississippi  executives,  Sargent  and  Claiborne,  and 
the  intendant,  Morales,  in  his  controversies  with  his  fel- 
lows, Salcedo,  Casa  Calvo,  and  Folch,  afforded  many 
instances  of  this  sort.  Their  mutual  attacks  and  re- 
criminations, generally  carried  on  in  secret,  confused 
the  national  interests  they  professed  to  serve,  and 
made  them  less  convincing  champions  when  ranged 

139 


140         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

against  their  natural  opponents.  For  instance,  Sargent, 
Wilkinson,  and  Ellicott,  from  varying  motives,  opposed 
the  schemes  of  the  land  promoter  and  trader,  Zacha- 
riah  Cox,  But  they  were  not  able  to  persuade  Gayoso 
that  Cox  should  be  delivered  to  them  when  he  fled  to 
New  Orleans ;  nor  were  they  able  to  prevent  his  return 
to  Tennessee,  where  he  had  many  friends  and  sym- 
pathizers. Their  opposition  contributed  to  the  failure 
of  his  plan  for  establishing  a  commercial  route  be- 
tween the  Tennessee  and  the  waters  of  the  Mobile, 
but  they  could  not  quiet  agitation  in  favor  of  the 
project,  nor  blot  out  the  land  claims  that  long  con- 
tinued to  harass  settlers  in  the  bend  of  the  Tennessee.^ 
The  adventurer  Bowles  owed  his  immunity  to  lack 
of  harmony  among  the  Spaniards,  as  well  as  to  his  in- 
fluence over  the  Indians.  Ellicott  gave  him  some  as- 
sistance when  he  encountered  him  wrecked  on  the 
Florida  coast.  Although  his  presence  among  the 
Creeks,  whom  he  attempted  to  organize  into  a  sort  of 
a  republic,  was  hardly  less  annoying  to  the  American 
officials  than  to  the  Spaniards,  they  refused  to  counte- 
nance any  underhand  means  to  make  way  with  him  or 
even  to  apprehend  him.     When,  early  in   1803,  the 

1  A  reprint  of  the  pamphlet  issued  by  Cox  in  Nashville  in 
1799  is  edited  by  R.  C.  McGrane  and  the  writer  in  the  Quar- 
terly of  the  Historical  and  Philosophical  Society  of  Ohio,  1913, 
29-114.  Cf.  also  Gayoso  to  Saavedra,  Nov.  22,  1798,  Spanish 
Transcript's,  Missouri  Historical  Society.  Robertson  (No. 
4666)  reverses  the  authorship  of  this  document. 


FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  141 

Spaniards  finally  surprised  his  stronghold  at  St.  Marks 
and  carried  him  away  to  the  dungeon  in  which  he 
ended  his  days,  the  event  relieved  the  Americans  as 
much  as  it  did  their  rivals. ^ 

The  Indians  presented  an  increasing  series  of  prob- 
lems. Ellicott  feared  for  the  safety  of  his  party  while 
surveying  in  the  Choctaw  country,  and  was  forced  by 
Creek  hostility  to  retire  from  the  Chattahoochee. 
Sargent  hardly  knew  how  to  keep  the  Choctaw  war 
parties  on  the  American  side  of  the  Mississippi,  as 
he  was  bound  to  do  under  the  Treaty  of  1795,  or  how 
to  render  his  necessary  parsimony  toward  them  more 
likable  than  apparent  Spanish  munificence.^  Even 
Wilkinson  varied  his  pursuit  of  "the  one  thing  need- 
ful "  with  attempts  to  place  American  relations  with 
the  Indians  on  a  more  permanent  basis.  To  do  this 
he  had  to  forego  his  dreams  of  a  bucolic  existence  at 
Fort  Adams,  where  he  might  devote  himself  to  land 
speculations  and  intrigues  with  the  Spaniards.  As  a 
result  of  two  years'  effort,  however,  he  flattered  him- 
self that  he  had  established  relations  between  the  In- 
dians and  whites  on  the  basis  planned  by  the  British 

2  Pickett,  History  of  Alabama,  I,  410-413,  458,  470;  Robert- 
son, List  of  Documents,  for  1799-1803,  passim ;  Secretary  of 
War  to  Benjamin  Hawkins,  Dec.  12,  1799,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  24,  same  to  same.  May  30,  1803,  Miscellaneous 
Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  27,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

3  Mississippi  Territorial  Archives,  I,  passim,  Jackson,  Miss. 


142         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

thirty  years  before.*  His  services  were  important, 
but  as  usual  he  spoiled  the  effect  by  using-  them  to 
cover  up  his  later  mercenary  dealings  with  the 
Spaniards. 

The  Indian  problem  assumed  a  new  importance 
when  the  French  seemed  on  the  point  of  reestablishing 
themselves  in  Louisiana.  The  French  agents  appeared 
among  distant  tribes  and  invited  their  leading  men  to 
visit  New  Orleans.  Such  action  aroused  dire  appre- 
hension in  the  entire  Southwest,  and  led  Clark  to  urge 
Wilkinson  to  occupy  Mobile  or  even  New  Orleans 
before  the  French  could  establish  themselves  there. 
He  also  stimulated  quarrels  between  the  French  com- 
missary, Laussat,  and  the  Spaniards  with  some 
measure  of  success.^  Perhaps  resentment  played  as 
great  a  part  as  patriotism  in  Clark's  attitude,  for  he 
had  been  disappointed  in  his  attempt  to  secure  employ- 
ment under  the  prospective  French  regime.  At  the 
same  time  he  did  not  hesitate  to  give  Madison  hints 
of  Wilkinson's  former  shady  transactions  with  the 
Louisiana  authorities.  Nor  did  he  and  Wilkinson 
spare  Jefferson  himself  in  criticising  what  they  termed 

*  Wilkinson  to  Dearborn,  Mar.  30,  1802,  Letters  Received, 
MS.,  War  Department;  Pickett,  History  of  Alabama,  462; 
Claiborne,  Mississippi,  I,  238. 

5  D.  Clark  to  Wilkinson,  Feb.  26,  1803,  Wilkinson,  Memoirs, 
II,  249 ;  same  to  same,  Apr.  13,  25,  May  4,  5,  20,  28,  1803,  Let- 
ters Received,  MS.,  War  Department. 


FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  J 43 

the  nerveless  policy  of  the  administration."  The  chief 
target  for  their  vituperation,  however,  was  its  youth- 
ful representative,  the  new  governor  of  Mississippi, 
W.  C.  C.  Claiborne. 

Wilkinson  was  perforce  also  led  to  concern  himself 
with  the  navigation  of  the  Mobile  and  its  branches. 
At  the  time  of  the  American  occupation  Gayoso  per- 
mitted him  to  send  troops  to  the  Tombigbee  by  way  of 
Bayou  St.  Jean  and  the  lakes.  He  told  his  superiors 
that  he  granted  this  favor  because  it  was  an  advantage 
thus  to  separate  the  American  forces,  but  he  warned 
Wilkinson  not  to  regard  the  concession  as  a  precedent 
for  the  future.  While  the  boundary  commission  was 
in  the  region  Gayoso  permitted  the  schooner  Pallits 
to  carry  provisions  from  Savannah  to  Fort  Stoddert, 
the  post  which  the  Americans  had  established  just 
above  the  line  of  demarcation.  This  also  was  not  to 
be  regarded  as  a  precedent,  but  both  incidents  caused 
much  trouble  for  those  who  came  after. 

Casa  Calvo,  Gayoso's  successor  ad  interim,  believed 
that  in  case  of  hostile  outbreak  the  Americans  would 
use  the  privilege  of  transporting  troops  to  surprise  and 
occupy  the  province.  If  once  they  gained  the  general 
right  to  navigate  rivers  through  alien  territory  they 
would,  by  monopolizing  the  Indian  trade,  ruin  the 
house  of  Panton,  and  reduce  the  Spanish  settlements 

"  (Wilkinson)  to  Clark,  Apr.  30,  1803,  Clark,  Proofs  of  the 
Corruption  of  General  James  Wilkinson,  Appendix,  196. 


144        FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

to  mere  presidial  guards  J  The  proposal  of  the  Amer- 
ican government  to  estabhsh  an  Indian  factory  at 
St.  Stephens  gave  point  to  his  warning.  President 
Jefferson  proposed  this  establishment  as  a  means  to 
wean  the  Choctaws  from  trading  at  Mobile  and  other 
Spanish  centers.  It  was  part  of  his  general  plan  to 
reform  all  the  aborigines.  In  this  case  its  success  de- 
pended on  the  courtesy  of  those  whom  he  wished  to 
circumvent.  Pursuant  to  his  plan,  in  March,  1803,  he 
appointed  Silas  Dinsmoor  as  agent  to  the  Choctaws, 
and  placed  Joseph  Chambers  in  charge  of  the  Indian 
factory  at  St.  Stephens.^ 

By  this  time  a  flourishing  settlement  was  springing 
up  around  the  trading  post.  In  behalf  of  these  new 
settlers,  therefore,  as  well  as  in  behalf  of  the  American 
garrison  and  trading  post,  Wilkinson,  in  the  early 
summer  of  1803,  determined  to  make  a  definite  plea  to 
the  Spanish  authorities  in  New  Orleans  for  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mobile.  The  all-pervading  suspicion  that 
then  characterized  the  Creole  capital  led  him  to  em- 
ploy a  special  messenger,  rather  than  make  the  journey 
himself.  His  aide.  Lieutenant  Walbach,  brought  back 
word  that  Morales  would  for  the  present  permit  gov- 

7  Casa  Calvo  to  Someruelos,  May  21,  1800,  to  Urquijo,  Oct. 
8,  1800,  Spanish  Transcripts,  Department  of  Archives  and 
History,  Jackson,  Miss. ;  Robertson,  4758,  4790. 

^  Claiborne  to  Silas  Dinsmoor,  Jan.  28,  Feb.  28,  Mar.  2,  14, 
1803,  Claiborne  to  Chambers,  June  28,  1803,  Governor'*-  Cor- 
respondence in  the  Mississippi  Territory,  MS. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES         1 45 

emment  goods  to  pass  Mobile,  but  he  must  refer  the 
wider  commercial  question  to  his  home  government. 
In  his  representation  Wilkinson  had  questioned  the 
exclusive  right  of  Spain  to  navigate  streams  only 
partially  within  her  territory,  or  to  close  the  only  out- 
let to  the  sea  for  residents  along  the  upper  courses  of 
a  river.  With  his  usual  assurance,  the  general  be- 
heved  that  he  had  "  tickled  "  the  intendant's  vanity  and 
"bewildered"  his  "shallow  understanding."  But 
Morales  granted  him  only  the  tentative  permission  to 
send  one  vessel  up  the  Mobile  each  fall  and  spring, 
provided  its  commander  bore  the  proper  official  cer- 
tificate that  it  was  engaged  exclusively  in  public  busi- 
ness.^ It  was  at  this  juncture  that  tidings  of  the  sale 
of  Louisiana  to  the  United  States  threatened  to  un- 
settle all  border  conditions. 

The  resulting  transfer  brought  Claiborne  and  Wilk- 
inson together  in  conspicuous  but  distrustful  associa- 
tion. While  the  more  crafty  of  the  ill-assorted  pair 
proceeded  to  renew  his  mercenary  relations  with  the 
Spaniards,  his  inexperienced  colleague  turned  to  the 
perplexing  problems  that  confronted  the  new  regime. 
Possession  of  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  had 
not  solved  the  disputes  over  extradition,  Indian  rela- 
tions, and  commercial  privileges,  but  it  had  localized 

^  Wilkinson  to  Dearborn,  Aug.  20,  1803,  with  enclosures, 
MS.,  Bureau  of  Indian  Affairs,  Choctaws  and  Chickasaws, 
1801-1823.  Some  of  the  material  is  duplicated  in  Wilkinson 
Papers,  MS.,  II,  Chicago  Historical  Society. 


146         FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

them  more  definitely  in  West  Florida.  The  ownership 
of  this  region  was  in  dispute,  and  there  were  current 
vague  rumors  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States 
would  take  forcible  possession  of  it,  upon  the  demand 
of  its  inhabitants,  or  would  exchange  the  new  acquisi- 
tion for  the  Spanish  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi. 
It  is  no  wonder  that  these  rumors  disturbed  the  motley 
population  of  New  Orleans  and  above  all  the  young 
executive  who  was  attempting  to  govern  the  city.^*^ 

Nor  was  the  course  of  the  Spaniards  at  all  reassur- 
ing. Without  consulting  the  views  of  the  American 
government,  they  arranged  to  have  Morales  continue 
his  functions  as  intendant  at  New  Orleans,  instructed 
Casa  Calvo  to  remain  there  as  boundary  commissioner, 
and  furnished  him  with  a  hundred  thousand  pesos  for 
his  work.  The  administration  regarded  Morales  as 
"a  mischievous  member  of  society,"  but  he  ignored 
all  polite  hints  that  he  remove  elsewhere.  His  long 
term  of  service  as  intendant — fourteen  years — although 
technically  only  an  ad  interim  appointment,  gives  color 
to  the  assumption  that  his  superiors  found  him  a 
useful  check  upon  the  actions  of  his  fellow-officials, 
as  well  as  a  shrewd  opponent  of  American  pretensions. 

10  From  this  point  the  narrative  is  mainly  dependent  upon 
the  manuscript  volumes  of  the  Claiborne  Correspondence,  in 
the  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library,  Department  of  State.  These 
volumes  largely  duplicate  material  in  the  Letter  Books  of 
Governor  Claiborne,  which  have  just  been  published.  Cf.  page 
X  of  the  Introduction. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 47 

Claiborne  believed  that  Morales'  presence  in  New 
Orleans  encouraged  opposition  to  the  claim  to  West 
Florida,  especially  among  the  reputed  land  specu- 
lators.^^ 

The  affable  and  popular  Marques  de  Casa  Calvo 
presented  a  welcome  contrast  to  the  stubborn  Morales, 
but  his  very  excellencies  rendered  him  a  dangerous 
permanent  resident.  To  him  Claiborne  attributed  the 
persistent  rumor  that  the  United  States  would  ex- 
change Louisiana  for  the  Floridas.  His  reputation 
for  intrigue  equalled  his  courtesy,  and  the  only  re- 
deeming feature  was  the  fact  that  his  residence  in  New 
Orleans  pleased  the  neighboring  Spanish  officials  as 
little  as  it  did  Claiborne.^^  Moreover  the  presence  of 
these  higher  officials  seemed  more  dangerous  in  view 
of  the  prolonged  stay  of  the  Spanish  garrison  in  New 
Orleans.  When  these  soldiers  finally  left,  the  per- 
plexed Claiborne  was  still  concerned  to  find  that  they 
had  simply  gone  to  the  posts  on  the  disputed  frontier, 

11  Claiborne  to  Madison,  May  24,  1804,  Claiborne  Corre- 
spondence, II,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library  (Parker,  Calendar 
of  Papers  in  Washington  Archives,  Relating  to  the  Territories 
of  the  United  States,  No.  6937,  Carnegie  Institution,  Wash- 
ington, 191 1.  Later  references  will  be  to  numbers  as  in  the 
case  of  Robertson's  Calendar)  ;  Hunt,  Madison,  VII,  78,  115; 
Morales  to  Cevallos,  Mar.  31,  1804,  Legajo  267,  Papeles  de 
Cuba ;  Robertson,  Louisiana,  II,  30,  n.  23. 

12  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Apr.  9,  1804  (Parker,  6971),  Sept. 
23,  1804  (Parker,  7059),  Mar.  30,  1805  (Parker,  7181)  ;  Mo- 
rales to  Soler,  June  20,  1805,  Legajo  595,  June  30,  1806,  Legajo 
2330,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


148  FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

where  reinforcements  from  Havana  or  Spain  itself 
would  probably  join  them.  The  administration  did 
not  wholly  share  Claiborne's  fears  or  trust  his  reports 
of  the  probable  strength  of  these  garrisons;  but  they 
instructed  him  to  inform  such  Spanish  officials  as  still 
remained  in  the  city  that  October  i,  1804,  the  date 
when  the  new  regime  for  Orleans  Territory  was  to  be 
formally  inaugurated,  would  be  a  fitting  time  for  them 
to  leave.  Neither  Morales  nor  Casa  Calvo  took  the 
hint.^3 

Complaint  and  suspicion  were  by  no  means  all  on 
one  side.  Casa  Yrujo,  the  Spanish  minister,  asked 
Madison  to  explain  why  the  American  government 
was  sending  more  regular  troops  to  the  new  acquisi- 
tion than  was  at  first  intended.  Such  action  on  the 
eve  of  a  possible  war  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain 
seemed  suspicious.  Madison  affected  ignorance  on  the 
subject,  but  thought  that,  even  if  true,  it  was  only  a 
necessary  precaution  in  a  newly  acquired  territory 
where  the  blacks  equalled  the  whites.  He  assured  the 
Spaniard  that,  when  the  anticipated  war  actually  broke 
out,  the  Americans  would  attempt  to  derive  no  ad- 
vantages from  it.  The  obvious  policy  for  both  his 
nation  and  Spain  was  to  maintain  the  status  quo  east 
of  the  Mississippi.     If  the  president  "had  varied  mili- 

^3  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Jan.  31,  1804  (Parker,  6953),  Apr. 
9,  1804  (Parker,  6955),  Oct.  5,  1804  (Parker,  7065)  ;  Hunt, 
Madison,  VII,  155;  Claiborne  to  Casa  Calvo  and  Casa  Calvo 
to  Claiborne,  July  25-27,  1804  (Parker,  7023-7031,  passim). 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  I49 

tary  dispositions  there,"  his  action  was  simply  tentative 
and  a  result  of  previous  Spanish  movements.^* 

Notwithstanding  their  common  fear  of  American 
aggression,  the  Spanish  officials  were  by  no  means 
united  in  their  proposals  to  defend  their  threatened 
frontier.  Salcedo,  who  still  wished  to  retain  the 
emoluments  of  office,  if  not  its  cares,  determined  to 
exercise  his  functions  as  governor  of  West  Florida  at 
Baton  Rouge,  which  he  described  as  "in  that  part  of 
Louisiana  which  still  remained  to  us."  He  dwelt  upon 
the  commercial  and  agricultural  advantages  of  the 
region  on  the  Mississippi,  and  its  strategic  importance 
as  a  point  from  which  to  threaten  New  Orleans.^' 
His  suggestions  for  fortifying  Baton  Rouge  fell  on 
deaf  ears.  His  superiors  feared  that  such  measures 
would  incite  the  very  attack  they  dreaded.  The  com- 
mercial advantages  of  the  district  as  well  as  its  secur- 
ity absolutely  depended  upon  the  near-by  Americans. 
Pensacola,  more  remote,  with  an  excellent  harbor  and 
an  adequate  meat  supply,  afforded  the  necessary  facili- 
ties   for    headquarters.^^      Its    commander,    Vizente 

1*  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Feb.  21,  1804,  Adams  Transcripts, 
Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library  (Robertson,  4953). 

1^  Salcedo  to  Someruelos,  Dec.  13,  1803  (Robertson,  4936). 

1^  Gelabert  to  Someruelos,  Dec.  30,  1803  (Robertson,  4938). 
Someruelos  to  Caballero,  Jan.  7,  1804  (Robertson,  4945). 
Folch's  legal  title  was  "  commandante  propietario,"  but  his 
neighbors  uniformly  called  him  governor  and  he  so  styled 
himself.  Cf.  Howard  to  Someruelos,  Oct.  31,  1806,  Legajo 
1564,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


150         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

Folch,  rather  than  the  decrepit  Salcedo,  was  invested 
with  the  governorship.  The  old  governor  retired  to 
the  Canaries,  and  his  son,  whom  report  had  stigma- 
tized as  the  evil  genius  of  his  administration,  later 
became  governor  of  Texas. ^" 

Folch  was  a  nephew  of  Stephen  Miro,  who  had  fol- 
lowed Galvez  in  the  governorship  of  Louisiana.  Dur- 
ing his  residence  of  twenty  years  on  the  frontier  he 
had  advanced  regularly  in  commission  and  responsi- 
bility. He  knew  his  neighbors  to  the  northward, 
their  language  and  their  political  views,  and  watched 
them  with  keen  insight  and  justifiable  foreboding. 
Claiborne  later  spoke  of  him  as  possessing  "  more  tem- 
per than  discretion,  more  genius  than  judgment,"  and 
characterized  his  general  conduct  as  "  far  from  con- 
ciliatory."^* But  even  so,  he  was  more  than  a  match 
for  the  American,  and  during  his  eight  years  of  execu- 
tive control  performed  his  difficult  tasks  to  the  satis- 
faction of  his  superiors  and  the  discomfiture  of  his 
enemies. 

Baton  Rouge,  if  not  to  become  the  capital  of  his 
province,  was  destined  to  remain  its  storm  center. 
Captain  Carlos  de  Grand  Pre  remained  in  immediate 
charge  of  it,  and  his  mild  administration  was  better  cal- 

1^  Robertson,  Louisiana,  II,  41,  231 ;  Claiborne  to  Madison, 
Feb.  26,  1804  (Parker,  6950). 

IS  Folch  to  His  Majesty,  Aug.  i,  1803,  Legajo  179,  Papeles 
de  Cuba;  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Mar.  30,  1805,  Claiborne  Cor- 
respondence, III,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  15I 

culated  than  were  the  more  vigorous  methods  of  Folch 
to  keep  its  Anglo-American  population  imder  nom- 
inal Spanish  sway.  Folch  often  suspected  Grand 
Pre's  abiht}-,  if  not  his  loyalt}-,  but  the  fact  remains 
that  the  subordinate  quelled  such  disturbances  as 
threatened  the  peace  of  the  western  jurisdiction  under 
his  rule  without  the  governor's  personal  intervention/® 
Folch's  enmit}'  finally  drove  Grand  Pre  from  office  to 
a  premature  grave,  but  his  successor  needed  barely 
twelve  months  to  incite  the  disaffected  residents  of  the 
region  to  open  rebellion. 

The  greater  part  of  these  were  Anglo-Americans 
who  resented  the  fact  that  they  were  not  included  in 
the  transfer  at  Xew  Orleans,  and  who  showed  their 
dissatisfaction  by  insolent  threats  against  the  local 
officials  or  by  open  disobedience.  The  officials,  tak- 
ing their  cue  from  the  concihatory  Grand  Pre,  tried 
to  placate  the  disaffected  without  jeopardizing  the  in- 
terests of  the  existing  government.-*^  Yet  they  held 
the  American  administration  responsible  for  the  in- 
cipient revolt  that  shortly  broke  out  in  the  Baton 
Rouge  district.  Jefferson  anticipated  such  an  event 
and  contemplated  it  with  equanimit}-,  but  this  attitude 
did  not  imply  the  direct  complicit}'  that  the  Spaniards 
charged  against  him. 

^^  Cf.  pp.  15S-161.  Folch's  correspondence  during  1804  and 
1805  emphasizes  the  necessity  for  defending  Baton  Rouge 
(Robertson.  501 1,  5017,  5031.  5033). 

-"  Casa  Calvo  to  Cevallos.  Mav  18,  1804  (Robertson,  4974)- 


152         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

The  causes  of  the  insurrection  of  1804  antedated  the 
acquisition  of  Louisiana.  Its  leaders  were  the  three 
Kemper  brothers,  who  long  bore  an  unenviable  repu- 
tation on  the  border  as  disturbers  of  the  peace.  The 
struggle  was  precipitated  by  a  lawsuit  between  them 
and  John  Smith,  a  prominent  merchant  of  Cincinnati 
and  speculator  in  West  Florida  lands,  who  was  then 
serving  in  the  United  States  Senate.  His  agents  hav- 
ing proved  unprofitable,  if  not  faithless,  Smith  ob- 
tained a  judgment  against  them  from  a  committee  of 
disinterested  neighbors,  and  sought  through  another 
agent  to  eject  them  from  some  of  his  property  near  the 
mouth  of  Bayou  Sara.^^  In  June,  1804,  the  alcalde, 
Alexander  Sterling,  had  some  altercation  with  Na- 
than Kemper.  He  then  placed  himself  at  the  head  of 
some  twenty  members  of  the  provincial  militia  and 
sought  to  execute  the  order  which  Grand  Pre  had  is- 
sued to  cover  the  case.  Nathan  and  Samuel  Kemper, 
with  four  other  well  armed  companions,  barricaded 
themselves  in  a  house  on  the  disputed  premises,  while 
their  more  notorious  brother,  Reuben,  seconded  their 
resistance  by  sending  threatening  missives  from  New 
Orleans.  Under  the  circumstances.  Sterling  contented 
himself  with  patrolling  the  neighborhood,  while  await- 
ing further  instructions  from  Grand  Pre. 

That  distressed  official  could   only   advise  him  to 

21  Grand  Pre  to  Folch,  July  19,  1804,  Legajo  106,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  I53 

pursue  his  cautious  policy.  While  the  district  was 
the  most  populous  of  West  Florida  its  residents  were 
largely  Anglo-Americans,  "  inclined  to  insubordination 
and  prone  to  insurgency."  Aside  from  the  uncertain 
militia,  he  could  muster  a  force  of  only  fifty-six,  "in- 
cluding the  drummer  boy  and  the  invalids."  Beyond 
the  line  were  the  dreaded  frontiersmen,  who  looked 
upon  his  jurisdiction  as  their  next  acquisition  and 
were  only  too  ready  to  initiate  the  necessary  measures 
to  acquire  it.  Pensacola  and  Havana  were  too  distant 
for  ready  recourse.  Casa  Calvo  at  New  Orleans  was 
the  only  one  who  might  aid  him,  and  in  his  extfemity 
he  applied  to  him  for  the  necessary  men  and  gunboats, 
with  which  to  "  exterminate  all  these  vagabonds  at  one 
blow."  But  he  did  not  await  the  tardy  arrival  of  rein- 
forcements. He  sent  an  improvised  gunboat  under 
the  command  of  Thomas  Estevan,  who,  cooperating 
with  the  militia  under  Champney  Terry,  drove  the  out- 
laws from  Bayou  Sara  into  American  territory .^^ 

Casa  Calvo  lost  no  time  in  letting  Claiborne  know 
of  these  events.  Reuben  Kemper  had  already  ap- 
pealed to  the  latter  in  regard  to  Smith's  lawsuit,  under 
the  impression  that  Claiborne  was  to  take  possession 
of  the  disputed  territory.  Having  referred  Kemper 
to  the  marques,  the  governor  now  expressed  his  regret 

22  Grand  Pre  to  Folch,  June  20,  1804  (Robertson,  4979)  ; 
Grand  Pre  to  Casa  Calvo,  June  24,  1804  (Robertson,  4981)  ; 
same  to  same,  Aug.  28,  1804  (Robertson,  4998). 


154         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

at  the  hostile  outcome,  but  was  sure  that  no  American 
official  was  concerned  in  it.  Casa  Calvo  had  intimated 
the  contrary,  and  Morales  repeated  the  charge  more 
definitely.  Both  Claiborne  and  Casa  Calvo  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  occasion  to  mention  the  claims  of  their 
respective  governments  in  the  rebellious  territory,  but 
as  a  negotiation  was  impending  to  settle  them,  the 
former  urged  leniency  toward  the  misguided  rebels.'^ 
Casa  Calvo  promised  to  recommend  this,  and  upon  his 
advice  Grand  Pre  offered  to  pardon  the  Kempers  if 
they  and  their  seditious  companions  would  leave  the 
province.^* 

This  ofifer  only  elicited  threats  to  burn  and  pillage 
the  dwellings  of  their  opponents  and  encourage  their 
slaves  to  escape.  A  provincial  patrol  under  Vizente 
Pintado  fired  upon  a  marauding  gang  about  to  cross 
the  line  and  wounded  and  captured  two  of  them. 
But  as  Georgia,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee  could  easily 
replace  these  "  white  Indians  and  river  pirates,"  the 
harassed  governor  renewed  his  plea  for  men,  money, 
munitions,  and  vessels  to  cope  with  them.  After  at- 
tempting to  fire  Pintado's  house,  the  outlaws  still  fur- 
ther astonished  him,  on  July  20,  by  reappearing  at 
Bayou  Sara.  Pintado  naively  ordered  them  to  de- 
liver up  their  arms  and  leave  the  disputed  premises, 

23  Claiborne  to  Madison,  June  27,  1804  (Parker,  7006). 

24  Grand  Pre  to  Casa  Calvo,  Aug.  28,  1804  (Robertson, 
4998). 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 55 

and  requested  further  instructions  from  Grand  Pre. 
Disregarding  threat  or  proffered  pardon,  the  impudent 
scoundrels  continued  in  his  jurisdiction  and  in  that 
of  the  neighboring  alcalde,  John  O'Conner,  accom- 
panied by  a  rabble  of  untrained  vagabonds,  who  gath- 
ered stolen  horses  and  slaves  with  impunity.'^  With 
such  subjects  the  lot  of  the  Florida  official  was  far 
from  enviable. 

But  worse  was  to  come.  On  August  7  the  brothers 
Nathan  and  Samuel  suddenly  crossed  the  line  at  the 
head  of  some  thirty  followers,  seized  Pintado,  O'Con- 
ner, and  Terry,  whom  they  treated  with  marked  in- 
dignity, burned  Pintado's  house  and  cotton  gin,  and 
took  up  their  march  for  Baton  Rouge.  Their  purpose 
was  to  surprise  and  capture  Grand  Pre,  and  thus  force 
the  surrender  of  the  fort.  This  was  no  mere  act  of 
bravado,  but  evidently  a  serious  attempt  to  overthrow 
the  existing  government,  for  it  was  accompanied  by  a 
proclamation  of  independence,  supposedly  the  work  of 
Edmund  Randolph  of  Pinckneyville,  a  partner  of  Daniel 
Clark.^®     They  also  raised  a  banner  composed  of  seven 

25  Grand  Pre  to  Casa  Calvo,  July  19, 1804  (Robertson,  4982), 
same  to  same,  July  21,  1804  (Robertson,  4984). 

-^  This  remarkable  document  begins  with  the  statement, 
"  For  a  people  to  be  free  it  is  sufficient  that  they  will  it."  It 
then  continues :  "  Whereas,  the  despotism  under  which  we 
have  long  groaned,  has  grown  into  an  unsupportable  burthen, 
and  as  it  is  long  since  admitted  men  are  born  with  equal 
rights,  we  the  undersigned,  inhabitants  of  that  part  of  the 
[Spanish]    dominions  called  West  Florida,  have  resolved  to 


156         FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

white  and  blue  stripes,  bearing  two  stars  in  a  blue  field. 
Thus  equipped  they  inaugurated  their  campaign  for 
"Floridean  freedom." 

By  seven  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  that  initial  day 
of  freedom  Grand  Pre  was  informed  of  the  threaten- 
ing peril  by  one  of  Pintado's  slaves.  Other  messen- 
gers confirmed  this  report,  and  among  them  an  Eng- 
lishman, John  Mears,  gave  some  details  of  the  insur- 
gents' reputed  strength  and  purpose.  They  claimed 
to  have  two  hundred  men  enlisted  in  their  cause,  and 
were  prepared  to  maintain  it  whether  the  United  States 
or  any  other  government  came  to  their  aid  or  not. 
Grand  Pre  put  his  slender  garrison  in  a  state  of  de- 
fense and  summoned  the  neighboring  militia.  At  day- 
break on  the  following  morning  he  exchanged  shots 
with  two  small  parties  skulking  near  the  fort.  Later 
John  O'Conner  came  as  the  messenger  of  the  rebels 
to  offer  himself  and  fellow-hostages  in  exchange  for 

throw  off  the  galling  yoke  of  tyranny  and  become  freemen, 
by  declaring  ourselves  a  free  and  independent  people,  and  by 
supporting  with  our  lives  and  property  that  declaration." 
They  then  invited  "  fellow  sufferers  throughout  the  province 
aforesaid  ...  to  aid  in  our  common  emancipation."  The 
signers  pledged  themselves  to  avoid  unnecessary  bloodshed 
and  to  respect  private  property.  As  soon  as  they  accom- 
plished their  emancipation  they  proposed  to  offer  themselves 
"to  some  government  accustomed  to  freedom."  Those  who 
opposed  them  were  to  be  regarded  as  their  "  common  enemy, 
the  enemy  of  mankind,  and  of  liberty."  This  proclamation 
was  published  in  the  Charleston  Courier,  Sept.  2,  1804  (Rob- 
ertson, 4997). 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES         1 57 

the  prisoners  whom  Grand  Pre  held.  The  latter  re- 
fused to  treat  with  the  insurgents,  O'Conner  could 
give  no  idea  of  their  strength,  but  evidently  it  was  not 
great  enough  to  enable  them  to  assault  the  fort  with- 
out artillery.  On  the  other  hand  the  Spanish  forces 
did  not  dare  venture  beyond  their  fortification. 

Discouraged  by  their  failure  to  capture  Grand  Pre 
and  the  unwillingness  of  the  people  at  large  to  revolt, 
the  insurgents  on  the  9th  retreated  to  Bayou  Sara. 
There,  as  "banditti,"  they  speedily  resumed  on  both 
sides  of  the  line  their  marauding  practices,  which 
they  tried  to  dignify  "under  pretense  of  giving  free- 
dom to  West  Florida. "^'^  It  was  these  practices,  un- 
checked by  the  Mississippi  authorities,  that  doubtless 
deterred  many  in  Feliciana  from  espousing  the  cause 
of  the  insurgents  and  led  the  better  elements  there  to 
appeal  to  the  Spaniards  for  protection.  O'Conner  re- 
ported that  nearly  all  the  people  there  were  ready  to 
revolt,  and  that  the  unstable  American  population 
above  was  ready  to  assist  them.  Grand  Pre  even  be- 
lieved that  Cato  West,  the  acting  governor  of  Missis- 
sippi, definitely  encouraged  their  aspirations.  Outside 
Feliciana,  the  people  remained  loyal  and  willingly  re- 
sponded to  the  call  for  such  military  service  as  the 
situation  demanded.  In  relays  of  a  hundred  each  they 
manned  the  fort,  kept  the  patrols,  garrisoned  strategic 
points,  and  loaned  their  slaves  to  the  common  cause. 

27  Grand  Pre  to  Casa  Calvo,  Aug.  8,  1804  (Robertson,  4989)  ; 
Charleston  Courier,  Sept.  25,  Oct.  11,  1804. 


158         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

By  August  16  the  commandant,  assisted  by  Armando 
Duplantier,  Samuel  Fulton,  and  George  Dupassau,  had 
assembled,  organized,  and  armed  a  force  of  nearly 
a  hundred  and  fifty  volunteers,  largely  from  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  Amite  and  Comite  rivers.  On  that  morn- 
ing Grand  Pre  presented  them  with  a  small  flag  and 
"  an  analogous  discourse,"  and  sent  them  to  scour  the 
roads  passing  through  Feliciana.  Michael  Jones,  a 
famous  partisan  of  the  American  Revolution,  was  to 
gather  men  in  the  St.  Helena  or  Ticfau  region  and 
secure  the  near-by  roads  leading  into  American  terri- 
tory. With  boats  at  the  same  time  blockading  Bayou 
Sara,  Grand  Pre  hoped  to  cut  off  the  escape  of  the 
insurgents  and  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the  revolt.^^ 

While  these  forces  were  marching  to  suppress  the 
insurrection,  Grand  Pre  entertained  an  unexpected  but 
distinguished  guest.  Daniel  Clark  presented  a  peni- 
tent letter  signed  by  Nathan  Kemper  and  five  other 
leaders,  and  asked  the  commandant  to  pardon  them 
on  the  plea  that  they  were  now  ready  to  lay  aside  their 
arms  and  refrain  from  further  molesting  persons  or 
property.  Grand  Pre  did  not  believe  him,  recounted 
the  outrages  which  the  insurgents  had  committed  both 
against  citizens  and  against  the  province,  and  sharply 
chided  Clark  for  asking  him  to  pardon  them.  More- 
over he  plainly  told  Clark  that  the  people  of  Feliciana 

28  Grand  Pre  to  Casa  Calvo,  Aug.  17,  1804  (Robertson, 
4991). 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 59 

associated  his  partner  Randolph  with  the  insurgents' 
proclamation.  On  the  whole  the  American  did  not 
carry  on  the  interview  with  his  usual  confidence. 
Grand  Pre  was  persuaded  that  Clark  and  Randolph 
had  largely  stimulated  the  revolt  because  of  their  ex- 
tensive property  interests  in  Feliciana,  and  that  his 
own  military  preparations  had  caused  them  to  abandon 
their  original  design  and  had  brought  Clark  to  ask 
pardon  for  the  deserters.  But  he  was  not  inclined  to 
be  lenient  with  them  a  second  time.^^ 

If  Grand  Pre's  military  precautions  dumfounded  the 
supposititious  chief  conspirator,  they  failed  to  entrap 
his  scattered  adherents.  Secrecy  on  the  part  of  the 
authorities  was  impossible ;  the  American  border  was 
very  near,  and  the  highways  and  byways  thither  were 
sufficiently  numerous  to  favor  the  fugitives  but  were 
so  nearly  impassable  as  to  hinder  organized  pursuit. 
The  leaders  of  the  punitive  forces,  Fulton  and  Duplan- 
tier,  carried  on  a  tart  correspondence  with  the  local 
authorities  in  Pinckneyville.  The  latter  promised  to 
arrest  and  punish  all  who  violated  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  but  refused  to  compel  revolting  Span- 
iards to  leave  their  territory.  Under  such  a  ruling  the 
Kempers  and  their  followers  feared  no  personal  harm 
above  the  line,  while  their  property  interests  below 
were  so  shght  as  to  be  negligible.     There  remained 

29  Grand  Pre  to  Casa  Calvo,  Aug.  19,  1804  (Robertson, 
4992). 


l60        FRONTIER   PROBLEMS   AND   PERSONALITIES 

nothing  for  Grand  Pre  to  do  but  arrange  to  have  his 
jurisdiction  adequately  patrolled,  and  to  thank  the 
officers  and  men  whose  services,  even  if  interested, 
had  enabled  him  to  survive  a  perilous  revolt.^" 

When  Casa  Calvo  learned  of  the  second  Kemper 
outbreak  he  reported  the  facts  to  Claiborne,  and  asked 
him,  by  notifying  the  neighboring  officials,  to  prevent 
aid  from  reaching  the  insurgents.  In  proffering  his 
request  he  had  no  wish  to  insinuate  that  the  American 
government  countenanced  these  outrages.  His  only 
purpose  was  to  preserve  the  harmony  that  then  existed 
between  the  two  nations.  He  also  asked  Claiborne  to 
reprimand  or  imprison  Reuben  Kemper  for  his  threat- 
ening correspondence  with  Alexander  Sterling.  Clai- 
borne's answer  was  delayed  on  account  of  a  severe 
attack  of  fever,  but  at  the  end  of  a  fortnight  he  as- 
sured Casa  Calvo  that  he  would  notify  the  officials 
as  requested,  although  he  hardly  thought  it  necessary. 
Certainly  no  Americans  of  repute  had  countenanced 
the  insurgents  in  West  Florida.  On  September  13 
Casa  Calvo  reported  that  the  outlaws  had  taken  refuge 
in  Mississippi  Territory,  and  asked  that  they  be  ex- 
tradited or  required  to  move  away  from  the  border. 
Claiborne  refused  to  apprehend  them,  but  promised  to 
bring  the  affair  to  the  attention  of  the  president  and 

3°  Fulton  and  Duplantier  to  Thomas  Dawson  and  reply  of 
latter,  Aug.  21,  1804  (Robertson,  4994,  4995).  Cf.  also  the 
three  following  entries  in  Robertson. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  l6l 

the  acting  governor  of  the  territory.^^  As  the  Span- 
iards strongly  suspected  both  officials  of  encouraging 
the  disturbance,  his  offer  doubtless  gave  them  little 
satisfaction.  However,  they  attributed  the  whole  pol- 
icy of  the  United  States  toward  such  offenders  as  due 
more  to  the  weakness  of  its  government  than  to  the 
open  wish  of  its  officials. 

When  Folch  first  heard  of  the  disturbances  at  Baton 
Rouge,  he  hesitated  to  advance  westward  until  he 
could  learn  the  disposition  of  the  people  in  the  St. 
Helena  district.  Assured  of  their  loyalty,  he  sent  for- 
ward a  force  of  fifty  men  with  artillery  to  construct 
a  military  road  from  Mobile  to  Baton  Rouge,  and  re- 
quested the  captain-general  to  send  him  more  men  and 
vessels.^^  As  soon  as  he  learned  of  the  second  out- 
break— about  three  weeks  after  the  event — he  placed 
himself  at  the  head  of  a  force  three  times  as  large 
as  that  of  the  insurgents,  and  on  August  31  left  Pen- 
sacola  for  Baton  Rouge  by  way  of  the  lakes.  His 
course  indicated  some  distrust  of  Grand  Pre's  age  and 
activity,  if  not  of  his  attachment  to  the  Spanish  cause, 
but  when  he  reached  Baton  Rouge  all  was  quiet.  He 
recommended  better  fortifications ;  provided  for  a  bet- 

31  Casa  Calvo  to  Folch,  Aug.  11,  1804  (Robertson,  4990); 
Claiborne  to  Casa  Calvo,  Aug.  27,  1804  (Parker,  7039)  ;  Clai- 
borne to  Casa  Calvo,  Sept.  13,  1804  (Parker,  7056).  Cf.  also 
Parker,  7041,  7042,  7055. 

32  Folch  to  Someruelos,  June  6,  1804,  Legajo  1557,  Folch 
to  Casa  Calvo,  July  17,  1804,  Legajo  55,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

12 


l62  FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

ter  system  of  administrative  and  police  regulations, 
particularly  in  respect  to  foreigners,  Indians,  and 
negroes ;  and  then,  led  by  the  scarcity  of  provisions  at 
Baton  Rouge,  returned  to  Pensacola.  On  his  way 
back  he  passed  through  New  Orleans,  where  the  ar- 
rest of  one  of  his  officers  led  to  a  bitter  correspondence 
with  Claiborne.  That  executive  believed  Folch's  jour- 
ney to  be  useless  and  possibly  hostile  to  the  United 
States,  but  the  Spanish  authorities  approved  it  and  re- 
joiced in  its  successful  outcome. 

Folch  partly  attributed  the  disturbances  to  the  care- 
less if  not  criminal  methods  of  Morales  in  conducting 
his  land  sales  and  to  a  six  per  cent  duty  on  the 
cotton  and  other  products  shipped  from  the  district. 
The  American  administration  knew  of  the  discontent 
prevailing  there  and,  as  he  strongly  suspected,  was 
only  too  glad  to  use  it  in  gaining  its  territorial  claims. 
The  official  periodical  of  Mexico  reported  the  same 
view.^^  Casa  Yrujo  reiterated  it  from  Philadelphia, 
and  while  visiting  Jefferson  at  Monticello,  brought  the 
matter  up  in  such  a  way  as  to  cause  the  president 
considerable  embarrassment.     When  his  own  part  in 

33  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Aug.  27,  1804,  Legajo  1557,  same  to 
same,  Dec.  5,  1804,  Legajo  1558,  Folch  to  Josef  Rufinaco,  Oct. 
8,  1804,  Legajo  55,  Folch  to  Casa  Calvo,  Oct.  7,  1804,  Legajo 
55,  Papeles  de  Cuba ;  Instructions  to  Syndics,  Oct.  30,  1804 
(Robertson,  5008)  ;  Claiborne  to  (Madison),  Nov.  22,  1804 
(Parker,  7085)  ;  same  to  same,  Apr.  27,  1805  (Parker,  1794)  ; 
Charleston  Courier,  Oct.  8,  1804. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  163 

the  mortifying  Jackson  episode  became  known,  he 
tried  still  harder  to  connect  Jefferson,  and  particularly 
Madison,  with  the  insurrection  in  West  Florida.  Mad- 
ison met  this  attempt  with  decidedly  bad  grace,  but 
desiring  to  insure  the  success  of  Monroe's  mission  he 
advised  Claiborne  to  bring  the  instigators  of  such 
movements  to  justice  if  they  operated  within  the  limits 
of  the  United  States  or  attempted  to  enlist  the  aid  of 
American  citizens.^* 

Affairs  along  the  Florida  border,  however,  were  not 
to  remain  peaceful  as  long  as  the  Kempers  were  at 
large.  In  April,  1805,  it  was  reported  at  Pinckneyville 
that  Reuben,  with  some  companions,  had  departed  for 
the  Bahama  Islands  to  enlist  the  aid  of  the  British  in 
a  project  to  invade  and  plunder  the  Baton  Rouge  dis- 
trict and  slaughter  its  principal  inhabitants.  Edward 
Randolph  was  reputed  to  be  one  of  the  leading  con- 
spirators. His  residence  near  the  line  and  his  busi- 
ness connections  on  both  sides  of  it  enabled  him  to 
exert  his  sinister  influence  to  the  utmost. 

The  alarmed  Grand  Pre  was  even  in  worse  shape  to 
deal  with  such  a  project  than  he  had  been  the  year 

8*  Casa  Yrujo  to  Someruelos,  Sept.  14,  1804  Legajo  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba;  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Dec.  5,  1805,  Legajo 
5546,  Estado,  Archivo  Historico  Nacional,  Madrid ;  Casa 
Yrujo  to  Madison,  Nov.  5,  22,  1804,  Spanish  Notes,  MS.,  I, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos, 
Oct.  26,  1804  (Robertson,  5003,  5007)  ;  Madison  to  Claiborne, 
Nov.  10,  1804  (Parker.  7104). 


164         FRONTIER  PROBLEMS   AND    PERSONALITIES 

before.  Casa  Calvo,  to  whom  he  straightway  ap- 
pealed, found  Claiborne  regretful  but  dubious  about 
the  conspiracy,  although  willing  to  warn  his  fellow- 
officials,  Robert  Williams,  the  new  governor  of  Mis- 
sissippi, was  equally  skeptical  but  was  fairly  complai- 
sant. Grand  Pre  had  furnished  him  with  a  list  of  the 
insurgents  and  their  abettors.  Folch  asked  him  and 
Claiborne  to  assist  in  punishing  them,  but  counseled 
Grand  Pre  to  rely  on  his  own  efforts  rather  than  on 
those  of  the  American  officials.  Williams  promised 
to  cooperate  with  the  Spaniards  in  suppressing  all  bor- 
der lawlessness,  and  especially  the  outbreaks  of  the 
Kempers.  But  his  course  a  few  months  later  showed 
Grand  Pre  the  wisdom  of  Folch's  advice.^'^ 

The  Kemper  episodes,  the  reports  that  American  reve- 
nue officers  had  sacked  a  house  on  the  Pascagoula,  and 
that  unknown  persons  were  killing  cattle  and  indulging 
in  promiscuous  shooting  near  Mobile,  made  the  Span- 
iards more  than  ever  determined  to  prevent  Americans 
from  settling  in  their  territory  or  traveling  through  it 
without  passports.^*'     But  in  the  summer  of  1805  they 

3^  Thomas  Hutchins  to  Grand  Pre,  Apr.  22,  1805,  Legajo 
1559.  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Grand  Pre  to  Casa  Calvo,  Apr.  29, 
1805,  Casa  Calvo  to  Claiborne,  May  6,  1805  (Parker,  7207). 
Cf.  also  7209,  7210,  7212,  7214;  Executive  Journal  Mississippi 
Territory,  1805-1810,  MS.,  7;  Grand  Pre  to  Williams,  May 
29,  1805,  Mississippi  Territorial  Archives,  MS. ;  Folch  to  Wil- 
liams, June  6,  1805,  ibid. 

36  Casa  Yrujo  to  Madison,  Aug.  2,  1805,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
I,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;   Folch  to  Someruelos, 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS   AND    PERSONALITIES  165 

afforded  the  Americans  some  chance  to  make  counter- 
complaints.  In  July  a  murderer  named  William  Flan- 
nigan  fled  from  Lake  Maurepas  to  Mississippi  Terri- 
tory.  More  than  a  month  later  a  posse  of  twelve  rode 
above  the  line  in  search  of  him,  threatened  a  resident 
on  the  Ticfau,  named  Holden,  and  apprehending  the 
nephew  of  the  murderer,  took  him  some  ten  miles  be- 
low the  line,  deprived  him  of  his  horse,  and  forced  him 
to  trudge  home  on  foot.  This  act  technically  consti- 
tuted a  violation  of  American  sovereignty,  but  the  char- 
acter of  all  concerned  was  evidently  such  as  warranted 
little  attention  from  the  authorities.^"  For  more  than 
a  month  those  of  Mississippi  took  no  notice  of  it; 
then  a  new  disturbance  in  which  the  Kempers  figured, 
or  possibly  hints  from  the  seat  of  government,  caused 
Williams  to  add  this  to  his  inflated  catalogue  of  Span- 
ish aggressions. 

On  the  night  of  September  3  a  party  of  white  men 
and  negroes  seized  Nathan  and  Samuel  Kemper  in 
their  homes  near  Pinckneyville.  A  more  important 
prize  was  the  redoubtable  Reuben,  whose  chance  pres- 
ence there  probably  determined  the  time  of  the  foray. 
Apparently  the  attacking  party  was  composed  of  resi- 
dents from  each  side  of  the  line,  who  regarded  the 
brothers,  and  especially  Reuben,  as  a  common  scourge. 

Sept.   13,   1805,  Dec.   13,   1805,   Legajo   1559;   Folch  to   Casa 
Yrujo,  Feb.  17,  1806,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 
3'  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  685. 


1 66         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 
t 

\  Having  secured  them,  they  passed  below  the  line,  and 
\  when  a  few  feet  within  the  province  of  West  Florida, 
^<;asually"  met  a  party  of  twelve  Spanish  militia  under 
Cap*-ain  Solomon  Alston.  The  captors  then  fled  in 
the  darkness,  leaving  the  Kempers  in  Alston's  hands. 
Captain  Alston  immediately  led  his  prisoners  to 
Tonica  Bayou,  whence  he  proceeded  to  conduct  them 
under  guard  to  Baton  Rouge.  While  on  the  way  the 
pirogue  in  which  they  were  proceeding  approached  so 
near  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  that  the  Kem- 
pers were  able  to  inform  a  chance  passerby  of  their 
plight.  Lieutenant  Wilson,  commanding  the  Amer- 
ican garrison  at  Point  Coupee,  took  the  whole  party 
into  custody,  and  prepared  to  defend  himself  against 
any  counter-attack  from  the  Spaniards.  Under  or- 
ders from  Captain  Richard  Sparks,  they  were  con- 
veyed to  Fort  Adams  and  turned  over  to  the  civil 
authorities.  Thus  the  Kempers,  whom  "  inexplicable 
chance "  had  apparently  delivered  into  the  snare  of 
Spanish  justice,  found  themselves  once  more  in  their 
customary  refuge. 

Williams  at  once  called  out  a  company  of  militia 
for  patrol  duty  at  Pinckneyville  and  another  on  the 
Ticfau  Bayou.  Having  thus  prepared  himself  against 
any  hostile  move  on  the  part  of  his  Spanish  neighbors, 
he  proceeded  to  lecture  Grand  Pre  for  this  technical 
invasion  of  American  territory.  Grand  Pre's  reply  to 
the  other's  scarcely  veiled  threats  was  moderate,  if 


FRONTIER  PROBLEMS   AND    PERSONALITIES         167 

not  convincing.  He  pointed  out  that  disturbances  for 
which  the  Kempers  were  responsible  accounted  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  border  patrol  that  had  by  chance 
encountered  them.  As  those  who  apprehended  the 
Kempers  were  American  citizens,  the  Spaniards  were 
not  responsible  for  the  initial  outrage.  The  arrest  of 
the  guard  and  prisoners  on  the  Mississippi  was  a  viola- 
tion of  the  Spanish  right  to  navigate  that  river ;  so  he 
requested  the  release  of  the  patrol  and  the  extradition 
of  the  Kempers  for  punishment.  After  an  examina- 
tion before  Judge  Thomas  Rodney  the  Spanish  sub- 
jects were  released  and  the  Kempers  bound  over  to 
keep  the  peace.^^ 

There  is  little  in  the  career  of  these  outlaws  to  sug- 
gest the  border  hero,  or  even  the  victim  of  Spanish 
persecution ;  but  Jefferson,  needing  material  to  arouse 
the  country  against  Spain  and  to  exert  a  favorable 
effect  on  our  negotiations  for  the  Floridas,  resorted 
to  the  use  of  a  partial  statement  of  the  Kemper  and 
Flannigan  incidents.  Casa  Yrujo,  after  the  president's 
message,  did  not  hesitate  to  supply  additional  facts,  in 
a  statement  to  his  fellow-diplomats.  This  speedily 
reached  the  public  prints,  but  elicited  no  reply  from  the 
incensed  Madison.  The  Spanish  minister  pointed  out 
that  such  disturbances  were  bound  to  occur  in  an  un- 

38  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  683-689; 
Grand  Pre  to  Folch,  Dec.  23,  1804,  Legajo  5546,  Estado, 
Archive  Historico  Nacional  (A.  H.  N.  hereafter),  Madrid. 


l68         FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

settled  border  population  served  by  irregular  militia 
officials,  and  that  they  became  important  only  when 
one  government  or  the  other  sanctioned  them  or  re- 
fused satisfaction  upon  complaint.  In  spite  of  the 
malice  of  this  suggestion  he  was  more  charitable  than 
Grand  Pre,  who  thought  that  the  American  govern- 
ment was  simply  using  the  occurrence  as  a  pretext  for 
hostility,  or  Folch,  who  in  a  private  letter  marvelled 
that  the  American  president  "  could  separate  himself 
so  far  from  the  truth."^^ 

A  less  dramatic  but  more  persistent  series  of  prob- 
lems centered  around  Mobile  Bay  and  its  affluents. 
The  inadequate  and  temporary  privilege  granted  by 
Morales,  at  Wilkinson's  request,  in  the  summer  of 
1803,  led  Claiborne  to  undertake  a  more  comprehensive 
agreement  with  Folch.  The  Indian  agent  Chambers 
wrote  that  he  could  not  continue  his  trading  house  at 
St.  Stephens  if  obliged  to  pay  duty  to  the  Spaniards 
at  Mobile  on  such  goods  as  he  needed.  Claiborne 
pointed  out  to  Folch  that  this  trade  kept  the  Indians 
contented  and  thus  assisted  the  United  States  in  ful- 
filling its  treaty  obligation  to  keep  them  quiet;  but  to 
no  effect.  Perhaps  Folch  knew  a  better  way  to  re- 
strain them.  Claiborne  then  advised  Chambers  to  pay 
the  duty  under  protest,  and  took  the  same  course  in 
the  matter  of  provisions  for  Fort  Stoddert.     In  the 

8*  Casa  Yrujo  to  Someruelos,  June  18,  1806,  Legajo  1708, 
Folch  to  Casa  Yrujo,  Feb.  17,  1806,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  169 

autumn  of  1804  the  question  recurred.  The  collector  at 
Mobile  permitted  a  vessel  loaded  with  military  stores  to 
proceed  to  Fort  Stoddert,  upon  the  promise  of  its  cap- 
ant  at  Mobile,  Joaquin  de  Osorno,  reported  that  John 
them.  In  the  spring  of  1805  Chambers  went  to  New 
Orleans,  and  through  the  intervention  of  Casa  Calvo 
secured  temporary  permission,  pending  royal  decision, 
to  bring  out  his  cargoes  of  furs  and  to  take  in  free  of 
charge  such  supplies  as  were  needed  at  his  factory 
and  at  Fort  Stoddert.*** 

But  private  commerce  must  look  out  for  itself,  and 
according  to  rumor  it  was  ready  to  do  so  in  typical 
frontier  fashion.  In  September,  1804,  the  command- 
ant at  Mobile,  Joaquin  de  Osorno,  reported  that  John 
Caller,  a  militia  colonel,  and  James,  his  brother,  justice 
of  the  peace  in  Washington  County  on  the  Tombigbee, 
were  threatening  to  capture  and  burn  every  Spanish 
vessel  that  came  up  the  river  and  throw  its  crew  over- 
board. Their  utterances  suggest  a  desire  to  rival 
the  Kempers.  The  Spaniards  were  inclined  to  regard 
them  as  mere  empty  threats ;  but  as  the  American 
frontier  magistrates,  according  to  Osomo's  superior, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Carlos  Howard,  were  often  ignor- 
ant and  half  civilized,  no  one  could  expect  wisdom  or 

*o  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  678-680; 
Charleston  Courier,  May  i,  1804;  Claiborne  to  Madison,  with 
enclosures,  Mar.  30,  1805   (Parker  7181,  7182,  7183). 


1 70         FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

moderation  from  them.  So  the  incident  in  time  swelled 
the  Spanish  diplomatic  correspondence.^^ 

A  proposal  for  a  general  embargo  that  then  appeared 
in  the  National  Intelligencer  aroused  Casa  Yrujo's  ap- 
prehensions. In  connection  with  random  newspaper 
comment  on  the  commerce  at  Mobile  and  proposals  to 
retaliate  by  restricting  Spanish  commerce  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi, he  believed  it  indicated  a  settled  spirit  of 
hostility  against  Spain.  When  Jefferson  referred  to 
exactions  on  the  Mobile,  in  his  annual  message  of 
December,  1804,  Yrujo  was  more  than  ever  confirmed 
in  his  view.  In  a  vigorous  rejoinder,  in  which  he  in- 
cluded the  Kemper  affair  of  that  year,  he  pointed  out 
that  the  duties  were  moderate — only  six  per  cent. 
Navigation  existed  there  only  by  the  courtesy  of  Spain, 
and  could  not  be  claimed  as  a  right.  Spain  did  not 
interfere  with  commercial  regulations  at  Fort  Stod- 
dert,  nor  should  the  United  States  complain  of  those 
at  Mobile.'^- 

The  situation  on  the  Mississippi  afforded  the 
Spaniards  some  opportunity  for  counter-attack.  The 
Americans  permitted  vessels  to  pass  New  Orleans  for 
West  Florida  only  under  adequate  bond  and  close  in- 

^^  (Casa  Calvo)  to  Howard,  Oct.  8,  1804,  Legajo  55,  Folch 
to  Someruelos,  Aug.  12,  1804,  Legajo  1558,  Papeles  de  Cuba; 
Casa  Yrujo  to  Madison,  Oct.  19,  1805,  Spanish  Notes,  MS.,  I, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

•*2  Annals  of  Ninth  Congress,  Second  Session,  690;  Casa 
Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Nov.  20,  1805  (Robertson,  5056). 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  17I 

spection.  This  care  was  deemed  necessary  to  prevent 
smuggling,  but  the  Spaniards  regarded  these  regula- 
tions as  designed  to  restrict  their  commerce  altogether. 
The  Americans  did  not  permit  vessels  loaded  with 
slaves  to  go  up  the  river  at  all,  for  this  would  measur- 
ably defeat  their  regulations  against  this  traffic  in 
Orleans  Territory.  Yet  they  did  not  think  that  these 
restrictions  paralleled  those  on  the  Mobile.  Naturally 
the  Spaniards  did  not  accept  this  view,  Casa  Yrujo 
least  of  all.^^ 

In  addition  to  the  perennial  commercial  problem,  the 
Spanish  possession  of  West  Florida  presented  another 
of  minor  but  irritating  character.  One  of  the  two 
natural  postal  routes  to  New  Orleans  passed  thither 
from  Muscle  Shoals  on  the  Tennessee  by  way  of 
Natchez,  St.  Francisville,  and  Baton  Rouge.  The 
other  extended  from  Muscle  Shoals  to  Mobile,  thence 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Pascagoula,  and  on  by  the  lakes 
to  the  city.  In  either  case  the  Spaniards  controlled  an 
important  stretch  of  the  route.  Acting  upon  Madi- 
son's suggestion,  Claiborne,  in  the  summer  of  1804, 
arranged  to  have  the  mail  by  the  western  route  pass 
through  Baton  Rouge.  Samuel  Fulton  was  designated 
as  a  "  discreet  person  "  to  open  the  mail-bags  and  dis- 
tribute the  portion  belonging  to  residents  in  that  juris- 
ts Robertson,  Louisiana,  II,  188;  Madison  to  Claiborne,  Dec. 
15,  1804,  Domestic  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  14,  415,  Bureau  of  In- 
dexes and  Archives  (Parker,  71 14). 


172         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS   AND   PERSONALITIES 

diction.*'*  In  the  following  year  Claiborne  tried  to 
arrange  for  a  like  privilege  through  Mobile.  Casa 
Calvo  favored  his  request,  but  Casa  Yrujo  refused  to 
sanction  it.  He  did,  however,  use  the  president's  ap- 
plication as  a  text  for  a  well-merited  lecture  on  Ameri- 
can pretensions  and  encroachments.*^ 

In  May,  1805,  under  the  mistaken  impression  that 
Folch  was  actually  constructing  a  military  road  from 
Mobile  to  Baton  Rouge,  Jefferson  felt  that  he  might 
reasonably  ask  for  the  postal  privilege.  He  instructed 
Claiborne  to  approach  Folch  directly,  while  the  Ameri- 
can representative  took  up  the  matter  at  Madrid. 
After  several  unsuccessful  attempts,  Claiborne's  secre- 
tary, John  Graham,  finally  reached  Pensacola  in  the 
fall  of  1805.  In  an  interview  with  Folch  he  learned 
that  the  other  had  no  objection  to  the  proposal.  The 
post-riders  were  to  proceed  from  Fort  Stoddert  by 
water  to  New  Orleans,  although  the  president  hoped 
later  to  extend  the  land  route  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Pascagoula  or  the  Pearl.*® 

The  failure  of  Monroe's  negotiation  caused  intense 
anxiety  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.     Nowhere  was 

4*  Madison,  Writings,  II,  203 ;  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Oct.  5, 
1804  (Parker,  7665). 

*^  Casa  Yrujo  to  Madison,  Mar.  12,  1805,  Spanish  Notes, 
MS.,  I,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

46  Jefferson  Papers,  MS.,  Third  Series,  Vol.  10,  No.  300, 
Vol.  II,  Nos.  26,  237,  Library  of  Congress.  Cf.  Parker,  7244, 
7249,  7250. 


FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 73 

this  more  felt  than  on  the  exposed  Florida  border. 
Grand  Pre  confidently  expected  an  attack  from  Mis- 
sissippi, and  recent  events  did  much  to  justify  his 
fear.  The  arrival  of  some  three  hundred  and  fifty 
additional  soldiers  at  Pensacola  in  the  fall  of  1805 
gave  Claiborne  equal  concern.  He  expected  the 
greater  part  of  them  to  reinforce  Mobile  and  Baton 
Rouge,  and  wondered  how  he  should  meet  them,  in 
case  of  emergency,  with  less  than  three  hundred  regu- 
lars in  New  Orleans  and  not  more  than  five  hundred 
reliable  men  all  told.  Yet  Folch  denied  any  actual 
increase  in  his  garrisons  and  Claiborne's  messenger, 
John  Graham,  could  find  no  direct  evidence  to  the 
contrary.  Folch  told  Graham  that  the  Kemper  affair 
and  the  threats  of  the  Tombigbee  settlers  would  war- 
rant such  an  increase  in  his  forces,  especially  as  the 
Americans  seemed  to  be  strengthening  their  garrisons 
at  New  Orleans  and  Fort  Stoddert.  He  had  not  com- 
plained of  the  latter  fact,  and  he  commended  his  course 
to  the  other.  Rumors  that  the  Spaniards  were  tamper- 
ing with  the  Indians  seemed  equally  groundless.  But 
the  course  of  the  astute  governor  was  not  wholly  dis- 
ingenuous. He  earnestly  besought  the  captain-general 
to  send  him  more  men,  and  even  attempted  to  purchase 
some  French  cannon  still  remaining  in  New  Orleans. 
The  consul  refused  to  sell  them,  but  assured  him  that 
the  Americans  should  not  get  them.*^ 

4'^  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Oct.  24,  1805  (Parker,  7291)  ;  same 


174         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

In  the  autumn  of  1805  Claiborne  also  ventured, 
through  the  obliging  Casa  Calvo,  to  renew  his  in- 
quiries into  the  land  sales  of  Morales.  The  intend- 
ant's  recent  activity  betokened  an  attempt  to  profit  to 
the  uttermost  from  a  transfer  which  his  government 
resisted  but  could  not  prevent.  Many  unprincipled 
Americans  were  ready  to  encourage  his  double-deal- 
ing. The  only  security  lay  in  stopping  these  sales 
entirely.  After  a  heated  correspondence,  carried  on 
through  Casa  Calvo,  the  American  governor  peremp- 
torily ordered  Morales  to  discontinue  his  sales  at  once 
or  leave  the  province.  By  complying  Morales  pro- 
longed for  some  months  his  residence  in  New  Orleans. 

Rumor  involved  Casa  Yrujo  in  Morales'  transac- 
tions, but  that  minister's  correspondence  does  not  re- 
veal his  complicity.  Casa  Calvo  repudiated  the  in- 
tendant's  policy,  although  he  tried,  at  the  same  time,  to 
bind  Claiborne  not  to  sell  any  land  beyond  the  Missis- 
sippi. This  continual  attempt  to  balance  territorial 
complaints,  coupled  with  a  reference  to  the  undue  ex- 
pansion of  republics,  caused  Claiborne  to  resent  the 
continuing  residence  of  the  marques.  Casa  Calvo 
assumed  the  functions  of  a  diplomat  and  did  more 
than  a  diplomat's  work.  His  presence  kept  alive  a 
feeling  of  loyalty  to  Spain  and  gave  force  to  the  per- 

to  same,  Dec.  9,  1805  (Parker,  7312)  ;  Folch  to  Someruelos, 
Jan.  31,  1806,  Legajo  1559,  same  to  same,  Mar.  12,  1806,  Le- 
gajo  185,  Morales  to  Soler,  Apr.  30,  1806,  Legajo  2330,  Des- 
forgues  to  Folch,  Mar.  10,  1806,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 75 

sistent  report  that  the  United  States  would  exchange 
the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  for  the  Floridas. 
Claiborne  devoutly  wished  to  be  rid  of  him  and  all 
other  busybodies.^^ 

There  was  much  in  the  official  correspondence  of 
the  Spaniards,  had  he  but  known  it,  to  justify  his  wish. 
Morales  urged  his  countrymen  at  all  cost  to  regain 
the  right  bank  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Island  of 
New  Orleans,  and  thus  break  up  the  rapidly  increas- 
ing illegal  trade  that  centered  at  the  latter  port.  If 
Spain  should  ofifer  the  right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans, 
the  Americans,  with  their  repugnance  to  high  war 
taxes,  would  be  led  to  make  a  peaceful  exchange  for 
the  Floridas.  But  an  ideal  policy  would  be  to  keep 
the  Americans  wholly  away  from  the  Gulf.  Mobile 
and  Pensacola  in  their  hands  would  inevitably  become 
centers  of  contraband  trade.*^ 

From  the  tone  of  the  president's  message  of  Decem- 
ber, 1805,  Casa  Yrujo  and  Folch,  in  common  with  most 
American  citizens,  were  led  to  anticipate  a  speedy 
declaration  of  war  against  Spain.  They  preferred  to 
meet  the  peril  by  military  measures  rather  than  terri- 
torial bargaining.  They  proposed  first  to  insure  the 
safety  of  Mobile  and  Pensacola  by  seizing  the  Ameri- 
can forts  on  the  Tombigbee.     Then  they  would  at- 

*8  Claiborne  to  Madison,  May  19,  1805  (Parker,  7217).  Cf. 
also  6997,  725s,  7258,  7259,  7270-7274. 

*^  Morales  to  Soler,  Sept.  20,  1805,  Legajo  595,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


176         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

tempt  to  reduce  New  Orleans  and  Natchez,  as  a  pre- 
liminary step  in  acquiring  the  western  bank  of  the 
Mississippi.  At  the  same  time  they  hoped  to  stir  up 
sedition  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  This  marks  a 
recurrence  to  the  outworn  separatist  intrigue,  but  even 
so  they  were  not  more  blind  than  was  the  American 
administration  a  year  later.  In  their  judgment  any- 
thing was  preferable  to  a  mere  defensive  policy.  A 
general  council  of  war,  convened  by  Folch,  devised 
plans  in  keeping  with  these  suggestions. ^° 

At  least  one  among  the  American  ofificials  had  some 
inkling  of  these  plans.  Harry  Toulmin,  a  recent  ap- 
pointee from  Kentucky,  was  the  federal  judge  in  the 
eastern  or  Tombigbee  district  of  Mississippi  Terri- 
tory. Interested  in  all  that  advanced  the  material  and 
moral  interests  of  his  adopted  home,  he  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  point  out  some  of  the  perils  that  threatened  it. 
Although  one  of  the  most  exposed  regions  in  the  whole 
United  States,  the  Tombigbee  country  mustered 
barely  three  hundred  militia.  While  this  number 
might  suffice  to  take  Mobile,  he  anticipated,  in  case  of 
war,  that  the  Spaniards  would  be  forewarned  and 
would  attack  first,  probably  with  the  aid  of  the  Indians. 
But  if  the  American  settlers  were  ready  for  a  quick, 
bold  stroke  and  could  be  reinforced  by  a  thousand 
militia    from    Tennessee    and   Kentucky,    they    could 

^'^  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  20,  1806,  Legajo  1559,  Folch  to 
Casa  Yrujo,  Feb.  17,  1806,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 77 

readily  secure  the  Floridas  and  also  gain  the  good-will 
of  the  savages.  The  country  could  provision  a  reason- 
ably large  force  even  if  the  enemy  consumed  most  of 
the  surplus  food.  Although  the  Spaniards  had  recently 
been  reinforced,  and  were  establishing  beacons  and 
block-houses  along  the  coast,  they  were  lately  becom- 
ing polite  to  the  Americans ;  but  he  was  uncertain 
whether  this  betokened  peace  or  war.^^ 

In  his  reference  to  Spanish  politeness  Toulmin  could 
hardly  have  had  in  mind  the  Spanish  attitude  toward 
the  Mobile  trade,  in  which  he  was  vitally  interested. 
In  July,  1805,  he  reported  that  there  were  two  vessels 
at  Fort  Stoddert  loading  with  cotton  and  that  they 
would  attempt  to  pass  Mobile  without  paying  the  duty. 
One  of  them  actually  did  so,  using  the  eastern  fork 
of  the  river;  but  on  the  return  voyage  the  owners 
directed  her  captain  to  call  at  the  port  and  pay  duty 
on  the  previous  cargo,  as  well  as  on  the  one  she  then 
carried.  The  incensed  Spaniards  seized  both  vessel 
and  cargo,  although  part  of  the  latter  belonged  to  the 
government  trading  house.  Toulmin,  who  was  also 
interested  in  a  schooner  loaded  with  goods  for  the 
Indian  factor.  Chambers,  tried  to  discuss  with  Colonel 
Maximilian  de  St.  Maxent,  then  commanding  at  Mo- 
bile, the  right  and  the  advisability  of  the  Spanish  prac- 
tice in  levying  duties  at  Mobile,  but  he  met  with  no 

^1  Toulmin  to  Lattimore,  Feb.  i,  1806,  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  30,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

13 


178         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

encouragement.  An  appeal  to  Congress  through  the 
territorial  delegate,  Hugh  Lattimore,  was  equally  fruit- 
less. The  House  referred  the  matter  to  the  secretary 
of  state,  but  Madison's  previous  discussions  with  Casa 
Yrujo  did  not  encourage  a  second  resort  to  the  mooted 
question.^- 

Claiborne  also  intervened  in  the  dispute.  In  Oc- 
tober, 1805,  he  tried  to  find  out  from  Morales  when 
the  Spaniards  began  to  lay  duties  at  Mobile,  and  asked 
him  to  discontinue  the  practice,  pending  an  appeal  to 
their  governments.  Incidentally  the  American  took 
occasion  to  intimate  that  the  claim  of  the  United  States 
to  West  Florida  gave  his  country  the  exclusive  right 
to  navigate  the  river,  but  he  tried  not  to  be  offensive 
about  it.  In  view  of  his  other  disputes  with  Morales, 
Claiborne  could  hardly  expect  the  intendant  to  second 
his  efiforts,  but  that  official  promised  to  write  Folch 
about  the  duties,  and  in  the  meantime  to  do  nothing 
to  disturb  the  existing  harmony.  The  only  result  of 
the  intendant's  inquiry  was  to  add  to  the  bitterness 
already  existing  between  him  and  Folch.  The  latter 
resented  his  intermeddling  and  refused  to  mix  up  in 
any  way  with  the  other's  intrigues.^^ 

52  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  II,  683 ;  Toul- 
min  to  St.  Maxent,  Oct.  4,  1805,  Mobile  Records,  MS.,  County 
Court  House,  Mobile,  Ala. ;  Petition  of  William  Harvey  and 
William  and  John  Pierce  et  al.,  Dec.  22,  1805,  Miscellaneous 
Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  30,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  cf. 
also  Parker,  4403. 

53  Claiborne  to  Morales,  Oct.  22,  Morales  to  Claiborne,  Oct. 


FRONTIER    PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 79 

The  American  governor  also  addressed  himself 
directly  to  Folch,  and  instructed  John  Graham  to  bring 
up  this  subject,  in  connection  with  a  discussion  of 
postal  routes,  increase  of  garrisons,  and  other  points 
at  issue.  Folch  assured  Claiborne's  messenger  that 
the  objectionable  duties  were  already  established  when 
he  assumed  office,  so  that  he  could  not  change  them, 
but  he  was  willing  to  suspend  them  temporarily,  pro- 
vided Graham  could  give  him  satisfactory  assurance 
regarding  vessels  bound  for  Baton  Rouge  and  other 
points  in  West  Florida.  If  the  Americans  did  not 
detain  these  vessels  at  New  Orleans  or  force  them  to 
pay  duties  on  goods  reexported  to  those  points,  he 
would,  pending  royal  decision,  prove  equally  accom- 
modating on  the  Mobile.^* 

Graham  could  not  give  him  the  assurance  required. 
Claiborne,  when  the  other  brought  back  the  proposal, 
feared  that  it  was  simply  a  pretext  to  estop  his  com- 
plaint. He  learned  upon  inquiry  that  there  were  no 
duties  such  as  Folch  mentioned  and  that  vessels  loaded 
with  slaves  could  not  pass  up  the  river.  This  restric- 
tion would  probably  be  sufficient  to  confirm  the  Spanish 

23,  Morales  to  Folch,  Oct.  25,  Folch  to  Morales,  Nov.  28,  1805, 
Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  American  State  Papers,  Foreign 
Relations,  II,  682. 

^*  Claiborne  to  Folch,  Oct.  31,  1805  (enclosed  in  Parker, 
7294?)  ;  Folch  to  Claiborne,  Nov.  28,  1805  (Parker,  7308, 
7310). 


l80         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

governor  in  his  attitude. ^^  During  Claiborne's  absence 
from  the  city  Graham  held  a  conversation  with  Morales 
on  the  subject,  and  found  him  even  less  amenable 
than  the  other.  Morales  said  that  the  Treaty  of  1795 
did  not  justify  any  foreign  commerce  whatever  on  the 
Mobile,  not  even  on  paying  the  six  per  cent  duty.  The 
question  was  one  for  a  full  treasury  council  to  decide, 
not  for  a  single  subordinate  official. ^^  In  view  of  the 
attitude  of  the  American  officials  toward  him,  the  un- 
graciousness of  Morales  is  not  surprising. 

The  Spanish  officials  were  neither  consistent  nor 
united  among  themselves,  as  the  Mobile  records  of  the 
period  abundantly  attest.  James  Innerarity,  the  rep- 
resentative of  John  Forbes  and  Company,  continued 
the  customary  traffic  in  furs  that  his  firm  had  always 
enjoyed,  and  even  employed  American  vessels  for  this 
purpose.  Although  the  Spaniards  bought  foodstuffs 
above  the  line,  they  would  not  permit  William 
Kennedy,  a  physician  at  Mobile,  to  send  supplies  to  his 
brothers  on  the  Tombigbee.  As  Joseph  Kennedy  was 
a  noted  opponent  of  the  Spaniards,  this  refusal  is  not 
surprising.  But  the  case  that  caused  the  most  serious 
dispute  was  that  of  the  schooner  Mary.  St.  Maxent 
had  previously  allowed  an  American  brigantine  to 
obtain  provisions  and  water  at  Mobile,  upon  paying 

^^  Claiborne  to  Folch,  Dec.  7,  1805  (enclosed  in  Parker, 
7312?). 

'''■'  Graham  to  Morales,  Dec.  23,  Morales  to  Graham,  Dec.  24, 
1 80s  (Parker,  7317,  7318), 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  l8l 

the  customary  charges.  His  subordinate,  Eslava,  de- 
cided that  this  justified  him  in  permitting  the  skipper 
of  the  Mary  to  land  part  of  her  cargo  at  Mobile  and 
sell  it,  and  then  proceed  up  the  Tombigbee,  Later  the 
vessel  conveyed  a  cargo  of  lumber  from  Mobile  to 
Havana.  Morales  called  Folch  to  account  for  per- 
mitting the  trade  at  all.  He  cited  royal  approval  of 
his  own  course  in  1803,  when  he  refused  Wilkinson's 
request  to  permit  general  trade  on  the  Mobile.  The 
Americans  were  not  accommodating  them,  so  why 
should  they  do  more  than  the  treaty  prescribed  ?^^ 

Morales  was  enraged  because  the  Americans  had 
finally  expelled  him  from  New  Orleans.  For  months, 
during  the  summer  and  early  fall  of  1805,  the  admin- 
istration came  to  no  decision  about  a  Spanish  policy. 
For  a  time  Jefferson  pondered  over  certain  measures 
to  strengthen  the  weak  American  border.  He  wished 
Congress  to  authorize  land  bounties  for  settlers  in  the 
Tombigbee  region  and  other  strategic  points,  in  return 
for  partial  military  service  during  the  first  seven 
years  of  residence.  He  considered  measures  for  more 
effectively  organizing  the  younger  militia.^^  But  in 
the  end  he  preferred  an  indefinite  negotiation  abroad 

^7  Mobile  Records,  MS.,  1805,  passim;  Parker,  7365;  St. 
Maxent  to  Folch,  Feb.  26,  1806,  Legajo  61,  Morales  to  Folch, 
Mar.  3,  1806,  Legajo  185,  Morales  to  Soler,  Apr.  30,  1806, 
Legajo  2330,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

58  Ford,  Jefferson,  VIII,  442;  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  31, 
1806,  Legajo  1559,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


1 82         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS   AND    PERSONALITIES 

to  these  and  other  measures  of  national  preparedness. 
There  was,  however,  one  measure  that  he  and  Madison 
were  determined  to  carry  out,  and  ultimately  they  per- 
suaded the  entire  cabinet  to  sanction  it.  Casa  Yrujo, 
Casa  Calvo,  and  Morales  must  be  forced  to  leave  the 
country.  As  a  preliminary  step  the  president  re- 
hearsed, in  his  message  of  December,  1805,  the  long 
catalogue  of  Spanish  aggressions  and  acts  of  un- 
friendliness, to  which  we  have  referred.  Among 
other  points  he  severely  criticized  the  commercial 
exactions  at  Mobile.  Casa  Yrujo,  who  had  intimated 
that  he  would  leave  the  country  when  agreeable  to 
himself  and  his  nation,  and  who  wished  to  make  his 
further  stay  as  disagreeable  as  possible,  readily  de- 
fended the  obnoxious  duties.  He  said  that  they  were 
moderate.  The  United  States  could  claim  no  exemp- 
tion on  the  ground  that  West  Florida  formed  part  of 
the  Louisiana  Purchase.  France  had  joined  Spain  in 
disposing  of  that  pretext. 

Governor  Folch  believed  the  message  to  be  a  char- 
acteristic display  of  American  arrogance.  Evidently 
the  administration  demanded  for  itself  the  exclusive 
right  to  levy  duties  and  to  pay  none.^^  His  colleagues, 
Morales  and  Casa  Calvo,  were  the  destined  victims  of 
American  displeasure.  After  prolonged  controversy 
and  delay,  Claiborne,  in  obedience  to  instructions  from 
Washington,  peremptorily  ordered  Morales  to  leave 

59  Annals  of  Ninth  Congress,  Second  Session,  687-693. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES         1 83 

New  Orleans.  By  the  end  of  January,  1806,  he  did 
so.  With  equal  difficulty,  although  in  a  less  disagree- 
able manner,  Claiborne  shortly  persuaded  Casa  Calvo 
to  follow.^" 

Folch  did  not  welcome  Morales  at  Pensacola,  and 
consented  only  with  bad  grace  to  recognize  his  official 
presence  there.  He  soon  found  reason  to  regret  the 
other's  interference.  Morales  regarded  the  traffic  at 
Mobile  as  contrary  to  what  he  believed  to  be  the  settled 
Spanish  policy.  When  St.  Maxent  brought  a  case  to 
his  attention,  in  March,  1806,  Morales  reiterated  the 
rule  that  he  had  laid  down  three  years  before.  Ves- 
sels in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States  might 
be  permitted  to  pass  Mobile  under  special  permit  from 
the  Spanish  authorities.  But  Spanish  subjects  could 
not  trade  with  foreigners,  except  in  case  of  urgent 
necessity,  nor  Americans  with  them.®^  Folch  pre- 
ferred to  permit  this  commerce,  upon  payment  of  the 
six  per  cent  duty,  and  claimed  that  he  found  the  prac- 
tice already  established  when  he  assumed  control.  He 
intimated  that  the  intendant  had  then  allowed  it,  in 
the  hope  that  by  thus  courting  favor  with  the  Ameri- 
go Claiborne  to  Madison,  Jan.  12,  28,  1806,  with  enclosures 
(Parker,  7329-7334,  7340)  ;  Morales  to  Soler,  Feb.  28,  Mar. 
31,  1806,  Legajo  267,  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Apr.  4,  1806,  Le- 
gajo  1559,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Cevallos  to  Erving,  June  24,  1806, 
Spanish  Dispatches,  MS.,  X,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives; 
Gayarre,  History  of  Louisiana,  IV,  131. 

61  Morales  to  Soler,  Apr.  30,  1806,  Legajo  2330,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


184         FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

cans  he  might  carry  on  his  speculations  in  New  Or- 
leans unchecked.  Disappointed  in  this  and  enraged  at 
his  expulsion,  he  now  demanded  a  war  with  the  United 
States,  in  order  to  soothe  his  wounded  pride.^^ 

Morales  would  neither  accept  responsibility  for  the 
questionable  traffic  nor  remain  silent  under  Folch's  in- 
sinuations, but  proceeded  to  lay  the  blame  on  Joaquin 
de  Osorno,  the  former  commandant  at  Mobile,  who 
had  permitted  some  thirty  infractions  of  his  orders 
in  the  previous  eighteen  months.  The  quarreling  offi- 
cials then  appealed  to  their  respective  superiors.*^^ 
The  vessel  that  had  provoked  the  dispute  was  forced 
to  return  to  New  Orleans.  It  was  rumored  that  the 
Spaniards  would  also  prevent  the  transit  of  mails 
through  West  Florida.  Claiborne  interpreted  these 
hostile  tokens  as  retaliatory  acts  for  the  expulsion  of 
Morales  and  Casa  Calvo.*'*  The  people  of  Washing- 
ington  County,  Mississippi,  passed  resolutions  declar- 
ing these  restrictions  a  violation  of  their  treaty  rights, 
and  characterized  as  "  an  enemy  to  his  country " 
every  one  who  should  sell  provisions  to  Spanish  sub- 
jects, or  transact  other  business  with  them.  Those 
who  aided  agents  or  vessels  of  the  Spanish  king  ex- 
posed themselves  "  to  all  the  pains  and  penalties  of 

62  Folch  to  Someruelos,  May  13,  1806,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 

•53  Morales  to  Folch,  May  22,  1806  (Robertson,  5094). 

^*  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Mar.  14,  15,  18,  1806  (Parker,  7360- 
7362). 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 85 

high  treason  against  the  United  States."  Colonel  John 
Caller  immediately  ordered  the  militia  to  close  the  river 
to  provision  boats.  Reports  that  the  regular  troops 
were  massing  at  Fort  Stoddert  more  seriously  alarmed 
St.  Maxent  at  Mobile.  His  trusty  mulatto  spy,  Regis 
Duret,  shortly  assured  him  that  the  latter  news  was 
false,  while  Judge  Toulmin  with  some  difficulty  per- 
suaded Caller  to  abandon  the  idea  of  a  secret  attack 
on  Mobile.®^ 

The  summer  of  1806  was  marked  by  some  shifting 
of  officials  in  the  disturbed  area.  Lieutenant  E.  P. 
Gaines,  later  dubbed  by  the  Spaniards  "the  Cock  of 
Stoddert,"  took  command  of  the  American  troops  at 
that  post.  Francisco  Collell  replaced  St.  Maxent  at 
Mobile,  and  during  Folch's  illness  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Carlos  Howard  assumed  temporary  control  at  Pensa- 
cola.  Gaines  made  some  pointed  inquiries  about  the 
transmission  of  the  mails.  These  inquiries,  and  the 
presence  of  loaded  vessels  at  Mobile,  led  Morales  to 
believe  that  the  American  administration,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  French  war  with  Prussia,  was  delib- 
erately seeking  to  embroil  itself  with  the  Spanish  fron- 
tier officials.  Sufficient  time  had  elapsed  since  Wil- 
kinson first  presented  the  issue  of  Mobile  commerce 

65  Gazeta  de  Mexico,  XIII,  379 ;  St'.  Maxent  to  Folch,  Mar. 
19,  1806,  Legajo  61,  same  to  same.  Mar.  2Q,  1806,  Legajo  6r, 
also  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Swaine  to  Mead,  Aug.  15, 
1806,  Mississippi  Territorial  Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  6. 


1 86        FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES 

to  settle  it  by  diplomacy,  and  the  failure  to  do  so  in- 
dicated premeditated  hostility .®° 

Although  he  still  firmly  held  the  opinion  that  the 
commerce  was  contrary  to  the  treaty  and  to  express 
royal  orders,  Morales  now  favored  concession.  With 
an  empty  treasury  and  uncertain  credit  he  could  not 
even  meet  the  regular  requirements  of  the  Indian 
trade.  He  longed  to  rid  himself  of  an  office  that 
promised  nothing  but  disgrace,  but  he  must  continue 
in  the  post  where  fate  had  placed  him.  The  only 
course  was  to  restore  the  commercial  privilege  that 
had  prevailed  before  the  preceding  March.  This 
would  permit  the  Americans  to  move  their  crops  and 
introduce  new  goods  subject  to  the  six  per  cent  duty. 
If  it  were  not  done  before  the  middle  of  October, 
he  and  his  colleagues  must  prepare  for  hostilities. 
Made  up  as  the  American  mihtia  was  of  ungovern- 
able men,  it  could  readily  starve  out  or  overrun  the 
province.  The  concession  would  remove  any  hostile 
pretext,  preserve  the  national  honor,  and  bring  in  some 
greatly  needed  revenue. 

The  captain-general  eagerly  seconded  this  solution 
of  the  difficulty,  and  advised  the  governor  and  the 

66  Gaines  to  Collell,  Aug.  i6, 1806,  and  reply,  Aug.  17,  Legajo 
61,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Morales  to  Folch,  Aug.  20,  1806  (Robert- 
son, 5101)  ;  Morales  to  Howard,  Sept.  11,  1806,  Legajo  1561 ; 
St.  Maxent  to  Howard,  Sept.  10,  1806,  Legajo  74,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


FRONTIER   PROBLEMS    AND    PERSONALITIES  1 8/ 

intendant  to  confer  over  the  details.^^  Folch's  illness 
prevented  the  conference,  but  Morales  did  not  inter- 
fere with  such  concessions  as  Howard  and  CoUell 
chose  to  grant.  At  the  same  time  the  American  offi- 
cials submitted  a  frank  statement  of  trading  condi- 
tions on  the  Mississippi.®^  As  a  result  of  this  frank- 
ness and  mutual  forbearance  the  Florida  frontier  re- 
mained quiescent  during  the  crisis  that  in  the  early 
autumn  of  1806  threatened  the  Texas  border.  It  was 
simply  the  calm  that  preceded  the  storm ;  and  the  gath- 
ering tempest,  commonly  called  the  Burr  Conspiracy, 
was  destined  to  exert  an  influence  on  American  fron- 
tier problems  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  real  peril 
involved. 

67  Morales  to  Collell,  Sept.  13,  1806,  Howard  to  Someruelos, 
Sept.  27,  1806,  Legajo  1561,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Someruelos  to 
Morales,  Nov.  14,  1806  (Robertson,  5109). 

^^  Toulmin  to  Mead,  Oct.  20,  1806,  Mississippi  Territorial 
Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  6;  St.  Maxent  to  Howard,  Oct.  29,  1806; 
E.  P.  Gaines  to  Commander  of  Mobile,  Nov.  5,  1806,  Legajo 
74,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Burr  Conspiracy  and  the  Embargo 

It  is  extremely  doubtful  just  what  Aaron  Burr  in- 
tended to  accomplish  by  his  mysterious  conspiracy. 
Perhaps  he  planned  a  more  dramatic  appeal  to  western 
sectionalism  than  had  yet  been  made.  As  a  confirmed 
opportunist  he  certainly  would  not  neglect  this  senti- 
ment, should  it  appear  wide-spread  or  influential 
enough  to  promise  success.  It  is  more  likely  that 
Mexico  was  his  objective  point,  with  West  Florida, 
and  especially  Baton  Rouge,  as  an  important  way  sta- 
tion. His  proposed  visit  to  St.  Augustine  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1804;  his  activity  at  Washington  during  the 
following  winter,  when  he  and  Wilkinson  frequently 
busied  themselves  in  mapping  Spanish  territory,  in- 
cluding West  Florida;  the  attempts  of  these  confed- 
erates and  their  friends  to  gain  for  Burr  the  governor- 
ship of  Orleans  Territory  and  "to  send  to  the  devil 
that  idiotic  boaster  W.  C.  C.  Claiborne " ;  and  the 
warnings  of  the  Spanish  minister  that  Burr  was  a 
British  spy,  planning  to  explore  the  Floridas, — all 
these  point  to  the  conclusion  that  Burr's  presence  was 
fraught  with  danger  to  the  Spaniards,  especially  in 
West   Florida.     Accordingly   Casa   Calvo   and   Folch 

188 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO       1 89 

were  warned  to  watch  him  closely,  and  the  latter  was 
empowered  to  arrest  him  should  he  give  occasion  for 
such  a  step.^ 

Burr's  actions  in  New  Orleans  during  his  brief  visit 
there  in  June  and  July,  1805,  increased  their  apprehen- 
sion. Casa  Calvo,  to  whom  Wilkinson  commended 
him,  had  contemplated  using  Burr's  plan,  whatever  it 
was,  to  advance  his  favorite  project — the  exchange  of 
the  Floridas  for  Louisiana  and  New  Orleans.  To  his 
mortification  Burr  avoided  his  society,  but  consorted 
with  James  Workman  and  other  members  of  the 
"  Mexican  Association."  These  conspirators  planned 
to  capture  Mobile  and  Pensacola  as  a  first  step  toward 
the  more  distant  goal.  So  Burr's  presence  boded  im- 
mediate peril.  Moreover  he  was  intimate  with  Daniel 
Clark,  the  reputed  accomplice  of  Morales  in  West 
Florida  speculations,  to  whom,  as  Wilkinson  intimated 
in  his  letter  of  introduction.  Burr  probably  communi- 
cated many  "  things  improper  to  letter."  But  despite 
these  well-founded  suspicions.  Burr  afforded  them  no 

1  A.  Burr  to  Governor  Enrique  White,  Sept.  22,  1804,  East 
Florida  Papers,  MS.,  Library  of  Congress;  Report  of  the 
Committee  appointed  to  inquire  into  the  conduct  of  General 
Wilkinson  (Ezekiel  Bacon,  Chairman),  203;  Wilkinson  to 
Casa  Calvo,  Mar.  18,  June  2,  1805,  enclosed  in  Casa  Calvo  to 
Cevallos,  Aug.  22,  1805 ;  Casa  Yrujo  to  Casa  Calvo,  May  23, 
1805,  Audiencia  de  Santo  Domingo,  MS.,  87-1-10,  Archivo 
General  de  Indias,  Seville. 


190      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 

occasion  to  apprehend  him  as  he  passed  through  West 
Florida  on  his  devious  way  northward.^ 

Before  Burr  returned  to  Washington,  his  agent, 
Jonathan  Dayton,  asked  the  Enghsh  minister  for  some 
British  vessels  to  assist  a  projected  revolt  among  the 
people  of  West  Florida.^  Casa  Yrujo  grew  still  more 
suspicious  when  he  noted  Burr's  intimacy  with  Day- 
ton, another  person  of  broken  fortune.  Dayton  told 
him  that  Burr  planned  to  seize  the  Floridas,  revolu- 
tionize the  western  States,  and  possibly  invade  Mex- 
ico. The  Spaniard  did  not  regard  the  Mexican  pro- 
ject as  serious,  and  felt  that  Dayton's  whole  purpose 
was  to  extort  money  from  him  and  the  English  min- 
ister. Wilkinson  had  evidently  taught  Dayton  how 
easy  this  was,  for  that  adventurer,  like  the  general, 
cffered  to  reveal  secret  views  of  the  president.  Casa 
Yrujo  scaled  Dayton's  reward  to  one  fourth  the  origi- 
nal demand,  but  his  superiors  refused  to  consider  it 
even  at  this  figure.* 

In  May,  1806,  Casa  Yrujo  reported  that  Burr's  plan 
was  suspended  to  await  the  outcome  of  the  Florida 
negotiation.     If  that  region  passed  under  the  control 

2  Casa  Calvo  to  Cevallos,  Aug.  22,  1805,  Audiencia  of  Santo 
Domingo,  MS.,  87-1-10,  A.  G.  I.,  Seville;  Documentos  His- 
toricos  Mexicanos,  I,  i-ioo,  passim  (Mexico  1910)  ;  Wilkin- 
son, Memoirs,  II,  Appendix,  LXXI. 

3  Merry  to  Lord  Mulgrave,  Nov.  25,  1805,  MS.,  British 
Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  45. 

*  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Jan.  i,  Feb.  13,  1806,  Legajo  5546, 
Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO       19I 

of  the  United  States  he  would  include  it  in  his  plan 
for  western  separation.  Thus  the  territory  would  fall 
into  his  possession  without  cost  or  without  stirring 
up  trouble  with  Spain.^  In  October,  Casa  Yrujo  ad- 
vised the  West  Florida  governor  that  Burr  was  about 
to  initiate  his  projected  western  revolt  and  that  he 
might  attempt  to  seize  the  Floridas  in  order  to  make 
his  enterprise  more  popular ;  so  he  warned  the  other 
to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  for  his  jurisdiction.  When 
Burr  started  a  second  time  down  the  Ohio,  Casa 
Yrujo  still  counseled  vigilance.  He  thought  the  ad- 
venturer had  possibly  abandoned  his  plan  to  invade 
Mexico,  for  Burr  had  requested  him  to  secure  the  re- 
moval of  commercial  restrictions  on  the  Mobile  and 
to  detain  the  mails  when  the  insurrection  broke  out. 
Instead,  the  Spanish  minister  warned  Folch  to  be 
doubly  watchful.^ 

In  August  and  September  of  1806  the  Spaniards 
were  more  interested  in  the  movements  of  Wilkinson 
than  in  those  of  Burr.  By  this  time  the  American  reg- 
ulars and  miHtia,  already  under  arms  to  repel  reported 
Spanish  aggressions,  were  preparing  to  act  against 
Baton  Rouge  as  well  as  Texas.  At  the  former  post 
Grand  Pre  determined  to  put  up  a  good  defense,  al- 
though he  had  only  sixty  men,  one  half  of  them  in- 

"^  Same  to  same,  May  14,  1806  (Robertson,  5093). 
®  Casa  Yrujo  to  Folch,  Oct.  30,  1806,  Legajo  104,  Casa  Yrujo 
to  Someruelos,  Dec.  10,  1806,  Legajo  1708,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


192 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY   AND    THE    EMBARGO 


valided,  and  an  uncertain  militia  largely  composed 
of  Americans^  Wilkinson  himself,  as  he  descended 
the  river,  was  uncertain  whether  to  attack  West  Flor- 
ida or  Texas.  Pensacola  in  his  estimation  could  de- 
fend itself,  and  no  more.  Mobile  was  menaced  by 
American  regulars  and  militia  on  the  Tombigbee. 
The  ruined  fort  at  Baton  Rouge  was  a  mere  holding 
point  surrounded  by  a  hostile  population  ready  to 
overthrow  it  themselves  or  to  do  so  in  conjunction 
with  the  American  garrison  at  Point  Coupee.  A  cam- 
paign against  the  Floridas  might  easily  be  combined 
with  his  first  forward  movement  "toward  the  Grand 
river."^ 

Some  maneuvres  among  the  American  forces  seemed 
to  make  this  certain.  The  alarmed  Spaniards  called 
a  council  of  war  at  Pensacola.  Those  present  agreed 
that  it  would  be  useless  to  reinforce  Baton  Rouge 
should  the  Americans  attack  that  post,  for  both  time 
and  transports  were  lacking.  Under  the  circum- 
stances Grand  Pre  should  yield  the  post,  after  render- 
ing the  artillery  useless.  Early  in  November  Howard, 
the  temporary  commander  at  Pensacola,  learned  that 
Wilkinson  had  already  begun  hostilities,  and  that  in 
consequence  the  militia  on  the  Tombigbee  had  been 
summoned  to  rally  at  Wakefield  on  the  last  Saturday 

"^  Acta  de  Junta  de  Guerra,  Pensacola,   Sept.  i6,  1806,  Le- 
gajo  74,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 
8  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  II,  Appendix  LX. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO       1 93 

in  October.  As  he  obtained  this  information  from  an 
American,  "drunk  as  is  usually  the  case  with  all  of 
that  nation  who  come  daily  to  this  plaza,"  it  naturally 
aroused  some  doubt  in  his  mind.  St.  Maxent,  on  his 
advice,  sent  his  trusty  agent  Regis  Buret  to  investi- 
gate, but  he  observed  no  unusual  change  in  the  garri- 
son at  Fort  Stoddert.^  Wilkinson,  as  the  Spaniards 
soon  learned,  had  no  intention  whatever  of  stirring  up 
a  border  war.  Having  formed  the  Neutral  Ground 
Agreement,  he  temporarily  left  the  people  on  the  Tom- 
bigbee  to  shift  for  themselves,  while  he  prepared  to 
open  the  most  reckless  and  far-reaching  intrigue  of 
his  whole  career." 

Early  in  the  autumn  of  1806  Folch  was  informed 
from  New  Orleans  that  in  the  following  spring  ten 
thousand  Kentuckians  and  three  thousand  regulars 
were  to  descend  the  Mississippi  for  a  projected  expe- 
dition against  Mexico.  They  were  to  be  joined  by 
eight  or  ten  thousand  Louisiana  militia  and  five  thou- 
sand negro  slaves,  who  were  to  be  liberated  for  this 
purpose.  A  portion  of  this  motley  host  was  to  be  de- 
tached to  hold  New  Orleans,  Baton  Rouge,  and  Pen- 
sacola,  while  the  main  body  invaded  Mexico  by  way 
of  Natchitoches  and  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande. 

8  Howard  to  Someruelos,  Nov.  2,  1806,  Legajo  1574;  St. 
Maxent  to  Howard,  Nov.  10,  1806,  Legajo  74,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

10  McCaleb,  The  Aaron  Burr  Conspiracy,  Ch.  V,  VI,  VHI, 
gives  the  best  summary  of  these  events. 

14 


194 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 


This  information  was  too  exaggerated  to  be  true ;  but 
when  Folch  later  received  a  newspaper  dipping  de- 
scribing Burr's  movements  along  the  Ohio,  he  felt  it 
worth  while  to  pay  more  attention  to  the  project. 
The  later  item  reached  him  through  Wilkinson's  con- 
fidant in  New  Orleans.  Perhaps  the  other  came  from 
the  same  source.  Both  reports  formed  part  of  the 
general's  plan  to  betray  Burr.^^ 

In  this  connection  Wilkinson  also  determined  to 
blackmail  the  Mexican  viceroy.  To  accomplish  this 
he  must  create  the  impression  that  Burr's  project  was 
most  serious  and  its  frustration  most  desirable.  To 
this  end  Wilkinson  evidently  wished  to  work  upon 
the  viceroy  through  Governor  Folch.  Accordingly  he 
advised  the  latter  that  a  confidential  communication 
was  on  its  way,  at  the  same  time  assuring  him  "  on 

^^  A  French  copy  of  this  original  project,  signed  by  Folch 
and  dated  at  New  Orleans,  Oct.  i,  1806,  is  in  Marina,  1805- 
1808,  MS.,  (Archivo  General  de  Mexico)  (cf.  Bolton,  Guide 
to  Materials  ...  in  the  Principal  Archives  of  Mexico,  183). 
Another  copy  in  Spanish  is  in  Legajo  1574,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 
Wilkinson  is  probably  the  source  of  the  project,  by  which  he 
evidently  wished  to  arouse  Spanish  fears.  He  may  even  then 
have  intended  to  betray  Burr,  seeing  that  the  latter  had  failed 
to  obtain  money  from  the  French  or  English  minister,  and 
convert  the  intricate  plot  into  a  mercenary  intrigue,  from 
which  he  alone  should  profit.  The  second  copy  of  the  project, 
with  the  newspaper  clipping,  reached  Folch  in  December 
through  Wilkinson's  confidant.  Louis  De  Clouet,  after  the 
general  had  come  to  New  Orleans  from  the  Texas  frontier. 
He  had  then  dispatched  his  messenger.  Burling,  to  the  viceroy. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO       1 95 

his  honor  as  a  soldier  "  that  such  measures  as  he  was 
taking  were  for  the  interest  of  Spain  as  well  as  of  the 
United  States.  Then  his  messenger  followed  with  a 
detailed  account  of  Burr's  proposed  plan  against  Lou- 
isiana and  Mexico.^^  Wilkinson  employed  Spaniards 
to  aid  him,  but  they  refused  to  take  any  definite  meas- 
ures against  the  predicted  danger  without  word  from 
Folch.  Leonard  had  also  warned  Morales  about  the 
Mexican  Association.  Friar  Antonio  Sedella  and  Rich- 
ard R.  Keene,  residents  of  New  Orleans,  gave  addi- 
tional information.  They  tried  to  implicate  the  Amer- 
ican government  in  a  wide-spread  plot  in  which  Daniel 
Clark,  Wilkinson,  and  Burr  played  important  but  un- 
certain parts.  Such  rumors  served  only  to  confuse 
the  situation.  Each  interested  reporter  wished  to  be 
the  first  to  give  information  to  the  higher  authorities 
and  was  naturally  inclined  to  exaggerate  whatever  he 
learned.^^ 

Folch,  already  recovered  from  the  illness  of  the  pre- 
ceding summer,  was  at  Mobile.  After  receiving  Wil- 
kinson's letter,  he  determined  to  visit  Baton  Rouge. 
Wilkinson  was  pleased  at  this  evidence  of  faith  in 
him  and  his  government,  and  as  further  testimony  sent 
the  Spaniard  Jefferson's  proclamation  against   Burr, 

^2  Wilkinson  to  Folch,  Dec.  6,  1806,  Legajo  5546,  Estado, 
A.  H.  N.,  Madrid;  De  Clouet  to  Folch,  Dec.  12,  1806,  Legajo 
61,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

13  Morales  to  Soler,  reservado,  May  23,  1806,  same  to  same, 
Nov.  8,  1806,  Legajo  267,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


196     THE   BURR    CONSPIRACY   AND   THE   EMBARGO 

which  he  felt  sure  would  convince  the  most  incredu- 
lous. Burr  was  then  approaching,  so  Wilkinson  ad- 
vised Folch  to  hasten  his  coming  and  asked  him  to  let 
American  troops  pass  Mobile  on  their  way  to  New 
Orleans.  As  this  transfer  was  to  protect  Mexico  as 
well  as  Louisiana  and  the  western  States  against  a 
common  enemy  (for  so  Wilkinson  chose  to  regard  his 
former  confrere),  and  as  his  officers  promised  to  keep 
the  troops  in  order  and  in  other  ways  preserve  the 
status  quo  which  the  president  desired  to  maintain,  he 
felt  that  there  could  be  no  objection  to  his  request.^* 

By  this  time  Folch  was  persuaded  that  Burr  would 
not  attempt  to  attack  Mobile  or  Pensacola  by  way  of 
Muscle  Shoals.  He  therefore  complied  with  the 
other's  advice  to  make  his  headquarters  at  Baton 
Rouge.  Before  moving  thither  he  almost  wrecked 
their  proposed  joint  action  by  refusing  to  let  the  Amer- 
ican troops  pass  Mobile.  Lieutenant  E.  P.  Gaines  and 
Captain  Thomas  Swaine,  commanding  the  detachment 
destined  for  New  Orleans,  vainly  sought  this  privilege, 
but  Folch  was  unwiUing  to  grant  it  without  the  previ- 
ous consent  of  Someruelos.  Time  was  pressing,  so 
Swaine  loaded  his  troops  on  a  schooner  and  dropped 
down  the  river  toward  Mobile.  When  the  amazed 
Folch  ordered  two  vessels  to  intercept  him,  Swaine 
discreetly  took   the   eastern    fork   of   the   river,   and 

1^  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  6,  1807,  Legajo  5546,  Estado, 
A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO       1 97 

after  safely  reaching  the  bay  sent  an  officer  to  inform 
the  Spaniard  of  what  he  had  done.  The  other  af- 
fected anger,  but  we  may  well  believe  that  this  was 
merely  a  pose  to  avoid  any  disagreeable  consequences 
with  his  superiors.  He  told  the  officer  at  Mobile  to 
let  the  incident  make  no  change  in  his  relations  with 
the  Americans.  Later  the  captain-general  permitted 
American  troops  to  pass  Mobile  in  small  parties,  tar- 
rying there  as  briefly  as  possible.^^ 

Although  Wilkinson  had  aroused  Folch  and  started 
him  westward  toward  Baton  Rouge,  he  could  not  per- 
suade Grand  Pre  to  pay  any  attention  directly  to  his 
many  warnings.  In  January  Burr  reached  Natchez, 
Wilkinson  advised  Folch  and  Morales  of  the  fact,  and 
suggested  that  they  should  concentrate  forces  at  Baton 
Rouge,  secure  the  artillery  there,  and  check  any  plan 
to  attack  Mobile  or  Pensacola.  At  the  same  time  he 
informed  them  that  good  faith  and  national  interests 
authorized  him  to  make  common  cause  with  them  in 
defending  their  respective  posts.  He  was  ready,  there- 
fore, to  consider  any  plan  that  promised  substantial 
agreement.  Apparently  the  administration  did  not  in- 
struct him  to  take  this  specific  step.  Very  likely  he  felt 
that  he  could  control  the  situation  to  better  advantage 
by  securing  the  chance  to  direct  the  Spanish  forces  as 
well  as  his  own.    At  any  rate  he  would  be  able  to  disarm 

15  Folch  to  Someruelos,  reservado,  Dec.  13,  1806,  Legajo 
1576,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


198      THE   BURR   CONSPIRACY   AND   THE   EMBARGO 

possible  criticism  of  his  own  course  by  showing  that 
the  neighboring  Spaniards  were  pursuing  a  similar  one. 
One  is  inclined  to  suspect  him  of  thinking  that  if  he 
could  induce  Folch  to  make  common  cause  with  him 
and  then  incidentally  pose  as  the  saviour  of  West  Flor- 
ida as  well  as  Louisiana  and  Texas,  he  could  better 
persuade  the  viceroy  of  New  Spain  to  pay  the  money 
that  he  had  demanded.  Wilkinson  also  desired  to 
hold  a  personal  interview  with  Folch  in  order  to  secure 
from  him  a  statement  that  he  had  never  been  a  Spanish 
pensioner.  Influenced  by  his  proposals  for  joint  ac- 
tion, Governor  Folch  on  his  journey  westward  planned 
to  visit  New  Orleans,  confer  with  Wilkinson  and  Clai- 
borne on  their  common  peril,  and  then  proceed  to 
Baton  Rouge  by  way  of  the  Mississippi.^*' 

Meanwhile  the  exaggerated  reports  of  Burr's  ad- 
vance had  so  excited  the  volatile  population  of  the 
Creole  capital  that  Governor  Claiborne,  ignorant  of 
the  general's  necessity,  refused  to  allow  Folch  and  his 
officials  to  enter  the  city;  and  Wilkinson  was  con- 
strained to  support  him.  Captain  Daniel  Hughes, 
Wilkinson's  aide,  urged  Folch  to  disregard  the  appar- 
ent discourtesy  of  their  refusal  and  come  on  any- 
how, promising  that  Claiborne  would  not  oppose  such 
a  move.     Hughes  himself  says  that  he  tried  to  in- 

"  Wilkinson  to  Jefferson,  Dec.  18,  1806,  Bacon's  Report, 
429;  Wilkinson  to  Folch  and  Morales,  Jan.  5,  1807,  Legajos 
1574  and  267,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Clark,  Proofs,  64-67.  Cf. 
also  my  article  in  American  Historical  Review,  XIX,  804  ff. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO       1 99 

duce  Folch  to  meet  Claiborne  and  Wilkinson  at  the 
St.  Jean  Bridge,  on  the  canal  outside  the  city  limits. 
The  incensed  Spaniard  did  not  believe  it  in  accordance 
with  his  dignity  as  "the  Governor  of  a  Province  and 
an  officer  of  His  Catholic  Majesty"  to  hold  an  inter- 
view within  sight  of  New  Orleans  while  he  was  de- 
nied permission  to  enter  it,  and  proceeded  immediately 
to  Baton  Rouge.  Although  Folch  thus  refused  to 
meet  him,  Wilkinson,  through  mutual  friends,  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  from  him  the  statement  explain- 
ing his  former  relations  with  the  Spaniards.  While 
not  wholly  satisfactory,  he  used  it  in  a  defense  that 
he  published  later  in  the  year.^^ 

Even  the  prospect  of  common  action  with  the  Amer- 
icans had  not  led  Folch  and  Morales  to  neglect  ordi- 
nary precautions.  Morales  opened  the  year  1807  by 
appealing  to  the  citizens  of  Pensacola  for  funds  to 
meet  the  projected  attack  of  the  Kentuckians.^^  Folch 
was  inclined  to  find  encouragement  in  the  reputed  op- 
erations of  these  insurgents.  He  distrusted  Burr  and 
believed  the  United  States  unfriendly,  but  such  a  pro- 
ject as  was  under  way  betokened  the  ultimate  separa- 
tion of  the  West  from  the  Union.     In  this  way  only 

1'^  American  Historical  Review,  X,  832  ff. ;  Folch  to  Some- 
ruelos,  reservado,  Feb.  3,  1807,  Legajo  1574  Papeles  de  Cuba; 
Report  of  Daniel  Hughes  to  (Wilkinson),  Jan.  — ,  1807,  Let- 
ters Received,  MS.,  War  Department. 

18  Edict  of  Morales,  Jan.  i,  1807,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de 
Cuba;  cf.  also  Robertson,  5121,  5128,  5129. 


200      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 

could  the  marvelous  progress  of  the  American  States 
be  checked.  Otherwise  they  would  soon  overthrow 
all  European  establishments  on  this  continent.  For 
this  reason  he  was  prepared  to  support  the  insur- 
gents, if  they  asked  for  aid,  and  advised  Grand  Pre  to 
observe  a  neutral  attitude  between  them  and  the 
United  States,  but  to  be  prepared  to  repel  an  attack 
from  either.  His  most  pressing  problem,  however, 
was  the  financial  one,  and  he  must  look  to  Mexico,  the 
objective  point  of  the  invasion,  for  its  solution. 

Other  wild  reports  of  the  number  and  purpose 
of  these  insurgents  had  come  to  Folch  while  on  his 
way  westward.  After  seizing  the  various  posts  in 
Louisiana  and  the  Floridas  and  making  sure  of  the 
artillery  and  munitions  in  them,  they  were  to  under- 
take an  expedition  against  Mexico.  When  that  re- 
gion proclaimed  its  independence,  it  would  join  the 
western  States  and  form  a  new  power.  The  thirteen 
thousand  men  already  enlisted  for  this  campaign  would 
shortly  increase  to  thirty  thousand.  Ten  thousand  of 
them  were  already  rallying  at  the  mouth  of  the  Cum- 
berland. On  reaching  Baton  Rouge  Folch  immedi- 
ately planned  to  get  the  artillery  out  of  their  reach. 
All  pieces  not  absolutely  necessary  should  be  sent  to 
Vera  Cruz.  The  forts  were  to  be  repaired  and  placed 
in  the  best  possible  state  of  defense.  The  one  at 
Baton  Rouge  was  so  ruined  as  to  be  indefensible. 
The  Spaniards  must  have  a  new  one  there  if  they 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO       201 

wished  to  preserve  the  Floridas  and  cause  the  Ameri- 
cans to  respect  their  rights  on  the  Mississippi. 

Wilkinson  reported  that  Grand  Pre  disregarded  his 
warnings  against  Burr.  Folch  found  his  subordinate's 
course  unaccountable.  Grand  Pre  preserved  a  mys- 
terious silence  in  the  midst  of  disturbing  rumors,  and 
neglected  to  carry  out  Folch's  suggestions  for  strength- 
ening that  part  of  the  province.  The  latter 's  own  ac- 
tivity in  moving  westward  and  in  embodying  the  militia 
there  disconcerted  the  insurgents  and  caused  them  to 
abandon  the  attack  on  Baton  Rouge  that  the  Spaniards 
momentarily  expected.  Folch,  therefore,  while  await- 
ing a  remittance  from  Mexico,  had  merely  maintained 
a  policy  of  watchful  waiting,  and  put  in  force  meas- 
ures for  the  better  organization  of  the  district.  Never- 
theless, he  did  not  cease  to  ponder  over  the  attitude  oi 
the  American  government,  and  he  even  imagined  that 
the  British  government  might  also  be  involved  in  the 
puzzling  conspiracy.^** 

The  suspicion  that  existed  between  himself  and 
Grand  Pre  found  its  counterpart  above  the  line.  On 
the  day  that  Wilkinson  and  Claiborne  refused  Folch 
permission  to  pass  through  New  Orleans,  they  advised 
Cowles   Meade,  acting  governor  of   Mississippi,  "to 

13  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  8,  1807,  Legajo  5546,  Estado, 
A.  H.  N. ;  same  to  same,  Feb.  10,  July  28,  1807,  Legajo  1562, 
Papeles  de  Cuba;  Folch  to  Iturrigaray,  Feb.  15,  1807,  Marina, 
1805-1808,  A.  G.,  Mexico;  Morales  to  Soler,  Jan.  31,  1807, 
Legajo  267,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


202      THE   BURR   CONSPIRACY   AND   THE   EMBARGO 

keep  a  strict  eye  upon  the  Spaniards."  Folch  was  re- 
ported to  be  taking  four  hundred  men  with  him  to 
Baton  Rouge.  While  they  desired  his  cooperation 
against  Burr,  the  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain  were  so  uncertain  that  they  must  exercise 
extreme  vigilance  in  regard  to  their  neighbors.  Yet 
Meade  was  more  inclined  to  be  suspicious  of  Wilkin- 
son than  of  the  Spaniards,  and  warned  Claiborne  to 
watch  out  for  him  and  for  Daniel  Clark  as  well.^" 
Late  in  February,  Wilkinson  reported  to  the  secretary 
of  war  a  rumor  that  Casa  Calvo  had  returned  to  Ha- 
vana and  was  to  bring  reinforcements  to  Baton  Rouge. 
The  American  general  was  going  to  divide  his  forces 
and  place  enough  men  in  Fort  Adams  to  capture  Baton 
Rouge,  if  hostilities  should  break  out.'^  We  may  in- 
terpret this  and  his  other  report  to  the  secretary  as 
attempts  to  conceal  his  real  relations  with  Folch. 

Wilkinson's  hatred  of  Burr  had  by  this  time  become 
extreme,  and  he  determined  to  get  the  other  into  his 
power.  For  this  purpose  he  commissioned  one  of  his 
aids.  Captain  Moses  Hooke,  to  go  to  Mississippi  Ter- 
ritory, seize  Burr  at  the  first  opportunity,  and  bring 
him  under  military  guard  to  New  Orleans.     In  com- 

20  Bacon's  Report,  429,  430;  Mead  to  Claiborne,  Nov.  23, 
1806;  Claiborne  and  Wilkinson  to  Mead,  Jan.  21,  1807;  Row- 
land, Third  Annual  Report  of  the  Department  of  Archives 
and  History  of  the  State  of  Mississippi,  146,  162. 

21  Wilkinson  to  Dearborn,  Feb.  20,  1807,  Letters  Received, 
MS.,  War  Department. 


THE   BURR   CONSPIRACY   AND   THE   EMBARGO      203 

pHance  with  this  commission  Captain  Hooke  repaired 
to  Natchez,  where  he  watched  developments  closely, 
yet  did  not  feel  justified  in  attempting  to  kidnap  Burr. 
The  civil  authorities,  represented  by  Judges  Rodney 
and  Bruin,  subjected  Burr  to  a  strict  inquiry.  In  addi- 
tion Cowles  Meade  had  a  reserve  warrant  issued  by 
Toulmin,  to  be  used  in  case  the  other  judges  released 
Burr.  Hooke,  therefore,  was  unwilling  to  use  violent 
measures,  especially  as  the  naval  officers  refused  their 
cooperation.^^  The  scheme  on  the  whole  was  a  des- 
perate one  and  shows  the  length  to  which  Wilkinson 
would  go  in  feeding  his  enmity  against  his  former 
friend.  Burr  evidently  had  some  inkling  of  Wilkin- 
son's attitude,  and  this  may  have  led  him  to  attempt 
to  escape  into  the  Floridas. 

It  is  also  possible,  as  Judge  Toulmin  afterwards 
surmised,"^  that  Burr  still  hoped  to  profit  by  some  des- 
perate stroke  near  Mobile.  A  position  near  that  port 
would  enable  him  to  open  relations  with  its  officials, 
if  that  were  his  plan,  as  many  suspected;  or  with  his 
slender  band  as  a  nucleus,  he  might  organize  the  people 
of  the  Tombigbee  settlements  for  their  long  threat- 
ened attack  upon  their  commercial  oppressors.  In 
either  case  he  would  have  Mobile  for  his  base  of  opera- 

22  Hooke  to  Wilkinson,  Feb.  20,  1807,  Letters  Received,  MS., 
War  Department;  cf.  also  the  statement  dated  Feb.  16,  1807, 
of  the  officers  accompanying  Hooke  in  Wilkinson  Papers,  HI, 
MS.,  Chicago  Historical  Society. 

23  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Apr.  14,  1807,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


204      '^^^^    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 

tions,  and  this  would  be  nearly  as  favorable  as  the 
one  he  may  have  planned  to  establish  at  Baton  Rouge. 
Claiborne  was  at  first  inclined  to  believe  that  the 
Spaniards  would  gladly  receive  Burr  and  assist  him 
to  dismember  the  American  union.  But  Casa  Yrujo's 
warnings  against  him  had  already  aroused  the  fron- 
tier commanders.^*  Their  attitude  confirms  the  im- 
pression that  Burr  had  no  agreement  with  them,  but 
desired  to  take  advantage  of  Folch's  absence  in  the 
West  to  strike  at  Mobile  or  Pensacola.  Wilkinson 
professed  to  fear  that  Burr  had  a  number  of  restless 
confederates  in  that  locality.^^  The  fact  that  John 
Adair,  the  Kentucky  senator,  was  journeying  to  New 
Orleans  by  way  of  the  Tombigbee  was  not  without 
its  significance.-^  It  was  with  a  feeling  of  relief, 
therefore,  that  both  the  Spanish  and  the  American 
authorities  learned  of  Burr's  arrest  near  Wakefield. 
Morales  believed  that  this  dissipated  all  projects  for 
invasion  and  rendered  further  precautions  useless. 
Folch  was  inclined  to  adopt  the  contrary  reasoning. 
Both  continued  to  distrust  the  American  government. 

2*  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Feb.  20,  1807,  Papers  in  Relation 
to  Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library,  De- 
partment of  State. 

25  Wilkinson  to  Jefferson,  Feb.  17,  1807,  ibid. ;  Toulmin  to 
Madison,  Apr.  14,  1807,  Madison  Papers,  MS.,  Library  of 
Congress. 

-8  Morales  to  Soler,  reservado  No.  70,  Feb.  28,  No.  7,  Le- 
gajo  267;  Folch  to  Someruelos,  July  28,  1807,  Legajo  1562, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO      205 

Wilkinson  no  longer  harbored  any  fears  of  the  "  Dons," 
if  he  ever  had  experienced  any  except  in  regard  to 
their  strong  box,  and  assured  Jefferson  that  he  would 
keep  a  vigilant  eye  on  them.^^  He  had  a  very  personal 
reason  to  inspire  his  watchful  zeal. 

While  Folch  was  preparing  to  defend  Baton  Rouge, 
he  adopted  some  financial  measures  that  later  ex- 
posed him  to  severe  criticism.  He  arranged  for  a 
loan  of  twenty  thousand  pesos,  through  Fortier  and 
Son,  a  New  Orleans  firm  of  "  tested  integrity  and  well 
known  fidelity."  He  could  do  so  only  by  securing  per- 
mission for  them  to  introduce  at  Vera  Cruz  an  equal 
amount  of  goods,  free  of  duty.  He  also  indorsed  the 
petition  of  Louis  De  Clouet  to  transfer  settlers  from 
West  Florida  to  some  point  on  the  Mexican  coast, 
preferably  New  Santander.  These  people,  so  the  peti- 
tion ran,  feared  the  possible  transfer  of  West  Florida 
to  the  Americans  and  were  weary  of  the  constant 
menace  of  invasion.  The  viceroy  and  his  advisers, 
however,  could  see  nothing  in  these  two  applications 
but  an  attempt  to  establish  clandestine  trade  between 
New  Orleans  and  Vera  Cruz.  The  American  vessel 
bearing  Folch's  agent  and  cargo  was  ordered  to  leave 
Vera  Cruz  without  unloading,  and  Folch  was  in- 
structed to  send  no  more  on  such  an  errand.^^ 

27  Wilkinson  to  Jefferson,  Mar.  3,  1807,  Papers  in  Relation 
to  Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 

"8  Folch  to  Iturrigaray,  Feb.  15,  1807,  Marina,  1805-1808, 
A.  G.,  Mexico;  De  Clouet  to  Folch,  Feb.  20,  May  19,  1807; 


206      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY   AND    THE    EMBARGO 

With  the  dispersion  of  Burr's  followers,  Folch  began 
to  transport  his  extra  troops  to  Mobile,  for  he  could 
not  provision  them  at  Baton  Rouge.  Wilkinson  also 
desired  to  return  a  portion  of  his  own  force  to  Fort 
Stoddert.  It  was  difficult  to  do  so  overland,  but  transfer 
by  the  Mobile  was  problematical,  in  view  of  Swaine's 
insulting  passage  in  December.  He  and  Claiborne 
had  refused  Folch  permission  to  enter  New  Orleans 
in  January,  and  they  ought  not  to  expect  a  privilege 
they  were  unwilling  to  grant.  Wilkinson  proposed  to 
attempt  the  passage  by  water,  instructing  the  officer 
in  charge  to  pass  Mobile  at  night.  If  stopped  by  the 
Spaniards,  he  should  return  for  further  orders.  Some 
inkling  of  this  reached  Folch,  who  ordered  St.  Maxent 
to  resist  any  such  attempt.  That  officer  stationed  a 
vessel  so  as  to  guard  against  another  violation  of 
Spanish  territory.^''  Wilkinson  had  no  desire  to  pro- 
voke Folch  further,  and  informed  the  secretary  of 
war  that  he  would  suspend  action  for  the  present. 
He  did  not  believe  that  Folch's  refusal  justified  an  ap- 
peal to  arms,  but  even  in  such  a  contingency  he  was 
confident  of  his  ability  to  reduce  Mobile  and  Pensa- 
cola   in   three   weeks.      Such   an   outcome   would   be 

Folch  to  Iturrigaray,  Mar.  20,  1807;  De  Clouet  to  Iturrigaray, 
Apr.  16,  1807,  Report  of  Fiscal,  May  11,  July  16,  1807,  Legajo 
185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

29  St.  Maxent  to  Folch,  Mar.  26,  Apr.  7,  Legajo  62;  Folch 
to  St.  Maxent,  Apr.  4,  1807,  Legajo  55,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  of. 
also  Robertson,  5 141,  5144,  5145,  5148. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO       207 

highly  honorable  to  the  national  arms  and  a  personal 
triumph  for  himself  ;  but  he  hesitated  to  press  the  con- 
troversy to  the  breaking  point.^''  His  forbearance 
would  be  more  convincing  were  he  not  about  to  in- 
crease his  own  obligations  to  Folch. 

Governor  Claiborne,  distrusting  Wilkinson,  but  ig- 
norant of  his  real  relations  with  the  Spaniard,  must 
perforce  second  his  action.  He  faithfully  detailed  to 
Madison  Folch's  continued  unfriendliness,  further 
marked  by  the  detention  at  Mobile  of  the  sloop  Castor 
loaded  with  military  stores  as  well  as  private  goods. 
Wilkinson  had  already  reported  these  conditions,  so 
Claiborne  saw  no  reason  to  interfere.^^  He  too  was 
in  no  position  to  offend  Folch.  Wilkinson's  arbi- 
trary course  at  New  Orleans,  in  which  he  had  acqui- 
esced, aroused  serious  opposition  in  the  territorial  leg- 
islature. To  neutralize  this  and  to  prevent  that  body 
from  adopting  a  protest,  Claiborne  and  Wilkinson  in- 
vited Folch  to  visit  New  Orleans  on  his  return  to 
Pensacola.  He  did  so,  late  in  April,  and  by  his  suc- 
cessful manipulation  conclusively  showed  that,  after 
four  years  of  American  occupation,  his  influence  in 
the  provincial  capital  was  still  more  potent  than  that 

30  Wilkinson  to  Dearborn,  Mar.  23,  1807,  Letters  Received, 
MS.,  War  Department. 

31  Claiborne  to  Madison,  Apr.  21,  1807  (Parker,  7459); 
Claiborne  to  Madison,  May  21,  1807,  Papers  in  Relations  to 
Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 


208      THE    BURR   CONSPIRACY   AND   THE   EMBARGO 

of  its  chief  executive  or  its  self-constituted  defender.^^ 
We  may  well  believe  that  he  did  not  render  this 
service  to  heap  coals  of  fire  on  their  heads.  The 
safety  of  his  province,  as  he  told  his  superior,  not  to 
mention  his  own  future  status,  was  dependent  on  his 
having  friends  on  both  sides  of  the  border.  What- 
ever his  motive,  his  conduct  contrasts  favorably  with 
that  of  his  opponents. 

Among  the  suspected  accomplices  involved  in  Burr's 
trial,  if  not  in  his  chimerical  plan,  were  the  American 
senators  John  Adair  of  Kentucky  and  John  Smith  of 
Ohio.  The  former  journeyed  to  New  Orleans,  where 
Wilkinson  dramatically  apprehended  him,  by  way  of 
the  Tombigbee,  and  was  supposed  to  have  imparted 
Burr's  schemes  to  some  of  the  leaders  of  that  region. 
At  least  the  adherents  of  the  administration  and  the 
Spaniards  as  well  reported  this  as  his  probable  pur- 
pose.^^  John  Smith  was  looking  after  his  land  inter- 
ests in  West  Florida  during  the  summer  following 
Burr's  arrest.  Learning  that  he  was  implicated  in  the 
conspiracy,  he  offered  to  surrender  himself  to  Gov- 
ernor Williams,  rather  than  to  Claiborne,  who  had 
threatened  to  send  him  north  in  chains.  Williams 
furnished  him  with  a  small  guard,  and  graciously  per- 

32  American  Historical  Review,  X,  837-840. 

33  McCaleb,  The  Aaron  Burr  Conspiracy,  222,  223 ;  The 
Quarterly  Publication  of  the  Historical  and  Philosophical  So- 
ciety of  Ohio,  IV,  125.  Also  Adair  to  Madison,  Jan.  8,  1809, 
Madison  Papers,  MS. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO      209 

mitted  him  to  journey  to  Richmond  by  way  of  Cin- 
cinnati, and  in  a  state  compatible  with  his  official  posi- 
tion and  the  public  interests.^*  Although  as  in  the 
case  of  the  chief  conspirator  the  department  of  justice 
failed  to  fix  the  charges  against  Adair  and  Smith,  they 
both  resigned  from  Congress.  Adair,  as  we  shall  see, 
sought  to  reinstate  himself  with  Madison,  in  connec- 
tion with  subsequent  developments  in  West  Florida. 
Smith  later  fixed  his  residence  at  Pensacola,  a  victim, 
as  he  professed,  of  Jefferson's  persecution.^^ 

The  Burr  episode  greatly  intensified  the  problems 
that  worried  Spanish  officials  in  the  Floridas.  They 
continued  to  hear  of  projects  similar  to  his,  while  the 
original  conspirator  vainly  sought  assistance  in  Europe. 
Their  exposed  position  gave  them  the  more  concern. 
Their  restless  neighbors,  whom  a  weak  federal  gov- 
ernment could  not  restrain,  flattered  themselves  that  it 
would  be  easy  to  invade  these  provinces.  British 
naval  activity  and  the  necessities  of  the  home  govern- 
ment lessened  their  resources  for  defense  and  ren- 
dered doubly  necessary  the  presence  of  skilled  officials, 
such  as  Folch  and  Casa  Calvo.  Their  anxiety,  how- 
ever, was  echoed  across  the  line,  where  some  high  in 
office  still  feared  the  spectre  of  disunion.     Casual  mi- 

34  Rowland,  Third  Annual  Report,  84-89;  Annals  of  Tenth 
Congress,  First  Session,  I,  55-62. 

35  Cf.  p.  640;  also  Smith  to  Pickering,  June  6,  1812,  His- 
torical Index  to  the  Pickering  Papers,  48,  Collections  of  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  6th  series,  Vol.  VUI. 

15 


210      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 

grations  suggested  a  Spanish  plan  to  introduce  sol- 
diers disguised  as  settlers  into  Orleans  Territory. 
The  Spaniards  also  provoked  the  usual  charge  that 
they  were  tampering  with  the  Indians  and  making 
them  promises  that  could  not  be  fulfilled.^''  Folch,  it 
must  be  confessed,  was  all  too  ready  to  appeal  to  sec- 
tionalism or  to  savagery,  but  he  was  too  shrewd  to  do 
so  without  some  prospect  of  success. 

Wilkinson's  departure  from  New  Orleans  left  Clai- 
borne exposed  to  the  full  attack  of  Burr's  adherents — 
a  danger  that,  as  usual,  he  was  not  inclined  to  mini- 
mize. The  discontent  reported  to  exist  in  West  Flor- 
ida afforded  him  a  new  cause  for  alarm.  The  people 
there  seemed  inclined  to  seek  a  British  alliance,  if  the 
United  States  failed  to  protect  them.  He  wrote  Wil- 
kinson— at  least  we  may  ascribe  to  him  a  letter  of  this 
period — "to  feel  Jefferson's  pulse"  in  this  matter.^^ 
The  executive  was  already  excited  over  the  Chesa- 
peake outrage,  so  the  interview,  if  it  ever  occurred, 
was  unproductive.  Early  in  1808  Folch's  superiors 
asked  him  to  investigate  the  rumor  about  possible 
British  interference.  He  did  so  but  was  unable  to 
substantiate  it. 

36  Silas  Dinsmoor  to  Williams,  May  14,  1807,  Mississippi 
Territorial  Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  7;  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Aug. 
14,  1807,  Legajo  1563,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Casa  Yrujo  to  Ce- 
vallos,  Sept.  g,  1807,  Legajo  5546,  Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 

37  McCaleb,  Aaron  Burr  Conspiracy,  307 ;  American  His- 
torical Review,  XVII,  295. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO      211 

However,  Folch  found  evidence  that  Burr  still  had 
many  adherents  there.  He  beUeved  that  there  was 
some  sort  of  connection  between  Burr  and  Miranda, 
and  that  both  were  seeking  British  assistance  in  their 
schemes  to  revolutionize  the  Spanish  colonies.  If  the 
Federalist  party  should  succeed  in  defeating  Madison 
for  the  presidency,  as  was  likely  to  happen,  he  ex- 
pected the  United  States  to  make  a  formal  alliance 
with  Great  Britain  against  France  and  Spain.  In 
that  event  he  planned  to  stir  up  the  Indians  and  or- 
ganize an  insurrection  in  Louisiana.  He  asked  Som- 
eruelos  to  advise  him  where  to  send  his  troops  in  case 
the  struggle  went  against  him.  Folch  also  had  to  ex- 
plain his  recent  interviews  in  New  Orleans  with  the 
French  refugee.  General  Moreau,  whose  presence  on 
the  border  seemed  to  indicate  a  possible  connection 
with  Burr,  and  whose  intimacy  with  Folch  aroused 
Claiborne's  suspicions.^^ 

To  the  West  Florida  officials  living  in  this  atmos- 
phere of  intrigue  and  suspicion  the  intendant  at  Ha- 
vana submitted  a  tentative  proposal  to  cut  down  their 
already  too  slender  garrisons.  Morales  preferred  to 
sell  the  province  to  the  Americans.  The  expense  of 
maintaining  a  hopeless  front  against  these  restless 
neighbors,  with  no  local  revenues,  with  uncertain  sub- 
sidies from  Mexico,  with  fortifications  in  ruins  and 

38  Folch  to  Someruelos,  May  23,  1808,  same  to  same,  Aug. 
13,  1808,  Legajo  1564,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


212      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY   AND    THE    EMBARGO 

with  no  possibility  of  increasing  their  defenders, 
seemed  to  him  the  determining  factor.  Pensacola  and 
Mobile  could  not  support  their  combined  population 
of  about  fifteen  hundred,  including  soldiery.  Baton 
Rouge  contained  four  or  five  thousand  people,  mostly 
of  Anglo-American  extraction,  scattered  through  the 
straggling  parishes.  More  productive  than  the  other 
two  centers,  it  was  so  enclosed  by  neighboring  Amer- 
ican territory  as  to  be  defenseless.  If  his  superiors 
wished  to  dispose  of  these  three  jurisdictions  in  West 
Florida  they  possibly  might  take  advantage  of  the 
American  desire  to  round  out  their  dominions,  and  by 
adding  East  Florida,  gain  the  territory  west  of  the 
Mississippi.  This  would  keep  their  undesirable  neigh- 
bors far  from  New  Spain.  If,  however,  the  Spanish 
authorities  preferred  to  keep  the  province  and  cut  down 
its  garrisons.  Morales  suggested  one  company  each  for 
Baton  Rouge,  Mobile,  and  Pensacola,  and  the  aban- 
donment of  the  general  settlement  at  the  last  named 
place.  They  should  provide  some  artillerists,  and  if 
necessary  some  subalterns  for  drilling  the  militia,  the 
proper  number  of  staff  officers,  and  the  necessary 
priests,  cutting  off  useless  offices  and  reducing  salaries 
to  the  bare  cost  of  living.  They  could  dispense  with 
war  vessels  and  new  fortifications,  but  must  continue 
the  customary  Indian  subsidies.  But  even  with  this 
retrenchment,  the  province  would  cost  more  than  it 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO       2I3 

was  worth,  and  local  influences  might  oppose  the  sug- 
gested reductions.^^ 

Morales  did  not  need  to  go  very  far  to  discover  op- 
position. Folch  did  not  believe  in  practicing  economy 
with  the  eyes  shut,  especially  in  view  of  the  "  repub- 
lican insolence  of  the  power  that  surrounded  "  the  mis- 
erable province  that  he  and  Morales  administered. 
His  irritation  was  increased  by  his  absolute  penury, 
which  contrasted  so  clearly  with  the  resources  of  his 
opponents  and  caused  galling  references  to  Spain's 
supposed  decadence.  A  timely  subsidy  of  two  hun- 
dred thousand  dollars  relieved  the  situation  only  tem- 
porarily. It  was  difficult  to  conceal  their  condition 
from  ambitious  neighbors,  who  were  only  too  ready 
to  invade  their  dominions  or  stir  up  insurrection  there- 
in. Previous  to  the  Treaty  of  1795,  Georgia  was 
their  nearest  neighbor,  and  its  people  gave  them  little 
concern.  But  as  a  result  of  the  treaty  the  Americans 
approached  within  twenty-five  leagues  of  New  Or- 
leans, and  were  only  half  as  far  away  from  Mobile 
and  Pensacola.  By  the  cession  of  Louisiana  the  Flor- 
idas  were  thrust  into  their  territory.  The  earlier 
treaty  and  the  later  cession  marked  the  advance  of  a 
decade — an  advance  that  should  have  occupied  cen- 
turies. With  appetite  whetted  rather  than  appeased  by 
these  successes,  the  Americans  now  openly  boasted  that 
if  Spain  did  not  cede  the  Floridas  by  treaty  they  would 

39  Morales  to  Rombaud,  June  i,  1807  (Robertson,  5149). 


214      "^^^    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO 

take  them  by  force.  The  recent  attempt  of  Burr,  fol- 
lowing the  lines  he  had  predicted  three  years  before, 
demonstrated  that  the  Floridas  could  not  long  continue 
under  the  present  regime.*^ 

Folch's  province  and  the  neighboring  East  Florida 
formed  the  most  difficult  posts  in  the  Spanish  colo- 
nies. The  existing  war  with  England  cut  off  sup- 
plies from  Havana  and  in  many  cases  prevented  Folch 
from  receiving  orders  from  the  captain-general,  or 
from  carrying  them  out  after  they  reached  him.  Un- 
der such  circumstances  connection  with  Mexico  was 
easier  and  more  certain  than  with  Cuba.  If  the 
United  States  should  attempt  hostilities,  it  would  be 
easy  to  combine  forces  with  the  internal  provinces 
against  Louisiana,  whose  people  were  not  greatly  at- 
tached to  the  American  government.  To  facilitate 
such  operations  the  two  Floridas  should  be  combined 
under  a  captain-general.  At  best  an  officer  of  that 
rank  in  Havana  knew  less  of  conditions  in  the  prov- 
inces than  the  immediate  commandants.  Yet  the  peril 
and  expense  that  the  latter  faced  made  frequent  trans- 
fers to  less  exposed  commands  necessary.  The  only 
remedy  was  to  create  the  more  honorable  and  better 
paid  position  on  the  exposed  frontier.     Its  incumbent 

40  Report  of  Junta  de  Guerra,  June  i8,  1807,  Folch  to  Some- 
ruelos,  June  23,  1807;  Folch  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  reser- 
vado,  Aug.  s,  1807,  Legajo  185,  Morales  to  Soler,  Feb.  29, 
1808,  Legajo  2330;  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Aug.  20,  1808.  Le- 
gajo 1565,  Papeles  de  Cuba.     Cf.  note  16,  p.  198. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO      215 

should  know  his  neighbors,  their  maxims  and  policy, 
and  for  this  reason  should  speak  both  French  and 
English.  Folch  did  not  hesitate  to  suggest  that  his 
long  service  in  the  region  entitled  him  to  favorable 
consideration,  if  the  government  contemplated  the 
change.*^ 

In  the  meantime  the  commercial  question  did  not 
become  less  troublesome.  In  the  spring  of  1807  the 
American  Congress  passed  an  act  subjecting  all  the 
commerce  on  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  custom  house  at  New  Orleans.  Warned 
by  the  Mobile  Act,  Casa  Yrujo  searched  this  new  act 
carefully  for  any  phrases  capable  of  double  meaning. 
Despite  later  assurance  that  it  was  not  designed  to  ad- 
vance the  administration's  territorial  pretensions,  he 
was  directed  to  show  that  it  could  not  in  any  way 
apply  to  West  Florida.*-  At  the  same  time  Folch 
and  Claiborne  "  ventilated "  another  phase  of  this 
problem.  The  Spaniard  permitted  the  Americans  to 
land  some  military  stores  at  Mobile  and  later  to  send 
them  to  their  destination  on  the  Tombigbee.  In  turn 
Folch  asked  if  he  might  send  some  arms  to  Baton 
Rouge  by  way  of  the  Mississippi.  In  granting  this 
Claiborne  used  the  expression  "mutual  navigation." 
The  other  protested  that  there  was  no  mutual  right 

*i  (Folch)  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  Aug.  8,  1807  (Rob- 
ertson, 5154). 

42  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Mar.,  Apr.  1807,  passim,  Legajo 
5548,  Estado,  A.  H.  N. 


2l6      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO 

involved.  Spain  secured  the  privilege  of  navigating 
the  Mississippi  by  definite  treaty,  but  there  was  no 
such  action  in  regard  to  the  Mobile.  On  occasion  he 
had  tolerated  commerce  there,  but  had  withdrawn  the 
privilege  when  the  United  States  began  to  restrict 
Spain's  right  on  the  Mississippi.  Claiborne  accepted 
the  favor  the  other  extended,  without  continuing  the 
discussion.  Possibly  he  found  Folch  more  accommo- 
dating because  J.  P.  Kennedy  and  his  friends  were 
sending  petitions  to  the  president  on  the  subject  of 
Mobile  commerce  and  threatening  to  take  matters  in 
their  own  hands  if  nothing  was  done  to  favor  them.^^ 
In  renewing  the  discussion  of  this  problem  with  his 
superiors,  in  June,  1808,  Folch  showed  that  he  was 
ready  to  concede  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mobile  to 
the  Americans.  The  situation  was  similar  to  that  of 
house  tenants  using  a  common  staircase.  The  dweller 
on  any  particular  floor  had  the  right  to  go  in  and  out. 
Under  this  concept,  fortified  by  Vattel,  he  thought  that 
the  navigation  of  the  Mobile  should  be  common  to 
Spain  and  the  United  States.  The  only  drawback  to 
Spain  would  be  the  loss  of  the  six  per  cent  duty, 
which   during   1807   amounted   to   some  6264  pesos. 

43  St.  Maxent  to  Folch,  May  27,  1807,  Folch  to  St'.  Maxent, 
June  6,  1807,  Legajo  1574,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Folch  to  Clai- 
borne, June  15,  1807  (Parker,  7462,  7475)  ;  Folch  to  Claiborne, 
Oct.  14,  1807,  Legajo  1565,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Toulmin  to  Wil- 
liams, Sept.  I,  1807,  Mississippi  Territorial  Archives,  MS., 
Vol.  7- 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO       217 

This  was  a  negligible  sum  in  view  of  the  damages 
that  a  denial  of  the  commerce  might  cause. 

Folch  believed  that  in  case  of  war  Spain  was  likely 
to  lose  the  Floridas ;  hence  his  willingness  to  concede 
the  long  contested  privilege.  At  the  same  time  the 
concession  would  afford  additional  proof  of  Spain's 
justice  and  good  faith.  In  contrast  he  dwelt  on  the 
inconsistency  of  the  American  government,  that  "  sub- 
lime composition  of  egoism  and  machiavellism,"  which 
alleged  reasons  based  on  Vattel  for  navigating  the 
Mobile,  and  then  quoted  the  same  authority  to  deny 
the  Spaniards  the  use  of  the  Mississippi.  Jefferson, 
prompt  to  take  advantage  of  the  detention  of  some 
American  vessels  at  Mobile,  had  charged  Spain  with 
unfriendliness.  This  was  in  keeping  with  his  usual 
artifice.  As  for  himself,  he  favored  placing  both 
Baton  Rouge  and  the  Tombigbee  settlements  on  the 
same  basis.  The  United  States  might  derive  the 
greater  benefit  from  this  arrangement,  but  its  recent 
policy  in  forbidding  the  introduction  of  slaves  from 
abroad  would  probably  afford  Mobile  and  Baton 
Rouge  a  chance  to  profit  through  clandestine  trade.'** 

There  were  rumors  elsewhere  to  this  effect,  but  it 
was  not  the  prospect  of  irregular  gains  from  this 
source  that  wholly  moved  Folch  to  concession.  The 
American  government  was  now  attempting  to  enforce 
its  long  threatened  embargo.  This  promised  new  dif- 
ficulties to  Spanish  frontier  officials,  for  the  people  of 

**  Folch  to  Cevallos,  June  i,  1808  (Robertson,  5157). 


21 8      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 

West  Florida  largely  obtained  their  food  supply  from 
American  territory.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Amer- 
icans failed  to  include  the  province  in  their  commercial 
prohibition,  it  would  suggest  that  they  already  re- 
garded it  as  their  own.  Either  dilemma  was  unac- 
ceptable enough  to  the  Spaniards. 

Folch  was  in  New  Orleans  when,  in  January,  1808, 
the  embargo  went  into  effect  at  that  port.  In  the 
course  of  the  following  month  he  asked  Claiborne 
about  possible  exceptions  to  it.  He  wanted  to  pur- 
chase two  vessels  in  New  Orleans,  in  order  to  convey 
artillery  and  ammunition  from  Baton  Rouge  to  Pen- 
sacola.  He  wished  to  know  if  the  armed  Spanish  ves- 
sels on  the  lakes  might,  as  heretofore,  obtain  provi- 
sions from  New  Orleans.  He  also  inquired  if  all  West 
Florida  ports  were  considered  as  foreign ;  and  if  so, 
if  Spanish  vessels  might  ascend  the  Mississippi  to 
Baton  Rouge  and  there  obtain  provisions  for  Mobile 
and  Pensacola.  Claiborne  answered  that  he  could  not 
suspend  any  provisions  of  the  embargo  until  he  learned 
the  president's  decision  upon  Folch's  questions.  In 
transmitting  these  questions  he  advised  Madison  that 
if  the  Spanish  vessels  were  given  an  uninterrupted 
passage  up  the  Mississippi,  or  if  the  embargo  was  not 
in  force  against  West  Florida,  then  Baton  Rouge,  Mo- 
bile, and  Pensacola  would  become  places  of  deposit 
for  western  produce.^^ 

4'^  Folch  to  Claiborne,  Feb.  11,  1808,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY   AND    THE   EMBARGO      219 

Folch  was  an  honored  guest  at  the  banquet  in  cele- 
bration of  Washington's  birthday.  He  took  Claiborne 
home  in  his  carriage,  and  finding  him  inclined  to  talk, 
elicited  some  further  evidence  of  American  unfriend- 
liness. Claiborne  confessed  that  he  was  ordered  to 
station  gunboats  on  Lake  Pontchartrain  so  as  to  cut  off 
all  communication  with  West  Florida  and  to  blockade 
Bayou  Manchac.  His  latest  instructions  were,  so 
Folch  reported,  "that  the  rigor  of  the  law  which  the 
embargo  imposes  should  be  observed  with  all  severity 
against  our  neighbors  and  .  .  .  upon  no  pretext  should 
you  have  any  compliance  with  them."  In  Folch's  es- 
timation, this  showed  that  the  American  government 
designed  to  use  the  embargo  to  starve  the  Spaniards 
out  of  West  Florida.*^ 

Valentin  de  Foronda,  whom  Casa  Yrujo  had  left 
behind  in  Philadelphia  as  charge  d'affaires,  found  in 
the  embargo  another  cause  for  complaint.  Senator 
Campbell,  in  a  bill  to  amend  the  Mobile  Act,  seemed 
to  regard  that  town  as  an  American  port.  Foronda 
asked  the  president  to  explain  the  ambiguous  phrase. 
His  question  was  turned  over  to  Gallatin,  who  stated 
that  the  bill  simply  referred  to  goods  passing  from 

Cuba  (cf.  Parker,  7485-7487).  Folch  was  then  using  his  best 
efforts  through  Vidal,  the  vice-consul  at  New  Orleans,  to  get 
flour  despite  the  American  prohibition.  Cf.  Morales  to  Some- 
ruelos,  Feb.  15,  29,  1808,  Legajo  2330,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

46  Folch  to  Foronda,  Mar.  i,  1808,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


220     THE   BURR   CONSPIRACY   AND   THE   EMBARGO 

New  Orleans  to  the  American  settlements  on  the  Tom- 
bigbee  or  other  affluents  of  Mobile  Bay.  If  duties 
were  paid  on  such  goods  at  Mobile  itself,  they  were 
not  thereby  to  be  regarded  as  foreign.  "We  uni- 
formly consider  territory  in  Spanish  possession  as 
Spanish  for  revenue  purposes  whatever  our  claims," 
wrote  the  secretary.*'^  Gallatin,  it  may  be  well  to  note, 
did  not  favor  American  pretensions  to  the  utmost. 

Folch  had  busied  himself,  while  in  New  Orleans,  in 
measures  to  circumvent  the  embargo,  as  well  as  in  at- 
tempts to  find  out  how  effectively  it  might  be  enforced. 
Starvation  threatened  the  soldiers  and  civilians  at  Mo- 
bile and  Pensacola  unless  he  could  secure  an  adequate 
supply  of  flour.  For  weeks  his  efforts  to  that  end 
were  unavailing.  Some  were  afraid  to  run  the  block- 
ade that  Claiborne  had  established  on  the  lakes ;  others 
regarded  such  an  attempt  as  unpatriotic.  Finally, 
through  the  influence  of  Abner  L.  Duncan,  Wilkin- 
son's legal  adviser,  Folch  succeeded  in  making  a  con- 
tract for  the  delivery  at  Pensacola  of  fifteen  hundred 
barrels  of  flour,  at  twenty  dollars  a  barrel.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  perceive  a  mutual  basis  for  this  contract. 
Wilkinson,  through  the  recent  revelations  of  Power 
and  Clark,  was  facing  a  congressional  investigation  and 
desired  another  exculpatory  letter  from  Folch ;  the  lat- 

47  Foronda  to  Madison,  Feb.  20,  1808,  Gallatin  to  Madison, 
Feb.  26,  1808,  Spanish  Notes,  MS.,  II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and 
Archives;  Foronda  to  Cevallos,  Feb.  22,  1808,  Legajo  5549, 
Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE   EMBARGO       221 

ter  needed  an  immediate  supply  of  flour.  Claiborne 
innocently  furthered  the  application  for  the  letter, 
while  Jose  Vidal,  the  Spanish  vice-consul,  lent  his  per- 
sonal credit,  along  with  Morales  and  Folch,  to  secure 
the  flour.  In  this  way  Wilkinson  was  exerting  his  sin- 
ister influence  against  the  president's  policy,  even 
while  that  executive  was  his  chief  protector.*^  Folch 
also  arranged  for  a  small  subsidiary  supply  of  flour 
from  Mexico,  and  urged  Foronda  to  send  him  some 
necessary  hospital  supplies.*^ 

While  such  methods  for  evading  the  embargo  robbed 
it  of  much  terror,  its  enforcement  proved  sufficiently 
annoying  to  the  Spaniards.  The  American  blockade 
of  Bayou  Manchac  would  prevent  Folch  from  send- 
ing assistance  to  Baton  Rouge,  should  that  be  neces- 
sary. He  charged  the  Americans  with  landing  infan- 
trymen on  Spanish  territory,  killing  live  stock,  and 
committing  other  outrages.  Their  naval  commanders 
stopped  and  searched  vessels  on  the  lakes,  including 
Folch's  schooner,  the  Vivora,  and  did  not  hesitate  to 
arrest  deserters  within  his  jurisdiction.  In  the  latter 
stages  of  the  embargo  they  closed  the  Mississippi  to  all 
Spanish  commerce,  except  in  connection  with  govern- 
ment business.  Folch  then  planned  to  send  vessels  up 
that  river  to  bring  out  cotton  from  Baton  Rouge.    He 

48  American  Historical  Review,  XIX,  806-809. 

49  Folch  to  Vidal,  Feb.  26,  1808,  Vidal  to  Folch,  Mar.  2,  1808, 
Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


222      THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 

had  no  way  of  retaliating  unless  he  encouraged  the 
African  slave  trade  through  his  territory  or  refused 
to  deliver  up  fugitive  slaves  and  criminals.  His  lot 
was  a  difficult  one.  He  must  do  nothing  to  provoke 
aggression,  and  at  the  same  time  preserve  the  honor 
of  his  flag  and  feed  a  scattered  dependent  population.^" 
The  embargo  rendered  other  local  problems  more 
troublesome.  The  shadow  of  Burr  appeared  in  a 
rumored  plot  of  J.  P.  Kennedy  and  F.  L.  Claiborne 
to  plunder  Mobile  at  the  head  of  a  party  of  six  hun- 
dred.^^  In  August,  1808,  Judge  Toulmin  proposed 
by  joint  action  to  prevent  the  bandits  of  either  juris- 
diction from  committing  depredations  with  impunity. 
He  offered  to  try  to  punish  a  Spanish  murderer  whom 
he  had  apprehended,  or  to  acquiesce  in  the  Span- 
iards' doing  so.^^  The  apparent  harmony  of  this  in- 
cident was  unique.  In  the  same  month  John  Owens, 
commander  of  gunboat  Number  26,  seized  an  Amer- 
ican deserter  Armstrong,  living  along  Bayou  Manchac. 
Samuel  Fulton  and  Philip  Hickey,  local  officials  of 
West  Florida,  immediately  reported  this  to  Grand  Pre, 
who  directed  a  vigorous  protest  to  Claiborne.     In  his 

oopolch  to  Someruelos,  Mar.  26,  Apr.  19,  1808,  Legajo  1574, 
Papeles  de  Cuba;  Foronda  to  Madison,  Apr.  8,  26,  30,  1808, 
Spanish  Notes,  MS.,  II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  cf. 
Parker,  7533,  and  Robertson,  5160. 

^1  Folch  to  St.  Maxent,  Jan.  31,  1808,  Legajo  55;  Folch  to 
Someruelos,  May  23,  1808,  Legajo  1564,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

^-  Toulmin  to  Commandant  of  Mobile,  Aug.  28,  1808,  Mobile 
Archives,  MS.,  County  Court  House. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO      223 

reply  Claiborne  reported  that  New  Orleans  was  over- 
run with  Spanish  criminals  and  deserters,  while  West 
Florida  probably  contained  a  large  number  of  Amer- 
ican undesirables.  He  regretted  that  they  had  no  plan 
for  mutual  extradition. 

In  his  second  demand  for  the  release  of  the  deserter, 
Grand  Pre  quoted  a  letter  of  Cowles  Meade  to  justify 
himself  for  not  having  delivered  up  American  refugees. 
When  Folch  learned  of  the  correspondence,  through 
the  New  Orleans  papers  rather  than  from  Grand  Pre, 
he  took  his  subordinate  to  task  for  engaging  in  the 
controversy  without  consulting  him.  Ultimately  For- 
onda  brought  this  incident  to  Madison's  attention.  It 
was  such  a  flagrant  violation  of  Spanish  sovereignty 
that  orders  were  issued  to  restore  Armstrong  and  two 
others,  similarly  apprehended,  to  the  outraged  Span- 
iards.''^ 

In  December  another  violation  of  Spanish  territory 
occurred  on  the  Mobile  frontier.  A  customs  officer, 
with  a  guard  of  soldiers,  seized  two  vessels  on  the 
Tensaw,  within  Spanish  territory.  Salazar,  then  com- 
mandant at  Mobile,  immediately  protested.  He  did 
not  think  the  Americans  were  at  war  with  Spain,  but, 
if  so,  they  should  proceed  with  their  "  accustomed 
generosity  "  and  not  as  bandits.     He  advised  Folch  to 

53  Someruelos  to  Folch,  Oct.  22,  1808,  Legajo  1565,  Papeles 
de  Cuba;  Someruelos  to  Garibay,  Feb.  6,  1809,  Legajo  5543, 
Estado,  A.  H.  N. ;  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  24,  1809,  Legajo 
1566,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  cf.  also  Parker,  7509,  7513,  7515,  7529. 


224      '^^^    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO 

station  armed  vessels,  with  a  supporting  military  de- 
tachment, on  the  Tensaw.  Captain  Gaines  at  once 
released  one  vessel  but  detained  the  other,  whose 
owner  seemed  to  be  using  it  in  contraband  trade.^* 

The  first  rigors  of  the  embargo  led  Folch  to  surmise 
that  it  would  lead  to  an  alliance  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  with  a  declaration  of  war 
against  France  and  allied  Spain.  Great  Britain  would 
cement  the  new  pact  by  seizing  the  Floridas  and  deliv- 
ering them  to  the  United  States.  Folch  might  only 
prevent  this  by  occupying  Louisiana  at  the  first  news 
of  hostilities.  To  effect  this  he  needed  fifteen  hundred 
men  with  fifty  pieces  of  artillery — an  estimate  which 
he  doubled  within  a  few  months.  As  it  was  he  could 
muster  only  three  hundred  and  eighty-one  men  and  was 
in  danger  of  losing  the  Floridas.  With  the  larger 
force,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  discontented  Indians, 
who  feared  the  land  hunger  of  the  Americans,  he 
might  be  able  to  stir  up  a  rebellion  in  Louisiana.  But 
he  must  be  supported  by  a  movement  from  the  interior 
provinces  of  Mexico,  which  was  threatened  by  re- 
newed activity  on  the  part  of  the  revolutionary  junta 
in  New  Orleans. ^^ 

Foronda  had  already  laid  Folch's  complaints  before 
Madison.     Jefferson  inspired  the  answer,  but  it  gave 

^*  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  27,  1809,  Legajo  1566,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 

^'^  (Folch)  to  Caballero,  Apr.  25,  1808,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


THE    BURR    CONSPIRACY    AND    THE    EMBARGO      225 

no  promise  of  lightening  the  embargo.  Spanish  rights 
on  the  Mississippi  should  be  balanced  by  American 
privileges  on  the  Mobile.  The  United  States  claimed 
to  the  Perdido,  but  it  would  not  bring  the  disputed 
region  under  its  laws  until  the  title  was  clearly  settled.^*' 
This  reply,  with  its  continued  emphasis  upon  Amer- 
ican pretensions  to  West  Florida,  gave  the  Spaniards 
little  satisfaction.  When  Folch  later  complained  of 
the  embargo  and  of  the  concurrent  violations  of  Span- 
ish territory,  the  captain-general  in  Cuba  reported  the 
affair  from  Havana  to  the  Regency,  then  carrying  on 
the  struggle  against  Napoleon. 

In  their  name  Cevallos  discussed  these  insults  with 
George  W.  Erving,  the  American  charge,  and  quoted 
Folch's  determination  to  use  force,  if  they  continued. 
Erving  excused  the  occurrences  as  due  to  a  desire  to 
carry  out  the  embargo  rather  than  to  show  hostility  to 
Spain  or  force  that  power  to  cede  the  Floridas.^^ 
With  a  continuance  of  the  alleged  insults,  and  with  a 
reported  increase  in  the  American  army  of  six  thou- 
sand regulars  and  four  times  as  many  volunteers,  the 
Spaniard  recurred  to  the  subject.  Spain  was  now  in 
friendly  alliance  with  England  against  the  ambitious 
Napoleon,  and  her  ministers  could  affect  greater  inde- 

56  Foronda  to  Madison,  Oct.  14,  1808,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  Foronda  to  the  Captain- 
General  of  Cuba,  Nov.  3,  1808,  Legajo  1708,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

^"^  Erving  to  Cevallos,  Nov.  12,  16,  1808,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  XI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 
16 


226      THE   BURR   CONSPIRACY   AND   THE   EMBARGO 

pendence.  Erving  refused  to  continue  the  discus- 
sion.^^ Greater  issues  now  claimed  the  attention  of 
himself  and  of  the  administration  at  home.  To  ap- 
preciate their  meaning  we  must  review  the  course  of 
the  Florida  negotiation  since  Monroe's  failure  at  Aran- 
juez. 

°8  Minute  to  Foronda,  May  19,  1809,  Erving  to  Martin  de 
Garay,  July  22,  1809,  Legajo  5549,  Estado,  A.  H.  N. 


CHAPTER  VII 

American  Bickering  and  French  Bargaining 

The  diplomatic  authorities  of  the  interested  coun- 
tries variously  reflected  the  uncertainty  following 
Monroe's  failure.  French  officials  watched  the  out- 
come with  interest,  not  unmixed  with  guile.  The 
Spanish  ministers  of  state  regarded  the  unsettled  ques- 
tions with  increasing  indifference  as  they  saw  their 
country  sinking  more  and  more  under  the  influence 
of  Napoleon.  From  that  subserviency  Jefferson  and 
his  advisers  hoped  to  profit  either  by  some  despairing 
attempt  of  Spain  to  ward  off  the  inevitable  blow  or 
by  the  deliberate  action  of  the  French  emperor.  Yet 
in  their  desire  to  gain  the  Floridas  without  insuf- 
ferable conditions,  they  wavered  between  a  mainte- 
nance of  the  existing  status,  a  closer  union  with 
France,  and  a  possible  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 
Amid  the  general  irresolution,  Armstrong's  proposal 
to  abandon  the  claim  to  West  Florida  and  occupy 
Texas  had  at  least  the  merit  of  reasonable  definiteness. 
Even  the  doubtful  Monroe,  as  we  have  seen,  fell  under 
its  spell  and  advised  immediate  action  in  keeping  with 
it.^     Yet  he  did  not  cease  to  think  that  Armstronsr, 

1  Cf.  p.  129. 

227 


228  AMERICAN    BICKERING  AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

like  Livingston,  might  be  influenced  by  some  merce- 
nary motive  in  urging  it. 

Early  in  August  the  American  administration 
learned  of  Monroe's  failure.  The  mild  but  hopeful 
Madison  suggested  that  the  negotiation  might  profit- 
ably be  transferred  to  the  United  States.  Jeflferson 
thought  that  this  would  merely  invite  another  failure. 
In  turn  he  proposed  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 
The  prospect  of  peace  in  Europe,  with  American  con- 
troversies unsettled,  alarmed  him.  They  could  not 
even  hope  to  maintain  the  status  quo  without  some 
sort  of  diplomatic  backing.  Madison  had  earlier 
hinted  at  a  British  alliance,  but  now  he  intimated  that 
Great  Britain  would  not  fight  their  battles  without  an 
awkward  stipulation  to  her  own  advantage.  He  could 
propose  nothing  more  definite  than  an  appearance  of 
greater  friendliness  for  Merry,  the  British  minister.^ 

Gallatin,  whose  opinions  were  entitled  to  careful  con- 
sideration, wrote  Madison  that  he  thought  the  Ameri- 
can demands  too  difficult  for  Spain  to  meet.  They 
could  be  pressed  only  at  the  risk  of  lowering  our  na- 
tional reputation.  The  rejection  of  our  claims  did  not 
justify  war,  nor  would  the  Floridas  afiford  compensa- 
tion for  its  cost.  Livingston  and  Monroe  were  at  fault 
in  not  insisting  upon  definite  boundaries  for  Louisiana. 

2  Ford,  Jefferson,  VIII,  374,  377.  The  three  following  para- 
graphs are  based  on  the  excellent  resume  to  be  found  in 
Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  Ch.  III. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    229 

He  favored  a  renewal  of  the  negotiation  with  an  ofifer 
to  accept  the  Sabine  and  the  Perdido  as  its  proposed 
limits.  In  the  meantime  Congress  might  organize  the 
militia  and  build  up  the  navy,  although  he  hesitated 
to  trust  his  colleague  Robert  Smith  with  its  manage- 
ment. 

Armstrong's  proposal  to  seize  Texas  seemed  more 
acceptable  to  the  president.  On  September  i6,  1805, 
the  latter  incorporated  this  suggestion  with  his  own 
project  for  a  British  alliance.  Madison  thought  that 
an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  should  not  prevent 
them  from  making  separate  terms  with  Spain,  when- 
ever attainable.  At  the  same  time  Armstrong  should 
disabuse  the  French  government  of  any  idea  of  finan- 
cial profit  and  suggest  the  possibility  of  an  alliance 
with  Great  Britain.  By  October  he  was  again  unde- 
cided, for  that  power  had  recommenced  a  commercial 
policy  that  did  little  to  invite  closer  relations.  Jeffer- 
son expected  the  war  in  Europe  to  keep  Napoleon  busy 
for  the  next  two  years.  This  would  enable  the  United 
States  to  engage  in  hostilities  against  Spain,  if  it 
seemed  desirable;  or  if  not,  to  make  another  attempt 
at  peaceful  settlement.  By  the  middle  of  October  he 
was  willing  to  initiate  the  negotiation  at  Paris,  with 
Armstrong,  or  Monroe,  or  both,  as  negotiators,  with 
France  as  the  mediator,  and  to  pay  a  round  sum  for 
the  Floridas  without  regard  to  the  final  recipient. 
France  must,  however,  undertake  the  part  of  mediator 


230   AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

at  once.  The  United  States  would  resist  any  attempt 
by  Spain  to  change  existing  conditions.  Thus  the 
president  sought  peace  with  well-feigned  vigor. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  after  four  months  of  in- 
decision the  cabinet,  at  its  meeting  on  November  12, 
failed  to  adopt  a  warlike  policy.  Its  last  effort  at 
amicable  settlement  with  Spain  was  to  be  directed  to 
the  French  government.  The  United  States  was 
ready  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  for  the  rights  of  Spain 
east  of  the  Iberville,  and  to  cede  a  portion  of  their 
Texas  claim.  In  addition  Spain  must  assume  a  cer- 
tain sum  for  spoliations.  The  limit  of  the  sum  to  be 
offered  for  the  Floridas,  which  was  the  "  exciting  mo- 
tive "  with  France,  was  fixed  at  five  millions  of  dollars. 
Gallatin  did  not  like  this  appearance  of  purchasing 
peace,  but  the  others  were  influenced  by  the  fact  that 
such  action  would  undoubtedly  secure  our  commerce 
on  the  Mississippi  and  the  Mobile.  In  addition  to 
this  main  point,  Casa  Yrujo  must  be  expelled  from  the 
country  together  with  Casa  Calvo,  Morales,  and  other 
Spanish  officials  at  New  Orleans.  This  part  of  the 
program,  as  we  have  already  seen,  was  more  easily 
realized  than  the  other. 

During  this  critical  summer  the  French  minister, 
Turreau,  assured  his  government  that  it  was  a  cardi- 
nal principle  of  the  Americans  to  acquire  territory 
without  war.  For  this  reason  their  ideas  were  exclu- 
sively directed  against  Spain,  their  weaker  southern 


AMERICAN    BICKERING  AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING    23I 

neighbor.  He  urged  Napoleon  to  take  the  Floridas 
and  Cuba  in  order  to  baffle  their  plans.^  This  pro- 
posal recalls  Talleyrand's  "  wall  of  brass,"  and  was 
doubtless  inspired  by  the  complacency  with  which  the 
Americans  had  already  met  his  previous  demands  in 
regard  to  Moreau  and  the  trade  with  Santo  Domingo. 
But  Jefferson  and  Madison  had  already  begun  to  cul- 
tivate closer  relations  with  Merry,  much  to  that  min- 
ister's surprise.  The  mystery  was  explained  when  the 
president  frankly  told  of  the  relations  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States.  Should  hostilities  result,  his 
country  could  easily  occupy  the  Floridas  and  Cuba. 
Such  a  necessary  move  for  self-defense  should  cause 
no  change  in  the  policy  of  Great  Britain,  although  by 
this  time  her  new  commercial  exactions  showed  that 
the  United  States  could  expect  nothing  more  than  an 
uncertain  neutrality.*  At  this  point  Skipwith  brought 
the  despatch  from  Armstrong  that  renewed  the  prom- 
ise of  a  closer  French  connection. 

In  the  midst  of  the  busy  Austrian  campaign  Tal- 
leyrand still  sought  to  profit  from  the  Florida  ne- 
gotiation. His  agent  Ouvrard  told  Armstrong  that 
Napoleon  would  use  his  influence  to  get  the  Floridas 
from  Spain  and  establish  a  suitable  western  limit  for 
Louisiana.  A  portion  of  the  commercial  claims  in 
which  France  was  concerned  were  to  be  dropped,  and 

3  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  85,  86. 
*  Ibid.,  loi,  102. 


232  AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

the  remainder  to  be  paid  by  bills  on  the  Spanish  colo- 
nies. In  addition  the  United  States  should  pay  ten 
millions  of  dollars  ostensibly  to  Spain,  in  reality  to 
France.  After  vigorous  argument  following  Arm- 
strong's rejection  of  these  propositions,  the  money 
payment  was  reduced  to  seven  millions.  Armstrong 
simply  sent  Jefferson  a  full  report  of  the  transaction. 
The  affair  had  been  managed  in  such  an  irresponsible 
way  that  he  thoroughly  distrusted  it.^ 

The  cabinet  had  already  concluded  that  it  would  be 
wise  to  offer  five  millions  for  the  Floridas.  This  was 
a  smaller  sum  than  the  French  proposition  contem- 
plated, with  more  uncertainty  about  the  recipient.  But 
they  might  scale  the  French  price  to  correspond  with 
their  own.  After  careful  advisement,  therefore,  the 
cabinet  agreed  to  pay  the  five  millions  for  the  Floridas 
as  soon  as  Spain  should  make  a  treaty  on  the  lines 
suggested,  and  to  make  no  mention  of  those  French 
claims  which  had  contributed  to  the  former  diplo- 
matic failure.®  This  plan  promised  to  settle  a  long 
standing  dispute  on  favorable  terms  at  a  time  when 
England  was  resuming  a  most  irritating  commercial 
course. 

It  was  one  thing  for  the  cabinet  to  contemplate 
spending  five  millions  in  settling  its  disputes  with 
Spain.     But,  unfortunately,  in  addition  to  the  remain- 

'^  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  103-106. 
^  Ibid.,  106,  107. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    233 

ing  commercial  claims,  Jefferson  needed  two  millions 
in  cash  to  carry  out  his  plan.  He  must  secure  this 
from  Congress.  He  preferred  to  approach  that  body 
indirectly,  for  in  his  subserviency  to  France  he  seemed 
virtually  to  lose  the  previous  antipathy  to  foreign  al- 
liance that  he  had  expressed  in  his  inaugural.  More- 
over his  course  was  open  to  attack  on  moral  grounds. 
Accordingly,  as  we  have  noted,  he  worded  his  annual 
message  so  as  to  arouse  public  opinion  in  favor  of  a 
vigorous  foreign  policy.  He  promised  to  follow  this 
within  a  few  days  by  a  more  confidential  communi- 
cation.'^ Congress  naturally  expected  vigorous  sug- 
gestions in  keeping  with  his  first  utterance,  and  was 
disappointed  when  the  secret  message  actually  ap- 
peared. This  paper  reviewed  recent  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Spain,  mentioned  the  Spanish  protest 
against  the  cession  of  Louisiana  and  the  Mobile  Act, 
and  emphasized  the  Spanish  view  that  the  United 
States  was  entitled  to  no  territory  east  of  the  Iber- 
ville, and  to  a  "  string  of  land  only  "  west  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. The  position  of  France  in  this  negotiation 
was  equivocal ;  but  she  favored  the  Spanish  preten- 
sions in  regard  to  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi, 
although  her  silence  in  regard  to  the  western  boun- 
dary led  him  to  infer  that  she  might  there  favor  the 
United  States.  With  this  merely  formal  recital  of 
differences,  the  message  referred  the  whole  subject  to 

■^  Ford,  Jefferson,  VIII,  390,  391. 


234  AMERICAN   BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

Congress  for  such  action  as  its  wisdom  and  zeal  should 
approve.* 

The  wisdom  of  the  Ninth  Congress  proved  to  be  an 
almost  negligible  quantity  and  its  zeal,  personified  in 
John  Randolph,  a  most  persistent  obstacle  in  the  pres- 
ident's path.  That  statesman  refused  to  favor  the  ap- 
propriation, even  if  it  were  asked  for  openly,  and  in- 
stead his  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  after  con- 
siderable discussion,  reported  on  January  3,  1806,  in 
favor  of  increasing  the  national  forces  along  the  south- 
ern border."  By  this  measure  of  preparedness  he  de- 
signed to  arouse  in  Spain  a  wholesome  respect  for  our 
power  and  intentions.  His  actual  purpose  was  to  settle 
the  outstanding  territorial  disputes  by  a  peaceful  ex- 
change of  territorial  claims  west  of  the  Mississippi  for 
those  of  Spain  to  the  eastward.  Randolph's  willing- 
ness to  follow  the  suggestions  of  Casa  Calvo  and  his 
confreres  was,  however,  more  apparent  than  real. 
Hatred  for  Madison  rather  than  admiration  for  the 
Spanish  controversialists  determined  his  action. 

The  friends  of  the  administration  succeeded  in 
amending  Randolph's  resolution  in  the  committee  of 
the  whole  so  as  to  appropriate  the  two  millions  that 
Jefiferson  required.  But  they  refused  to  substitute 
the  phrase  "  east  of  the  Perdido  "  for  "  east  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi "  in  the  preamble  of  the  act.     This  unwilling- 

8  Ford,  Jefiferson,  VIII,  397-402. 

3  Annals  of  Ninth  Congress,  First  Session,  1117-1118. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    235 

ness  to  jeopardize  the  negotiation  by  claiming  too  much 
was  in  harmony  with  Randolph's  position.  During 
the  ensuing  debate  in  the  House  the  Virginian  com- 
pletely reversed  himself  on  the  West  Florida  dispute, 
and  stated  that  Spain  had  a  perfectly  good  claim  to  the 
territory  between  the  Iberville  and  the  Perdido.  Mad- 
ison had  grossly  mismanaged  the  whole  subject  of 
Louisiana  boundaries  and  by  false  inferences  had  led 
the  House  into  such  questionable  measures  as  the 
Mobile  Act. 

Notwithstanding  his  previous  bungling  the  secre- 
tary had  now,  so  Randolph  charged,  persuaded  the 
administration  to  adopt  a  new  negotiation  involving 
an  expenditure,  including  claims,  of  five  millions. 
This  new  proposition  was  simply  an  attempt  to  buy 
territory  which  a  highwayman  was  trying  to  wrest 
from  its  rightful  owner.  The  true  course  of  honor, 
the  overridden  chairman  contended,  was  to  assume  a 
strong  position  on  the  border  and  await  a  favorable 
turn  for  negotiation.  This,  however,  should  contem- 
plate a  real  exchange  of  territory,  with  no  payment  of 
money  either  directly  to  Spain  or  indirectly  to  France. 

Randolph  was  too  rabid  to  gain  more  than  casual 
support  for  his  bizarre  policy  of  economy  and  pre- 
paredness. The  majority  preferred  to  entrust  the  de- 
fense of  the  frontiers  to  the  regular  mihtia  and  to 
expend  the  two  millions  necessary  to  complete  the 
purchase  of  the  Floridas.     By  this  means  they  would 


236  AMERICAN   BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

acquire  undoubted  Spanish  territory  as  well  as  the 
portion  in  dispute,  and  it  would  cost  far  less  than  a 
war  in  which  France  would  probably  support  Spain. 
It  was  no  concern  to  them  what  became  of  the  pur- 
chase money;  their  government  was  in  no  sense  the 
guardian  of  Spain.  With  such  arguments  the  ma- 
jority justified  their  action  in  attempting  to  purchase 
peace  rather  than  in  asserting  a  vigorous  national  pol- 
icy.^'' The  "  Two  Million  Act "  that  passed  was  based 
upon  that  which  authorized  Monroe's  special  mission 
three  years  before.  The  circumstances  surrounding 
both  were  in  many  cases  identical.  The  former  ap- 
parently contributed  to  bring  about  the  Louisiana  Pur- 
chase. It  was  not  certain  that  the  outcome  of  the  lat- 
ter would  be  equally  advantageous. 

The  determining  factor  in  the  earlier  transaction 
was  the  willingness  of  our  diplomats  to  meet  Na- 
poleon's monetary  demands.  The  attempt  in  the 
second  to  scale  these  from  seven  to  five  millions,  of 
which  two  millions  only  was  to  be  paid  in  cash,  was 
not  a  favorable  symptom.  In  1803  the  diplomatic 
principals,  despite  their  mutual  distrust  and  jealousy, 
acted  together  in  essential  matters,  while  their  fellows 
in  London  and  Madrid  loyally  seconded  their  efforts. 
It  remained  to  be  seen  if  their  successors  would  do 
as  well  three  years  later.  The  stake — the  peaceful 
possession  of  the  Floridas — was  the  same ;  but  the  situ- 

10  Annals  of  Ninth  Congress,  First  Session,  1133-1138. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING    237 

ation  both  at  home  and  abroad  was  infinitely  more 
complicated. 

Of  the  previous  diplomatic  group,  Monroe  was  the 
only  one  in  active  service.  From  his  post  in  London 
he  could  play  only  a  subordinate  part  in  the  Florida 
negotiation  and  that  largely  in  an  underhand  way.  In 
the  summer  of  1805  James  Bowdoin,  the  new  minister 
to  Spain,  was  with  him  in  London.  After  consulting 
together  they  decided  that  if  Bowdoin  went  straight- 
way to  Spain,  it  would  create  the  impression  that  the 
United  States  was  taking  Monroe's  failure  altogether 
too  easily.  As  it  was  desirable  to  have  a  representa- 
tive there,  they  concluded  to  send  George  W.  Erving, 
Bowdoin's  secretary,  to  act  as  charge,  while  Bowdoin 
himself  went  to  Paris,  the  real  diplomatic  center. ^^ 
By  this  decision,  whether  they  willed  it  or  not,  and  by 
the  secret  correspondence  which  the  three  subsequently 
maintained,  they  established  a  Massachusetts-Virginia 
combination  against  the  Empire  State  group  that  Arm- 
strong represented.  Partisanship  did  not  in  this  case 
cease  at  the  water's  edge,  nor  was  faction  controlled 
within  the  party  ranks.  To  this  fact  we  may  in  part 
attribute  the  failure  of  the  negotiation  that  now  fol- 
lowed at  Paris. 

The  decision  at  London  was  naturally  displeasing  to 

11  Bowdoin  to  Madison,  July  8.  31,  1805,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  IX,  Erving  to  Madison,  Aug.  24,  1805,  Spanish  Dis- 
patches, MS.,  X,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


238   AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

Armstrong.  He  wrote  Monroe  that  the  mere  pres- 
ence of  Erving  at  Madrid  would  probably  do  no  harm, 
but  any  overtures  on  his  part  to  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment would  result  in  "nothing  but  mischief. "^^  Erv- 
ing believed  that  Armstrong  wanted  to  handle  the 
negotiation  himself  at  Paris.  He  also  noted  that  the 
French  government  still  hoped  to  make  money  out  of 
the  quarrel  and  that  the  course  of  some  of  his  fellow- 
countrymen  tended  to  confirm  it  in  this  hope.  Arm- 
strong had  indiscreetly  permitted  one  of  these  irre- 
sponsible agents,  Daniel  Parker,  agent  of  the  banking 
house  of  the  Hopes,  to  learn  his  instructions.  Parker 
declared  that  France  had  interfered  in  the  negotiation 
much  less  than  the  Americans  believed,  and  would  not 
interfere  unless  both  disputants  appealed  to  her  as  um- 
pire. He  thought  Erving  blustering  when  the  latter 
denied  that  the  American  government  intended  to 
make  such  an  appeal.  If  it  did  not,  it  should  pursue 
a  more  vigorous  and  consistent  commercial  policy  to- 
ward England.  The  recent  exactions  of  that  power 
must  soon  lead  France  to  make  similar  exactions,  and 
thus  affect  the  whole  negotiation  adversely.^^ 

Bowdoin,  when  he  reached  Paris,  also  recognized 
the  general  diplomatic  benefit  of  emphatic  protests 
against  England's  policy.     But  it  would  be  still  more 

^2  Armstrong  to  Monroe,  Sept.  18,  1805,  Letters  to  Monroe, 
Lenox  MSS. 

13  Erving  to  Monroe,  Sept.  20,  Oct.  10,  Nov.  25,  1805,  Lenox 
MSS.;  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  379. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    239 

serviceable  to  occupy  part  of  the  disputed  territory 
and  get  rid  of  the  money-jobbers.  These  were  de- 
termined to  convert  the  American  commercial  claims 
into  bills  of  exchange  on  the  Spanish  colonies  and  in 
addition  make  the  United  States  pay  well  for  the 
Floridas.^*  Thus  American  desire  and  Spanish  weak- 
ness were  to  minister  to  French  needs.  Napoleon's 
corrupt  agents,  rather  than  Napoleon  himself,  seemed 
responsible  for  most  of  this  jobbery.  Its  prevalence 
and  Armstrong's  reticence  led  Bowdoin  to  write  Erving 
that  afifairs  did  not  look  so  propitious  as  he  had 
expected.  ^^ 

Since  Armstrong  did  not  welcome  Bowdoin's  pres- 
ence in  Paris,  the  latter  had  to  "  skrew  and  wire  draw 
to  obtain  the  most  simple  facts  "  from  him.  Armstrong 
advised  him  to  remain  in  Paris  until  they  learned  the 
result  of  the  proposition  he  had  sent  home,  but  he  gave 
him  no  copy  of  it,  and  in  the  interim  favored  no  new 
application  to  Talleyrand.  This  imparted  to  Arm- 
strong's course  "an  odd  appearance,"  and  caused 
Bowdoin  to  "  augur  no  good  "  from  "  these  intermixed 
jurisdictions."^®  Erving,  playing  the  usual  waiting 
game  at  Madrid,  coincided  with  his  opinion.  He  did 
not  anticipate  any  serious  negotiation  "  with  baseness 

1*  Bowdoin  to  Monroe,  Nov.  25,  1805,  Adams,  History  of 
the  United  States,  III,  379- 

^5  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  254,  Proceedings  of  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  7th  Series,  Vol.  VI. 

16  Ibid.,  261-265. 


240  AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

and  apathy  on  one  side,  and  the  most  barefaced  cor- 
ruption on  both."  The  young  charge  was  hardly  war- 
ranted in  characterizing  the  situation  so  bluntly,  but 
he  wished  to  discourage  the  corrupt  intermediaries. 
"  We  must  have  more  regard  for  our  own  honor  than 
their  wants."  The  Americans  must  also  remove  the 
idea  that  their  "  pacifick  system "  would  never  be 
changed.  "A  blow  must  be  struck  which  will  arouse 
it  [i.  e.,  the  Spanish  government]  from  its  lethargy 
and  convince  France  that  we  are  no  longer  to  he  trifled 
with  before  we  shall  be  able  to  negotiate  with  any 
probability  of  success."  In  accounting  for  the  sub- 
serviency of  the  Spanish  government,  he  wrote :  "  They 
have  no  statesmen,  no  force,  no  money. "^'^ 

It  is  interesting  to  note  how  quickly  Bowdoin  as- 
sumed the  hopeless  tone  of  Monroe  at  Aranjuez. 
"  Present  interest  and  not  great  principles  rule  on  the 
continent  now."^®  After  another  of  Parker's  financial 
propositions  early  in  December,  he  wrote  discourag- 
ingly.  "  More  Jesuitness  can  hardly  be  conceived  .  .  . 
nothing  but  a  wish  to  serve  our  country  could  induce 
me  to  bear  with  such  legerdemain."^^  The  only  ground 
for  hope  was  the  fact  that  the  French  government 
would  not  care  to  have  its  part  in  the  negotiation  pub- 
lished.    Apparently   Talleyrand's   agents   were   deter- 

^''  Ibid.,  257.     The  italicized  portions  were  written  in  cipher. 
^8  Bowdoin  to  Madison,  Dec.  7,   1805,   Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  IX,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 
^^  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  269. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    24I 

mined  to  force  the  relinquishment  of  the  commercial 
claims  and  the  payment  of  a  substantial  sum  for  the 
Floridas.^"  Talleyrand's  absence  in  Austria  seemed 
merely  to  thicken  the  atmosphere  of  jobbery  at  Paris. 

Early  in  January,  1806,  Bowdoin  reported  to  Monroe 
that  Parker  had  broached  to  him  a  new  plan,  fathered 
by  one  of  Godoy's  agents.  The  net  proceeds  from  the 
Floridas  were  to  be  fixed  at  four  millions.  Spain 
should  turn  that  sum  over  to  France  as  if  in  payment 
of  a  debt  that  the  latter  power  had  guaranteed;  or 
France  might  assume  the  hypothetical  debt,  take  the 
Floridas  in  payment,  and  then  sell  them  to  the  United 
States.  Bowdoin  was  unwilling  to  consider  a  cash 
payment  above  two  millions  and  wrote  to  Monroe  for 
advice.^'^ 

At  the  same  time  he  charged  Erving  to  be  very  care- 
ful about  mentioning  these  rumors  in  Madrid.  Godoy 
hated  the  French  and  they  were  jealous  of  him.  It 
might  be  possible  to  convince  the  Spanish  minister  that 
France  must  keep  out  of  the  controversy  and  give 
Spain  the  entire  benefit  of  any  money  payments. 
Perhaps  it  would  be  well  to  hint  that  a  cession  of 
Texas  to  the  United  States  would  increase  the  value 
of  Godoy's  land  claims  in  that  province.  If  by  any 
means  Erving  should  induce  the  other  to  say  that  he 
would  accept  the  two  millions  for  the  Floridas  in  addi- 

"^  Bowdoin  to  Monroe,  Dec.  17,  1805,  Lenox  MSS. 
21  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  279-282. 

17 


242    AMERICAN   BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

tion  to  our  claims,  Bowdoin  would  at  once  leave  for 
Madrid.  He  might  thus  avoid  the  financial  schemes 
that  Talleyrand  and  Parker  were  trying  to  put  through 
in  Paris.^^  A  month  later  he  wrote  Erving  to  disre- 
gard these  suggestions.  Armstrong  was  more  uncom- 
municative than  ever,  and  there  was  a  rumor  that 
Casa  Yrujo  had  been  empowered  to  take  up  the  nego- 
tiation in  Washington.-^ 

The  return  of  Napoleon  and  Talleyrand  to  Paris 
early  in  February,  after  the  successful  Austrian  cam- 
paign, encouraged  Bowdoin,  if  not  Armstrong.  The 
tone  of  the  president's  recent  public  message  might 
strengthen  Talleyrand's  antipathy  to  the  American 
administration  and  influence  his  imperial  prompter. 
England's  commercial  policy  was  unfavorable  also  to 
the  negotiation.  In  March  Armstrong  told  Bowdoin 
that  Talleyrand  would  not  act  until  he  heard  definitely 
from  his  unofficial  proposals  of  the  preceding  au- 
tumn.^* Bowdoin  was  inclined  to  put  more  confidence 
in  the  good  intentions  of  Napoleon,  if  the  stock  jobbers 
would  only  let  him  alone.  Yet  he  suspected  that  the 
success  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  had  led  all  French- 
men, including  the  emperor  himself,  to  anticipate 
another  easy  subsidy. 

A  new  overture  from  a  Spanish  contractor,  Ouvras 

--  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  282-287. 
=3  Ibid. 

2*  Bowdoin  to  Madison,  Mar.  9,  1806,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  IX,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    243 

[Ouvrard?]  by  name,  had  mentioned  six  millions  as 
the  prospective  sum  required.-^  Bowdoin  had  no  in- 
structions to  guide  him  and  Armstrong  still  maintained 
"  the  same  foolish  senselessness  of  reserve."^^  But 
the  former  was  more  concerned  over  "ye  same  cool- 
ness and  neglect  from  Mr.  T[alleyrand],"  whom  he 
had  not  yet  met,  despite  several  mortifying  attempts 
to  do  so.  On  March  i,  1806,  in  a  long  communication 
to  Jefferson  reviewing  conditions  to  date,  he  called 
Spain  a  province  of  France  with  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace  as  its  prefect.  Any  dispute  with  the  former 
power,  therefore,  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  dispute  with 
France.  He  and  Armstrong  were  more  likely  to  settle 
it  while  the  two  powers  were  still  at  war  with  England ; 
and  he  believed  that  three  or  four  millions,  with  the 
allowance  of  certain  commercial  claims  and  a  suitable 
western  boundary,  would  be  sufficient  for  the  purpose. 
This  would  certainly  be  the  case  if  France  were  to  be 
beneficiary,  and  would  permit  some  allowance  for  in- 
terested speculators.  But  Bowdoin  desired  to  keep 
clear  of  all  such.-^ 

Before  the  despatch  from  the  discouraged  envoy 
reached  America,  Madison  had  penned  the  new  in- 
structions that  were  to  guide  him  and  his  unwilling 
colleague   in   their  joint   mission.^^     After   reviewing 

25  Bowdoin  to  Monroe,  Feb.  24,  1806,  Lenox  MSS. 

26  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  307. 

27  Ibid.,  294  ff. 

28  Madison  to  Armstrong  and  Bowdoin,  Mar.  3,  1806,  In- 
structions, MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


244   AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

Armstrong's  despatch  of  the  previous  September,  he 
stated  that  the  president's  impulse  was  to  report  the 
failure  of  the  negotiation  to  Congress  for  such  action 
as  seemed  best,  together  with  a  covert  threat  against 
the  French  government.  When,  however,  the  presi- 
dent received  Armstrong's  later  communication,  he  be- 
lieved that  he  might  proceed  as  he  had  done  in  1803, 
and  had  laid  the  matter  before  Congress  at  its  regular 
session.  After  a  delay  caused  by  "  some  variances  of 
opinion  "  (thus  does  he  pass  over  Randolph's  revolt) 
Congress  acted  as  he  wished.  The  two  commissioners 
in  Paris  were  to  inform  the  French  government  at 
once  that  they  were  ready  to  act  under  its  friendly 
auspices.  He  left  to  them  the  method  and  the  place  for 
presenting  this  overture,  as  well  as  the  definite  language 
in  which  it  should  be  expressed. 

The  essential  points  of  the  negotiation  were  the 
Floridas,  the  spoliations,  and  a  suitable  western  bound- 
ary. The  article  in  regard  to  West  Florida,  for  many 
reasons  the  crucial  one,  was  to  be  worded  in  accord- 
ance with  Spanish  feelings  rather  than  American 
claims.  As  Madison  suggested  in  his  draft,  Spain 
should  "  acknowledge  and  confirm  to  the  United  States, 
West  Florida  and  cede  to  them  forever  the  same  and 
East  Florida,"  or  "(if  unattainable  in  that  form), 
Spain  cedes  and  confirms  forever  to  the  United  States, 
East  and  West  Florida."  By  so  wording  the  article, 
the  secretary  pointed  out,  the  commissioners  would 


AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    245 

date  the  cesssion  of  the  disputed  territory  from  the 
Louisiana  Purchase,  and  thus  invahdate  subsequent 
land  sales.  At  the  same  time  Madison  observed  that 
if  Spain  could  be  brought  to  acknowledge  more  com- 
pletely the  right  of  the  United  States  to  the  Perdido, 
the  Americans  should  use  that  river  rather  than  the 
Appalachicola  as  a  future  divisional  line. 

The  observations  of  the  secretary  would  hardly  make 
his  proposals  more  agreeable  to  Spain,  Nor  were  his 
measures  to  cut  off  stock  jobbing  calculated  to  make 
them  acceptable  to  France.  Yet  he  and  his  sponsors 
afifected  a  virtue  by  this  means  even  while  acceding  in 
part  to  Talleyrand's  dubious  proposals.  Having  thus 
alienated  the  two  nations  most  intimately  concerned, 
they  were  unable,  because  of  Great  Britain's  com- 
mercial policy,  to  anticipate  aid  from  that  quarter. 
Moreover  the  opposition  of  Randolph,  which  even 
Merry  noted  in  his  correspondence,  had  delayed  action 
too  long  to  be  effective,  had  it  been  in  keeping  with 
French  desires.  Talleyrand  was  ready,  therefore,  in 
response  to  Masserano's  prayer  for  intervention,  to 
favor  Spain  rather  than  the  United  States  in  the 
troublesome  controversy.  Merry's  warning  also  set 
the  English  government  against  any  possible  triple 
entente.  Skipwith,  he  informed  his  superior,  took 
back  with  him  the  copy  of  a  resolution  to  prohibit  the 
importation  of  British  manufactures.-^ 

29  Merry  to  C.  J.  Fox,  June  29,  1806,  MS.,  British  Foreign 
Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  49. 


246    AMERICAN   BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

The  jealousy  and  suspicion  that  then  ruled  among 
the  American  representatives  was  in  itself  sufficient  to 
wreck  the  negotiation.  Skipwith,  Bowdoin,  and  the 
latter's  secretary,  James  Sullivan,  united  in  charging 
Armstrong  with  desiring  to  exclude  Bowdoin  from  the 
negotiation.  Armstrong's  reputed  indebtedness,  his 
intimacy  with  the  untrustworthy  Parker,  and  his 
duplicity  in  recommending  a  vigorous  course  toward 
Spain  while  encouraging  secret  financial  intrigues,  all 
conspired  to  arouse  in  them  the  same  distrust  that 
formerly  hampered  Livingston. 

The  little  coterie  at  Paris  tried  to  share  their  opin- 
ions with  Erving  and  Monroe.  To  the  latter  Skip- 
with  wrote :  "  In  other  words  the  General  has  become 
the  conductor  to  our  good  President  of  Parker's  spe- 
cifics. ...  If  they  succeeded  he  might  gain  in  popu- 
larity and  perhaps  participate  in  the  emoluments 
anticipated  by  the  quack;  while  should  Parker's  pre- 
scriptions fail,  our  Diplomat  still  expected  to  hold  his 
last  Trump  in  his  own  hands  by  resorting  to  the 
dignified  grounds  on  which  he  had  ostensibly  placed 
himself  with  you.  He  is  as  little  your  friend,  I  give 
you  my  word,  as  he  is  the  Friend  of  virtue  and  dignity 
in  any  other  man."  Bowdoin  sent  Sullivan  to  give 
Monroe  a  personal  report  of  the  situation.  Armstrong 
treated  him  with  neglect  and  was  too  intimate  with 
Parker.  The  jobbers  would  not  let  Spain  compose 
her  own  quarrels.     All  that  the  Americans  could  do, 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    247 

in  Bowdoin's  opinion,  was  to  threaten  the  French  and 
Spanish  colonies  and  what  was  left  of  their  commerce.^*' 
Monroe  still  expressed  hope.  At  any  rate,  since  the 
administration  had  finally  determined  upon  a  policy, 
they  should  all  join  to  push  it  through.  By  so  doing 
they  might  unite  factions  at  home  and  settle  all  pend- 
ing issues  in  Europe.^^  Monroe's  philosophy  always 
surpassed  his  performance. 

The  negotiation  at  Paris  promptly  took  the  usual 
course  that  characterized  Talleyrand's  control.  One 
of  his  former  attaches,  M.  Dautremont,  told  Skipwith 
shortly  after  his  return,  that  the  emperor  detested 
American  principles.  This  was  very  probable.  But 
Dautremont  advised  the  American  to  see  M.  Roux, 
Talleyrand's  man  of  affairs,  and  offered  him  an  invita- 
tion to  dine  with  M.  Doyen,  another  of  the  minister's 
panderers,  through  whom  he  could  meet  Senor 
Izquierdo.  The  latter  was  Godoy's  confidential  agent, 
and  if  Skipwith  objected  to  meeting  Izquierdo  directly, 
he  might  make  Doyen  his  intermediary.^- 

These  proposals  smacked  strongly  of  the  X.  Y.  Z. 
affair  of  the  previous  decade.     Bowdoin  advised  Skip- 

30  Skipwith  to  Monroe,  May  3,  May  [?],  1806,  Sullivan  to 
Erving,  May  5,  1806,  Bowdoin  to  Monroe,  May  30,  1806, 
Lenox  MSS. 

31  Monroe  to  Bowdoin,  June  24,  1806,  Lenox  MSS.  (Ford 
Collection). 

32  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  309;  Adams,  History  of 
the  United  States,  III,  379. 


248   AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

with  to  draw  Dautremont  out,  but  to  refuse  all  per- 
sonal relations  with  those  whom  he  mentioned.  When 
the  agent  found  that  his  suggestions  elicited  no  profit- 
able proposals  from  Bowdoin,  he  ceased  for  the  time 
being  to  make  them.  This  gave  the  Americans  a 
chance  to  approach  Talleyrand  directly.  Bowdoin, 
although  associated  with  Armstrong  in  the  commission 
to  the  French  government,  had  never  been  presented 
to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs ;  consequently  Arm- 
strong had  to  conduct  all  the  personal  interviews.  On 
May  I  he  informed  Talleyrand  that  his  country  was 
prepared  to  renew  the  negotiation  "  under  the  auspices 
of  a  common  friend,"  but  was  not  yet  ready  to  make 
overtures.  "The  first  steps  must  be  taken  by  Spain 
and  be  the  result  of  her  own  reflections  or  counsels 
given  her."  Obviously  Armstrong  expected  the  em- 
peror to  give  them.  "  The  views  of  the  United 
States,"  to  quote  from  his  later  note,  "have  been  ex- 
clusively directed  to  His  Imperial  and  Royal  Majesty  " 
as  the  only  possible  mediator.^^ 

The  emperor's  first  response  was  little  in  keeping 
with  Armstrong's  obsequious  approach.  He  permitted 
Talleyrand,  on  May  3,  to  show  the  American  a  formal 
declaration  from  the  Spanish  king  that  he  would  in 
no  manner  dispose  of  the  Floridas.  Talleyrand  had 
previously  not  known  of  this  declaration,  and  its  effect, 

33  Armstrong  to  Talleyrand,  May  6,  26,  1806,  Spanish  Dis- 
patches, MS.,  IX,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    249 

backed  up  by  books,  maps,  and  formal  arguments,  was 
inconsistent  with  his  previous  statement  that  the  king 
had  placed  the  whole  matter  in  the  emperor's  hands. 
To  forestall  this  charge,  Talleyrand  intimated  that  the 
Spanish  sovereign  had  changed  his  mind  because  Bow- 
doin  had  told  Erving  that  the  French  proposed  to  turn 
the  negotiation  into  a  job.  Talleyrand  had  no  author- 
ity for  this  insinuation,  but  his  immediate  purpose  was 
to  relieve  himself  of  criticism,  to  sow  dissension  among 
the  American  negotiators,^*  and  to  regain  control  of 
the  affair. 

To  serve  the  last  named  end  he  made  a  long  report 
to  the  emperor,  dated  May  6,  1806.  In  this  Talley- 
rand mentioned  that  the  commission  to  Armstrong  and 
Bowdoin  gave  him  an  opportunity  once  more  to  ex- 
press his  opinion  on  the  dispute  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain.  The  commercial  claims  were  fully 
covered  by  the  treaty  of  September,  1800.  The  Amer- 
ican claim  to  West  Florida  would  not  bear  the  least 
examination,  although  he  discussed  it  sufficiently  to 
prove  his  point.  He  had  asserted  this  so  often  that 
he  did  not  think  the  United  States  would  recur  to  the 
repeated  discussions  with  France  and  ought  not  to 
do  so  with  Spain.  If  its  representatives  did  so,  the 
French  government  ought  formally  to  oppose  them, 
but  if  they  wished  to  discuss  amicably  the  acquisition 
of  Florida,  they  might  address  themselves  simply  to 
Spain. 

»*  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  376-378. 


250   AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

Talleyrand  showed  that  West  Florida  had  no  im- 
portance except  for  the  navigation  of  its  rivers  and 
its  situation  on  the  Gulf.  In  the  hands  of  the  United 
States  its  commerce  and  population  would  rapidly  in- 
crease, but  never  while  Spain  controlled  it.  That 
nation  desired  to  retain  the  Floridas,  especially  after 
the  transfer  of  Louisiana,  in  order  to  exclude  the 
United  States  from  the  Gulf.  West  Florida  was  liable 
to  be  a  serious  cause  for  quarrel  because  no  natural 
barrier  separated  it  from  the  contiguous  American 
territory,  where  the  population  was  continually  increas- 
ing. The  United  States  was  more  interested  in  ac- 
quiring this  area  and  the  remaining  territory  east  of 
the  Mississippi  than  Spain  with  its  stationary  popula- 
tion was  concerned  in  retaining  it. 

Talleyrand  intimated  that  Napoleon  had  sold  Loui- 
siana to  stimulate  commercial  rivalry  between  the 
various  States  of  the  Union  and  emphasize  western 
separatism.  The  same  reason  might  lead  him  to  favor 
the  American  acquisition  of  the  Floridas,  unless  he 
wished  them  for  himself  or  to  serve  some  ulterior  ne- 
gotiation. Since  the  recent  French  victories  the  Amer- 
ican government  had  showed  ifself  more  compliant,  but 
it  must  go  to  still  greater  lengths.  It  must  cease  exag- 
gerating the  pretended  inroads  and  commercial  exac- 
tions of  the  Spaniards,  and  restrain  such  projects  as 
Miranda's.  In  behalf  of  France  it  must  relinquish  the 
trade  with    Santo   Domingo,    and   adopt   commercial 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    25 1 

measures  against  Great  Britain.  It  might  thus  bring 
the  negotiation  to  a  successful  conclusion.  He  inti- 
mated, however,  that  as  the  Americans  desired  the 
Floridas  so  greatly,  they  might  seize  them  by  force. 
The  emperor  should  determine  whether  or  not  it  was 
to  his  advantage  to  keep  alive  a  dispute  so  dangerous 
that  it  must  inevitably  involve  the  Spanish  colonies. 
In  any  case  he  should  permit  only  a  settlement  that 
was  favorable  to  Spain.^^ 

Talleyrand  worked  upon  Armstrong  to  bring  about 
a  second  application  to  the  emperor  by  assuring  the 
American  minister  that  His  Majesty  was  ready  to  lend 
his  good  offices  to  settle  the  controversy.  Then  he 
instructed  Vandeul,  the  French  minister  at  Madrid,  to 
act  in  keeping  with  his  report.  The  United  States 
ought  not  to  ask  for  any  commercial  claims  or  demand 
any  part  of  the  Floridas.  It  must  purchase  the  latter 
entire,  and  settle  the  western  boundary  of  Louisiana 
with  due  regard  to  Spanish  susceptibilities  and  with 
proper  indemnity  for  any  territory  yielded.  The 
French  representative  was  to  express  no  opinion  about 
the  Floridas,  but  he  might  intimate  the  commercial 
advantages  that  the  United  States  expected  to  gain 
from  possessing  them,  and  also  suggest  how  easily 
it  could  invade  them.  Unless  Spain  were  determined 
to  preserve  these  colonies,  she  might  listen  to  these 

'5  Archives  des  Affaires  fit'rangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol. 
59,  133-138. 


252  AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

American  propositions  with  favor,  and  content  herself 
with  the  thought  that  they  would  be  much  more  valu- 
able to  the  United  States  than  to  herself.  The  em- 
peror would  be  glad  to  see  this  dispute  settled,  and 
Vandeul  was  to  do  all  possible  to  favor  this,  without, 
however,  intervening  officially  or  displaying  more  than 
casual  interest.^^ 

The  situation  was  not  hopeful.  Cevallos  and  Mas- 
serano  were  both  complaining  about  the  expulsion  of 
Casa  Calvo  and  Morales,  and  later  about  Miranda, 
with  the  evident  object  of  preventing  friendly  discus- 
sion. Godoy  told  Vandeul  that  ''everything  stood 
well  and  there  zvas  no  necessity  for  negotiation" 
When  Vandeul  urged  the  wish  of  the  emperor  to  see 
the  affair  settled  and  reported  what  steps  had  already 
been  taken  to  bring  this  about,  Godoy  consented  to 
undertake  the  negotiation.  The  Frenchman  hastened 
to  inform  Talleyrand  and  Erving  of  his  initial  success. 
In  a  second  interview  a  few  days  later  he  attempted 
to  settle  the  details.  At  first  Godoy  insisted  upon 
negotiating  at  Madrid,  or  knowing  the  views  of  the 
United  States,  before  agreeing  to  abide  by  the  result, 
but  finally  yielded  to  the  arguments  of  the  French  min- 
ister.    These  were  backed  by  assurances  that  his  gov- 

36  Talleyrand  to  Vandeul,  May  28,  1806,  Archives  des  Af- 
faires fitrangeres,  fispagne,  MS.,  Vol.  669;  Talleyrand  to 
Armstrong,  June  4,  1806,  Spanish  Dispatches,  MS.,  IX,  Bu- 
reau of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Adams,  History  of  the  United 
States,  III,  380. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    253 

ernment  would  not  support  the  American  claim  to 
West  Florida  and  by  a  frank  warning  that  the  United 
States  might  seize  the  region.  Under  such  pressure 
Godoy  then  reluctantly  consented  to  refer  the  whole 
affair  to  French  arbitration.  Vandeul  regarded  this 
as  safer  than  leaving  so  delicate  an  adjustment  ex- 
posed to  the  factitious  complaints  of  Cevallos  or  the 
uncompromising  Americanism  of  Erving.^^ 

Vandeul  was  moving  too  rapidly  for  his  superiors, 
or  at  least  Napoleon  affected  to  think  so.  In  the 
course  of  the  severe  reprimand  that  Talleyrand,  upon 
the  emperor's  order,  administered  to  him,  he  told  the 
charge  that  however  much  Napoleon  might  desire  to 
see  the  differences  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States  settled,  "  the  terms  and  the  way  must  be  left  to 
them;  affairs  of  this  delicacy  .  .  .  [must]  be  man- 
aged very  carefully."  Talleyrand  closed  his  rebuke 
with  this  sentence :  "  The  government  alone  can  know 
whether  this  step  is  consistent  with  its  interests  of  the 
moment  and  with  the  general  plan  it  has  formed  for 
itself."  Probably  he  only  meant  that  Napoleon  had 
determined  to  use  the  Floridas  as  a  means  of  coercing 
the  United  States  to  support  his  commercial  policy ; 
but,  in  the  words  of  Izquierdo  to  Godoy,  "  Who  is  able 
to  divine  the  mind  of  M.  Talleyrand?"^® 

37  Vandeul  to  Talleyrand,  June  16,  in,  26,  1806,  Archives  des 
Affaires  fitrangeres,  fispagne,  MS.,  Vol.  670;  Adams,  History 
of  the  United  States,  III,  381-385. 

'8  Bowdoin  to  Madison,  Aug.  22,  1806,  Spanish  Dispatches, 
MS.,  IX,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


254 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 


During  the  summer  of  1806  the  Spanish  Court  be- 
came enraged  over  Napoleon's  design  to  give  the  Ba- 
learic Islands  to  the  Bourbons,  whom  he  had  driven 
from  Naples.  Some  inkling  of  their  rage  may  have 
reached  the  emperor  at  Paris  and  induced  him  to 
suspend  the  Florida  negotiation.  If  Spain  were  be- 
coming restive,  it  would  be  advisable  to  keep  the  con- 
troversy open.  But  a  series  of  contemporary  memoirs 
may  have  assisted  to  confirm  him  in  his  purpose  or 
reconcile  Talleyrand  to  it.  One  of  them,  written  by 
Pinckney  Horry,  a  nephew  of  General  C.  C.  Pinckney 
and  a  naturalized  French  subject,  displays  all  the  neo- 
phyte's zeal  in  behalf  of  his  adopted  country.  He  ad- 
vised that  France  secure  for  herself  East  Florida, 
which  would  afford  her  a  favorable  position  for  exert- 
ing pressure  on  both  Spaniards  and  Americans.  By  a 
measured  and  pliant  conduct  it  might  be  possible  to 
neutralize  the  jealousy  that  her  presence  there  might 
cause;  for  possession  was  less  important  than  her 
conduct  as  a  neighbor.  The  ruling  class  of  the  Caro- 
linas  and  Georgia,  pleasure-loving  and  honorable 
men,  were  easily  led  by  those  who  knew  them.  They 
still  felt  a  bitter  hatred  for  England,  and  would  pre- 
vent the  English  party  in  the  United  States  from  at- 
tempting hostile  measures  against  the  French.  Spain 
should  acquiesce  in  their  occupying  the  peninsula 
rather  than  permit  the  United  States  to  get  it.     She 


AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    255 

could  not  adequately  defend  it  herself,  and  risked  the 
loss  of  all  her  colonies  by  attempting  to  hold  it.^^ 

Another  memoir  was  the  work  of  a  certain  M.  Vez- 
monnet,  who  had  recently  returned  from  the  United 
States.  That  power,  as  the  president  had  avowed, 
expected  soon  to  purchase  the  Floridas  or  take  them 
by  force.  West  Florida  was  the  key  to  Louisiana, 
and  there  could  be  no  permanent  tranquility  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States  until  the  latter  got  it. 
Then  it  would  share  with  England  the  commerce  of 
Cuba  and  Mexico  and  inoculate  those  colonies  with 
the  views  of  independence.  The  emperor  alone  could 
prevent  this.^**  Still  later  an  anonymous  memoir 
stated  that  the  Floridas  might  yet  cause  Jefferson  to 
draw  the  sword  instead  of  the  pen.  His  enemies  had 
criticised  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana,  and  this  had  led 
to  his  obsession  for  the  Floridas  and  his  insistence 
upon  the  claim  to  the  Perdido.  While  internal  dissen- 
sion among  the  Americans  might  suffice  to  protect  the 
Floridas  and  Mexico  from  the  torrent  o'f  independ- 
ence that  was  sweeping  toward  them,  French  assist- 
ance was  also  essential  and  must  not  be  ignored.*^ 
None  of  the  nations  of  that  period  had  any  inten- 
ds The  memoir  bears  the  date  June  25,  1806,  Archives  des 
Affaires  fitrangeres,  Etats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  59,  215  ff. 

*^  The  memoir  is  dated  Aug.  6,  1806,  Archives  des  Affaires 
£trangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  59,  240-246. 

^1  The  memoir  is  dated  Nov.  ?,  1806,  Archives  des  Affaires 
fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  59,  310. 


256   AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

tion  of  ignoring  France ;  Spain  least  of  all.  But  for  a 
time  resentment  over  the  Balearics  led  Godoy  into  a 
mad  attempt  at  independent  action.  This  will  par- 
tially explain  the  course  of  Izquierdo,  his  agent  at 
Paris.  Izquierdo  did  not  welcome  his  principal's  un- 
willing instructions  to  undertake  a  territorial  negotia- 
tion that  involved  little  honor  and  less  financial  return. 
He  told  his  friend,  M.  Cazenove,  who  had  urged  him 
to  treat  with  Armstrong,  that  they  could  do  no  more 
than  examine  documents  at  Paris.  Those  in  the 
Spanish  embassy  had  already  been  turned  over  to  him, 
when  he  learned  of  the  emperor's  change  of  mind  and 
returned  them  forthwith.  The  imperial  decision  gave 
him  no  less  satisfaction  than  it  did  his  superiors. 

For  a  time  Godoy  and  Cevallos  thought  of  having 
Casa  Yrujo  bring  this  decision  to  the  attention  of  the 
American  government  and  publish  it  in  the  American 
papers.  But  still  distrusting  their  imperial  ally,  they 
contented  themselves  with  giving  their  representative 
a  resume  of  the  decision  and  made  no  mention  of 
Izquierdo's  brief  agency.  Casa  Yrujo  would  know 
how  to  make  the  most  of  it.*^  The  emperor  had 
already  taken  pains  to  have  the  American  government 
informed  of  his  position.  He  regretted  its  settled 
spirit  of  animosity  toward  Spain.     Turreau  was  to  in- 

^-  Izquierdo  to  ?,  June  27,  1806,  Izquierdo  to  Cevallos,  Aug. 
8,  1806,  Cevallos  to  Casa  Yrujo,  Aug.  22,  1806,  Legajo  5542, 
Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING   257 

form  Madison  that  neither  that  power  nor  France 
recognized  the  claim  to  West  Florida  and  that  it  was 
useless  for  the  United  States  to  insist  upon  it.  If  she 
wished  to  acquire  the  Floridas,  let  her  consult  the  inter- 
ests of  Spain.  Moreover  any  attempt  to  interfere 
with  the  Spanish  colonies  would  result  in  European 
intervention.*^ 

Madison  was  already  directing  his  course  in  keeping 
with  this  fiat.  If  the  negotiation  for  the  Floridas 
should  again  fail,  as  seemed  likely,  he  instructed  Arm- 
strong and  Bowdoin  to  secure  the  status  quo,  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mobile,  and  the  ratification  of  the  claims 
convention  of  1802.  He  had  hoped  that  Monroe  and 
Pinckney  would  secure  these  very  points  at  Aranjuez 
the  year  before.  This,  according  to  the  meek  and 
patient  secretary,  would  insure  the  continuance  of  an 
honorable  peace  with  Spain  and  give  needed  time  for 
further  consideration  of  the  disputed  points.  It  would 
also  insure  "the  increase  of  the  relative  power  of  the 
United  States,  for  which  time  alone  is  wanted."" 
Madison  here  mentioned  the  factor  that  was  ultimately 
to  determine  the  ownership  of  the  desired  territory. 
It  was  likewise  the  factor  that  most  greatly  aroused 
Spanish  concern. 

The  change  in  Napoleon's  policy  put  still  farther 

43  (Talleyrand)  to  Turreau,  July  31,  1806,  Archives  des 
Affaires  fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  59,  233-236. 

**  Madison  to  Bowdoin  and  Armstrong,  May  26,  1806,  In- 
structions, MS.,  VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 
18 


258    AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

asunder  those  who  were  joined  in  the  trying  negotia- 
tion. Neither  Armstrong  nor  Bowdoin  could  at  first 
explain  Izquierdo's  failure  to  pursue  the  task  already 
initiated.  Bowdoin  was  inclined  to  think  that  Godoy 
had  appointed  his  agent,  a  "  Spaniard  of  no  great  con- 
sideration," an  "  artful  and  intriguing  man  "  like  him- 
self, and  then  had  refused  to  give  him  the  necessary 
powers  to  treat.  By  this  means  the  Spaniard  would 
avoid  unacceptable  action.  The  Americans  believed,  as 
was  natural,  that  the  course  of  both  principal  and 
agent  was  determined  by  Talleyrand  himself,  or  by 
the  stock-jobbers  who  hoped  to  profit  by  the  transac- 
tion. In  this  number  Bowdoin  was  ready  to  class  his 
colleague,  Armstrong,  who  was  inclined  to  excuse 
Izquierdo  and  intimated  that  perhaps  the  Spanish 
agent's  instructions  required  some  amendment.  Arm- 
strong intimated  that  Bowdoin  must  restrain  his  im- 
patience or  they  would  lose  the  initial  advantage.*^ 

At  this  juncture  Talleyrand's  agent,  Dautremont, 
paid  Skipwith  another  visit.  He  assured  the  Amer- 
ican that  the  recent  capture  of  Buenos  Ay  res  by  the 
British  rendered  a  settlement  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States  more  imperative  than  ever.  Contrary 
to  report  Dautremont  insisted  that  Izquierdo  was  em- 
powered to  treat  with  the  Americans,  subject  to 
French  control.  All  depended  on  Talleyrand.  Skip- 
with ought  to  know  how  important  it  was  "  to  smooth 

^5  Bowdoin  to  Monroe,  Aug.  16,  i8o6,  Lenox  MSS. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    259 

the  way  by  reconciling  public  measures  to  the  interests 
of  influential  individuals." 

In  view  of  the  X.  Y.  Z.  episode,  this  "  reconciling  " 
must  take  some  other  form  than  a  direct  bribe  if  the 
"  influential  individuals  "  were  "  to  procure  the  salu- 
tary purposes  intended."  In  the  course  of  their  inter- 
view Skipwith  learned  that  this  was  to  take  the  form 
of  a  land  grant  to  Talleyrand's  favorite  brother.  The 
family  name  was  not  to  appear  in  the  transaction. 
Izquierdo  could  sign  the  necessary  papers  and  Dautre- 
mont  and  Skipwith  receive  a  share  in  the  profits. 
Skipwith  refused  to  entertain  the  proposal  and  Bow- 
doin  commended  him  for  his  straightforwardness. 
Policy  as  well  as  common  honesty  should  lead  them  to 
reject  every  suggestion  of  the  sort,  which  could  only 
delay  the  desired  acquisition  and  defer  permanent 
peace.*® 

Bowdoin,  however,  was  anxious  to  settle  the  issues 
with  Spain  before  England  should  make  peace  with 
France,  and  urged  Monroe  to  use  his  efforts  to  that 
end.  When  the  early  days  of  September  arrived  with- 
out further  move,  he  feared  that  France  and  Spain 
were  delaying  the  settlement  until  a  general  peace 
should  occur.  He  reminded  Armstrong  that  the 
American  people  expected  some  effective  action  and 
that  right  soon.  Disturbances  on  the  Louisiana  fron- 
tier betokened  early  hostilities.     Congress  was  to  as- 

*^  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  309. 


260   AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

semble  in  early  session  to  learn  the  news  from  Paris. 
He  suggested  another  and  more  vigorous  representa- 
tion to  one  or  both  of  the  recalcitrant  governments. 

Bowdoin  made  this  suggestion  to  Armstrong  by  let- 
ter, following  the  custom  he  now  pursued.  On  the 
next  day  Armstrong  replied  that  he  only  expected  the 
French  government  "to  rescue  the  negotiation  from 
the  torpor"  in  which  it  lay.  If  Talleyrand  should  not 
do  this  the  Americans  could  not  induce  Izquierdo  to 
negotiate,  and  still  less  to  agree  to  what  they  wished. 
Bowdoin  ought  not  to  regard  France  as  the  leading 
party  to  the  negotiation ;  that  attitude  smacked  of  the 
"  heterodoxy  of  Mr.  J.  Randolph."  Such  prospects  as 
they  had  for  the  negotiation  were  due  to  Napoleon. 
In  view  of  the  way  he  was  being  criticized  in  both 
hemispheres  he  might  well  decline  to  go  further. 
Armstrong  felt  that  this  "  would  be  a  matter  for  regret 
but  not  for  blame."*^  If  the  negotiation  succeeded 
people  would  say  that  he  was  bought  with  American 
gold ;  if  it  failed,  that  he  kept  Spain  from  acting  so  as 
to  assume  the  principal  part  himself. 

Possibly  Armstrong  desired  to  excuse  their  prospec- 
tive failure  by  what  he  termed  irrational  public  criti- 
cism. Bowdoin  thought  they  ought  to  ignore  what 
was  said  across  the  Atlantic.     France  had  more  than 

*^  Bowdoin  to  Armstrong,  Sept.  8,  1806,  Armstrong  to  Bow- 
doin, Sept.  9,  1806,  Spanish  Dispatches,  MS.,  IX,  Bureau  of 
Indexes  and  Archives ;  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  328. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    26 1 

a  passing  interest  in  the  relations  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States.  If  she  were  involved  in  a  war  with 
the  latter  along  with  Spain,  she  would  lose  her  West 
India  colonies  and  the  remnant  of  her  commerce  under 
the  American  flag.  Commercial  reasons  would  lead 
Great  Britain  to  take  the  side  of  the  United  States  and 
continue  the  war  with  France  to  the  bitter  end.  The 
reiterated  hope  of  British  cooperation  suggests  the  eve 
of  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  but  the  United  States  was  far 
from  being  as  well  represented  abroad  as  on  that 
occasion. 

On  the  evening  of  September  9,  when  he  penned  the 
above  letter  Bowdoin  received  assurance  from  Erving, 
based  on  a  statement  of  Vandeul,  that  neither  Izquierdo 
nor  Masserano  had  been  empowered  to  treat  with  Arm- 
strong and  himself,  and  that  Godoy  did  not  intend  to 
send  such  powers.  This  misinformation  completely- 
changed  his  estimate  of  the  emperor's  action.  "The 
saddle  should  rest  on  the  right  back,"  he  wrote,  and  by 
this  he  meant  on  Parker  and  the  money  jobbers  whose 
intrigues  with  Armstrong,  he  felt,  had  done  the  mis- 
chief. He  advised  Erving  to  continue  his  relations 
with  Vandeul  so  as  to  obtain  further  information  of 
conditions  at  Paris.  He  was  inclined  to  believe  with 
Erving  that  Napoleon  would  act  even  if  the  Spanish 
government  would  not.**  Armstrong  doubted  the  re- 
liability of  Erving's  information,  and  suggested  that 

^s  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  325. 


262   AMERICAN   BICKERING   AND   FRENCH    BARGAINING 

it  would  be  more  in  keeping  with  Bowdoin's  "  preach- 
ing" and  his  own  "practice"  to  furnish  him  with  a 
copy  of  Erving's  letter,  so  that  he  could  judge  for 
himself.** 

Bowdoin  wished  his  colleague  to  join  him  in  a  note 
to  Talleyrand  that  would  show  that  they  knew  of  his 
agency  in  holding  up  the  negotiation.^"  At  the  same 
time  they  should  jointly  ask  Cevallos,  through  Erving, 
if  Spain  was  going  to  consider  the  American  propo- 
sitions. Armstrong,  possibly  with  undue  caution,  re- 
fused to  entertain  either  suggestion.  He  and  Bowdoin 
were  not  sure  enough  of  their  ground  to  make  such  a 
representation  to  the  French  government,  while  direct 
communication  with  the  Spanish  government  would 
violate  their  instructions.^^  One  might  suggest  that 
on  a  preceding  occasion  American  commissioners,  spe- 
cifically committed  to  French  guidance,  had  broken 
their  instructions  and  had  gained  decidedly  thereby. 
But  such  was  not  likely  to  be  the  case  in  the  latter 
part  of  1806. 

At  one  time  Bowdoin  contemplated  carrying  out 
his  plan  alone,  but  he  did  not  have  the  courage  to 

^9  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  329. 

5°  Armstrong  had  contemplated  a  note  to  Talleyrand,  com- 
pelling him  to  explain  the  failure  to  act  under  the  instructions 
to  Izquierdo,  but  Talleyrand  and  Duroc  dissuaded  him. 
Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  386.  He  does  not 
seem  to  have  confided  this  to  Bowdoin. 

51  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  330-336. 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    263 

follow  Jay's  bold  example.  He  wrote  Monroe  that 
France  and  Spain  were  playing  the  same  game  that 
had  proved  so  effective  in  1805,  but  the  instructions  to 
himself  and  Armstrong  did  not  permit  them  to  force 
Spain  to  negotiate.^^  That  power  feared  some  con- 
cession if  she  did,  and  steadfastly  refused  to  initiate 
the  necessary  parleys,  and  the  French  government 
made  no  effort  to  compel  her  to  adopt  a  contrary 
course.  He  told  his  doubting  colleague  that  if  the 
United  States  could  settle  its  disputes  with  Great 
Britain  and  join  a  league  of  the  northern  European 
powers  against  Napoleon,  the  league  would  speedily 
bring  the  evasive  Talleyrand  to  terms. ^^  In  a  letter 
to  Erving  he  pointed  out  what  he  considered  the  whole 
difficulty.  Within  five  days  after  Skipwith  arrived  in 
Paris  with  the  new  instructions,  in  the  preceding  May, 
Parker  told  him  that  they  "  were  not  relished  and 
would  not  go  down."  All  subsequent  French  efforts 
in  behalf  of  the  negotiation  were  mere  pretexts. 
Armstrong's  course  was  thoroughly  contemptible. 
The  whole  situation  was  the  legacy  of  "  that  old  villain 
from  New  York  [Livingston]  ."^^ 

Shut  off  from  direct  approach  to  the  French  foreign 
office,  but  continually  subjected  to  the  importunities  of 
its  corrupt  agents,  Bowdoin  naturally  attributed  to 
the  latter  an  undue  importance.     He  could  not  know 

^2  Bowdoin  to  Monroe,  Oct.  i,  1806,  Lenox  MSS. 

^3  Cf.  note  51. 

s*  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  340;  see  note,  p.  7Z- 


264   AMERICAN    BICKERING   AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING 

that  they  represented  the  weakest  side  of  Talleyrand's 
work,  and  realized  only  dimly  that  the  arch  plotter 
himself  was  then  passing  from  power.  Talleyrand 
preferred  a  more  direct  attitude  toward  the  United 
States.  He  had  no  desire  to  pose  as  Spain's  champion 
or  as  an  exemplar  of  directness,  but  he  despised  both 
contestants  and  believed  he  could  be  ruthless  in  deal- 
ing with  them.  He  may  also  have  wished  some  fur- 
ther hoard  to  tide  over  the  lean  years  before  him, 
and  sought  this  in  the  present  negotiations.  But  Na- 
poleon overruled  his  schemes  for  petty  plunder  as  he 
did  his  more  far-reaching  commercial  measures  by 
depriving  him  of  all  direct  agency  in  the  negotiation. 
Armstrong  suspected  the  emperor's  agency,  but  he 
could  not  definitely  interpret  it.  When  on  September  25 
Napoleon  left  Paris  to  wage  war  against  Prussia  and 
took  the  unwilling  Talleyrand  with  him,  Armstrong 
recognized  that  there  was  no  immediate  prospect  of 
negotiation,  and  sought  a  vacation  in  southern  France. 
Before  leaving  he  thanked  the  absent  emperor,  or 
rather  Talleyrand,  for  his  specious  interest  in  the  nego- 
tiation, as  shown  in  the  note  of  June  4.  He  also  told 
his  doubting  associate  that  Izquierdo  had  really  been 
empowered  to  treat  with  them,  but  that  his  powers 
had  been  immediately  revoked,  and  instead  he  had 
been  instructed  to  initiate  parleys  for  a  treaty  between 
Spain  and  France  and  Great  Britain.  If  Bowdoin 
thought  that  they  should  send  the  French  government 


AMERICAN    BICKERING    AND    FRENCH    BARGAINING    265 

a  vigorous  note  on  the  anomalous  situation,  he  sug- 
gested that  Bowdoin  should  employ  the  "  greater  leis- 
ure "  in  prospect  in  composing  an  appropriate  draft.^^ 
Armstrong's  sarcasm  did  nothing  to  soften  Bow- 
doin's  asperity  or  to  convince  him  of  the  truth  of  his 
statement.  He  felt  that  he  had  "thoroughly  sifted" 
his  colleague's  course,  and  wrote  of  him  to  Erving: 
"His  conduct  sufficiently  speaks  for  itself."  Iz- 
quierdo  without  power  to  treat  had  gone  to  Holland. 
France  was  indifferent  and  Spain  obstinate,  while  both 
powers  disparaged  the  friendship  of  the  United  States 
and  despised  its  hostility.  Left  behind  in  the  deceitful 
atmosphere  of  Paris  jobbery,  commended  to  no  person 
of  influence,  subject  to  expenses  more  than  double 
his  salary,  it  is  little  wonder  that  Bowdoin  found  his 
diplomatic  career  anything  but  pleasant.  He  could 
only  pour  out  his  woes  in  a  long  personal  letter  to 
Jefferson  in  which  he  castigated  with  equal  fervor  the 
machinations  of  the  stock-jobbers,  the  dilatory  atti- 
tude of  Spain,  and  the  duplicity  of  Talleyrand.  If  the 
United  States  attempted  to  come  to  terms  with  France 
and  Spain  it  might  be  disappointed  in  the  cardinal 
points  of  the  negotiation.  He  therefore  advised  the 
president  to  fortify  the  western  country  and  be  pre- 
pared for  any  eventuality.^® 

^5  Armstrong  to  Talleyrand,  Oct.  15,  1806,  same  to  Bowdoin, 
Oct.  18,  1806,  Spanish  Dispatches,  MS.,  IX,  Bureau  of  Indexes 
and  Archives ;  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  343. 

^^  Bowdoin  to  Jefferson,  Oct.  20,  1806,  Bowdoin  and  Temple 
Papers,  II,  343. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Shadow  of  the  Corsican 

The  latter  part  of  1806  marked  a  critical  stage  in 
American  diplomacy.  Territorial  disputes  with  Spain 
were  still  unsettled.  Great  Britain  multiplied  her  com- 
mercial exactions  and  her  grudging  concession  to  the 
joint  efforts  of  Monroe  and  William  Pinkney  was 
so  unacceptable  that  Jefferson  would  not  even  sub- 
mit the  treaty  to  the  Senate.  Napoleon,  victorious  at 
Jena  and  Auerstadt,  was  determined  that  there  should 
be  no  more  neutrals,  and  in  December  issued  from 
Berlin  the  decree  that  intensified  the  isolation  of  the 
United  States.  Spain  became  restive  under  French 
domination,  and  in  October  Godoy  ventured  to  call 
the  nation  to  arms  and  to  take  tentative  steps  toward  a 
British  alliance.  For  the  time  being  Napoleon  ignored 
this  rash  move  of  the  upstart  puppet,  but  the  latter 
knew  that  he  was  marked  for  subsequent  vengeance. 

Bowdoin  noted  Godoy's  restlessness,  and  this  led 
him,  on  October  30,  1806,  to  enquire  of  Erving 
whether,  "  in  a  certain  event,  Spain  would  settle  their 
disputes."  This  event — the  possible  defeat  of  Na- 
poleon— was  now  the  task  of  the  Muskovite  rather 
than  the  Hohenzollern,  but  Godoy  quickly  relapsed 

266 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN  267 

into  his  former  subserviency  and  lost  his  chance  for 
independent  action.  Had  he  persisted  he  might  have 
been  led  into  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain.  Bowdoin 
perceived  this,  and  advised  the  immediate  seizure  of 
the  Floridas,  should  such  an  alliance  be  formed.  This 
would  be  merely  a  precautionary  measure,  and  a  pre- 
text to  justify  it  could  be  found  in  the  recent  Spanish 
incursion  along  the  Sabine.  Later  the  report  that 
Casa  Yrujo  was  empowered  to  treat  at  Washington — 
a  report  that  proved  to  be  without  foundation — seemed 
to  render  further  negotiation  at  Paris  useless.^ 

Napoleon's  action  at  this  juncture,  had  Bowdoin  but 
known  it,  was  in  keeping  with  this  conclusion.  In  No- 
vember, 1806,  he  sent  Eugene  de  Beauharnais  as  am- 
bassador to  Spain.  Talleyrand,  who  was  now  display- 
ing, in  token  of  speedy  official  demise,  his  new  title,  Duke 
of  Benevento,  wrote  his  instructions.  He  was  to  pre- 
vent the  quarrel  between  Spain  and  the  United  States 
from  becoming  sharper,  but  not  to  assume  the  role  of 
formal  intermediary.  "  The  affairs  of  France  are  to- 
day in  Europe,"  the  ennobled  secretary  warned  him, 
"those  of  America  are  of  secondary  order."^ 

A  confidential  memoir  of  the  same  month  informed 
Talleyrand  that  if  the  United  States  were  forced  into 
the  European  war,  it  would  probably  ally  itself  with 

1  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  349,  351,  353. 

2  Talleyrand  to  Beauharnais,  Nov.  9,  1806,  Archives  des 
Affaires  fitrangeres,  fispagne,  MS.,  Vol.  670,  413. 


268  THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN 

England.  Federalist  attacks  upon  the  purchase  and 
exploration  of  Louisiana  had  compelled  Jefferson  to 
emphasize  the  importance  of  the  Floridas.  At  the 
same  time  Spain  preferred  to  check  his  aspirations  by 
stimulating  internal  disturbances  in  the  United  States, 
rather  than  by  calling  in  the  aid  of  France.^  Beau- 
harnais  found  that  Erving  was  keeping  up  a  continual 
complaint  against  Spain's  failure  to  settle  the  dispute 
and  was  threatening  to  leave.  This  threat  suggested  a 
possible  alliance  with  Great  Britain  and  the  promotion 
of  revolt  in  the  Spanish  colonies.  Eugene  curtly  advised 
him  to  adopt  mo're  friendly  relations  with  Cevallos.* 
Across  the  Atlantic,  Turreau,  the  French  minister, 
watched  the  situation  closely  for  the  first  signs  of  an 
alliance  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
He  was  also  instructed  to  maintain  a  good  understand- 
ing between  the  latter  and  Spain,  without  taking  a  direct 
part  in  the  negotiation.  He  found  his  influence  wan- 
ing because  of  illicit  commerce  between  Spain  and 
Great  Britain.  In  order  to  deal  effectively  with  this 
and  the  general  diplomatic  tangle  he  advised  his  gov- 
ernment to  secure  Cuba.  France  needed  it  anyhow  if 
she  expected  to  build  up  a  colonial  empire  in  the  West 
Indies.  When  it  was  once  in  her  possession  she  could 
ward  off  any  danger  that  threatened  from  the  United 

3  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol. 
59,  310. 

^  Beauharnois  to  Talleyrand,  Apr.  23,  1807,  Archives  des 
Affaires  £trangeres,  £spagne.  Vol.  671,  264. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  269 

States.  This  fact  ought  to  reconcile  Spanish  pride  to 
ceding  it.  By  giving  up  one  colony  it  might  save  all 
from  a  common  danger  that  threatened  them.^ 

The  hopeless  situation  in  which  Bowdoin  was  placed 
led  him  to  criticise  the  executive  as  well  as  his  col- 
league. He  was  dissatisfied  with  the  peaceful  tone  of 
Jefferson's  last  message.  Furthermore  he  believed 
that  the  president  had  acted  with  insufficient  energy 
against  Burr  and  Miranda.  Even  Merry  reported 
that  the  latter's  expedition  was  a  stumbling-block  to 
the  furtherance  of  the  negotiation.^  Toward  his  col- 
league Bowdoin  grew  more  bitter.  Armstrong  had 
returned  post-haste  to  Paris  when  he  learned  of  the 
Berlin  Decree,  but,  as  his  colleague  expressed  it,  he 
thought  more  of  "  a  salve  for  past  folly  "  than  of  the 
public  good.  At  any  rate  Bowdoin  feared  that  he  still 
cherished  the  purpose  to  put  through  some  sort  of  land 
deal  with  Izquierdo,  Parker,  and  their  abettors.  Bow- 
doin also  warned  Erving  to  see  that  Godoy  and  his 
confederates  did  not  grant  away  all  the  desirable  land 
in  Texas  and  the  Floridas,  in  case  they  abandoned 
hope  of  keeping  them.'^     Jefferson,  who  was  greatly 

5  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  Apr.  10,  May  20,  1807,  Archives 
des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  60,  77-82, 
111-123. 

«  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  366,  376;  Merry  to  Fox, 
Nov.  2,  1806,  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5, 
Vol.  49. 

''  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  354-356,  367,  370. 


270  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

concerned  over  the  lack  of  harmony  between  his  agents 
in  Paris,  had  for  a  time  planned  to  send  William  Short 
to  act  as  arbiter  between  them.  Such  an  appointment 
would  simply  have  added  to  the  strife  already  existing 
there.^ 

In  the  early  part  of  1807  Armstrong  schemed  to  get 
an  invitation  to  Warsaw,  where  Talleyrand  was  tem- 
porarily located.  But  he  failed  in  his  attempt  to  get 
away  from  his  unwelcome  colleague.  Armstrong  had 
criticised  the  course  of  Spain  in  appointing  Izquierdo 
to  treat  with  them  and  then  v/ithdrawing  his  powers. 
At  the  same  time  he  indicated  a  complete  surrender 
to  the  French  point  of  view  by  stating  that  the  western 
boundary  of  Louisiana  was  now  virtually  the  only 
point  at  issue  between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 
The  emperor  had  expressed  his  opinion  so  thoroughly 
in  regard  to  the  eastern  boundary  that  he  hoped  he 
would  now  favor  them  with  his  opinion  on  the  western 
limit.®  Armstrong  was  undoubtedly  anxious  to  reach 
Warsaw  before  Napoleon  made  his  treaty  with  the 
czar.  But  Talleyrand  was  too  busy  with  the  prelim- 
inary parleys  at  Tilsit  to  consider  such  minor  matters 
as  American  territorial  claims,  even  after  Armstrong's 
abject  submission. 

Madison   promptly    protested   against   Armstrong's 

8  Jefferson  to  William  Short,  June  12,  1807,  Ford,  Jefferson, 
IX,  69. 

3  Armstrong  to  Talleyrand,  Feb.  5,  Mar.  5,  1807,  Archives 
des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  60,  33-35,  69. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  27I 

deference  to  the  emperor.  The  Americans  were  will- 
ing to  welcome  Napoleon's  intervention  "  to  promote 
justice  and  peace,"  but  they  made  a  distinction  between 
his  personal  opinion  and  his  authority  as  umpire.  To 
the  latter  they  were  absolutely  opposed.^''  Yet  Casa 
Yrujo  wrote  that  a  majority  of  the  American  people 
did  not  support  the  territorial  pretensions  of  the  ad- 
ministration. The  latter  asserted  them  simply  to  gain 
an  advantage  in  diplomatic  bargaining.  If  Spain  pro- 
tested with  moderation  the  United  States  would  have 
to  give  them  up.^^  This  statement  upon  the  alleged 
authority  of  an  important  member  of  Congress  was 
not  calculated  to  clear  the  atmosphere  at  Paris  or 
Madrid. 

Nor  did  personal  missives  from  Jefferson  and  his 
advisers  tend  to  improve  matters.  "We  ask  but  one 
month,"  wrote  the  former,  exasperated  at  what  he 
termed  Spanish  "perfidy  and  injustice,"  ".  .  .  to  be 
in  possession  of  the  city  of  Mexico."^-  Conditions  on 
the  Mobile,  according  to  Madison,  were  "  kindling  a 
flame  which  was  not  easily  manageable. "^^  The  Amer- 
ican people,  wrote  Secretary  Dearborn,  would  show 

10  Madison  to  Armstrong,  Oct.  18,  1807,  Instructions,  MS., 
VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

11  Casa  Yrujo  to  Cevallos,  Apr.  10,  1807,  Legajo  5548,  Es- 
tado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 

^-  Jefferson  to  Bowdoin,  Apr.  2,  1807,  Bowdoin  and  Temple 
Papers,  II,  2)7^- 

^3  Madison  to  Armstrong,  May  22,  1807,  Instructions,  MS., 
VI,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


272 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN 


little  reluctance  to  a  "brush"  with  Spain.  "We 
could  in  a  very  short  time,"  he  added,  "  dispossess  His 
Catholic  Majesty  of  all  his  possessions  north  of  .  .  . 
the  Isthmus  of  Darien.  We  do  not  covet  their  terri- 
tories or  their  mines,  but  they  are  certainly  in  our 
power,  as  much  so  as  the  British  provinces  of  Canada, 
Nova  Scotia,  and  New  Brunswick  are."^*  In  the 
course  of  the  next  few  years  Dearborn  himself  was  to 
demonstrate  the  inanity  of  this  boast  at  the  head  of  a 
division  of  the  American  army.  Now  he  could  only 
bemoan  the  fact  that  Napoleon  had  so  many  more  im- 
portant things  to  consider  that  he  could  not  decide 
what  Spain  should  do.  On  the  contrary  Napoleon 
had  already  determined  that  precise  thing.  Obviously 
his  views  did  not  correspond  to  the  American's  hopes, 
as  Armstrong  was  to  discover. 

Undeterred  by  previous  rebuffs,  Armstrong  on  June 
1 6  sent  to  Talleyrand  certain  "hypotheses"  as  a  basis 
for  ending  the  protracted  and  irritating  negotiation. 
Spain  might  now  be  willing  to  part  with  her  territory 
east  of  the  Mississippi,  or  she  might  part  with  the  ter- 
ritory between  the  Mississippi  and  the  St.  Mark  (Ap- 
palachicola),  or  with  all  the  territory  east  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. Upon  the  first  of  these  hypotheses,  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  the  Bravo  were  to  be  taken  as  the  limits  of 
Louisiana  following  Napoleon's  opinion  and  the  decla- 
im Dearborn  to  Bowdoin,  Apr.  24,  1807,  Bowdoin  and  Tem- 
ple Papers,  II,  376. 


THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN  273 

ration  of  Laussat.  On  the  second,  the  United  States 
would  yield  the  territory  between  the  Colorado  and 
the  Bravo  for  that  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  St. 
Mark.  On  the  third  hypothesis,  the  United  States 
would  pay  Spain  —  millions  of  dollars  and  take  the 
Sabine  as  the  western  boundary  of  Louisiana,  with  a 
line  drawn  from  its  source  to  include  the  drainage  area 
of  the  Mississippi ;  or  the  United  States  would  pay  a 
larger  sum  and  take  the  Colorado.  All  claims  against 
Spain  were  to  be  paid  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  1802  or  in  bills  drawn  on  the  Spanish 
colonies.^^ 

These  unsought  advances  from  Armstrong  must 
have  caused  Talleyrand  to  smile  even  in  the  midst  of 
the  busy  days  at  Tilsit.  On  July  6  he  replied,  excus- 
ing his  failure  to  answer  sooner  on  account  of  the  im- 
portant business  that  had  recently  engrossed  him,  and 
expressing  the  pleasure  that  His  Majesty  felt  in  seeing 
affairs  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  once  more 
in  process  of  settlement.  This  letter  was  hardly  what 
Armstrong  wanted,  although  it  was  all  that  he  might 
reasonably  expect.  A  week  later,  Talleyrand  wrote 
him  from  Koenigsburg,  announcing  peace  between 
France  and  Russia.  He  was  flattered  that  Armstrong 
had  reposed  such  confidence  in  his  government.  He 
was  pleased  that  all  discussions  in  regard  to  the  eastern 

"  Armstrong  to  Talleyrand,  June  12,   16,   1807,  ibid.,  385, 
387-389. 
19 


274 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 


limits  of  Louisiana  were  abandoned,  and  he  hoped  that 
there  would  be  no  wordy  discussion  in  regard  to  the 
western  limit,  where  few  people  were  concerned.  He 
believed  that  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to 
meet  at  Madrid  was  a  proof  of  this.  His  Majesty  ap- 
proved such  friendly  negotiation  and  would  frown 
upon  a  contrary  policy.  Early  in  August  Armstrong 
replied  that  Talleyrand  had  mistaken  his  meaning. 
No  negotiation  was  going  on,  nor  on  account  of  the 
hostile  attitude  of  Spain  was  there  likely  to  be  any 
negotiation.^^ 

This  communication  remained  unanswered,  but  it 
represented  the  most  advanced  point  in  the  negotiation 
since  the  Spanish  government  had  withdrawn  Izqui- 
erdo's  powers  a  year  before.  Champagny,  Talley- 
rand's successor,  continued  in  his  footsteps.  This 
was  only  natural,  for  Napoleon  had  definitely  deter- 
mined the  pathway  for  both.  The  negotiation  had 
now  reached  the  point  when  the  diplomatic  burden  was 
to  be  shifted  from  West  Florida  to  Texas,  as  Arm- 
strong had  indicated  in  his  latest  advances.  Yet  the 
uncertainty  that  still  marked  the  controversy  led  Na- 
poleon for  months  to  dangle  the  Floridas  before 
Jefferson's  eyes  whenever  he  wished  to  entice  him  to 
support  his  commercial  policy. 

Bowdoin  viewed  with  apprehension  the  treaty  be- 
tween Napoleon  and  the  czar.     The  failure  to  include 

"  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  389-393- 


THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN  275 

England  in  it  was  bound  to  have  some  influence  on 
the  dispute  with  Spain,  but  he  did  not  know  what.  In 
the  latter  part  of  the  summer  the  Chesapeake  outrage 
was  to  complicate  American  affairs  still  more.  In 
the  midst  of  the  excitement  aroused  by  this  the  presi- 
dent urged  Bowdoin  to  go  to  Madrid  unless  he  pre- 
ferred to  return  home.  Spain  had  recalled  Casa  Yrujo 
and  would  probably  appoint  another  minister.  Evi- 
dently the  president  regarded  prospective  hostilities 
with  England  as  an  inducement  for  Spain  to  make 
better  terms  with  him.  Madison's  instructions  of  that 
date  seemed  contrary  to  Jefferson's  advice.  He  told 
Bowdoin  and  Armstrong  that  the  Florida  negotiation 
should  be  suspended,  unless  any  payment  incurred  by 
it  could  be  postponed  until  after  the  expected  clash 
with  Great  Britain.  If  Bowdoin  did  go  to  Madrid,  he 
should  try  to  get  more  favorable  commercial  relations 
with  Cuba.^^ 

Bowdoin  had  already  notified  his  colleague  that  he 
would  leave  for  the  United  States  as  soon  as  the 
Spanish  business  was  settled.  In  order  to  hasten 
matters  he  wished  to  be  presented  to  the  emperor  after 
the  latter's  return  from  Tilsit,  and  asked  Armstrong 
to  procure  the  necessary  credentials.  This  request  led 
to  an  open  break  in  their  relations.  Armstrong  re- 
plied that  none  but  duly  accredited  ministers  could  be 
admitted    to    the    emperor's    receptions.       Bowdoin 

17  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  396-401,  403,  404- 


276  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

thought  that  his  peculiar  mission  entitled  him  as  a  rep- 
resentative of  the  United  States  to  some  recognition, 
and  intimated  that  Armstrong  had  not  properly  pre- 
sented his  case  or  obtained  for  him  an  early  interview 
with  Talleyrand.  Armstrong  retorted  that  he  had  only 
conformed  to  prevalent  usage,  and  twitted  Bowdoin 
with  attempting  to  secure  an  interview  with  Talley- 
rand without  his  knowledge,  when  he  first  came  to 
Paris.  The  result  had  been  most  mortifying  to  Bow- 
doin, and  he  evidently  did  not  relish  this  reference. 
As  little  was  he  pleased  with  Armstrong's  parting  in- 
junction to  find  some  other  person  upon  whom  to  dis- 
charge "the  irritations  of  ill  health  and  ill  humor,"  of 
which  his  associate  was  heartily  tired.  After  receiv- 
ing this  "  ill-judged,  unauthorized,  and  abusive  letter," 
Bowdoin  determined  to  trouble  the  other  no  more.^^ 

By  this  time  Armstrong  believed  that  France  would 
not  favor  the  United  States  in  the  negotiation,  and 
this  belief  probably  made  him  less  careful  of  his  col- 
league's personal  feelings.  French  preparations  on 
the  Spanish  border  now  betokened  a  design  to  in- 
vade the  Iberian  Peninsula.  Bowdoin  therefore  deter- 
mined to  accept  the  permission  of  the  administration 
to  retire,  but  did  not  leave  France  without  other  ill- 
judged  controversies  with  his  unacceptable  colleague, 
who,  he  believed,  had  imposed  on  the  president.  From 
Cherbourg  he  wrote  to  Erving  that  the  president  might 

18  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  401,  407,  409, 416-419,  421. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  277 

appoint  another  minister  to  pursue  the  deceptive 
schemes  marked  out  by  "Armstrong  and  his  motley 
coadjutors,"  but  if  so,  "  a  chapter  of  accidents  "  rather 
than  "  regular  and  progressive  negotiation "  would 
bring  success  to  the  United  States.  He  also  warned 
Erving  not  to  commit  the  "  unpardonable  sin  "  of  inti- 
macy with  Monroe,  or  to  give  his  confidence  too  freely 
to  Madison.^^  With  this  parting  advice  against  do- 
mestic intrigue,  Bowdoin  left  Europe,  an  intensely 
disappointed  man ;  but  he  was  neither  the  first  nor  the 
last  diplomatic  sacrifice  to  the  untenable  West  Florida 
claim. 

Champagny,  the  successor  to  Talleyrand,  met  Arm- 
strong's first  advances  in  a  friendly,  if  somewhat  in- 
definite, spirit.  This  led  the  administration  at  home  to 
anticipate  an  early  adjustment  of  the  vexatious  con- 
troversy. In  August,  1807,  Madison  suggested  that 
the  situation  on  the  Mobile  might  yet  lead  to  forcible 
measures,  if  not  satisfactorily  adjusted  before  the  next 
meeting  of  Congress.  In  bringing  this  implied  threat 
to  Champagny's  attention,  Armstrong  explained  it  as 
partially  due  to  the  prospective  rapprochement  between 
Spain  and  Great  Britain.  At  all  events  the  United 
States  must  be  ready  to  prevent  the  latter  power  from 
acquiring  the  Floridas.^** 

19  Bowdoin  and  Temple  Papers,  II,  406,  412,  426,  433,  443. 

20  Cf .  note  13 ;  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV, 
306. 


278  THE  SH.\DOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN 

Early  in  February,  1808,  the  emperor  was  ready  to 
take  final  measures  against  the  Bourbon  monarchy  in 
Spain.  He  then  intimated,  through  Champagny,  that 
the  Americans  had  his  permission  to  occupy  the 
Floridas,  provided  they  first  declared  war  against  Eng- 
land. If  they  openly  became  his  allies,  he  might  induce 
Spain  through  his  influence  to  consent  to  the  arrange- 
ment. His  evasive  promise  was  evidently  designed  to 
tempt  the  United  States  to  adopt  a  general  commercial 
poHcy  favorable  to  himself.  When  Armstrong  tried 
to  bring  out  this  purpose  more  clearly,  the  emperor 
retorted,  on  February  11,  by  scolding  the  American 
minister  for  his  country's  subserviency  to  Great 
Britain.  The  disgusted  Armstrong  then  advised  the 
administration  to  select  either  France  or  England  as  its 
chief  enemy,  but  to  seize  the  Floridas  at  once.^^  On 
May  2,  after  a  delay  that  was  more  than  seemly,  Madi- 
son's instructions  assumed  a  mildness  that  little  com- 
ported with  Armstrong's  advice.  The  United  States, 
he  said,  had  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  emperor 
would  approve  the  seizure  of  the  Floridas.  The  sec- 
retary advised  Armstrong  to  assure  the  emperor  that 
they  "  had  chosen  as  the  bases  for  their  policy  a  fair 
and  sincere  neutrality  among  the  contending  Powers," 
which  they  were  unwilling  to  abandon  "  for  the  pur- 
pose of  obtaining  a  separate  and  particular  object, 
however  interesting  to  them."     Yet  they  might  be  led 

21  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  293-295. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  279 

by  British  hostility  to  occupy  the  Floridas,  and  in  that 
case  were  pleased  to  know  "  that  the  measure  received 
His  Majesty's  approbation."-^ 

Possibly  the  failure  to  settle  commercial  and  other 
disputes  with  Great  Britain  accounted  for  the  com- 
plaisant attitude  of  the  administration.  But  Napoleon 
needed  something  more  than  special  missions,  with 
which  he  had  already  been  sufficiently  favored;  or  a 
general  embargo — for  that  measure  of  retaliation  was 
now  in  force — to  serve  his  immediate  purpose  in  the 
American  colonies  of  Spain.  When  at  Bayonne  late 
in  June  he  received  the  substance  of  Madison's  missive, 
he  determined  to  humiliate  the  minister  who  dared  to 
transmit  it,  even  if  he  could  not  directly  affront  the 
secretary  who  wrote  it.  He  directed  Champagny  to 
inform  Armstrong  that  the  latter  had  misunderstood 
his  previous  communication.  He  would  not  approve 
the  occupation  of  the  Floridas  by  the  United  States, 
even  in  case  of  British  attack,  unless  the  king  of  Spain, 
now  his  brother  Joseph,  permitted  or  requested  it.^^ 

An  unsigned  minute,  dated  at  Bayonne  on  June  30, 
was  in  keeping  with  this  declaration.  It  stated  that  His 
Majesty,  presumably  Joseph  Bonaparte,  proposed  to 
follow  the  system  of  "  good  understanding  and  strict 
friendship"  which  Spain  had  always  observed  toward 
the  United  States.     Yet,  as  if  to  leave  the  American 

2-  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  306. 
23  Ibid. ,311. 


280  THE  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN 

some  faint  hope,  he  promised  on  his  arrival  in  Madrid 
to  appoint  a  representative  to  confer  with  Armstrong 
upon  the  outstanding  disputes.^*  From  this  vague  and 
obviously  inspired  despatch,  possibly  an  indirect  result 
of  the  "  Dos  de  Mayo,"  the  impatient  Armstrong  de- 
rived no  comfort  and  advised  his  own  recall. 

Nor  did  Turreau,  across  the  Atlantic,  afford  the  ad- 
ministration any  greater  comfort.  Armed  with  in- 
structions similar  in  tone  to  the  message  of  Cham- 
pagny  to  Armstrong,  he  obtained  late  in  June  an  inter- 
view with  Madison.  He  was  unable  to  influence  the 
secretary  with  his  tantalizing  offer  of  the  Floridas. 
Nor  did  he  succeed  better  with  Jefferson,  who  met  him 
with  a  long  list  of  unfriendly  acts  committed  by  his 
government.  He  answered  the  president's  strictures 
on  the  Florida  imbroglio  by  saying  that  the  negotia- 
tion ought  to  fail.  The  laws  of  Spain  did  not  permit 
any  alienation  of  territory,  and  France  could  not  lend 
itself  to  an  attempt  to  plunder  an  ally.  The  United 
States  offered  no  adequate  compensation  for  the  de- 
sired cession.  If  England  attempted  to  occupy  it  and 
thus  threatened  Louisiana,  the  Americans  should  unite 
with  Spain  against  their  common  enemy  without  any 
regard  to  disputed  limits.^^  This  affectation  of  virtue 
seemed  to  silence  for  the  time  being  the  president's 
complaints. 

2*Legajo  5542,  Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 
25  Turreau  to  Champagny,  June  28,  1808,  Archives  des  Af- 
faires fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  61,  166. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  281 

Turreau  devoted  his  despatch,  a  few  days  later,  to 
the  reputed  views  of  Madison.  Like  Jefferson,  the 
heir  apparent  of  the  administration  seemed  determined 
to  secure  the  Floridas.  Such  a  purpose  filled  Turreau 
with  alarm.  "  The  cession  of  the  Floridas,"  he  wrote, 
"  soon  or  late  will  be  a  mortal  blow  to  the  Spanish  pos- 
sessions in  America.  It  will  remove  all  hope  of  a  new 
arrangement  with  the  generous  Louisianians  who 
scarcely  bear  the  American  yoke  and  who  wish  to  pre- 
serve their  attachment  for  France."  After  indicating 
the  common  interest  of  his  own  country  as  well  as 
Spain  in  this  territory,  he  went  on  to  say  that  if  France 
must  make  the  sacrifice,  she  should  first  force  Spain 
to  cede  the  territory  to  her  and  then  carry  on  the 
negotiation  with  the  United  States.  If  then  obliged 
to  abandon  the  Floridas,  France  should  employ  all 
possible  means  to  counteract  the  effect  of  this  act. 
The  cession  of  Cuba  to  France,  the  surrender  of  a 
portion  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Mississippi  to  Spain, 
the  free  navigation  of  that  stream,  special  commercial 
privileges  for  a  term  of  years,  a  large  money  indemnity 
with  the  renunciation  of  all  commercial  claims,  an 
American  alliance  against  England — these  were  some 
of  the  factors  that  might  be  used  to  counterbalance 
the  loss  of  the  Floridas.  In  any  case  the  Americans 
must  not  know  of  the  cession  of  Cuba  to  France  until 
the  Florida  question  was  settled. 

Turreau  advised  the  abandonment  of  the  Floridas 


282  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

because  he  was  sure  Great  Britain  had  already  offered 
to  conquer  and  cede  them  to  the  United  States.  The 
French  government  must  be  willing  to  make  a  similar 
cession,  or  at  least  be  willing  to  give  up  the  commercial 
duties  at  Mobile.  Jefferson's  harping  on  that  subject 
had  evidently  impressed  Turreau  and  caused  him  to 
reverse  his  previous  advice.  But  he  felt  that  Na- 
poleon must  do  something  to  keep  his  influence  over 
Madison  and  at  the  same  time  insure  the  latter's 
popularity  as  a  presidential  candidate.  The  French 
minister  was  dangerously  near  meddling  in  domestic 
politics,  but  his  predecessors  afforded  him  more  than 
one  precedent  for  his  course.^*' 

Of  a  contrary  tenor  were  a  series  of  contemporary 
memoirs  prepared  by  the  traveler  C.  C.  Robin.  He 
pointed  out  the  desirability  of  securing  the  Floridas 
for  France,  in  case  "  notable  changes  "  should  occur 
in  Spain.  The  French  might  occupy  that  region,  pos- 
sibly by  corrupting  Folch  and  his  fellow-officials,  and 
then  use  it  as  a  base  of  operations  against  the  United 
States  or  Spanish  America.  In  this  way  alone  could 
France  exert  proper  pressure  in  Louisiana  and  re- 
strain the  pretensions  of  the  Americans.^'^  The  sug- 
gestion reverts  to  the  French  policy  in  the  Mississippi 
Valley  during  the  previous  decade. 

The  Emperor  of  Western  Europe,  apparently  su- 

20  Turreau  to  Champagny,  July  3,  1808,  ibid. 
27  Archives   des   Affaires   fitrangeres,    Espagne,    MS.,   Vol. 
676,  198. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  283 

preme  in  his  chosen  field  of  action,  needed  neither 
memoir  nor  ministerial  note  to  determine  his  policy. 
His  former  ally,  Charles  IV,  having  abdicated  the 
regal  power  that  he  had  exercised  so  ill,  was  now 
his  abject  hostage.  The  miserable  Prince  of  the 
Asturias,  recently  proclaimed  Ferdinand  VII,  was 
likewise  a  pitiful  French  captive.  Spain  lay  helpless 
before  him.  In  the  distance  beckoned  a  still  more 
tempting  prize — her  American  colonies.  He  might 
insure  himself  a  free  hand  there  if  he  could  involve 
the  United  States  in  hostilities  with  Great  Britain. 
At  any  rate  he  desired  its  neutrality.  The  Floridas 
would  be  a  cheap  price  to  pay  for  either  contingency. 
For  many  years  Napoleon  had  used  the  coveted  terri- 
tory as  a  bait;  now  he  proposed  to  let  the  president 
swallow  it,  hook  and  all.  But  he  distinctly  warned 
him  to  behave  circumspectly  with  reference  to  the 
other  Spanish  colonies. 

Scarcely  five  years  had  passed  since  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte had  planned  to  establish  a  colonial  empire  in  the 
region  about  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  persistent  re- 
volt of  the  blacks  in  Santo  Domingo  had  then  defeated 
his  purpose.  Now  the  uprising  of  the  Spanish  people 
defeated  his  second  attempt  at  American  dominion  and 
led  to  consequences  which  even  he  could  not  foresee. 
In  retrospect  we  may  note  that  the  famous  "  Dos  de 
Mayo  "  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  Bourbon 
rule  in  the  New  World,  as  well  as  the  decline  of 


284  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

Napoleon's  power.  In  common  with  the  other  por- 
tions of  Spanish  America,  West  Florida  was  bound  to 
feel  its  influence  and  thereby  increase  the  concern 
of  its  northern  neighbors. 

To  Jefferson  the  rising  of  the  Spanish  people  seemed 
to  present  another  opportunity  to  gain  the  Floridas. 
The  revolt,  it  is  true,  did  not  greatly  arouse  his  sym- 
pathy. His  "  pursuit  of  Florida,"  to  quote  Henry 
Adams,  had  enmeshed  him  too  completely  for  that. 
He  rather  expected  England  to  make  up  with  the 
United  States,  while  Bonaparte  was  occupied  with 
Spain.  Then  without  committing  himself  to  either 
contestant,  he  expected  to  seize  the  territory  to  the 
Perdido  as  a  rightful  possession  and  "the  residue  of 
the  Floridas  "  in  lieu  of  his  commercial  claims  against 
Spain.  His  policy  was  wholly  selfish.  Moreover  the 
increase  in  the  army  that  Congress  had  just  author- 
ized would  give  him  the  means  to  carry  it  out.  He 
proposed  to  gather  the  new  recruits  and  armed  vessels 
at  strategic  points,  ready  to  act  as  soon  as  Congress 
should  give  its  consent.  There  was  already  a  suffi- 
ciently large  American  force  near  Baton  Rouge  to 
overcome  its  slender  garrison.  The  embargo  afforded 
him  the  necessary  pretext  for  stationing  other  troops 
on  the  St.  Mary's  and  the  Tombigbee  for  the  seizure 
of  Mobile,  Pensacola,  and  St.  Augustine.^^ 

28  Ford,  Jeflferson,  IX,  203 ;  cf.  my  article  on  "  The  Pan- 
American  Policy  of  Jefferson  and  Wilkinson,"  in  Quarterly 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley  Historical  Association,  I,  212-239. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  285 

Early  in  September  popular  sentiment,  according  to 
Gallatin,  seemed  generally  to  favor  the  Spanish 
patriots.^"  The  victories  of  the  latter  over  the  French 
rendered  Napoleon  less  formidable,  but  increased  the 
possibility  that  England  might  become  the  protector 
of  the  Spanish  colonies.  With  this  in  mind  the 
Cabinet  agreed,  at  its  meeting  on  October  22,  not  to 
interfere  with  these  colonies  if  they  wished  to  remain 
under  nominal  Spanish  control,  but  to  oppose  their 
incorporation  with  England.  Claiborne  was  author- 
ized to  express  this  sentiment  to  any  of  the  neighbor- 
ing colonial  officials,  while  assuring  them  of  warm 
friendliness.  "  We  consider  their  interests  and  ours 
the  same,"  the  president  added,  "and  that  the  object 
of  both  must  be  to  exclude  all  European  influence  from 
this  hemisphere."^" 

General  Wilkinson  supported  this  new  Pan-Ameri- 
can policy  with  enthusiasm.  On  August  25,  1808,  he 
warned  Folch  that  Spain  was  bound  to  succumb  to 
Bonaparte.  This  would  give  the  Spanish  colonies  an 
opportunity  to  declare  their  independence,  or  at  any 
rate  present  to  them  the  necessity  for  defending  them- 
selves, and  in  either  event  Folch  was  destined  to  play 
an  important  part.  He  later  warned  Folch  against  de- 
pendence upon  Great  Britain.     That  power  could  not 

29  Jefferson  Papers,  MS.,  Series  3,  Vol.  7,  No.  71,  Library 
of  Congress. 

30  Writings  of  Jefferson  (Memorial  edition),  XII,  186. 


286  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

save  them  or  the  mother-country  from  Napoleon, 
but  was  planning  ultimately  to  exploit  both.  "  My 
country,"  he  generously  wrote,  "must  undoubtedly 
sympathize  with  Spanish  America  and  if  called  on 
will  help  her."  But  he  added :  "  In  the  meantime  save 
your  province  from  any  European  power  and  let 
Someruelos  take  care  of  Cuba  which  may  slip  into 
the  hands  of  a  false  friend."^^ 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  new  spirit  of  friendliness 
for  the  Spanish  colonies  was  accompanied  by  a  re- 
newed fear  of  British  aggression  in  the  neighboring 
Floridas.  Wilkinson  emphasized  this  in  a  letter  to 
Jefferson.  Expressing  the  "liveliest  hopes"  in  the 
speedy  emancipation  of  Mexico  and  South  America, 
and  mentioning  the  desirability  and  necessity  of  an 
"  excision  of  our  transatlantic  connections,"  he  re- 
gretted the  credulity  with  which  the  "  feeble,  unin- 
formed Spaniards"  were  surrendering  themselves  to 
"the  interested  officious  interference  of  the  British." 
Agents  should  be  sent  to  warn  them  against  these 
"  insidious  encroachments "  and  to  assure  them  of 
American  sympathy.  He  offered  to  convey  such  a 
message  to  the  Marques  de  Someruelos,  whose  femi- 
ninity and  "  feeble  intellect "  might  otherwise  enable 

31  Wilkinson  to  Folch,  Aug.  25,  1808,  enclosure  in  Folch  to 
Someruelos,  reservado,  Jan.  26,  1809,  Legajo  1566,  Papeles  de 
Cuba.  The  same  material  is  in  Legajo  5559,  Estado,  A.  H.  N., 
Madrid. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  287 

the  British  to  "  cajole  or  frighten  him "  out  of  Cuba 
and  the  Floridas.^^ 

Possibly  Wilkinson  was  led  to  propose  this  "  season- 
able counteraction"  from  wholly  selfish  motives.  He 
told  his  patron  that  he  longed  for  "  some  interesting 
appointment "  that  would  enable  him  "  by  irref ragible 
evidence  to  strike  diunb "  his  annoying  "slanderers 
and  revilers."  Yet  he  continued  to  assure  Folch  that 
he  and  his  fellow-officials  might  count  on  the  assistance 
of  the  United  States.  When  reporting  his  proposed 
mission  to  Havana  and  Pensacola,  in  consequence  of 
his  orders  to  assemble  in  New  Orleans  "  as  large  a 
body  of  troops  as  possible,"  he  again  warned  Folch 
that  the  "  magnanimous  sons  of  the  Peninsula  "  would 
find  the  armies  of  Bonaparte,  backed  up  by  those  of 
Alexander,  irresistible.  The  only  hope  for  the  Spanish 
colonies  lay  in  their  union  and  subsequent  alliance  with 
the  United  States.  In  these  movements  Folch's  "  sur- 
passing talents  in  political  science"  should  receive 
adequate  recognition.^^ 

Wilkinson's  patronizing  air  nettled  Folch  no  less 
than  his  predictions  regarding  Spain.  The  proposed 
mission  to  Havana  and  Pensacola  caused  him  and  Som- 
eruelos  serious  misgivings.  Wilkinson's  statement  that 
he  was  to  assemble  seven  thousand  men  in  New  Or- 

32  Wilkinson  to  Jefferson,  Oct.  i,  1808,  Jefferson  Papers, 
MS.,  Series  2,  Vol.  85,  No.  109,  Library  of  Congress. 

33  Wilkinson  to  Folch,  Nov.  5,  1808,  Legajo  1566,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


288  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

leans  aroused  their  profound  alarm.  Although  the 
number  reported  by  the  newspapers  was  only  four 
thousand,  even  this  was  sufficiently  disquieting.  Pre- 
texts for  this  unexampled  increase  in  military  strength 
on  the  Mississippi  were  not  lacking.  The  embargo 
was  to  be  more  strictly  enforced ;  the  Burr  conspiracy 
was  reviving;  the  British  were  to  send  a  squadron 
from  Halifax  to  the  West  Indies,  obviously  to  occupy 
the  Floridas.  The  Spaniards  felt  that  these  news- 
paper rumors  were  designed  to  conceal  the  real  pur- 
pose of  their  unquiet  neighbors — to  seize  the  Floridas 
for  themselves. 

Folch  had  already  noted  increased  activity  among 
the  New  Orleans  militia.  Other  military  measures 
convinced  him  that  the  American  government  had 
sold  itself  to  France  in  return  for  a  promise  of  the 
Floridas  and  Canada.  The  presence  in  the  United 
States  of  French  agents,  who  were  later  to  visit  the 
Spanish  colonies,  and  the  rumor  that  Napoleon  was 
indifferent  to  the  fate  of  the  Floridas  or  to  the  inde- 
pendence of  Spanish  America,  tended  to  strengthen 
this  impression.^*  The  English  representative  even 
told  him  that  the  American  government  had  refused 
the  advances  of  a  revolutionary  party  in  Cuba,  because 
they  expected  to  gain  that  island  from  Bonaparte.^^ 

3*  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  26,  1809,  Legajo  1566,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 

35  Erskine  to  Canning,  May  4,  1809,  British  Foreign  Office, 
MS.,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  63. 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN  289 

Under  the  circumstances  loyal  Spaniards  every- 
where viewed  with  suspicion  the  new  protestations  of 
American  friendship.  Folch  and  his  advisers  particu- 
larly distrusted  their  former  pensioner.  Folch  wrote 
that  if  he  did  not  know  Wilkinson  so  thoroughly  he 
would  not  encourage  his  proposed  visit  to  Pensacola. 
As  it  was  he  might  gain  from  him  some  information 
that  would  prove  serviceable  in  this  crisis.  Somer- 
uelos  warned  Folch  to  be  very  circumspect  in  his  deal- 
ings with  "  No.  13,"  with  whom  in  less  critical  times 
"His  Majesty  had  some  relations. "^^  The  Council  of 
the  Regency  at  Seville  regarded  Wilkinson  with  suspi- 
cion because  of  his  recent  part  in  Pike's  expedition. 
His  ambition  might  lead  him  to  excite  insurrection  in 
the  Spanish  provinces.^'^  Foronda  at  Baltimore  and 
Vidal  at  New  Orleans  reinforced  these  suspicions,  and 
the  British  government,  upon  application  from  its  ally, 
instructed  its  new  representative,  Francis  James  Jack- 
son, to  make  the  necessary  protests  to  the  American 
government.^*  Wilkinson,  the  new  apostle  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  seemed  destined  to  attract  as  little  honor 
outside  his  country  as  within  its  borders. 

Nor  were  the  Spaniards  silent  in  regard  to  the  more 

3«  Someruelos  to  Folch,  Feb.  28,  1809,  Legajo  1566,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 

3TApodaca  to  Garay,  June  9,  1809,  Legajo  5559,  Estado,  A. 
H.  N.,  Madrid. 

38  Apodaca  to  Canning,  May  18,  1809,  MS.,  British  Foreign 
Office,  Spain,  Series  ^2,  Vol.  84. 
20 


290 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 


threatening  perils  that  his  mission  portended.  Ceval- 
los,  in  the  name  of  the  Regency,  told  Erving  that  any 
attempt  by  the  French  to  sell  the  Floridas  to  the 
United  States  would  be  absolutely  null  and  would  be 
insulting  to  his  nation,  Erving  assured  him  that  there 
was  nothing  of  the  sort  under  way,  and  as  proof  pre- 
sented a  newspaper  item  to  the  effect  that  the  appro- 
priation for  this  purpose  was  now  to  be  used  for  the 
Dutch  debt.^^  The  colonial  authorities,  including 
Folch,  were  warned,  in  case  of  hostilities,  to  avail 
themselves  of  all  possible  means  to  seize  Louisiana. 
Foronda,  encouraged  by  the  reports  of  the  recent 
Spanish  victories,  asked  Madison  to  explain  why  the 
administration  planned  to  concentrate  4000  men  in 
New  Orleans.  He  expected  only  an  "oracular  re- 
sponse "  from  the  secretary,  nor  was  he  disappointed. 
But  he  and  his  fellows  of  the  consular  service  thor- 
oughly warned  the  frontier  officials  against  Wilkinson. 
Foronda  also  mentioned  to  Someruelos  another  of  Jef- 
ferson's emissaries,  "  the  assumed  consul  Anderson." 
He  hoped  the  captain-general  would  refuse  to  receive 
them,  for  neither  had  a  passport  from  him.*° 

It  was  by  conduct  of  this  same  Anderson  that  Wil- 
kinson informed  Someruelos  that  he  was  coming  to 
confer  "  on  subjects  of  interest  to  our  respective  gov- 

39  Legajo  5549,  Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 
*o  Foronda  to  Captain-General  of  Cuba,  Jan.  6,  20,   1809, 
Legajo  1708,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN  29I 

ernments."  His  progress,  as  usual,  failed  to  keep 
pace  with  his  predictions.  He  embarked  from  Balti- 
more late  in  January,  1809.  Touching  at  Norfolk, 
he  was  there  tendered  a  public  dinner  at  which  he  gave 
the  toast,  "The  New  World,  governed  by  itself  and 
independent  of  the  Old."  This,  as  was  to  be  expected, 
aroused  the  sensibilities  of  both  Foronda  and  Turreau. 
Detained  by  bad  weather  at  Charleston,  he  did  not 
reach  Havana,  on  board  the  sloop  of  war  Hornet, 
until  March  23.  Here  he  found  in  progress  a  series  of 
riots  against  the  French.  So  great  was  popular  re- 
sentment against  all  foreigners  that  Wilkinson  secured 
but  one  interview  with  Someruelos.  On  this  occasion 
he  presented  the  latter  an  unsigned  note  which  the 
captain-general  answered  on  the  30th.  Three  days 
later  Wilkinson  continued  his  voyage  to  Pensacola.^^ 
The  brief  interview  and  the  note  constituted,  if  we 
may  trust  the  captain-general's  account,  his  sole  deal- 
ings with  Wilkinson.  We  may  attribute  the  contents 
of  the  missive  to  Jefferson  rather  than  the  general. 
It  began  by  expressing  sympathy  for  Spain  in  her 
struggle  for  independent  existence  and  regret  that 
the  police  regulations  necessary  to  enforce  the  em- 
bargo had  inconvenienced  "  innocent  neighbors." 
After  this  introduction  of  marked  friendliness  there 

^1  Wilkinson  to  Someruelos,  Feb.  22,  1809,  Someruelos  to 
Garibay,  Apr.  7,  1809,  Legajo  1708,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  also 
Le^jo  5543,  Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 


292 


THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN 


followed  the  statement  that  Wilkinson  was  to  rein- 
force New  Orleans  for  the  sole  purpose  of  protecting 
recognized  American  territory.  The  United  States 
neither  intended  nor  desired  to  usurp  any  region  occu- 
pied by  Spain.  For  the  present  it  would  not  even 
reopen  its  claim  to  West  Florida.  But  if  an  "  inimical 
power"  attempted  to  use  that  territory  in  attacking 
the  American  possessions  on  the  Mississippi  or  in  dis- 
embarking troops  in  East  Florida,  then  the  United 
States  would  "regard  itself  as  authorized  (without 
any  hostile  view  against  Spain  or  its  interests)  by 
well-known  principles  in  time  of  war,  and  by  natural 
law  and  the  law  of  Nations,  to  oppose  such  an  at- 
tempt by  all  possible  means ;  counteracting  the  designs 
of  its  enemies  by  such  movements  and  seizures  as  cir- 
cumstances should  dictate."  Such  was  the  message 
that  Wilkinson  was  charged  to  deliver  in  the  "true 
spirit  of  conciliation  and  good  will." 

Jefferson's  combined  condolence  and  threat  exerted 
little  effect  on  the  captain-general.  He  had  been  suf- 
ficiently schooled  to  meet  it  by  Folch  and  Foronda. 
He  informed  Wilkinson  that  his  missive  suggested 
momentous  diplomatic  questions  that  only  those  "  es- 
pecially appointed  for  the  purpose"  could  discuss. 
He  mentioned  the  ruin  that  threatened  most  European 
peoples  and  warned  against  trusting  the  unnamed  Cor- 
sican.  With  his  note  he  enclosed  a  proclamation  that 
he  had  lately  used  to  arouse  the  people  of  Cuba.    Thus 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  293 

he  foiled  Wilkinson's  attempt  either  to  seduce  or  to 
frighten  him.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  to  Mexico 
a  call  for  help  that  caused  the  officials  there  to  re- 
double their  defensive  efforts  and  to  adopt  at  their 
chief  seaports  a  more  intolerant  attitude  toward  for- 
eign commerce. 

Wilkinson's  widely  heralded  journey  gave  rise  to 
another  incident  in  the  perennial  Mobile  controversy. 
The  American  schooner  Victoria,  carrying  supplies 
for  the  Indian  factory  at  St.  Stephens,  was  detained 
at  Mobile  because  she  also  bore  a  quantity  of  powder 
and  lead  for  troops  at  Fort  Stoddert.  In  default  of 
a  higher  executive  officer,  the  factor,  George  T. 
Gaines,  asked  Judge  Toulmin  to  secure  the  release  of 
the  vessel  and  goods.  The  new  commandant  received 
Toulmin's  advances  with  courtesy,  and  permitted  the 
vessel  to  proceed  after  storing  the  powder  and  lead 
at  Mobile,  and  shortly  after  gave  the  same  permis- 
sion to  another  vessel  loaded  with  military  stores. 
Folch  released  even  this  ammunition  upon  receiving 
Toulmin's  assurance  that  "it  was  intended  for  the 
Indians."  He  avoided  arousing  the  resentment  of  the 
Indians  at  a  possible  failure  to  receive  their  supplies, 
and  gave  the  Americans  no  further  cause  for  such 
suspicious  movements  as  Wilkinson's  coming.^- 

The  general  did  not  find  Folch  at  Pensacola  when 
he  reached  there  early  in  April,  1809.     The  governor 

^2  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Feb.  25,  1809,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


294  "^H^  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN 

had  already  gone  to  Baton  Rouge,  the  anticipated 
scene  of  danger,  just  as  he  had  done  in  1804  and  1807. 
The  general  immediately  proceeded  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  wrote  the  new  secretary  of  war 
that  "the  awfully  critical  situation  of  Spanish  Amer- 
ica imperiously  enjoins  it  on  us  to  strengthen  this 
feeble,  remote,  and  exposed  quarter."  He  may  have 
felt  that  Great  Britain's  forces  in  the  West  Indies 
constituted  a  serious  menace,  for  he  ofifered  to  seize 
West  Florida  before  that  power  could  do  so.  Per- 
haps he  was  merely  expressing  his  resentment  at  the 
apparent  failure  of  his  mission;  or  in  view  of  that 
failure  was  trying  to  secure  himself  with  the  new  ad- 
ministration. He  did  suggest  that  such  a  seizure 
might  "affect  Cuba  and  Mexico  to  our  injury."^^ 
Certainly  neither  would  ally  itself  with  the  United 
States  after  such  a  forcible  act.  Great  Britain  might 
even  venture  to  forestall  further  hostilities  of  the  sort 
by  occupying  Cuba  herself. 

The  delays  that  hampered  Wilkinson's  progress  may 
have  caused  the  president  to  doubt  his  ultimate  success. 
At  any  rate  he  determined  to  let  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties know  how  benevolent  his  sentiments  were  toward 
them  as  he  quit  ofhce.  Possibly  he  could  at  the  same 
time  determine  the  policy  of  his  successor.  He  ac- 
cordingly furnished  Claiborne  with  instructions  similar 
to  those  borne  by  Wilkinson.     The   two   men  were 

*3  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  II,  344-349. 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  CORSICAN  295 

thus  associated  in  the  new^  propaganda,  but  the  younger 
was  not,  as  on  former  occasions,  left  largely  in  the 
dark  as  to  his  elder  colleague's  aims  and  purposes. 
In  fact  he  was  surprisingly  prepared  for  the  part  he 
was  to  play.  Before  receiving  the  president's  in- 
structions he  wrote  Secretary  Madison,  on  March  19, 
1809,  that  two  officers,  whom  he  regarded  as  spokes- 
men for  Folch,  had  told  him  that  they  thought  their 
country  must  shortly  yield  to  Bonaparte.  In  that  case 
the  Spanish  colonies  would  declare  their  independ- 
ence.** 

The  incident  may  represent  Folch's  method  of  test- 
ing the  earlier  cryptic  utterances  of  Wilkinson.  If  so, 
Claiborne's  first  reactions  were  not  illuminating.  Nor 
did  the  vice-consul,  Jose  Vidal,  succeed  better.  He 
noted  the  continuous  arrival  of  American  recruits  at 
New  Orleans.  He  knew  that  Wilkinson  was  on  his 
way  thither  and  that  he  purposed  to  call  on  Folch  and 
Someruelos.  But  it  was  impossible  to  learn  the  im- 
port of  these  movements.  He  could  only  surmise 
that  the  United  States  was  anxious  to  cultivate 
friendly  relations  with  the  Spanish  colonies,  in  order 
to  forestall  Great  Britain.  He  felt  that  the  Amer- 
ican officials  were  wholly  under  French  influence,  and 
that  in  this  way  they  hoped  to  acquire  the  Floridas 
and  make  sure  of  their  hold  on  Louisiana.     Other- 

**  Claiborne  to  Secretary  of  State,  Mar.  19,  1809  (Parker, 
7560). 


296  THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  CORSICAN 

wise  Great  Britain  might  enable  Spain  to  keep  the  one 
and  recover  the  other. 

Late  in  March,  in  keeping  with  JefFerson's  instruc- 
tions, Claiborne  called  on  Vidal  and  explained  the 
mystery.  The  United  States  desired  a  friendly  alliance 
with  the  Spanish  colonies.  Vidal  thanked  Claiborne 
for  his  friendly  overtures  and  promised  to  transmit 
his  message  to  the  Mexican  viceroy.  Although  not 
empowered  to  discuss  these  matters  officially,  he  ven- 
tured to  remind  the  other  that  the  Spanish  colonies 
would  never  forget  the  heroic  efforts  of  England  in 
behalf  of  the  mother-country.*^ 

Claiborne  fared  somewhat  better  with  Folch.  In 
April  the  New  Orleans  executive  was  at  Pointe  Coupee, 
opposite  Baton  Rouge.  Folch  was  then  at  the  latter 
place  and  immediately  invited  the  other  to  dine  with 
him.  The  American  is  our  only  authority  for  what 
took  place,  for  Folch  himself  evidently  did  not  report 
this  interview  to  Someruelos.  Yet  we  may  be  certain 
that  Claiborne  represents  the  Spaniard's  views  with 
reasonable  accuracy.  According  to  him,  Folch  thought 
that  Spain  still  had  a  chance  to  oppose  Bonaparte. 
In  any  event,  the  colonies,  especially  Cuba  and  Mex- 
ico, would  never  recognize  a  dynasty  that  he  sup- 
ported, but  upon  the  first  intimation  of  Spain's  fall 
would  proclaim  their  independence.     Folch  professed 

<5  Vidal  to  Garibay,  Apr.  10,  1809,  Marina,  1809-1814,  A.  G., 
Mexico. 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  CORSICAN  297 

to  believe  that  the  Floridas  must  inevitably  pass  into 
the  possession  of  the  United  States,  for  they  were  of 
value  only  to  that  power;  but  he  voiced  the  resent- 
ment of  the  Regency  over  the  report  that  Joseph 
Bonaparte  proposed  to  sell  them  to  the  United  States. 
Folch  assured  Claiborne  that  Spain  desired  to  culti- 
vate friendly  relations  with  the  United  States.  He 
also  referred  to  her  debt  of  gratitude  to  Great  Britain. 
Perhaps  this  was  his  way  of  intimating  that  the 
United  States  might  profit  more  from  the  friendship 
of  these  two  powers  than  from  its  former  subservience 
to  France.  Claiborne  stated  that  it  was  not  the  policy 
of  his  country  to  interfere  directly  in  European  af- 
fairs. Noting  how  interested  his  government  was  in 
Spain's  struggle  for  independence,  he  said  that  it  would 
acquiesce  in  her  continued  control  over  Cuba  and 
Mexico;  but  it  earnestly  desired  to  exclude  all  Euro- 
pean, and  particularly  British  and  French,  influence 
from  this  continent.  These  expressions,  accompanied 
by  appropriate  disavowals,  apparently  gave  Folch  all 
he  needed  to  know  of  Jefferson's  purpose  in  regard  to 
the  Spanish  colonies.*"  At  the  same  time  he  had 
aroused  American  expectations  in  regard  to  the  Flor- 
idas, and  to  these  in  some  degree  he  was  later  to  be 
a  vicarious  sacrifice.  In  this  respect  his  attempted 
finesse  overreached  itself,  but  for  the  time  being  he 
parried  unwelcome  overtures  from  his  neighbors. 

*6  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Apr.  21,  1809  (Parker,  7567). 


298  THE  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN 

Wilkinson's  long  delay  in  reaching  New  Orleans 
made  his  part  in  Jefferson's  plan  a  distinct  anticlimax. 
His  interviews  with  his  former  friends,  Vidal  and 
Folch,  were  as  fruitless  as  his  brief  visit  to  Havana. 
To  Vidal  he  reported  the  substance  of  his  communica- 
tion to  Someruelos,  which  did  not  differ  materially 
from  what  Claiborne  had  already  told  the  vice-consul 
about  the  views  of  the  American  government.  Vidal 
insisted  that  Spanish  America  would  follow  the  lead 
of  the  mother-country  and  maintain  friendship  with 
Great  Britain.  Wilkinson  seem.ed  ready  to  accept  that 
power  as  a  member  of  the  proposed  Pan-American 
alliance.  In  this  concession  Vidal  believed  that  Wil- 
kinson spoke  for  the  administration.*"  It  is  likely 
that  he  was  looking  out  for  his  personal  interests  as 
well.  The  Spanish  authorities  already  knew  that 
they  had  nothing  to  fear  from  Wilkinson's  undisci- 
plined levies  in  New  Orleans,  now  rapidly  being  deci- 
mated by  disease.  His  enemies  were  using  the  con- 
dition of  these  forces  to  renew  their  attacks  upon  him. 
He  must  therefore  employ  every  possible  means  to 
strengthen  his  tottering  influence.  To  the  adminis- 
tration he  proposed  a  comprehensive  plan  for  the  im- 
mediate occupation  of  West  Florida  and  the  defense 
of  New  Orleans.  Thus  he  would  recommend  himself 
to  his  superiors,  if  they  still  pursued  Jefferson's  de- 

^^  Enclosure  in  Vidal  to  Garibay,  Apr.  10,  1809,  Marina, 
1809-1814,  A.  G.,  Mexico. 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  CORSICAN  299 

vious  policy.*^  With  the  Spaniards  he  determined  to 
urge  the  feasibihty  of  combining  Anglo-American  and 
Spanish-American  influences.  By  means  of  some  ght- 
tering  generahties  of  this  sort  he  might  persuade  his 
friend  Folch  to  take  some  compromising  step.  Then, 
whatever  the  outcome  of  the  wider  plan  of  alliance, 
Folch  would  probably  have  to  deliver  the  Floridas  to 
the  United  States.  Such  a  consummation  would  en- 
able him  to  defy  his  most  persistent  foes. 

In  pursuit  of  his  plan,  therefore,  Wilkinson  held  his 
last  series  of  interviews  with  Folch  at  New  Orleans  in 
April  and  May,  1809.  He  has  given  us  two  accounts 
of  these,  but  we  may  accept  the  first  as  being  the  more 
likely.  It  has  the  merit  of  being  in  keeping  with  the 
contemporary  report  of  Claiborne,  and  is,  in  itself, 
significant  in  view  of  Folch's  later  relations  with  the 
American  government. 

According  to  the  American  general,  Folch  fully  ex- 
pected Bonaparte  to  subdue  Spain.  He  desired  to  ob- 
tain an  order  from  the  existing  national  Junta  for  the 
delivery  of  West  Florida  to  the  United  States,  and 
requested  Wilkinson  to  loan  him  a  swift  despatch  ves- 
sel to  send  to  Cadiz  for  that  purpose.  In  case  the 
Junta  should  already  have  succumbed  to  the  French, 
he  proposed  to  apply  to  the  viceroy  of  Mexico,  with 
whom  he  had  some  influence,  for  conditional  authority 

48  Wilkinson  to  Secretary  of  War,  Apr.  13,  1809,  Wilkinson, 
Memoirs,  II,  344-349. 


300 


THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN 


to  surrender  his  province  to  the  Americans.  Then 
after  a  short  pause,  he  added :  "  Now  I  will  open  my 
Heart  to  you — If  they  do  not  listen  to  me,  I  shall  con- 
sider myself  abandoned  by  me  [my]  Country,  and  will 
make  direct  application  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States — I  mentioned  to  Him  the  views  of  the  British 
to  Florida.  That  grows  out  of  the  corruption  of  their 
understanding.  What  do  they  want  it  for?  to  go  to 
War  with  you?  they  shant  have  it,  for  it  is  as  neces- 
sary to  the  United  States,  as  the  drawer  to  the  Case." 
After  cautioning  Madison  to  treat  this  information 
with  "entire  reserve,"  Wilkinson  hinted  that  the 
United  States  might  obtain  "prompt  possession"  of 
West  Florida  by  "  an  indemnity "  to  its  leading  offi- 
cials.*'' This  is  a  suggestion  more  in  keeping  with 
the  general's  character  than  with  Folch's.  The  lat- 
ter's  own  letters  express  thorough  loyalty  to  Ferdi- 
nand Vn.  His  subsequent  course  certainly  shows 
him  to  have  been  in  no  sense  a  champion  of  Spanish- 
American  independence.  Yet  it  is  probable  that  the 
reports  of  Wilkinson  and  Claiborne  about  his  wil- 
lingness to  deliver  West  Florida  may  have  some  foun- 
dation, for  later  he  actually  made  such  an  offer.  For 
this  reason,  when  the  offer  came,  it  aroused  extrava- 
gant hopes  on  the  part  of  the  administration.     On  the 

*^  J.  W.  to  Madison,  May  i,  1809,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ;  a 
variant  copy  is  in  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  38,  Bureau 
of  Indexes  and  Archives,  filed  under  the  year  1813.  Cf.  also 
Claiborne  to  Smith,  May  14,  1809  (Parker,  7567). 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  30I 

Other  hand  it  is  equally  probable  that  while  conferring 
with  them,  the  Spaniard  knowingly  conveyed  more 
than  his  real  views.  He  despised  Claiborne  and  dis- 
trusted Wilkinson,  and  may  have  thought  himself  jus- 
tified in  deceiving  them  and  the  government  they  rep- 
resented. From  it,  if  not  from  its  immediate  agents, 
he  apprehended  the  most  threatening  peril  to  his  do- 
minions, 

Folch's  letters  from  New  Orleans  seem  to  show  that 
Wilkinson's  mission  was  simply  to  reassure  him  upon 
this  point.  The  general  gave  him  a  statement,  simi- 
lar to  the  one  already  given  Someruelos,  which  ex- 
plained the  assembling  of  American  troops  at  New 
Orleans.  Folch  admitted  that  this  movement  had 
caused  him  some  anxiety,  appreciated  the  good  inten- 
tions of  the  United  States,  and  assured  Wilkinson  of 
his  own  friendliness.  When,  however,  he  returned 
to  Pensacola,  he  unbosomed  himself  to  his  superior. 
He  then  showed  that  he  regarded  Wilkinson's  elab- 
orate explanation  of  the  presence  of  troops  in  New 
Orleans  as  a  pretext  suggested  by  Jefiferson  to  con- 
ceal his  real  purpose — the  opening  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  the  Spanish  colonies.^" 

In  reporting  Folch's  course  to  his  superiors,  Som- 
eruelos criticized  him  for  venturing  to  discuss  such 

50  Wilkinson  to  Folch,  May  3,  1809,  Folch  to  Wilkinson, 
May  4,  1809,  Folch  to  Someruelos,  May  23,  1809  (Robertson, 
5 168-5 I 70). 


302 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN 


delicate  subjects  with  the  Americans.  He  had  advised 
him,  he  reported,  to  shun  this  course  in  the  future,  for 
the  Americans  simply  desired  to  draw  out  his  views 
in  order  to  turn  them  to  their  own  advantage.  He 
should  uniformly  reply  to  suggestions  of  independence 
and  alliance  that  Spaniards  would  die  to  preserve  the 
union  of  the  two  Americas  with  Spain. ^^  Notwith- 
standing his  firm  tone,  we  may  readily  believe  that  he 
foresaw  the  crisis  of  the  next  year  and  wished  to  avoid 
any  responsibility  for  it.  Folch  likewise  apprehended 
this  crisis,  and  may  have  aroused  the  hopes  of  the 
Americans  in  regard  to  his  province  so  as  to  establish 
his  influence  with  them  in  case  of  dire  need.  When 
the  crisis  actually  came,  more  than  a  year  later,  he  was 
able  to  invoke  the  aid  of  American  officials  to  save 
Mobile  from  filibusters  and  at  the  same  time  escape 
the  peril  of  disloyalty.  Folch  did  not  spend  twenty 
years  on  the  Florida  frontier  in  vain. 

Wilkinson  had  failed  as  a  diplomat,  but  he  might 
still  retrieve  his  reputation  as  a  general.  On  May  12, 
while  Folch  was  still  in  the  city,  and  while  his  own 
force  was  daily  falling  into  greater  disorganization, 
he  sent  to  the  secretary  of  war  an  elaborate  plan  for 
the  defense  of  that  area.  West  Florida  constituted 
the  danger  point  and  he  recommended  its  capture.  A 
week  later,  after  the  Spanish  governor  had  departed, 

'^^  Someruelos  to  G.  F.  O.,  Oct.  8,  1809,  Legajo  157,  Papeles 
dc  Cuba. 


THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN  303 

but  before  he  had  reached  Pensacola,  Wilkinson  re- 
ported that  a  threatened  "  commotion  "  in  that  city  was 
likely  to  overwhelm  Folch,  either  "by  the  usurpation 
of  the  Spanish  subjects  or  by  the  enterprise  of  the 
American  settlers."  The  Spaniard  might  call  upon 
him  for  assistance,  and  he  wished  instructions  to  cover 
the  case  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. ^^  In  reply 
the  secretary  of  war  wrote  him,  July  22,  1809:  "It  is 
the  continued  wish  and  instruction  of  the  President 
that  no  interference  of  any  kind  in  the  affairs  and  ter- 
ritories of  Spain  should  take  place,  or  be  encouraged, 
or  permitted,  by  any  person  or  persons,  whether  civil 
or  military  belonging  to  or  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States."^^  Some  weeks  later  public  outcry, 
caused  by  the  ravages  of  disease  among  Wilkinson's 
green  levies,  and  his  own  manifest  incapacity  forced 
the  administration  to  order  him  before  a  court-martial. 
Thus  ended  in  utter  fiasco  an  effort  that  may  be  termed 
the  first  Pan-American  mission. 

The  dictum  of  the  administration  concerning  in- 
terference in  the  Spanish  colonies,  including  West 
Florida,  seemed  final.  To  account  for  it  we  must 
review  the  course  of  events  in  Washington  since  Jef- 
ferson had  provided  for  Wilkinson's  mission.  The 
president  did  not  wholly  rest  his  hopes  of  the  Floridas 
on  a  Pan-American  alliance,  as  was  shown  in  his  letter 

"^2  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  II,  351. 
53  Ibid.,  357. 


304  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

to  Monroe,  January  28,  1809.  He  believed,  though 
unwilHngly,  that  Napoleon  Bonaparte  would  subdue 
Spain.  France  and  England  might  then  relax  their 
exactions  on  neutral  commerce,  in  order  to  monopolize 
the  Spanish  colonies.  At  any  rate  Napoleon  planned 
to  do  so  and  might  try  to  secure  the  neutrality  of  the 
United  States  by  repealing  his  decrees  and  offering 
the  Floridas.^*  He  thus  implied  that  he  was  willing 
to  profit  by  the  Napoleonic  intervention,  even  while 
urging  the  Spanish  colonial  authorities  to  unite  with 
him  in  excluding  it  and  British  influence  from  this  con- 
tinent. But  a  few  weeks  later  he  wrote  Dupont  de 
Nemours:  "All  these  concerns  I  am  now  leaving  to 
be  settled  by  my  friend,  Mr.  Madison."^^ 

That  was  precisely  what  Jefferson  could  not  do. 
He  could  not  forbear  meddling  with  a  negotiation 
that  had  so  thoroughly  engrossed  him.  On  April  10, 
1809,  he  wrote  his  successor:  "I  suppose  the  conquest 
of  Spain  will  soon  force  a  delicate  question  on  you 
as  to  the  Floridas  and  Cuba,  which  will  offer  them- 
selves to  you.  Napoleon  will  certainly  give  his  con- 
sent without  difficulty  to  our  receiving  the  Floridas, 
and  with  some  difficulty  possibly  Cuba."  Eight  days 
later  he  added:  "Napoleon  ought  to  conciliate  our 
good  will  because  we  can  be  an  obstacle  to  the  new 
career  opening  to  him  in  the  Spanish  colonies."     The 

f**  Writings  of  Jeflferson  (Memorial  Edition),  XII,  240. 
^^  Ibid.,  259. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  305 

Floridas  alone  would  not  be  a  sufficient  reward  for 
American  neutrality.  The  United  States  would  ac- 
quire them  anyhow  at  the  first  outbreak  of  war  and 
until  then  did  not  need  them.  Napoleon  must  also  let 
the  United  States  acquire  Cuba,  if  he  wished  a  free 
hand  in  Mexico  and  the  remaining  colonies.  In  case 
Napoleon  continued  his  commercial  exactions,  as  Jef- 
ferson wrote  W.  C.  Nicholas,  the  people  of  Cuba  and 
the  Floridas  might  proffer  themselves  to  the  United 
States.^®  The  situation  had  greatly  changed  since  the 
preceding  autumn.  Then  neither  France  nor  Great 
Britain  showed  any  disposition  to  compose  her  differ- 
ences with  the  United  States.  Now  Madison  thought 
that  the  former  was  inclined  to  be  more  conciliatory. 
If,  then.  Napoleon  should  attempt  to  keep  the  United 
States  from  trading  with  the  Spanish  colonies,  as  he 
had  formerly  done  with  Santo  Domingo,  and  should 
couple  this  requisition  with  an  offer  to  cede  the 
Floridas,  it  "  would  present  a  dilemma  not  very  pleas- 
ant."^'^  Evidently  Madison  was  less  ambitious  than 
Jefferson,  or  possibly  more  scrupulous.  At  any  rate 
Turreau  did  not  keep  him  waiting  long  for  a 
"  dilemma." 

The  French  minister  was  incensed  at  the  repeal  of 
the  embargo.  Without  an  accompanying  declaration 
of  war  against  England,  he  regarded  this  proceeding 

^^  Writings  of  Jefferson  (Memorial  Edition),  XII,  273,277. 
"  Hunt,  Madison,  VIII,  53. 
21 


306  THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN 

as  a  pro-British  measure.  The  operation  of  the  Non- 
Intercourse  Act  strengthened  his  conviction,  and  he 
prepared  for  a  diplomatic  rupture.  He  threatened 
such  a  break  by  withdrawing  from  Washington,  with- 
out paying  his  respects  to  the  new  president.  From 
Bakimore,  on  April  15,  he  directed  an  informal  note 
to  Robert  Smith,  the  new  secretary  of  state,  asking 
him  to  explain  some  current  rumors  affecting  Na- 
poleon's other  pet  hobby — the  Spanish  colonies.  The 
French  minister  professed  to  believe  that  these  reports 
were  circulated  by  those  who  wished  to  sever  the 
harmony  existing  between  his  nation  and  the  United 
States,  yet  he  had  reported  them  to  his  court  and 
awaited  with  interest  an  explicit  answer  from  the 
American  authorities.^* 

Turreau  had  already  charged  the  new  administra- 
tion with  a  desire  to  gain  the  Floridas,  just  as  the 
preceding  one  had  gained  Louisiana.^^  Now  he  told 
Champagny  in  his  dispatch  of  April  22  that  the  con- 
centration of  American  troops  in  New  Orleans  under 
Wilkinson  was  part  of  a  scheme  to  cooperate  with  a 
party  in  the  Floridas  favoring  independence.  He 
credited  the  American  authorities  with  inciting  secret 
assemblies  there  and  in  Cuba  similar  to  those  that 
Miranda  had  attempted  to  organize  at  Caracas.     The 

58  Turreau  to  Smith,  Apr.  15,  1809,  Archives  des  Affaires 
fitrangeres,  Et'ats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  62,  123. 

58  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol. 
62,  13,  79,  81. 


THE   SHADOW   OF   THE   CORSICAN  307 

administration,  according  to  an  anonymous  note,  which 
he  attributed  to  a  clerk  in  the  State  Department,  was 
sending  revolutionary  agents  to  both  localities  and  also 
to  Mexico.  Wilkinson's  toast  at  Norfolk  and  his  visit 
to  Havana  were  in  keeping  with  this  policy.  The  only 
remedy  was  for  France  to  seize  Cuba  immediately. 
The  riots  against  the  French  on  that  island,  riots  that 
had  interfered  with  Wilkinson's  mission,  would  afford 
sufficient  pretext  for  that  action.  Having  forestalled 
the  Americans  there,  the  French  might  later  occupy 
the  Floridas  and  Mexico.®" 

Could  Madison  have  perused  this  dispatch,  he  would 
have  been  still  more  thoroughly  confirmed  in  his  belief 
that  Cuba  would  "be  a  cardinal  object  with  Napoleon." 
But  desiring  above  all  things  to  avoid  a  rupture  with 
France,  he  requested  Gallatin  to  visit  the  minister, 
on  his  way  northward,  and  explain  the  real  sentiments 
of  the  administration.  Evidently  Gallatin  believed 
that  the  president's  views  were  the  same  as  his  own ; 
otherwise,  it  will  be  difficult  to  reconcile  them,  as  re- 
ported by  Turreau,  with  Madison's  later  action. 

Gallatin  told  the  French  minister  that  the  admin- 
istration disclaimed  all  responsibility  for  Wilkinson's 
utterances.  They  were  to  be  attributed  to  "  the  vanity, 
the  indiscretion,  and  the  ordinary  inconsistencies  of 
that  General,"  whom  the  other  knew  as  well  as  they. 

60  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol. 
62,  121,  122. 


308  THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN 

If  Turreau  imagined  that  Mr.  Madison  desired  the 
Floridas,  he  was  mistaken.  That  was  Mr.  Jefferson's 
hobby,  but  did  not  represent  the  views  of  his  cabinet. 
The  Floridas  would  be  desirable  only  because  their 
possession  might  prevent  misunderstandings  with 
Spain  and  secure  an  outlet  for  the  southern  States. 
The  administration  was  in  no  way  responsible  for 
such  popular  meetings  as  had  taken  place  there.  As 
for  Cuba,  the  United  States  would  not  take  it  as  a 
gift.^i 

Gallatin's  assurances  evidently  failed  to  convince 
the  other.  In  reporting  them  he  called  the  attention 
of  his  superiors  to  the  fact  that  they  were  accom- 
panied by  no  favorable  action  in  regard  to  commercial 
policy.  At  the  same  time  Secretary  Smith  instructed 
Armstrong  at  Paris  to  say  that  while  the  general 
policy  of  the  United  States  was  to  preserve  neutrality 
toward  the  Spanish  colonies,  it  would  feel  free  to 
act  otherwise,  if  necessary  to  preserve  its  territorial 
claims.^^  When  the  Erskine  agreement  resulted  in  a 
fiasco,  Jefferson  wrote  Madison  that  if  Bonaparte  were 
wise  enough  to  change  his  attitude  toward  the  United 
States  he  must  inevitably  lead  it  to  declare  war  against 
England.  In  that  event  he  advised  the  immediate 
occupation  of  Baton  Rouge  in  order  to  forestall  the 

8^  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  V,  37,  38. 
"-  Smith  to  Armstrong,  May  i,  1809,  Instructions,  MS.,  VII, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


THE   SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN  309 

British.  Our  claim  to  this  territory  would  justify 
the  step.^^ 

Inconsistencies  thus  characterized  Jefferson  and  Mad- 
ison's commercial  policy  toward  Spanish  America  and 
even  toward  the  neighboring  West  Florida.  Jefferson 
was  ready  to  assist  a  revolt  in  the  Spanish  colonies 
should  Bonaparte  dominate  Spain.  For  this  he  ex- 
pected the  Floridas  as  his  reward ;  hence,  his  desire  to 
open  diplomatic  relations  with  them,  even  through  the 
untrustworthy  Wilkinson.  At  the  same  time,  if  Bona- 
parte should  pursue  a  more  favorable  commercial 
policy  toward  us,  he  might  purchase  our  neutrality  in 
respect  to  his  own  Spanish-American  plans  by  the 
bribe  of  the  same  Floridas  with  Cuba  included.  His 
own  cabinet  did  not  seem  to  approve  his  views,  but 
he  persisted  in  setting  them  on  foot,  and  even  exerted 
pressure  on  his  successor  to  continue  them.  On  as- 
suming office,  the  latter  was  led  by  Turreau's  protests 
to  repudiate  them.  To  this  change  in  policy  we  may 
attribute  the  instructions  that  bade  Wilkinson  refrain 
from  all  interference  in  the  neighboring  Spanish  prov- 
inces. 

Some  echoes  of  Wilkinson's  fruitless  mission  ap- 
peared in  the  correspondence  of  Francis  James  Jack- 
son, who  succeeded  the  unfortunate  Erskine.  He  was 
not  able  to  bring  about  the  recognition  of  Luis  de 
Onis,   the   recently  appointed  envoy  of  the   Spanish 

^3  Writings  of  Jefferson  (Memorial  Edition),  XII,  304. 


310  THE  SHADOW  OF  THE   CORSICAN 

Regency;  but  he  was  able  to  assure  the  British  min- 
istry that  neither  England  nor  Spain  need  feel  any 
concern  over  the  situation  in  New  Orleans.  The  raw 
troops,  who  were  being  decimated  by  disease,  were  a 
greater  danger  to  themselves  than  to  any  prospective 
enemy.  Their  incompetent  commander  was  about  to 
face  a  court-martial.  Secretary  Smith  had  assured  him 
that  any  changes  in  the  military  establishment  there 
were  only  intended  to  overawe  the  turbulent  popula- 
tion of  New  Orleans,  and  had  added :  "  I  have  no 
hesitation  in  declaring  to  you  without  reserve  that  we 
have  no  views  or  intentions  whatever,  that  can  or 
ought  to  give  the  slightest  umbrage  to  the  Spaniards."®* 
Perhaps  Smith  was  protesting  too  much,  as  he  did 
a  year  later  in  regard  to  West  Florida.®^  At  any 
rate  Jackson  felt  that  he  had  more  important  ques- 
tions to  settle  with  the  Americans  than  this  intermin- 
able Florida  controversy.  He  affected  greater  con- 
cern over  the  presence  on  the  threatened  frontier  of 
Major  Z.  M.  Pike,  Wilkinson's  protege,  who  had  re- 
cently returned  from  the  Interior  Provinces  of  Mexico, 
and  over  the  report  that  Humboldt  was  to  come  to 
America  as  Napoleon's  agent.  The  recent  influx  of 
French  refugees  from  Cuba,  too,  caused  both  the 
Spaniards  and  the  Americans  to  become  more  cau- 
tious in  their  dealings  with  each  other. 

^*  Jackson  to  Canning,  Oct.  i8,  1809,  British  Foreign  Office, 
MS.,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  64. 
^^  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  V,  313. 


THE   SHADOW   OF  THE   CORSICAN  3II 

About  the  same  time  a  would-be  agent  of  the  Corsi- 
can  was  earnestly  addressing  himself  to  the  French 
foreign  department.  Aaron  Burr  proposed  to  seize 
the  Bahamas  and  the  Floridas,  attract  to  his  standard 
friends  from  Georgia  and  the  western  States,  and  then 
resume  his  former  plan  to  conquer  Mexico.  The  one 
element  to  determine  the  success  was  possession  of  the 
Floridas,  even  if  this  should  involve  the  hostility  of  the 
United  States.  Napoleon  did  not  favor  his  project.®*' 
A  year  later  Burr  suggested  a  more  fantastic  scheme 
to  reconcile  France  and  England  and  with  their  joint 
forces  subdue  the  United  States  and  conquer  Mexico. 
Burr  himself  was  to  operate  in  the  South  where  he  had 
many  adherents.  This  plan  probably  represents  the 
final  despairing  efifort  of  the  political  adventurer.®^ 
Shortly  afterwards  he  returned  to  the  United  States, 
a  disappointed  man,  universally  shunned  by  his  former 
associates.  He  disappeared  as  an  important  political 
factor,  although  his  name  was  associated  with  nearly 
every  disturbance  in  the  Southwest  during  the  follow- 
ing decade. 

68  Roux  to  Cadore,  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  £tats 
Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  63,  39-42. 

87  Anonymous  letter  dated  Dec.  10,  181 1,  in  the  Madison 
Letters,  Lenox  MSS. 


CHAPTER   IX 

The  Movement  for  Self-Government  at  Baton 
Rouge 

From  the  Napoleonic  intervention  we  may  date  the 
series  of  revolts  that  ultimately  gave  each  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  a  republican  form  of  government. 
In  common  with  these  dependencies  West  Florida 
felt  this  revolutionary  impulse,  but  its  past  history, 
its  position,  and  its  population  had  already  determined 
its  ultimate  incorporation  with  the  American  Union. 
Napoleon's  action  gave  the  signal  for  initiating  the 
movement.  Jefferson  had  for  some  years  anticipated 
this  event,  and  as  we  have  just  seen,  undertook  new 
measures  to  hasten  it.  The  inhabitants  of  the  terri- 
tory itself  were  scarcely  less  backward;  but  it  was 
incumbent  upon  them  to  proceed  with  great  caution 
and  finesse. 

In  1807,  shortly  after  the  Burr  fiasco,  Claiborne  had 
reported  serious  discontent  among  his  people,  and  ex- 
pressed the  fear  that  the  prospective  insurgents  there 
might  appeal  to  Great  Britain  for  aid.^  In  June,  1808, 
a  certain  Major  John  Ellis  was  brought  to  task  for 
saying  that  Grand  Pre  was  incompetent,  the  govern- 

1  See  page  210. 

312 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  313 

ment  that  he  represented  extremely  weak,  and  the 
fort  at  Baton  Rouge  a  tempting  object  of  attack.  His 
remarks  were  discourteous,  even  profanely  so;  but 
the  authorities  could  not  prove  him  disloyal,  although 
they  tried  to  connect  him  with  those  evil  spirits  of  the 
frontier,  Reuben  Kemper  and  Aaron  Burr.- 

The  events  of  the  next  few  months  seemed  measur- 
ably to  confirm  EUis's  opinion  of  Grand  Pre.  In  July, 
1S08,  he  entertained  a  distinguished  visitor,  as  he  sup- 
posed "an  official  of  a  friendly  nation,"  General 
Octaviano  Davilmar.  He  was  one  of  those  agents 
whom  Xapoleon,  months  before  he  revealed  his  pur- 
pose in  regard  to  Spain,  was  sending  to  the  Spanish 
colonies.  Davilmar  had  already  had  a  varied  experi- 
ence in  Europe  and  the  West  Indies.  Reaching  Phila- 
delphia early  in  1808,  he  held  a  brief  conference  with 
]Moreau  after  the  latter  returned  from  the  South,  and 
then  started  for  the  same  region.  Both  Wilkinson 
and  Claiborne  informed  Vidal  of  his  approach, 
designating  him  as  "  General  Alvina."  Vidal  at  once 
informed  the  jMexican  viceroy,  and  later  wrote  that 
Davilmar  was  "  a  man  of  talent,  high  enterprise,  with 
no  morality ;  cruel,  and  with  his  apparent  and  assumed 
affability,  capable  of  insinuating  himself  into  the 
hearts  of  the  most  imperturbable  and  of  playing  upon 
the  ignorant  at  will."     Davilmar  evidently  used  these 

'  Baton  Rouge  Records,  MS.,  Count>-  Court  House,  Baton 
Rouge,  La. 


314  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

talents  with  success  upon  Grand  Pre.  That  official 
treated  him  most  hospitably,  and  even  furnished  him 
with  a  boat  for  his  journey  up  the  Red  River  toward 
the  Texas  frontier.  The  general  left  a  trunk  with 
his  host,  possibly  as  a  pledge  of  good  behavior,  and 
Grand  Pre  placed  this  in  a  public  storeroom,  without 
suspecting  it  or  its  owner.  Soon,  however,  came  the 
news  of  Napoleon's  designs  against  the  Spanish 
monarchy.  Then  followed  tidings  of  Davilmar's 
arrest  in  Texas.  More  serious  still,  Folch  had  re- 
ported the  Frenchman's  presence  at  Baton  Rouge  in 
such  a  way  as  to  implicate  his  unsuspecting  host.  Ac- 
cordingly Someruelos  instructed  Folch  to  order  Grand 
Pre  to  Havana,  where  he  wished  to  consult  him  upon 
"interesting  affairs."  This  order  was  the  first  com- 
munication that  Folch  had  sent  his  subordinate  for 
nearly  a  year.^ 

The  intervention  of  Napoleon  in  Spain,  the  Ameri- 
can embargo,  and  the  recall  of  Grand  Pre  appeared 
to  the  people  of  the  Baton  Rouge  district  as  distress- 
ing calamities,  but  of  the  three,  the  last  was  the  worst. 
To  his  mild  control  they  attributed  the  prosperity  of 
their  community.  As  one  of  their  addresses  stated: 
"  In  all  the  time  of  your  rule  you  have  exerted  your- 
self to  perceive  our  wants.     You  have  heard  our  peti- 

3  Vidal  to  Iturrigaray,  Apr.  7,  July  25,  1808,  same  to  Gari- 
bay,  May  2,  1809,  Marina,  1809-1814,  A.  G.,  Mexico;  Folch  to 
Someruelos,  Aug.  29,  1808,  Legajo  1565,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  315 

tions.  Every  individual  always  found  free  access  to 
you  and  you  never  refused  to  listen  to  the  general  voice 
or  to  individual  representations  which  were  for  the 
pubhc  good  or  to  remedy  some  evil."  To  give  point 
to  their  petitions  for  his  retention,  the  militia  organ- 
izations passed  resolutions  in  which  they  commended 
the  stand  of  their  "  brothers  and  fellow  citizens  in  the 
mother  country  "  and  offered  their  "  ardent  desires  and 
prayers  for  its  prosperity."  Precluded  by  distance 
from  taking  direct  part  in  its  defense,  they  promised 
in  their  own  locality  to  "  sustain  the  monarchy  or 
remain  buried  in  its  ruins."*  As  this  address  came 
from  Feliciana,  Grand  Pre  was  probably  led  to  dis- 
count its  language. 

In  another  address  protesting  against  the  embargo 
the  signers  asserted  that  it  was  their  "  constant  ambi- 
tion ...  to  keep  forever  the  designation  of  Span- 
iards." In  their  love  and  loyalty  to  the  Spanish  crown 
they  expressed  deepest  sympathy  for  their  fellow- 
citizens  who  were  struggling  so  gloriously  in  Spain. 
Such  an  opportunity  to  risk  life  and  fortune  for  their 
country  aroused  their  envy.  After  congratulating 
themselves  upon  the  peace  and  prosperity  they  had 
enjoyed  under  Grand  Pre,  they  suggested  that  if  in- 
trusted with  the  defense  of  their  personal  rights  they 

*  Address  of  thirty-five  residents  of  New  Feliciana  to 
Grand  Pre.  It  bears  date  of  May  27,  1808,  but  this  should 
obviously  be  later,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


3l6  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

would  be  quick  to  follow  "the  Glorious  example  of 
our  brothers  in  Spain."^  Even  the  fulsome  tone  of 
this  address  cannot  wholly  conceal  the  sinister  import 
of  their  suggestion  for  independent  action. 

This  suggestion  and  the  imminent  danger  of  recall 
gave  Grand  Pre  an  additional  motive  for  organizing 
his  militia  more  effectively.  The  people  needed  pro- 
tection from  the  "  roving  bands  of  murderous  Ameri- 
can highwaymen  "  that  continually  infested  the  country. 
Moreover  Napoleon's  course  made  it  necessary  to  take 
precautions  against  Frenchmen  wherever  found.  In 
Cuba  the  Spaniards  were  forcing  them  to  leave.  It 
would  be  exceedingly  dangerous  to  attempt  this  in 
West  Florida,  where  Folch  estimated  the  French  as 
comprising  two  fifths  of  the  population — double  the 
number  of  Spaniards.  Those  who  were  thus  ex- 
patriated would  unite  with  the  "  followers  of  Robes- 
pierre "  in  Louisiana  and  disturb  the  whole  region.^ 
Yet  they  were  being  continually  reinforced  by  refugees 
from  Cuba,  and  it  was  necessary  to  take  some  measures 
to  organize  his  jurisdiction  for  defense.  Accordingly 
in  October,  1808,  he  nominated  additional  militia 
officers  and  designated  the  following  April  as  the  time 
for  final  organization  and  a  general  review.  To  such 
members  as  were  then  assembled  he  delivered  a  vigor- 

5  Representation  to  Grand  Pre,  Oct.   19,   1808   (Robertson, 

S159). 

6  Folch  to  Someruelos,  reservado,  Aug.  25,  1808,  Legajo 
1565,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  317 

ous  patriotic  address  and  urged  them  to  cheer  the 
hearts  of  their  fellow-patriots  in  Spain  by  a  spirited 
defense  of  this  exposed  outpost.  Those  present  then 
took  an  oath  of  allegiance  and  loyalty  to  their  "  au- 
gust, legitimate,  and  well-beloved  king,"  Ferdinand 
VII.^  If  we  are  to  judge  from  their  later  acts,  most 
of  them  did  so  with  mental  reservations. 

Belated  pledges  of  loyalty  could  not  save  the  com- 
mandant who  had  incurred  Folch's  distrust  and  shown 
hospitality,  although  unwittingly,  to  a  French  adven- 
turer. Moreover  Davilmar  in  his  confessions  had  im- 
plicated Grand  Pre,  and  the  New  Orleans  papers  pub- 
lished the  charges.  He  must  take  steps  to  clear  his 
reputation.  So,  early  in  December,  1808,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  his  successor  and  several  of  his  former  subor- 
dinates, he  gathered  testimony  of  Davilmar's  move- 
ments and  opened  the  trunk  that  the  Frenchman  had 
left  in  his  keeping.  It  contained  nothing  more  danger- 
ous than  French  uniforms,  a  copy  of  Machiavelli,  a 
treatise  on  the  art  of  war,  and  some  comments  on  the 
same.  The  fateful  trunk  was  then  sealed  up  and  the 
superseded  commandant  prepared  to  accompany  it  to 
Havana.^ 

A  number  of  those  who  were  present  at  this  exami- 
nation determined  to  take  advantage  of  their  meeting 

■^  Discourse  of  Grand  Pre,  Nov.  15,  1808,  Legajo  185,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba. 

8  Report  of  Junta  at  Baton  Rouge,  Dec.  3,  1808,  Legajo  185, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


31  8  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

and  of  Grand  Pre's  necessity  to  advance  the  popular 
interests.  After  discussion,  one  of  the  group,  Thomas 
Lilley,  the  syndic  of  Springfield,  addressed  to'  Grand 
Pre  a  letter,  dated  December  4,  1808,  in  which  he 
mentioned  the  prevalent  unrest  and  suggested  that  he 
should  authorize  the  alcaldes  and  syndics  to  meet  at 
some  central  place  to  discuss  the  best  means  for  quiet- 
ing the  public  mind.  To  this  representation,  accom- 
panied by  others.  Grand  Pre  acceded.  It  was  neces- 
sary for  the  petitioners  to  hold  this  meeting  before 
Grand  Pre's  departure.  They  agreed  therefore  to 
assemble  on  the  following  Wednesday  morning  at 
Thompson's  Creek  in  the  Feliciana  district.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  regular  officials,  they  determined  to  invite 
some  of  the  leading  residents  who  were  most  in  touch 
with  popular  sentiment.  Despite  the  shortness  of  the 
intervening  time  they  were  fairly  successful  in  secur- 
ing a  good  attendance. 

When  they  met  at  the  agreed  time,  William  Harris 
was  first  nominated  as  presiding  officer,  but  he  de- 
clined in  favor  of  Thomas  Lilley,  who  seems  to  have 
been  the  prime  mover.  John  Murdock  became  secre- 
tary. After  stating  the  purpose  of  the  meeting  and 
reading  Lilley's  letter  to  the  commandant  and  the 
latter's  response,  the  members  engaged  in  a  frank, 
candid,  and  moderate  discussion.  As  a  result  of  this 
exchange  of  views,  they  unanimously  resolved  to  peti- 
tion   Captain-General    Someruelos   to    defer   the    de- 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  319 

parture  of  Grand  Pre  until  the  existing  crisis  was 
over.  They  appointed  a  committee  of  five  to  draw 
up  this  address  and  at  the  same  time  present  a  similar 
one  to  Grand  Pre.  Then  the  members  unanimously 
adopted  a  resolution  opposing  a  report  in  the  Orleans 
Gazette  that  Grand  Pre  and  the  people  of  West  Flor- 
ida were  accomplices  of  Davilmar.  They  sent  a  copy 
of  this  to  Claiborne  and  requested  him  to  apply  recent 
English  practice  to  those  guilty  of  such  libels. 

Their  petition  to  the  captain-general  mentioned  the 
circumstances  that  led  to  their  meeting  and  emphasized 
the  necessity  of  doing  everything  possible  to  tran- 
quilize  the  minds  of  the  people.  For  this  purpose 
they  wished  Grand  Pre  to  continue  in  his  position  until 
his  successor  gained  full  knowledge  of  their  needs  and 
character.  Though  Grand  Pre  had  assured  them  that 
the  new  official  was  even  better  qualified  than  he  for 
the  post,  yet  the  people  could  only  gain  full  confidence 
in  him  through  actual  experience.  They  assured  Som- 
eruelos  that  no  other  portion  of  the  king's  dominions 
contained  more  loyal  subjects  than  they. 

In  addition  to  this  petition  and  an  address  to  Grand 
Pre,  those  irrepressible  Anglo-Americans  displayed  a 
tendency  that  augured  the  speedy  end  of  the  Spanish 
regime  in  West  Florida.  A  number  present  expressed 
the  "desire  to  discuss  subjects  of  highest  import  to 
the  colony  " — an  unknown  and  unnecessary  procedure 
under  the  Spanish  government.     They   first   consid- 


320 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 


ered  the  embargo — a  serious  grievance  and  one  which 
they  regarded  as  contrary  to  their  treaty  rights.  They 
discussed  the  duties  which  they  paid  at  New  Orleans 
and  considered  the  estabhshment  of  similar  duties  in 
their  jurisdiction.  This  suggested  a  possible  revenue, 
and  they  proposed  to  use  such  sources  of  income  for 
the  benefit  of  Spain,  in  return  for  her  past  generosity. 
At  the  same  time,  they  wished  to  offer  their  worthy 
executive  a  good  salary  as  a  token  of  personal  esteem 
and  as  a  recognition  of  his  just  administration.  It 
was  a  critical  moment  when  those  assembled  thus 
proposed  to  assume  the  financial  administration  of 
the  province.  If  they  were  in  earnest,  the  step  meant 
the  recognition  of  the  principle  of  representative  gov- 
ernment ;  if  not,  it  was  a  step  toward  revolution  and 
Grand  Pre  was  to  be  bribed  to  favor  it.  In  either 
case  it  was  contrary  to  the  existing  system  of  control. 
Before  adjournment,  they  took  a  still  more  unprece- 
dented step.  Believing  that  every  person  in  the  juris- 
diction was  interested  in  the  common  good,  although 
not  able  to  meet  with  them  on  this  occasion,  they 
called  a  meeting  for  December  21.  To  this  meeting 
the  several  ofificers  were  instructed  to  invite  "those 
calculated  to  give  the  best  advice." 

In  their  address  to  Grand  Pre  these  self-constituted 
intermediaries  between  him  and  the  people  attempted 
to  justify  the  call  for  this  second  assemblage.  They 
needed  a  wider  expression  of  public  opinion  before 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  32 1 

they  could  take  any  definite  measures  to  calm  the  pre- 
vailing unrest.  For  this  purpose  they  had  requested 
the  militia  officers  and  other  respectable  citizens  to 
meet  with  them.  They  thanked  Grand  Pre  warmly 
for  permitting  the  first  meeting,  and  in  view  of  the 
general  uncertainty  in  administrative  affairs,  requested 
him  to  remain  until  they  heard  from  their  petition  to 
Someruelos.  At  any  rate  they  hoped  he  would  not 
leave  before  their  next  meeting.^ 

The  action  of  the  assembly  added  materially  to 
Grand  Pre's  embarrassment.  He  had  felt  obliged  to 
sanction  their  first  meeting,  for  a  refusal  might  have 
precipitated  worse  consequences.  But  the  whole  pro- 
cedure was  extra-legal  in  character,  and  speedily  be- 
came distinctly  illegal.  Yet  they  used  it  as  a  pre- 
cedent for  a  second  meeting  before  learning  whether 
Grand  Pre's  superiors  approved  of  the  first.  The 
captain-general  would  examine  closely  whatever  hap- 
pened on  the  eve  of  Grand  Pre's  departure.  He 
would  naturally  suspect  collusion  when  an  assemblage 
that  Grand  Pre  permitted  petitioned  for  his  retention. 
In  this  way  its  members,  whether  they  willed  it  or 
not,  were  proceeding  at  the  expense  of  the  executive 
for  whom  they  professed  so  much  admiration  and  re- 

9  Journal  of  Events  in  the  Assembly  of  Alcaldes  and  Syn- 
dics of  the  Colony  of  Baton  Rouge  in  West  Florida.  Address 
of  Assembly,  etc.,  to  Marques  de  Someruelos,  Dec.  9,  1808, 
Address  of  Assembly,  etc.,  to  His  Excellency  M.  de  Grand 
Pre,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


322  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

spect.  On  the  other  hand,  their  action  was  personally 
complimentary  to  Grand  Pre  and  all  their  acts  were 
apparently  dictated  by  candor  and  good  faith.  He 
must,  therefore,  express  his  disapprobation  of  the  sec- 
ond meeting  in  a  very  guarded  manner.  Accordingly, 
on  December  17,  he  wrote  Lilley,  who  acted  as  inter- 
mediary, that  the  existing  confusion  and  uncertainty 
greatly  distressed  him.  His  successor  would  certainly 
continue  to  advance  the  best  interests  of  the  colony. 
His  own  responsibility  to  his  superiors  and  especially 
to  Someruelos  made  it  his  duty  to  visit  Havana.  Yet 
he  proposed  to  delay  his  departure  for  a  few  days,  and 
he  charged  Lilley  to  make  this  known.  Two  days 
later  a  more  intimate  letter  made  Lilley  think  that 
Grand  Pre  did  not  approve  of  the  proposed  meeting. 
But  this  would  occur  on  the  morrow,  and  the  mem- 
bers were  probably  already  on  the  way.  By  approving 
their  report  in  his  letter  of  the  17th,  Grand  Pre  had 
tacitly  favored  a  second  meeting.  So  Lilley  and  two 
others  who  were  with  him  determined  to  proceed 
with  it. 

At  the  same  time  he  wrote  Lilley,  Grand  Pre  sent 
Thomas  Estevan  a  different  type  of  letter.  Estevan 
had  already  protested  against  any  steps  to  impede 
Grand  Pre's  departure.  Such  action  could  only  com- 
promise him.  The  sooner  he  departed,  the  sooner  he 
might  return.  Estevan  gained  many  adherents  to  this 
view.     In  consequence,  on  December  20,  he  wrote  to 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  323 

John  Murdock,  at  whose  house  the  meeting  of  the 
2ist  was  to  occur,  that  Grand  Pre  disapproved  of 
their  proceedings  and,  accordingly,  the  alcaldes  and 
syndics  ought  not  to  meet  again.  This  communica- 
tion reached  Murdock  early  on  the  appointed  day. 
While  the  members  then  assembled  felt  that  Estevan 
labored  under  some  misapprehension  in  regard  to  their 
objects,  they  were  unwilling  to  place  themselves  in 
opposition  to  the  constituted  authorities,  and  ad- 
journed without  further  action.^" 

George  Harris  of  Montesano,  who  translated  the 
official  proceedings,  personally  explained  the  motives 
of  those  who  promoted  the  two  meetings.  He  be- 
lieved that  Grand  Pre  had  not  acted  unwisely  in  per- 
mitting them,  and  the  conduct  of  the  members  showed 
that  they  merited  the  executive's  confidence.  He  de- 
plored the  mistaken  policy  of  Estevan,  who  dispersed 
the  brave  men  coming  from  a  distance  and  misinter- 
preted their  motives.  They  desired  to  make  a  contri- 
bution to  the  mother-country,  but,  much  to  their  mor- 
tification, were  regarded  as  disturbers  of  the  peace. 
One  must  not  judge  the  people  of  West  Florida  by 
the  neighbors  that  surrounded  them  and  flattered  the 
lowliest  elements  of  the  multitude  in  order  to  gain  its 
purpose.      He    forbore   to    dwell   on    this   point,    for 

i**  Journal  of  Events,  Nos.  16,  19,  21,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba.  Estevan  was  in  charge  of  a  small  guard  at  Bayou 
Sara. 


324  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

Grand  Pre  knew  better  than  he  that  "one  can  make 
of  these  people  (so  singularly  composed  of  diverse 
elements)  all  that  one  wishes  by  mildness,  but  that 
amid  the  singular  circumstances  in  which  we  are,  it 
will  throw  itself  into  the  arms  of  our  neighbors,  if 
one  affronts  it  and  above  all  when  it  is  opposed  in  its 
good  dispositions,  or  its  pretensions  of  a  reasonable 
nature."" 

With  this  as  his  bon  voyage,  Harris  closed  his  ac- 
count of  the  first  orderly  attempt  at  independent  ac- 
tion in  West  Florida.  Because  it  was  orderly  it  dif- 
fered from  the  earlier  projects  of  the  Kempers,  and 
for  this  reason  was  supported  by  the  better  elements 
of  the  population.  Although  undertaken  in  the  name 
of  Ferdinand  VII,  few  were  at  a  loss  to  detect  the 
trend  of  the  movement.  But  its  leaders  had  so  skill- 
fully combined  Grand  Pre's  interests  with  their  own 
desires  that  it  was  hard  to  separate  them,  or  to  lodge 
a  charge  of  disloyalty  against  any  one  individual.  It 
is  no  wonder,  then,  that  Turreau  and  Foronda  asso- 
ciated these  assemblies  with  Wilkinson's  mission  and 
that  the  American  administration  felt  compelled  to  dis- 
claim any  connection  whatever  with  them.^^ 

In  making  use  of  the  local  municipal  officers  to 
form  this  assembly,  its  leaders  were  reverting,  albeit 

11  George  Harris  to  Grand  Pre,  Dec.  27,   1808,  Journal  of 
Events,  No.  21,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 
1-  See  page  308. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  325 

unconsciously,  to  an  earlier  Spanish  practice.  In  the 
crisis  caused  by  Napoleon's  intervention  others  were 
employing  the  same  means  throughout  Spanish  Amer- 
ica, notably  in  Mexico.  Possibly  some  news  of  this 
reached  West  Florida,  and  suggested  similar  action. 
If  so,  the  experiment  was  to  benefit  Grand  Pre  as 
little  as  the  action  in  Mexico  did  Iturrigaray.  Both 
were  deprived  of  their  office  and  called  to  answer  for 
their  conduct,  but  there  were  fewer  forceful  mani- 
festations of  displeasure  in  the  case  of  the  minor  of- 
ficial. Yet  it  is  likely  that  the  perplexities  of  these 
months  materially  hastened  Grand  Pre's  death.  This 
occurred  in  Havana  shortly  after  he  reached  there  to 
give  an  account  of  his  troubled  stewardship.^^ 

Despite  the  failure  of  the  attempt  at  self-govern- 
ment, its  protagonists  did  not  abandon  similar  meas- 
ures under  Grand  Pre's  successor.  One  of  the  most 
significant  was  taken  as  a  result  of  the  American  em- 
bargo. After  a  petition  to  the  new  executive,  Carlos 
Dehault  de  Lassus,  a  committee  was  appointed  to  ex- 
amine Bayou  Manchac  and  the  Iberville,  in  order  to 
determine  if  the  channel  could  be  deepened  for  com- 
mercial purposes  or  if  a  road  could  be  constructed  along 
the  northern  bank  for  use  during  low  water.  Early  in 
January,  1809,  this  committee,  consisting  of  Samuel 
Fulton,  Philip  Hickey,  Joseph  Sharp,  and  John  Dav- 

13  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  28,  1809,  Legajo  1566,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


326  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

enport,  reported  that  the  project  was  feasible.  They 
even  believed  that  it  would  be  possible  to  consider  the 
often  suggested  plan  of  constructing  a  canal  to  join 
the  Mississippi  with  the  Iberville  and  the  Lakes.  In 
accordance  with  their  report,  the  alcaldes  and  syndics 
of  the  locality,  including  the  above  committee,  came 
together  some  two  weeks  later  in  an  assembly  presided 
over  by  De  Lassus  to  consider  means  to  facilitate  the 
project.  Their  proposal  was  in  keeping  with  the  pol- 
icy already  initiated  by  Grand  Pre  to  meet  the  situa- 
tion caused  by  the  blockade.  This  general  meeting 
determined  to  construct  a  road  along  the  bayou,  and 
appointed  the  same  four  as  a  committee  to  ascertain 
the  expense  and  supervise  the  work.  This  assump- 
tion of  the  money  power  for  a  measure  of  common 
action  marked  a  very  practical  step  toward  self-gov- 
ernment.^* 

We  have  already  noted  that  John  Adair  was  brought 
to  trial  as  an  accomplice  of  Burr.  Escaping,  like  the 
principal,  with  nothing  more  serious  than  Jefferson's 
enmity,  he  spent  the  next  two  years  on  the  Florida 
border,  pursuing  his  private  business.  Evidently  he 
felt  that  the  change  in  administration  gave  him  a 
chance  to  reinstate  himself  with  the  dominant  party, 
for  on  January  9,  1809,  he  took  occasion  to  inform 
Madison  of  existing  conditions  in  the  territories  of 

1*  Relation  to  De  Lassus,  Jan.  11,  1809,  Report  of  industrial 
council,  Jan.  25,  1809  (Robertson,  5161,  5162). 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  327 

Orleans  and  Mississippi  and  in  West  Florida.  Pos- 
sibly we  may  discount  his  report  of  foreign  and  Fed- 
eralistic  influences  in  the  two  territories,  the  opposi- 
tion aroused  there  by  the  embargo,  the  desire  for 
statehood,  and  other  causes  that  weakened  the  hold 
of  the  government  upon  all  but  an  inappreciable  ele- 
ment of  the  population. 

He  seems  to  speak  with  more  certainty  in  regard  to 
West  Florida.  He  had  sojourned  there  for  a  con- 
siderable period  despite  the  opposition  of  Wilkinson's 
creatures,  and  we  may  accept  his  conclusions  with 
some  confidence.  According  to  him,  five  sixths  of  the 
wealth  and  population  of  West  Florida  were  west  of 
the  Pearl  River.  Nine  tenths  of  the  people  there 
were  Americans.  All  except  a  very  few  persons  of 
former  Tory  persuasion  preferred  the  American  gov- 
ernment to  any  other.  These  few  individuals  of 
talent  and  wealth  gave  some  influence  to  the  British 
party.  The  French  and  Spanish  interests  were  not 
worth  naming.  The  three  or  four  hundred  men  com- 
prising the  garrison  at  Pensacola  were  veritable  sans 
culottes,  without  clothing,  rations,  money,  or  credit. 
Under  the  circumstances  the  people  of  West  Florida 
were  "  as  ripe  fruit  waiting  the  hand  that  dares  to 
pluck  them." 

British  agents,  Adair  stated,  were  making  some 
impression  by  offering  commercial  advantages  that 
proved   doubly   attractive   during   the    embargo,   and 


328  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

must  inevitably  draw  a  considerable  emigration  from 
the  Southern  States.  If  in  addition  the  British  should 
land  a  small  force  there  and  offer  commercial  privi- 
leges to  the  surrounding  American  territory,  it  would 
work  incalculable  harm,^^  Thus  he  and  Wilkinson 
alike  urged  the  fear  of  British  intervention.  But 
Madison's  hand  was  not  yet  nerved  to  pluck  the  fruit 
that  he  had  so  long  craved.  It  must  be  still  more  defi- 
nitely forced  upon  him.  The  population  of  the  Baton 
Rouge  jurisdiction,  as  Adair  suggested,  was  ready  to 
do  this.  By  the  early  part  of  1810,  Samuel  Fulton, 
one  of  their  number,  ventured  to  call  Madison's  at- 
tention to  the  situation.  He  wrote  that  Spain  would 
probably  yield  to  Bonaparte  and  that  this  would  neces- 
sitate some  changes  in  West  Florida.  If  the  Ameri- 
can government  desired  to  take  possession  of  the  terri- 
tory, he  might  be  able  to  render  it  effective  assistance, 
and  would  be  glad  to  do  so. 

Fulton's  ofifer,  which  may  be  regarded  as  typical, 
was  by  no  means  an  empty  one.  We  have  already 
noted  his  presence  among  the  earlier  adventurers  of 
the  Florida  border.  After  a  number  of  years  in 
French  service,  he  offered  himself  to  Madison  in  1803, 
on  the  strength  of  the  secretary's  previous  friendli- 
ness. .  As  Madison  could  not  then  use  him,  Fulton  be- 
came a  Spanish  citizen  at  Baton  Rouge.  As  adjutant- 
general  of  the  West  Florida  militia,  he  thoroughly  or- 
is Adair  to  Madison,  Jan.  g,  1809,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  329 

ganized  that  body  and  also  took  a  prominent  part  in 
public  affairs.  His  defection  would  seriously  embar- 
rass the  existing  regime.^*' 

A  letter  from  Governor  Holmes  of  Mississippi, 
bearing  date  of  June  20,  1810,  described  the  condition 
in  West  Florida  more  clearly.  Complete  anarchy  pre- 
vailed there.  The  regular  authorities  had  altogether 
ceased  to  exercise  their  functions  and  voluntary  police 
associations  were  wholly  ineffective.  The  people  were 
divided  into  different  national  factions,  each  uncertain 
of  its  future  action.  The  most  numerous  one  desired 
ultimate  annexation  to  the  United  States,  but  its 
leaders  did  not  favor  immediate  action  for  fear  of 
involving  themselves  in  a  premature  revolt.  Yet 
Holmes  felt  that  they  would  run  this  risk  rather  than 
submit  longer  to  anarchy  or  to  foreign  rule.  The 
slave  population  and  the  refugee  element  were  to  be 
feared  because  of  their  influence  upon  contiguous 
American  territory.  Holmes  did  not  expect  any 
power  to  intervene  with  the  possible  exception  of 
Great  Britain,  and  the  Washington  authorities  would 
best  know  how  probable  this  intervention  was." 

Holmes  had  not  spent  many  months  on  the  fron- 
tier, but  his  letter  marks  him  as  a  shrewd  observer  of 

16  Fulton  to  Madison,  April  20,  1810,  Madison  Letters,  Lenox 
MSS. 

1^  Holmes  to  Smith,  June  20,  1810,  Governor's  Correspond- 
ence, Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library 
(Parker,  4366). 


330  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

events  in  the  neighboring  jurisdiction.  His  neighbor, 
Claiborne,  who  was  then  in  Washington,  made  a  simi- 
lar report  to  the  administration.  Furthermore  he  had 
persuaded  the  president  to  adopt  his  plan  of  inter- 
vention, suggested  three  years  before.  As  a  result  he 
was  empowered  to  enlist  the  aid  of  William  Wykoff, 
Jr.,  a  member  of  the  executive  council  of  Orleans 
Territory.  On  June  14,  1810,  Claiborne  wrote  the 
latter  that  the  prospect  of  independence  in  South 
America  might  likewise  lead  West  Florida  to  declare 
itself  free.  In  view  of  the  American  claim  to  the  ter- 
ritory, this  meant  intervention.  But  it  was  highly  de- 
sirable to  have  intervention  come  through  invitation 
of  its  people.  "  Can  no  means  be  devised,"  the  gov- 
ernor queried,  "to  obtain  such  a  request?"  There 
was  a  French,  an  English,  and  an  independent  party 
among  the  people,  but  none  of  these  could  control  the 
situation.  "  Nature  has  decreed  the  union  of  Florida 
with  the  United  States,"  he  affirmed,  "and  the  wel- 
fare of  her  inhabitants  demands  it."  Wykoff  was 
thereupon  empowered  to  visit  West  Florida  as  an 
emissary  of  the  United  States,  to  assure  its  inhabi- 
tants, including  the  Tories,  that  they  would  be  wel- 
comed by  our  government,  and  to  suggest  a  conven- 
tion of  its  people,  as  far  east  as  the  Perdido,  as  the 
best  means  of  bringing  about  a  united  request  for 
American  intervention.     He  promised  Wykoff  his  ex- 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  33 1 

penses,  and  advised  him  to  send  his  communications 
unsigned  if  he  thought  it  necessary.^^ 

One  is  incHned  to  suspect  that  the  letters  of  Holmes 
and  Claiborne  are  not  merely  coincident  but  collusive. 
Yet  the  situation  they  portrayed  was  sufficiently  evi- 
dent to  any  interested  spectator.  Claiborne's  letter, 
it  is  true,  clearly  indicates  that  the  American  govern- 
ment was  now  ready  to  abandon  oblique  diplomacy 
for  underhand  intervention.  The  change  did  not 
mark  a  higher  moral  purpose ;  but  in  view  of  the  pre- 
carious hold  that  the  Spaniards  then  had  on  the  Flor- 
idas,  the  possibility  of  British  intervention,  and,  above 
all,  its  own  lack  of  preparedness,  some  finesse,  to  use 
no  uglier  word,  seemed  necessary.  A  revolt,  or  at 
any  rate,  a  united  representation,  exhibiting  every 
appearance  of  spontaneity,  would  best  serve  the  pur- 
pose. To  such  a  task  the  administration  now  directed 
its  energies.  In  Claiborne  and  Holmes  it  had  two  ad- 
mirable agents  for  its  purpose.  But  Robert  Smith, 
who  as  secretary  of  state  would  naturally  direct 
their  movements,  was  unequal  to  the  task.  Madison, 
therefore,  had  to  assume  direct  executive  control,  but 
even  he,  on  occasion,  paused  for  helpful  suggestions 
from  Jefferson  or  Gallatin. 

Smith's  immediate  reply  to  Holmes  was  to  the  effect 
that  the  situation  in  West  Florida  "very  properly  en- 
gaged his  attention."     The  government  had  already 

18  Claiborne  to  Wykofif,  June  14,  1810  (Parker,  7460). 


332 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 


taken  measures  to  ascertain  the  views  of  the  people  in 
West  Florida,  and  he  should  aid  in  this  task  as  much 
as  possible.^^  On  August  19  the  president  suggested 
more  explicit  instructions.  Governor  Holmes  was  to 
keep  a  "  wakeful  eye  "  on  West  Florida  and  promptly 
transmit  any  interesting  reports  therefrom  to  the  seat 
of  government.  He  was  likewise  to  have  his  militia 
ready ;  and  in  case  of  foreign  intervention  or  "  inter- 
nal convulsions  "  he  was  to  protect  the  rights  and  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  "by  every  means  within 
the  Hmits  of  executive  authority."  So  far  Madison's 
advice  might  apply  to  any  frontier  commander  in  any 
emergency,  but  in  view  of  Claiborne's  letter  to 
Wykoff,  the  president's  closing  words  were  extremely 
suggestive :  "  Will  it  not  be  advisable  to  apprize  Gov- 
ernor H[olmes]  confidentially  of  the  course  adopted 
as  to  W[est]  F[lorida]  and  to  have  his  cooperation 
in  diffusing  the  impressions  we  wish  to  be  made 
there?  "2° 

In  keeping  with  the  president's  direction,  Smith 
sent  Holmes  copies  of  the  instructions  already  sent  to 
Wykoff,  and  advised  him  to  cooperate  with  Boiling 
Robertson,  who  was  then  in  temporary  charge  of  Or- 
leans Territory.  But  before  these  instructions  reached 
him.  Holmes  had  used  his  "  wakeful  eye,"  and  the 

I''  R.  Smith  to  Holmes,  July  12,  1810,  Mississippi  Territorial 
Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  9;  cf.  also  Domestic  Letters,  MS.,  Vol. 
14,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives  (Parker  4369). 

-"Madison  to  Smith,  July  17,  1810  (Parker,  4370). 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  333 

citizens  of  West  Florida  were  acting  in  a  manner  that 
showed  Httle  necessity  for  "diffusing  impressions." 
Holmes,  a  former  Virginian,  with  a  long  service  in 
Congress,  probably  knew  thoroughly  the  wishes  of 
the  administration.  With  only  a  few  months'  ex- 
perience as  governor,  his  tact,  geniality,  and  common 
sense  had  already  established  his  hold  upon  his  own 
people  and  had  recommended  him  to  the  people  of 
the  neighboring  territory.  He  knew  of  but  one  solu- 
tion for  the  problem  before  him:  ultimate  annexa- 
tion to  the  United  States.  To  this  end,  therefore,  he« 
worked,  slowly,  but  cautiously,  and  much  of  the  credit 
for  the  final  peaceful  result  is  due  to  his  common 
sense,  his  frank  and  sincere  interest  in  the  task  before 
him,  and  the  prudence  which  marked  each  successive 
step  in  his  policy.  Moreover,  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  he  acted  for  months  without  instructions 
from  the  seat  of  government,  aside  from  Smith's  first 
non-committal  letter. 

The  general  discontent  in  West  Florida  came  to  a 
head  in  the  turbulent  district  of  Bayou  Sara.  The 
people  there  complained  bitterly  of  De  Lassus,  of  his 
secretary,  Raphael  Crocker,  and  of  the  military  com- 
mandant, Thomas  Estevan.  Taxes  were  high,  fees 
exorbitant,  and  officials  open  to  bribery.  In  many 
legal  cases  it  was  necessary  to  make  costly  journeys 
to  Baton  Rouge.  Some  of  the  associates  of  De  Lassus 
thought  that  he  felt  resentful  because  the  people  mani- 


334  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

fested  so  much  regret  at  Grand  Pre's  departure.  He 
objected  to  imputations  against  his  secretary  Crocker, 
even  in  the  form  of  remonstrances  from  his  fellow- 
officials.  It  was  about  De  Lassus  and  Crocker  that 
complaint  centered.  Most  of  them  were  exceedingly 
general,  but  there  is  at  least  one  definite  charge  of 
bribery  against  the  latter.  Crocker  later  characterized 
this  as  a  pretext  of  embryo  insurgents  to  justify  their 
later  revolt,  and  claimed  that  American  officials  in- 
spired it.  His  fellow-officials,  who  were  not  par- 
ticularly favorable  to  him,  found  no  definite  founda- 
tion for  it.  Possibly  one  of  these,  Juan  Metzinger, 
expressed  the  real  cause  of  the  trouble :  "  The  laws, 
our  lovely  laws  were  dead."^^ 

These  popular  complaints,  whether  well  founded 
or  not,  led  directly  to  a  movement  for  betterment. 
This  occurred  in  May  and  June,  1810,  and  was  pos- 
sibly timed  so  as  to  take  advantage  of  Folch's  absence 
in  Havana.  Crocker  later  attributed  it  to  the  machi- 
nations of  a  group  of  physicians,  who  were  accus- 
tomed to  hold  frequent  meetings  with  some  wealthy 
Americans  in  Bayou  Sara.     Neither  Estevan,  the  com- 

2^  Copy  of  the  Summary  upon  the  Manner  in  which  the 
Fort  of  Baton  Rouge  was  surprised,  Legajo  163,  Papeles  de 
Cuba.  This  copy,  which  will  be  referred  to  as  "  summary," 
consists  of  384  folios  and  is  the  most  complete  Spanish  source 
for  the  revolt  at  Baton  Rouge  and  the  causes  leading  up  to  it. 
The  statements  in  the  above  paragraph  are  based  on  folios  4, 
5,  14,  20,  26,  67,  78,  82,  243,  249,  251. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  335 

mandant  there,  Lennan,  the  curate,  nor  others  of 
Spanish  leanings  attended  these  meetings.  Estevan, 
who  was  very  unpopular,  knew  of  them,  and  of  the 
frequent  attacks  on  the  government  that  emanated 
from  them.  But  he  trusted  no  one  in  his  jurisdiction, 
and  was  wholly  uncertain  what  course  De  Lassus 
wished  him  to  pursue.-- 

At  the  same  time,  another  storm  was  brewing  at  Ba- 
ton Rouge.  In  June  two  Frenchmen  from  New  Orleans 
began  to  hold  nightly  assemblages  among  the  French 
in  the  vicinity,  under  pretext  of  defending  them- 
selves from  Spanish  plots.  These  meetings  alarmed 
the  Spaniards  and  afiforded  a  prospect  of  speedy  col- 
Hsion.  At  the  same  time,  De  Onis  informed  De  Las- 
sus through  Diego  Morphy,  now  vice-consul  at  New 
Orleans,  that  several  French  emissaries  from  New 
Orleans  planned  to  raise  a  revolution  in  West  Flor- 
ida. One  of  these  had  already  proposed  to  capture 
Baton  Rouge  and  Pensacola.  While  these  machina- 
tions seem  only  a  natural  surmise  from  Napoleon's 
intervention,  De  Lassus  regarded  them  as  part  of  a 
general  propaganda  against  his  jurisdiction.  He  de- 
termined, therefore,  to  expel  all  these  malcontents 
and  their  followers,  and  he  gave  them  three  days  in 
which  to  leave  the  province.  Most  of  them  crossed 
the  Mississippi  to  Iberville  Parish,  from  which  they 
threatened  to  return  and  overwhelm  the  government 

22  Summary,  is.  202,  217,  225. 
23 


336  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

that  had  dispossessed  them.  They  could  probably  do 
this  with  little  difficulty,  unless  the  American  authori- 
ties prevented  them,  for  De  Lassus'  resources  con- 
sisted of  a  ruined  fort  with  barely  ten  men  com- 
petent to  defend  it.^^ 

The  action  of  De  Lassus  was  probably  unwise. 
Many  of  those  expelled  had  long  resided  in  the 
province,  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  Spain, 
and  had  served  in  the  local  militia.  Yet  he  believed 
that  his  action  was  justified  because  of  the  general 
attitude  of  his  fellow-officials  against  the  French,  and 
because  of  the  fact  that  their  presence  disturbed  the 
better  classes  of  people,  who  were  sincerely  attached 
to  Spain.  Their  threats  to  return  and  dispossess  him 
caused  him  to  issue  orders  for  assembling  the  terri- 
torial militia  and  to  prepare  for  instant  defense. 

The  news  from  Estevan  at  Bayou  Sara  confirmed 
him  in  his  course.  That  officer  reported  the  circula- 
tion of  an  anonymous  petition  calling  for  a  popular 
convention.  Estevan,  distrusting  everybody,  wished 
De  Lassus  to  consult  with  him  at  Bayou  Sara.  De 
Lassus  regarded  the  peril  from  French  refugees  in 
his  own  vicinity  as  greater  than  any  danger  threaten- 
ing the  other,  but  sent  Philip  Hickey  and  George 
Mather  to  advise  Estevan.     He  suggested  that  they 

23  Summary,  fs.  2i6,  217;  St.  Maxent  to  Someruelos,  reser- 
vado,  July  10,  1810,  Legajo  1574,  Morales  to  Captain-General, 
Aug.  12,  1810,  Legajo  1708,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Natchez  Weekly 
Chronicle,  June  18,  1810. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  337 

should  call  the  inhabitants  together,  read  them  the 
letters  from  Morphy,  and  show  them  that  any  in- 
ternal disturbance  would  favor  the  enemies  of  the  na- 
tion. The  selection  of  Hickey  was  hardly  in  keeping 
with  Spanish  interests.  He  had  been  prominent  in 
the  abortive  attempt  to  call  a  convention  in  December, 
1808,  and  we  may  well  believe  that  he  would  not  neg- 
lect this  opportunity  to  further  the  same  end.  Hickey 
had  always  appeared  well  affected  toward  the  Spanish 
government,  was  a  close  friend  of  De  Lassus,  and 
during  the  succeeding  days  often  assured  the  latter 
that  the  resulting  assemblage  was  thoroughly  loyal. 
Yet  he  was  suspected  of  being  the  author  of  the  anony- 
mous paper  that  brought  it  together.  He  was  either 
an  astute  politician,  or  else  Governor  De  Lassus  griev- 
ously misjudged  him.^"^ 

Rumor,  according  to  Morphy,  credited  the  people 
of  Bayou  Sara  with  anticipating  an  advance  in  land 
values  from  a  change  in  government.  Such  a  reck- 
less speculation  seemed  to  him  far  more  dangerous 
than  the  threats  of  French  refugees.^^  A  few  weeks 
later  he  was  to  know  that  his  fears  were  only  too 
well  grounded.  In  the  meantime,  before  Hickey  and 
his  companion  reached  the  disturbed  area,  a  group 

24  Dispatches  of  St.  Maxent  and  Morales  as  above;  Este- 
van  to  De  Lassus,  June  23,  and  De  Lassus  to  Estevan,  June 
25,  1 810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

25  Morphy  to  Captain-General,  Aug.  12,  1810,  Legajo  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


338  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

of  its  militia  officers,  among  who'm  John  H.  Johnston 
figured,  persuaded  Estevan  to  summon  a  convention. 
That  official  was  then  ill ;  but  when  he  was  visited  by 
the  petitioners  in  a  body,  he  ordered  the  alcaldes, 
syndics,  militia  officers,  and  other  leading  inhabitants 
to  form  a  general  meeting  for  discussing  measures  to 
restore  public  tranquility.-''  Thus  he  not  only  an- 
ticipated De  Lassus  in  calling  the  people  of  West 
Florida  together,  but  forestalled  Claiborne's  agent, 
Wykoff. 

Madison  was  to  learn  of  the  situation  in  West  Flor- 
ida from  still  another  source.  After  a  residence  of 
nine  years  in  the  Bayou  Sara  region,  William  Barrow, 
a  native  of  North  Carolina,  enjoyed  considerable  popu- 
larity on  account  of  his  wealth  and  worth.  For  this 
reason  the  Spanish  authorities,  despite  his  well  known 
American  proclivities,  had  not  ventured  to  molest  him. 
Early  in  June,  Barrow  wrote  to  his  old  friend.  Dr.  J. 
R.  Bedford  of  Nashville,  that  he  was  greatly  alarmed 
over  the  situation  in  West  Florida.  He  feared  their 
existing  government  was  "  quite  done,"  and  he  had 
little  hope  that  the  United  States  would  take  possession 
of  the  region.  The  people  were  divided  in  sentiment, 
with  no  able  men  to  advise  them.  He  asked  Bed- 
ford to  consult  with  "  men  of  talents  and  honor  "  in 
his   vicinity  and  give  him   the  best   advice  possible. 

^'^  Estevan  to  De  Lassus,  July  i,  1810,  enclosed  in  Folch  to 
Someruelos,  Aug.  29,  1810,  Legajo  1561,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  339 

Barrow  wished  to  act  justly  and  with  due  regard  to 
the  safety  and  honor  of  his  fellow-citizens. 

Bedford  celebrated  the  national  holiday  by  sending 
President  Madison  a  copy  of  this  letter,  together  with 
some  comments  of  his  own.  From  other  sources  he 
felt  sure  that  a  revolution  would  shortly  occur  in  West 
Florida.  The  inhabitants  there  might  "  disclaim  all 
subordination  or  allegiance  to  the  mother  country,  or 
the  Usurper,  and  cooperate  with  the  other  Spanish 
provinces  to  form  a  new  nation ;"  or  they  might  de- 
clare themselves  wholly  independent  and  establish  a 
government  upon  "  economical  and  liberal  principles 
...  to  endure  no  longer  than  it  may  be  reciprocally 
eligible  to  become  an  integral  part  of  the  United 
States."  The  people  of  the  South  desired  its  annexa- 
tion, and  would  do  nothing  to  prevent  such  a  step. 
Hence  Bedford's  direct  appeal  to  the  president  and 
his  willingness  to  receive  in  return  any  suggestion  from 
him.-^ 

Bedford's  action*  was  entirely  satisfactory  to  Bar- 
row. Whether  it  was  equally  so  to  Madison  we  have 
no  direct  means  of  knowing.  Along  with  the  reports 
from  Holmes  and  Claiborne,  it  may  have  stimulated  the 
later  instructions  to  the  Mississippi  executive.  De- 
spite Bedford's  injunctions  to  secrecy,  some  inkling 
of  the  purpose  of  the  people  in  West  Florida  may 

27  Bedford  to  Madison,  July  4,  1810,  enclosing  Barrow's 
letter  of  June  4,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


340  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

have  leaked  out  and  inspired  those  reports  that  they 
had  declared  their  independence.  These  caused  some 
premature  rejoicing  in  the  American  press  and  at  the 
same  time  called  forth  greater  vigilance  on  the  part 
of  De  Lassus.  Some  of  the  people  of  West  Florida, 
as  Barrow  later  wrote,  were  ready  to  take  this  serious 
step  and  call  upon  the  United  States  to  aid  them, 
without  knowing  whether  it  would  do  so  or  not.  It 
was  necessary  to  restrain  their  impatience  and  at  the 
same  time  establish  a  more  adequate  local  govern- 
ment. 

In  consequence  of  the  events  already  described,  a 
number  of  those  residing  in  Feliciana  (which  in- 
cluded Bayou  Sara)  met  at  the  farm  of  Mr.  Sterling, 
some  fifteen  miles  from  the  Mississippi  and  about  ten 
miles  below  the  line  of  demarcation.  Their  ostensible 
object  was  to  secure  themselves  against  foreign  in- 
vasion and  domestic  disturbance.  The  leaders  of  the 
meeting  submitted  a  prearranged  plan  which  was 
adopted,  with  eleven  dissenting  votes  only  out  of  about 
five  hundred.  Under  this  plan  the  people  selected 
four  of  their  respectable  and  wealthy  neighbors,  and 
empowered  them  to  ask  each  of  the  remaining  six 
districts  of  the  province  to  elect  a  single  representa- 
tive. This  council  of  ten,  provided  the  others  ac- 
cepted the  proposal,  was  to  be  invested  with  the  gen- 
eral powers  of  government,  which  they  were  to  ad- 
minister in  a  manner  best  calculated  for  the  common 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  34I 

good.  It  was  tacitly  understood  that  the  Spanish  offi- 
cials were  to  continue  in  office  provided  they  submitted 
to  the  new  authority.  "You  may  readily  conjecture," 
wrote  Holmes  on  the  nth,  "how  this  business  will 
eventuate."-® 

Notwithstanding  his  confidence  in  the  outcome  of 
this  movement.  Holmes  "utterly  forebore  to  express 
his  opinion  as  to  the  probable  action"  of  his  govern- 
ment. While  the  large  majority  of  the  wealthy  and 
respectable  element  favored  an  appeal  to  the  United 
States,  a  few  regretted  this  movement  because  of  at- 
tachment to  the  British  government,  or  for  more  per- 
sonal reasons.  Philip  Hickey  and  the  curate  Lennan 
informed  De  Lassus  that  a  plan  was  on  foot  to  seize 
the  fort  at  Baton  Rouge  and  deprive  him  of  his  com- 
mand. This,  however,  was  to  be  suspended  while 
awaiting  the  action  of  the  proposed  convention.  De 
Lassus  regarded  this  report  as  exaggerated,  and  de- 
spite Hickey's  suspicious  attitude,  continued  to  employ 
him  to  tranquilize  the  people.  His  only  precaution 
was  to  double  the  guards  in  his  ruined  fort,  although 
he  did  nothing  to  repair  it.  He  had  ample  warning 
of  the  dangerous  movement  now  under  way,  and 
might  have  crushed  it  in  its  incipiency.  Because  he 
did  not,  his  superiors  were  inclined  to  regard  him  as 
an  accomplice  in  the  events  that  followed.^^ 

The  action  of  New  FeHciana  quickly  affected  the 

28  Holmes  to  Smith,  July  11,  1810  (Parker,  4368). 

29  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Aug.  29,  1810;  cf.  note  26. 


342  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

Other  portions  of  the  jurisdiction.  On  July  6  the 
people  of  Baton  Rouge  asked  permission  to  call  a 
similar  assembly,  and  there  was  every  prospect  that 
St.  Helena  and  Tanchipaho  were  ready  to  cooperate. 
Among  those  at  Baton  Rouge  who  signed  the  petition 
were  George  Mather  and  Philip  Hickey,  who  had 
already  acted  as  messengers  to  Estevan ;  Joseph  Sharp 
and  Samuel  Fulton,  whom  Claiborne  had  mentioned  in 
his  letter  to  Wykofif ;  Fulwar  Skipwith,  who  had  lost  his 
position  in  Paris  and  was  now  seeking  to  recover  his 
poHtical  and  financial  standing  in  West  Florida;  An- 
drew Steele,  Thomas  Lilley,  John  Davenport,  George 
Harris,  and  others,  fourteen  in  all,  who  had  been  or 
were  soon  to  be  prominent  in  West  Florida  history. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  list  contains  no  name  of 
Spanish  origin. 

In  his  answer  of  the  same  date  De  Lassus  claimed 
that  the  petition  had  grown  out  of  his  letter  of  June 
25  to  Thomas  Estevan.  Its  purpose  was  evidently  to 
preserve  intact  the  dominions  of  the  Spanish  mon- 
archy and  sustain  the  laws.  As  such  action  would  in- 
sure the  tranquility  and  well-being  of  each  citizen,  he 
permitted  the  people  in  the  districts  of  Baton  Rouge, 
Bayou  Sara,  and  St.  Helena  to  hold  the  desired  as- 
semblies. Acting  under  this  permission,  the  people 
of  Baton  Rouge  assembled  at  the  house  of  Samuel 
Fulton  to  choose  their  delegates.^" 

30  Petition  to  De  Lassus,  July  6,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  343 

Not  all  the  people  within  these  localities  welcomed 
the  innovation.  Many  who  were  attached  to  Spanish 
interests  did  not  understand  the  course  of  events  and 
wondered  at  the  compliance  of  the  governor.  They 
imagined  that  he  was  either  deceived  or  else  lacked 
sufficient  troops  to  check  the  movement.  Among 
these  was  Shepherd  Brown,  the  commandant  at  St. 
Helena,  who  had  received  a  number  of  unsigned  docu- 
ments from  Baton  Rouge,  indicating  an  intention  to 
establish  "  a  new  order  of  things."  Among  them  was 
the  permission  of  De  Lassus  to  hold  popular  assem- 
blies. This  appeared  so  extraordinary  to  Brown  that 
he  feared  the  other  had  been  compelled  to  issue  it  be- 
cause he  lacked  the  means  to  discover  and  punish 
those  who  were  behind  the  movement.  Accordingly, 
he  sent  a  trusty  militia  lieutenant,  Joseph  Thomas,  to 
learn  definitely  whether  De  Lassus  had  given  the 
order  voluntarily  or  if  it  had  been  extorted  from  him. 
He  desired  the  executive's  express  assurance  that  he 
was  acting  of  his  own  free  will  and  that  his  course 
was  designed  "  to  preserve  intact  this  part  of  the  king- 
dom and  of  our  loved  and  worthy  sovereign,  Don 
Ferdinand  VH,  and  to  sustain  his  government  and 
wise  laws."  If,  on  the  contrary,  his  permission  had 
been  extorted  by  fear,  Brown  wished  him  to  know 
that  the  inhabitants  of  St.  Helena  desired  no  change 
in  government.  Five  hundred  militia  were  ready  to 
sacrifice  their  lives  for  the  honor  of  the  Spanish  flag. 


344  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

and  would  obey  his  word  without  delay.^^  Despite 
this  assurance,  it  is  doubtful  if  any  such  number  were 
ready  to  follow  Brown  into  an  actual  clash  with  their 
fellow-citizens. 

In  his  reply  De  Lassus  assured  Brown  that  he  had 
in  no  way  been  forced  to  permit  the  assemblies. 
Those  who  asked  for  them  did  so  with  all  possible  re- 
spect. He  was  persuaded  that  the  inhabitants  were 
well  disposed  toward  him  and  desired  only  an  oppor- 
tunity to  show  their  fidelity  to  Ferdinand  VII,  as  his 
messenger  would  personally  tell  him.^-  This  reply  to 
Brown  and  the  previous  communications  to  Estevan 
indicate  that  De  Lassus  knew  he  could  not  meet  the 
peril  confronting  him  and  that  he  was  too  proud  to 
acknowledge  it.  One  can,  of  course,  reason  equally 
well  that  he  knew  the  conditions  and  was  ready  to 
make  a  corrupt  bargain  for  his  tacit  consent,  or  was 
unwilling  to  resist  because  he  saw  the  futility  of  such 
a  course. 

Upon  receiving  this  word.  Brown  arranged  to  elect 
the  delegates  from  St.  Helena.  As  it  was  difficult  to 
find  a  common  meeting-place  for  all  the  inhabitants  of 
his  jurisdiction,  he  divided  it  into  four  precincts,  one 
of  which  was  to  select  two  delegates  and  the  others 
one  each.     As  a  result  of  his  influence,  he  secured  the 

31  Summary,  f .  205 ;  Shepherd  Brown  to  De  Lassus,  July 
10,  1810. 

32  De  Lassus  to  Brown,  July  13,  1810. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  345 

election  of  what  he  termed  "five  faithful  vassals,"^^ 
for  whose  "  zeal  and  patriotism  "  as  well  as  obedience 
to  De  Lassus'  wishes  he  personally  vouched.  In  his 
action  at  this  time  and  subsequently  Brown  seems 
much  more  loyal  than  De  Lassus.  Folch  later 
thought  that  the  commandant  made  a  military  mistake 
when  he  rejected  Brown's  proffered  aid,  and  a  polit- 
ical one  when  he  permitted  widely  separated  districts 
to  meet  in  a  common  assembly.  By  so  doing  he 
made  all  acquainted  with  the  disaffection  that  pre- 
vailed in  Bayou  Sara. 

Thus  the  irregular  meeting  in  that  region  led  to  a 
general  assembly  for  the  whole  jurisdiction  of  Baton 
Rouge.  Despite  the  criticism  that  other  officials 
passed  on  De  Lassus'  action,  it  is  hard  to  see  what  else 
he  could  have  done.  He  afterward  claimed  that  he 
had  asked  for  reenforcements  from  Pensacola  and 
that  he  did  not  consent  to  the  assembling  of  the  con- 
vention until  he  had  learned  that  they  would  not  be 
forthcoming.  In  permitting  this  significant  step  he 
only  designed  to  temporize  with  the  prospective  in- 
surgents and  thus  gain  time  for  later  assistance.  He 
expected  the  assembly  to  take  no  more  positive  action 
than  to  express  the  reasons  that  led  to  its  meeting. 
Yet  at  that  very  time  popular  report  credited  it  with 
intending  to  establish  a  better  system  of  justice,  repair 
fortifications,   nominate   local   officials,   and   in   other 

33  Brown  to  De  Lessus,  July  23,  1810,  ibid. 


346  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

ways  relieve  the  people  of  the  abuses  under  which  they 
were  suffering.  Yet  all  was  to  be  done  in  the  name 
of  Ferdinand  VII.^* 

On  July  25  the  greatly  feared  convention  assembled 
at  St.  John's  Plains  in  the  house  of  Richard  Duvall, 
some  five  leagues  from  Baton  Rouge.  The  members, 
numbering  fourteen,  comprised  four  each  from  New 
Feliciana  and  St.  Helena,  five  from  Baton  Rouge, 
and  one  from  Tanchipaho.  They  organized  by  choos- 
ing John  Rhea  as  chairman,  and  Dr.  Andrew  Steele  as 
secretary.  Of  their  number  Manuel  Lopez  was  the 
only  one  who  bore  a  Spanish  name.  He  and  those 
who  had  been  selected  through  Brown's  influence  were 
probably  ready  to  support  the  governor.  John  W. 
Leonard  was  an  adherent  of  De  Lassus,  as  was  Samuel 
Crocker,  one  of  the  clerks.^^ 

The  members  naturally  hesitated  to  proceed  along 
the  unaccustomed  path  of  self-government.  Their 
experience  under  the  Spanish  regime  and  a  certain 

34  Summary,  f  s.  65,  68,  83,  218,  230. 

35  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Sept.  29,  1819,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles 
de  Cuba;  National  Intelligencer,  Sept.  24,  1810.  The  list  of 
names  given  is  as  follows :  from  New  Feliciana,  William  Bar- 
row, John  H.  Johnston,  John  Mills,  John  Rhea ;  from  Baton 
Rouge,  Philip  Hickey,  Thomas  Lilley,  Manuel  Lopez,  Edmund 
Hawes,  John  Morgan ;  from  St.  Helena,  Joseph  Thomas,  John 
W.  Leonard,  William  Spiller,  Benjamin  C.  Williams;  from 
Tanchipaho,  William  Cooper.  Cf.  account  given  by  Henry 
L.  Favrot  in  Publications  of  the  Louisiana  Historical  Society, 
Vol.  I,  Part  n,  41-43. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  347 

mutual  distrust  caused  them  to  avoid  hasty  action 
until  each  had  disclosed  his  attitude.  Some  of  them 
were  ready  for  common  action  and  were  doubtless 
responsible  for  circulating  an  anonymous  code  that 
had  already  been  favorably  received.  This  was  de- 
signed to  place  all  political  power  in  the  hands  of  the 
convention,  acting  jointly  with  De  Lassus.  At  the 
same  time,  there  were  reports  in  circulation  above  the 
line  that  the  convention  would  declare  its  independ- 
ence and  that  a  filibustering  party  would  be  formed 
to  assist  in  this  movement.  Governor  Holmes  later 
solemnly  denied  this,  but  the  rumor  naturally  caused 
the  Spanish  officials  to  regard  the  meeting  with  sus- 
picion and  to  fear  American  complicity. 

According  to  Holmes  the  majority  of  the  conven- 
tion undoubtedly  favored  annexation  to  the  United 
States.  A  strong  minority,  still  attached  to  the  Span- 
ish system,  industriously  circulated  a  report  that  Folch 
had  returned  from  Havana  and  would  employ  the 
military  forces  at  Pensacola  to  break  up  their  delibera- 
tions. The  majority  hesitated  to  ask  openly  for  Amer- 
ican assistance,  for  they  might  thus  be  overwhelmed 
before  the  United  States  could  act  upon  their  applica- 
tion. In  fact,  they  did  not  know  how  such  an  applica- 
tion would  be  received.  Thus  it  was  impossible  to 
obtain  any  expression  of  their  real  sentiments.  On 
the  other  hand,  De  Lassus  trembled  for  his  person 
and  position,  yet  he  had  neither  the  courage  nor  the 


348  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

resources  to  precipitate  a  struggle.  This  led  him  to 
acquiesce  in  whatever  the  convention  undertook.^^ 

One  of  its  first  acts  was  to  pass  a  comprehensive 
resolution  defining  its  powers :  "  Resolved,  That  this 
Convention  created  by  the  whole  body  of  the  people 
of  the  government  of  Baton  Rouge,  and  by  the  previ- 
ous consent  of  the  Governor,  is  therefore  legally  con- 
stituted to  act  in  all  cases  of  national  concern  which 
relate  to  this  province,  to  provide  for  the  publick  safety, 
to  create  a  revenue,  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Gov- 
ernor, to  create  tribunals  civil  and  criminal,  and  to  de- 
fine their  own  powers  relating  to  other  concerns  of 
the  government,  when  to  adjourn,  when  to  meet  again 
and  how  long  to  continue  their  session." 

After  enumerating  this  catalogue  of  powers  in 
which  the  executive  was  to  appear  only  as  an  occa- 
sional accomplice,  the  members  proceeded  to  express 
his  position  still  more  clearly:  "Resolved  that  it  is  the 
unanimous  wish  of  this  Convention  to  proceed  in  all 
our  deliberations  for  the  public  welfare  with  the  en- 
tire approbation  of  his  Excellency  Charles  Dehault 
De  Lassus,  our  present  Governor  and  that  we  become 
responsible  with  him  to  the  superior  authorities  for 
the  expediency  of  the  measures  which  may  be  adopted 
with  his  concurrence,  that  we  engage  to  support  him 
as  our  Governor,  with  the  emoluments  appertaining 

36  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Sept.  29,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles 
de  Cuba;  Holmes  to  R.  Smith,  July  31,  1810  (Parker,  4373). 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  349 

to  his  present  office,  and  to  give  him  all  the  aid  in  our 
power  in  the  execution  of  the  duties  thereof." 

As  if  to  make  this  forced  complicity  more  agreeable, 
the  members  graciously  thanked  him  for  permitting 
them  to  meet  and  for  discovering  that  he  was  author- 
ized to  divest  himself  of  civil  and  military  power. 
They  wished  to  break  the  force  of  the  latter  sugges- 
tion, however,  by  offering  to  continue  his  present  sal- 
ary,^'^  After  thus  taking  power  into  their  hands  in  a 
way  unknown  to  Spanish  procedure,  they  continued 
their  deliberations  on  the  second  day  by  stating  a 
series  of  grievances  which  they  proposed  to  use  as  a 
basis  for  drawing  up  a  formal  frame  of  government. 
Their  statements  merely  added  insult  to  injury,  but 
they  were  so  presented  as  to  compromise  nearly  all  of 
their  number. 

Grievance  number  one,  as  stated  by  Lilley  and  sanc- 
tioned by  Harris,  was  to  the  effect  that  the  province 
was  a  refuge  for  criminals,  while  men  of  fortune  and 
character  were  barred  out  of  it.  Hickey  and  Barrow 
suggested  that  in  the  defenseless  state  of  the  province 
it  was  a  grievance  to  have  no  means  for  organizing 
the  militia.  This  seems  to  be  hardly  true,  if  we  may 
judge  from  recent  occurrences.  Cooper  and  Miller 
deplored  the  lack  of  facilities  for  the  speedy  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  and  Johnston  and  Barrow  claimed 

37  Clipping  from  Natchez  Chronicle,  Aug.  6,  1810,  enclosed 
in  Holmes  to  Smith,  Aug.  8.     Cf.  n.  42. 


350  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

that  they  had  no  competent  tribunals  to  administer 
justice  in  their  own  language.  Barrow  and  Spiller 
objected  to  the  proposed  system  for  resurveying  their 
lands ;  Thomas  and  Hickey  called  attention  to  the  neg- 
lect of  all  laws  relating  to  roads,  slaves,  and  live  stock. 
Thus  asserting  their  power  and  airing  their  griev- 
ances, they  appointed  a  committee  consisting  of  John 
H.  Johnston  and  John  Mills  o'f  New  Feliciana,  John 
W.  Leonard  of  St.  Helena,  and  Philip  Hickey  and 
Thomas  Lilley  of  Baton  Rouge,  to  draw  up  a  plan 
for  redressing  these  grievances  and  providing  for  the 
defense  of  the  province.  Then  Lopez  and  Hickey 
discovered  a  grievance  in  the  fact  that  there  was  no 
regularity  in  official  fees,  while  Leonard  and  Spiller 
asked  for  a  uniform  system  of  weights  and  measures. 
The  latter  pair  also  deplored  the  presence  of  French 
refugees  in  the  province.  Williams  and  Spiller 
claimed  that  many  who  had  long  resided  in  the  prov- 
ince were  unable  to  obtain  titles  to  their  lands.  At 
this  juncture  Hickey  and  Lilley  resolved  that  it  was 
their  duty  to  relieve  the  mother-country  as  much  as  pos- 
sible while  she  was  engaged  in  a  doubtful  contest  for 
her  very  existence.  They  must  find  within  the  col- 
ony the  necessary  funds  for  its  government.  Lopez 
and  Lilley  likewise  desired  a  popular  counsellor  who 
could  give  opinions  in  cases  that  arose  under  the 
Spanish  law.  This  suggestion  might  convey  the  idea 
that  the  existing  authorities  were  incompetent.     Fi- 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  35 1 

nally  the  members  concurred  in  a  general  resolution 
for  self-protection  by  asserting  that  they  should  be 
free  from  arrest  during  attendance  upon  the  conven- 
tion and  while  traveling  to  and  from  its  sessions. 
John  Morgan  of  Baton  Rouge  and  William  Cooper  of 
Tanchipaho  were  the  only  members  whose  names  did 
not  appear  in  connection  with  these  grievances. ^'^ 

Having  taken  this  significant  forward  step,  the  con- 
vention adjourned  until  the  second  Monday  of  August, 
Before  separating,  the  members  gave  De  Lassus  a  ful- 
some address,  through  a  committee  composed  of 
Manuel  Lopez,  Joseph  Thomas,  and  Philip  Hickey. 
In  such  action  they  doubtless  felt  safe  in  giving  his 
friends  a  majority.  They  spoke  of  the  satisfaction 
that  they  derived  from  his  approval  of  their  action. 
In  the  name  of  their  constituents  they  thanked  him 
for  his  efforts  "to  preserve  popular  tranquility  in  a 
time  of  general  anxiety  and  alarm."  Then  they  stated 
that  the  object  of  their  deliberations  was  "to  promote 
the  safety,  honor,  and  happiness  of  our  beloved  king, 
Ferdinand  VII,  to  guard  against  his  enemies,  foreign 
and  domestic,  and  to  punish  wrongs  and  correct  abuses 
dangerous  to  the  existence  and  prosperity  of  the  prov- 
ince." They  hoped  that  their  future  action  would 
meet  with  his  approval,  quoted  their  resolutions  in 
regard  to  the  powers  of  governm.ent  and  his  salary, 
notified  him  of  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to 

38  National  Intelligencer,  Sept.  24,  1810. 
24 


352  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

redress  their  grievances,  and  stated  their  intention  of 
reassembling  on  August  14,  "  to  receive  the  report  of 
said  committee  and  to  proceed  in  the  discharge  of 
other  duties  enjoined  by  our  constituents."  After 
thus  divesting  him  of  his  ordinary  authority,  the  clos- 
ing stock  phrase  "  May  God  preserve  yo'u  many  years  " 
seemed  bitterly  ironical.^'' 

William  Barrow's  neighbors,  to  paraphrase  his  re- 
port, had  been  weak  enough  to  choose  him  as  a  dele- 
gate, and  he  had  taken  a  prominent  part  in  the  conven- 
tion. Shortly  after  its  adjournment  he  wrote  to  his 
friend  Bedford  that  notwithstanding  the  apparent  har- 
mony, which  he  hoped  would  continue,  the  delegates 
were  at  a  loss  what  course  to  adopt.  Some  were  for 
the  United  States,  some  for  Great  Britain,  and  many 
for  Ferdinand  VII.  For  the  present,  therefore,  they 
had  determined  to  continue  the  Spanish  laws  with 
necessary  amendments,  put  reliable  men  into  office, 
and  treat  all  with  equal  justice.  In  the  midst  of  the 
popular  confusion  and  ignorance  his  fellow-citizens 
wished  to  know  what  they  might  reasonably  expect 
of  the  United  States.  They  had  no  desire  "to  cast  a 
stigma  on  themselves  or  risk  their  best  rights  and  in- 
terests." He  hoped  the  measures  taken  would  quiet 
the  minds  of  the  people  and  give  the  leaders  oppor- 
tunity to  determine  the  best  method  of  procedure. 

39  Address  to  De  Lassus,  July  27,  1810,  enclosed  in  letter  of 
Holmes,  Aug.  8,  1810.     Cf.  n.  42. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  353 

As  the  United  States  had  excited  them  by  laying  claim 
to  the  territory,  it  was  in  duty  bound  to  advise  them 
in  the  present  crisis,  and  to  act  as  was  becoming  to 
"a  free  and  independent  nation."  Unfortunately,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  course  of  the  American  government 
in  reference  to  this  very  region  had  measurably  de- 
prived them  of  that  status.  Barrow  mentioned  a  re- 
port that  soldiers  were  to  be  sent  from  Pensacola  to 
restore  the  old  order  of  things,  and  regarded  such  a 
possibility  with  apprehension.  The  people  had  defi- 
nitely chosen  their  delegates,  and  he  believed  they 
would  support  them  if  in  danger.*" 

Bedford  sent  this  communication  to  Madison  al- 
though he  had  not  heard  from  his  previous  one. 
His  apology  for  intruding  a  second  time  upon  the 
president  was  a  sincere  desire  to  advance  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  as  well  as  those  of  his  friends  in 
West  Florida.  These  were  to  a  certain  extent  recip- 
rocal. Barrow  had  Vv^ritten  Bedford  that  he  firmly 
believed  they  were  absolved  from  allegiance  to  the 
mother-country  and  had  a  natural  right  to  assume 
self-government.  In  time  West  Florida  must  become 
a  part  of  the  United  States.  To  facilitate  this  step  it 
might  be  better,  pending  action  by  the  latter,  to  form 
a  temporary  independent  government  and  to  include 
East  Florida  if  the  latter  desired  to  cooperate.     As 

*o  Barrow  to  Bedford,  Aug.  5,  1810,  enclosed  in  Bedford  to 
Madison,  Aug.  26,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


354  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

Bedford  did  not  know  that  the  executive  had  the 
right  or  the  desire  to  act  alone  in  this  matter,  he  sug- 
gested that  the  people  of  West  Florida  should  con- 
tinue "  their  present  quiet  situation "  until  Congress 
could  meet  and  act  upon  their  application  for  incor- 
poration with  the  Union,  as  it  would  promptly  do, 
Bedford  believed  that  the  American  government  was 
friendly  and  solicitous  for  the  people  of  Florida;  that 
it  conceived  itself  to  be  the  lawful  owner  of  the  terri- 
tory ;  but  that  the  "  peaceful  and  neutral  disposition  " 
of  the  government  would  forbid  any  attempt  to  acquire 
it  by  other  than  mild  measures,  unless  these  became 
"  hopeless  or  rather  obstructive."*^ 

A  correspondent  from  this  convention  wrote  in  a 
similar  vein  to  the  Natchez  Weekly  Chronicle.  His 
letter  appeared  in  the  issue  of  July  29,  and  likewise 
afforded  Holmes  a  text  for  his  own  of  July  31. 
After  quoting  from  it.  Holmes  mentioned  the  desire 
of  the  people  in  West  Florida  to  join  the  United 
States,  but  said  that  they  feared  to  take  the  necessary 
steps  before  they  knew  the  attitude  of  its  government. 
A  week  later,  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  Smith's 
cautious  letter  of  July  12,  he  assured  the  secretary 
that  he  was  observing  carefully  the  situation  in  West 
Florida  and  would  report  fully  and  promptly  thereon. 
His  informant  had  recently  returned  to  Natchez  from 
West  Florida,  and  had  given  him  additional  details, 

^1  Bedford  to  Madison,  Aug.  26,  i8io,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  355 

including  a  copy  of  the  address  of  the  convention  to 
the  governor.  From  the  style  of  this  paper  one  might 
infer  that  the  people  wished  merely  to  redress  griev- 
ances and  support  their  present  administration;  but 
Holmes  had  already  shown  that  these  public  acts  re- 
vealed the  views  neither  of  De  Lassus  nor  of  the  con- 
vention. The  former  had  simply  sanctioned  what  he 
could  not  prevent.  The  greater  part  of  the  people 
desired  American  intervention,  as  he  had  previously 
reported,  but  would  adopt  no  direct  means  to  bring 
this  about  before  they  learned  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States.  Although  this  was  a  matter  for  his 
superiors  to  determine,  he  ventured  to  suggest  that 
West  Florida  could  then  be  obtained  without  any  ma- 
terial expense  or  the  loss  of  a  single  life.  Should 
some  powerful  nation  invade  the  region  or  send  emis- 
saries into  it,  the  condition  might  change.  Under  the 
circumstances  he  would  gladly  receive  the  instructions 
of  the  president  that  Smith  promised,  and  would  faith- 
fully observe  them.*- 

In  an  early  August  issue  of  the  Natchez  Weekly 
Chronicle  there  appeared  a  review  of  the  situation 
that  was  evidently  intended  to  hurry  on  American 
action.  Its  closing  paragraphs  stated:  "Idle  dema- 
gogues  and   declaimers   may   endeavor  to  alarm  the 

*2  Holmes  to  Smith,  Aug.  8,  1810,  enclosing  clipping  from 
the  Natchez  Weekly  Chronicle  (Parker,  4374,  4375). 


356  MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT 

fears  of  the  people  and  may  threaten  them  with 
French  vengeance,  but  if  the  deputies  are  faithful  to 
Florida,  adhere  to  principle,  and  pursue  a  wise  and 
just  policy,  they  will  acquire  for  themselves  immortal 
honor,  and  secure  a  free  and  equitable  government  to 
their  posterity. 

"As  far  as  we  have  seen  an  expression  of  public 
sentiment,  there  is  not  one  American  heart  that  does 
not  beat  in  unison  with  the  people  of  Florida;  and  the 
prayers  of  seven  millions  of  freemen  are  daily  offered 
up  to  this  fountain  of  all  good  for  the  civil  and  political 
freedom  and  universal  prosperity  of  our  enlightened 
neighbors.  The  people  of  the  United  States  and  of 
Florida  have  the  same  object  in  view,  the  same  end 
to  accomplish.  They  are  all  nations  of  this  soil  and 
they  must  preserve  it  inviolate.  Never  must  they 
permit  this  hallowed  haunt  of  liberty  to  be  polluted 
by  the  followers  of  the  Corsican.  Let  the  Florida 
Convention  cast  a  retrospective  eye  over  the  miseries 
of  Spain,  and  remember  that  these  evils  have  been 
brought  about  her  by  the  intrigues  of  the  French,  and 
that  torrents  of  blood,  similar  to  those  which  have 
flowed  in  the  mother  country,  will  deluge  their  happy 
land,  the  moment  they  are  led  astray  by  the  siren 
songs  of  Toryism.  Let  the  American  Congress  and 
the  Florida  Convention  perfectly  understand  each 
other,  unite  in  measures  of  defense,  and  plant  on  the 


MOVEMENT  FOR  SELF-GOVERNMENT  357 

shores  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  a  bar- 
rier that  will  secure  us  forever  against  the  corrupting 
influence  of  French  politics.  By  this  means  they  will 
not  only  preserve  liberty  to  themselves,  but  will  trans- 
mit it  unimpaired  to  their  latest  posterity."*^ 

43  Cf.  Parker,  4375. 


CHAPTER  X 

Drifting  Toward  Insurrection 

The  meeting  at  St.  John's  Plains  marked  the  end  of 
the  first  step  toward  American  intervention.  The 
measures  then  taken  to  secure  provincial  self-govern- 
ment were  largely  farcical,  and  none  knew  it  better 
than  De  Lassus.  As  he  was  not  ready,  however,  to 
break  with  the  popular  leaders,  three  days  after  the 
convention  adjourned  he  replied  to  its  address  through 
the  spokesman  of  the  committee  of  five,  Thomas 
Lilley.  His  words  were  as  courteous  as  their  own  and 
equally  sincere.  He  was  gratified  to  note  the  unanim- 
ity with  which  they  desired  to  promote  the  interests 
of  Ferdinand  VH.  His  confidence  in  their  loyalty  led 
him  to  take  such  measures  as  he  had  employed  to  quiet 
the  people  of  Bayou  Sara.  These  measures  had  nat- 
urally resulted  in  the  present  assembly. 

Those  whom  he  addressed  doubtless  appreciated  the 
naturalness  of  this  result  more  than  did  his  immediate 
superiors.  Both  Folch  and  Morales  later  regarded 
him  as  weak,  or  worse  than  weak,  for  ever  permitting 
the  convention  to  assemble,  and  even  at  that  late  date 
thought  he  ought  to  have  proceeded  against  its  leaders. 
But  in  his  letter  to  Lilley,  De  Lassus  went  on  to  state 

358 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  359 

that  he  expected  tranquihty  to  follow  the  meeting 
and  it  was  that  expectation  which  had  caused  him  to 
approve  the  measures.  He  declared  that  he  was  always 
ready  for  common  action,  provided  the  members  in- 
tended nothing  contrary  to  the  laws  and  instructions 
which  he  must  follow.  He  asked  them  to  report  to 
him  any  specific  cases  of  injustice,  and  insisted  that 
they  must  reveal  the  authors  of  certain  seditious  broad- 
sides advising  independence.  He  would  be  glad  to 
accede  to  their  proposals  if  he  could  do  so;  or  if  not, 
he  would  hasten  to  send  these  to  his  superiors,  for  he 
was  persuaded  that  they  would  ask  nothing  but  what 
was  in  accord  with  the  laws  under  which  they  lived  so 
happily.  Thus  they  would  cooperate  as  faithful  vas- 
sals to  preserve  the  dominions  of  Ferdinand  VH. 
He  was  flattered  by  their  desire  to  continue  him  as 
chief,  and  were  it  possible,  such  an  expression  of  con- 
fidence would  cause  him  to  redouble  his  efforts  in  their 
behalf.  He  appreciated  their  ofifer  to  share  with  him 
any  responsibility  for  necessary  changes  in  the  admin- 
istration, but  as  chief  executive  he  alone  was  re- 
sponsible under  Spanish  law,  so  that  he  could  not  ap- 
prove their  generous  ofifer.  Nor  could  he  accept  the 
compensation  they  mentioned,  for  his  salary  from  the 
royal  treasury  was  sufficient  for  his  needs.  We  may 
note  in  passing  that  at  this  time  he  bitterly  complained 
to  Folch  about  the  lack  of  funds.  Yet  he  added  that 
if  they  determined  upon  a  sum,  he  would  inform  his 


360  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

superiors  so  that  they  could  use  it  as  seemed  best. 
He  approved  the  membership  of  the  committee  of  five 
and  also  the  resolution  of  the  convention  to  meet 
again  in  August.  Mills,  the  chairman  of  the  commit- 
tee, expressed  his  gratification  at  the  tone  of  this  com- 
munication, and  promised  to  give  it  to  the  convention 
as  soon  as  it  reassembled.^ 

This  letter  is  in  striking  contrast  to  one  that  ap- 
peared in  the  National  Intelligencer.  The  correspond- 
ent wrote  of  the  convention  as  proceeding  "  with  cau- 
tion and  prudence,  but  as  cognizant  of  [its]  rights." 
While  professing  allegiance  to  Spain,  the  delegates  de- 
cided all  local  matters  for  themselves,  and  upon  the 
definite  subjection  of  the  mother-country  would  prob- 
ably declare  their  independence.  This  would  present 
a  serious  problem  to  the  southern  part  of  the  United 
States.  When  a  country  was  conquered,  its  dependen- 
cies might  submit  or  resist  as  they  saw  fit.  No  one 
could  doubt  the  choice  of  the  Florida  people.  To  give 
point  to  this  view,  there  was  published  a  report  from 
Pinckneyville  that  five  hundred  men  were  on  their 
way  to  Baton  Rouge  to  support  the  executive.  This 
rumor  was  probably  based  on  Shepherd  Brown's  offer, 
and  the  writer  suggesting  it  stated  that  if  the  people  of 
West  Florida  were  wise,  they  would  take  the  fort  ere 
these  reenforcements  arrived.     Moreover  there  were 

1  De  Lassus  to  the  Committee,  July  30,  1810,  Mills  to  De 
Lassus,  Aug.  3,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  36 1 

suggestions  in  the  press  of  New  Orleans  and  else- 
where that  a  declaration  of  independence  by  the 
people  of  West  Florida  would  probably  be  followed  by 
annexation  to  the  United  States.^ 

These  reports  greatly  encouraged  Holmes,  but 
alarmed  Folch.  The  latter  naturally  associated  this 
movement  with  the  contemporary  declaration  of  in- 
dependence in  Caracas,  which  elicited  favorable  com- 
ment from  the  American  newspapers.  On  returning 
to  Pensacola  from  Havana,  he  found  dispatches  from 
De  Lassus,  bearing  the  date  of  June  20  and  22,  which 
had  come  by  way  of  New  Orleans.  They  were  ac- 
companied by  papers  reporting  later  and  more  serious 
events,  and  by  some  information  from  St.  Helena, 
which  also  aroused  his  keen  distrust.  He  immediately 
wrote  for  an  explanation  and  promised  on  receiving 
it  to  leave  for  the  threatened  region.  But  everything 
depended  upon  the  requisite  funds. 

By  the  end  of  August,  Captain  Luis  Piernas  ar- 
rived at  Pensacola  with  a  remittance  of  fifty  thousand 
pesos.  Folch  immediately  sent  him  with  six  thousand 
pesos  as  his  special  messenger  to  De  Lassus.  He  was 
to  observe  and  report  in  detail  upon  everything  hap- 
pening in  Baton  Rouge.  Folch  wrote  his  ill-fated 
subordinate  that  he  was  sending  a  special  messenger, 
because  De  Lassus'  silence  was  causing  him  to  believe 
that  he  could  not  otherwise  communicate  with  him. 

2  National  Intelligencer,  Sept.  24,  26,  1810;  Democratic 
Clarion  and  Tennessee  Gazette,  July  27,  1810. 


362  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

He  advised  the  executive,  if  possible,  to  retire  to  the 
Chifonte  under  pretext  of  ill  health,  and  said  that  he 
would  try  to  meet  him  there.^ 

Shortly  after  he  had  dispatched  Piernas  to  Baton 
Rouge,  Folch  received  from  De  Lassus  a  communica- 
tion, dated  August  4,  giving  a  resume  of  events  to' 
that  date.  This  was  his  first  definite  information  re- 
garding actual  events  in  Baton  Rouge,  but  the  fact 
that  five  weeks  had  elapsed  since  it  was  penned  did 
not  relieve  his  anxiety  or  give  him  renewed  confidence 
in  De  Lassus.  Both  he  and  Morales  believed  that  it 
was  possible  for  him  to  have  proceeded  against  the 
convention  even  at  that  late  date.  He  should  have 
dissolved  the  committee  of  five,  prohibited  the  reas- 
sembling of  the  deputies,  seized  their  journal,  and 
taken  other  measures  to  preserve  the  royal  authority. 
Yet  he  had  done  none  of  these  things,  and  thus  laid 
himself  open  to  charges  freely  made  in  the  Orleans 
papers,  that  he  was  an  accomplice  in  the  project  for 
independence.  His  own  attempt  to  explain  his  course 
simply  added  to  the  suspicions.  Although  Folch  had 
been  his  fast  friend,  even  he  could  no  longer  approve 
his  course.  But  he  and  Morales  felt  that  the  Amer- 
icans were  secretly  behind  the  movement  for  inde- 
pendence.* 

3  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Aug.  6,  8,  27,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba. 

*  Morales  to  Hormazas,  reservado,  Sept.  30,  1810,  Legajo 
267,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  363 

When  the  representatives  of  the  people  of  Baton 
Rouge  reassembled  in  convention,  on  August  13,  the 
Mississippi  executive  followed  Secretary  Smith's  sug- 
gestion and  sent  his  own  personal  agent,  Colonel 
Joshua  G.  Baker,  to  ascertain  their  real  views  and 
those  of  their  constituents.  The  convention  remained 
in  session  for  three  days,  and  then  adjourned  to  per- 
mit De  Lassus  to  act  upon  its  measures.  Among 
others,  the  members  favored  arming  the  entire  militia. 
As  the  people  cherished  no  resentment  against  the 
government  under  which  they  lived  so  happily,  the 
authorities,  they  said,  had  nothing  to  fear  from  this 
action.  Significant  as  this  measure  was,  it  was  less 
important  than  "  an  ordinance  for  the  public  security 
and  good  administration  of  Justice  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  Baton  Rouge  and  in  West  Florida,"  which  they 
proposed  to  put  into  force  at  their  next  meeting.  Ac- 
cordingly they  asked  De  Lassus  to  approve  it  without 
referring  to  any  superior  authority.  A  desire  he  had 
always  shown  to  favor  them  made  them  think  that  he 
would  so  so,  especially  as  they  had  agreed  to  share  all 
responsibility  with  him.  Only  by  so  acting  could  they 
save  the  country  from  anarchy.^ 

Despite  their  open  assurance,  the  members  of  the 
convention  did  not  expect  De  Lassus  to  sanction  their 
action.     One  of  their  number  v/rote  Boiling  Robert- 

s  Address  to  De  Lassus,  Aug.  15,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba.     Cf.  Robertson,  5173. 


364  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

son,  at  New  Orleans,  that  De  Lassus  would  probably 
"accede  to  nothing  without  consulting  higher  author- 
ity, and  his  refusal  might  be  attended  with  serious 
consequences."  The  majority  of  the  office-holders 
were  English  in  sympathy,  and  this  constituted  the 
principal  obstacle  to  independence.  If  the  United 
States  did  not  countenance  their  efforts,  they  would 
probably  send  a  messenger  to  England  to  propose  an 
alliance  with  that  government.^ 

William  Barrow,  whom  we  have  already  noted  as 
one  of  the  leading  members  of  the  American  party, 
accompanied  Baker  back  to  Mississippi.  His  pur- 
pose was  to  give  Holmes  a  personal  report  of  the  pro- 
ceedings in  the  convention  and  to  reinforce  it  with 
letters  from  his  associates.  Like  Robertson's  corre- 
spondent, he  did  not  expect  De  Lassus  to  approve  the 
work  of  the  convention.  The  delegates  were  anxious 
to  learn  whether  Holmes  would  intervene  in  case  they 
needed  his  aid.  Through  Barrow  the  presiding  officer, 
John  Rhea,  informed  Holmes  that  the  members  of  the 
convention  were  anxious  for  immediate  annexation  to 
the  United  States.  He  wished  to  know  if  their  re- 
gion would  be  acknowledged  as  a  sister  State  or  at- 
tached to  one  of  the  adjoining  territories.  The  body 
over  which  he  presided  had  been  elected  by  the  people 
with  the  full  consent  of  De  Lassus,  and  so  was  em- 

<>  Robertson  to  Smith,  Aug.  26,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  365 

powered  to  act  in  a  sovereign  capacity  for  itself.''  We 
may  surmise  that  its  adjournment  for  a  week  was  as 
much  to  lay  the  situation  before  Holmes  as  to  give 
De  Lassus  an  opportunity  to  render  his  decision. 

One  of  the  important  members  of  the  convention, 
John  H.  Johnston,  was  prevented  by  illness  from  at- 
tending its  second  meeting.  Colonel  Baker  called  on 
him  while  on  his  way  thither,  and  Johnston  naturally 
interpreted  this  visit  as  displaying  more  than  a  passing 
interest  in  West  Florida  affairs.  He  immediately  in- 
formed Governor  Holmes  of  his  gratitude  for  this 
favor,  and  frankly  expressed  his  opinion  on  existing 
conditions.  Corrupt  and  "villainous  Court  syco- 
phants "  were  enabled  to  "  batten  on  the  spoils  of  the 
land"  because  so  large  a  portion  of  the  population 
consisted  of  American  refugees  or  ignorant  time- 
servers.  These  classes  rendered  necessary  the  devious 
methods  which  the  "  reformers  "  were  pursuing.  The 
population  needed  to  be  placed  "  under  the  conduct  of 
a  wise  guardian  who  will  transform  them  from  slaves 
to  men."  They  beheld  such  a  guardian  in  the  United 
States,  their  mother-country,  but  he  confidently  as- 
serted that  two  thirds  of  the  people  regarded  her  tardi- 
ness and  neglect  as  worthy  only  of  a  stepmother. 

The  Conventionalists  feared  the  possibility  of  Span- 
ish vengeance   should  they  break  openly  with  their 

'''Enclosure  in  Holmes  to  Smith,  Aug.  21,  1810  (Parker, 
4378). 


366  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

executive.  Johnston  was  prompted  to  ask  whether,  in 
the  event  of  a  break,  the  United  States  would  receive 
them  into  her  "bosom."  He  then  inserted  an  illumi- 
nating question:  "If  it  is  necesary  for  the  convention 
to  formally  declare  the  province  independent  of  Spain 
and  call  upon  the  United  States  for  protection,  will  it 
not  be  proper  to  insert  therein  two  or  three  stipula- 
tions of  consequence  to  us  but  not  interesting  to  the 
United  States  ?  "  Aside  from  these  conditions,  which 
could  not  be  considered  "  after  annexation,"  they 
would  "  cheerfully  submit  in  all  things  to  the  federal 
constitution."  His  "  stipulations "  were  that  British 
land  titles  should  be  disregarded  when  the  same  hold- 
ing was  covered  by  a  Spanish  title ;  that  actual  settlers 
should  be  entitled  to  as  much  land  as  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment had  habitually  granted ;  and,  with  certain  ex- 
ceptions, that  a  general  amnesty  should  be  granted  to 
all  Tories,  deserters,  and  fugitives  from  justice.^ 

These  conditions  seem  to  imply  that  the  aims  of 
the  "  reformers "  were  not  wholly  unselfish.  They 
evidently  expected  a  reward  for  the  risk  involved  in 
their  devious  method  of  bringing  about  American  in- 
tervention. It  is,  however,  possible  to  interpret  their 
stipulations  as  something  more  than  a  bid  for  free 
lands.  The  third  proviso,  though  rather  indefinite, 
was  in  keeping  with  the  later  recommendations  of 
Claiborne  and  Holmes.     The  proposition  in  regard  to 

s  Johnston  to  Holmes,  Aug.  14,  1810  (Parker,  4379). 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  367 

British  titles  probably  arose  from  the  fact  that  some 
lands  in  West  Florida  had  been  abandoned  by  their 
owners  during  the  confusion  that  existed  from  1779 
to  1781,  and  were  later  occupied  by  immigrants  who 
derived  their  title  from  Spanish  sources  alone.  This 
would  explain  the  proviso  in  regard  to  the  size  of  land 
grants.  There  is  a  possibility  that  some  of  the  lands 
in  question  had  been  acquired  from  Morales  since 
the  Louisiana  Purchase,  and  that  title  to  them  might 
prove  defective  in  view  of  the  American  claim  to 
this  territory,  unless  there  was  an  expressed  stipu- 
lation to  the  contrary. 

Holmes  was  naturally  impressed  by  Rhea's  and 
Johnston's  letters  and  by  Barrow's  personal  report. 
He  frankly  told  Barrow,  however,  that  he  had  no 
instructions  to  justify  his  interference  in  West  Flor- 
ida. He  was  merely  to  collect  and  transmit  to  the 
seat  of  government  information  of  the  events  that 
might  happen  there,  but  personally  he  hoped  that  all 
these  "would  eventuate"  for  the  good  of  the  people. 
In  his  letter  to  Secretary  Smith  he  cautiously  ven- 
tured to  arouse  the  administration  by  calling  atten- 
tion to  a  newspaper  report  that  Governor  Folch  was 
at  Pensacola,  having  just  returned  from  Havana  with 
a  large  force  destined  for  service  at  Baton  Rouge.'* 

Meanwhile,  at  that  center,  George  Mather  and 
Philip  Hickey  were  striving  to  induce  De  Lassus  to 

^Holmes  to  Smith,  Aug.  21,  1810  (Parker,  4376). 
25 


368  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

accept  the  measures  of  the  convention.  These  two 
men  had  acted  as  his  personal  representatives  during 
the  first  disturbance  at  Bayou  Sara  and  were  able  to 
give  reliable  information  of  existing  conditions.  Pos- 
sibly Hickey  was  a  biassed  adviser,  for  he  had  been 
identified  with  the  earlier  movements  for  a  convention 
that  occurred  late  in  1808.  This  fact  and  his  subse- 
quent activity  in  the  present  developments,  as  Folch 
later  remarked,  should  have  disqualified  him.  But 
he  and  his  com.panion  now  assured  the  executive  that 
he  could  save  his  jurisdiction  from  anarchy  only  by 
approving  the  action  of  the  convention. 

Its  proposals,  they  contended,  were  neither  disloyal 
nor  unreasonable.  Some  anonymous  papers,  revolu- 
tionary in  character,  were,  it  is  true,  being  circulated 
by  individuals  who  had  little  to  lose  in  an  era  of  dis- 
order. The  calling  of  the  convention  had  been  the 
work  of  the  more  respectable  elements  of  the  popula- 
tion. To  hold  this  element,  there  must  be  adopted 
a  less  costly  and  elaborate  method  of  administering 
justice,  one  requiring  in  trivial  cases  fewer  journeys 
from  remote  settlements  to  Baton  Rouge  and  fewer 
appeals  to  more  distant  tribunals.  These  people  also 
complained  of  some  of  the  subordinate  officials,  es- 
pecially the  surveyors.  At  the  time  when  the  mother 
nation  was  fighting  for  its  very  life  against  the 
usurper,  many  believed  that  they  should  provide  for 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  369 

the  maintenance  of  their  own  government."  We  may 
note  in  this  defense  the  unexpressed  but  yet  definite 
corollary,  that  the  control  of  funds  must  also  rest 
with  the  people. 

Another  member  of  the  convention  was  not  so  favor- 
ably impressed  with  its  work.  Manuel  Lopez  at- 
tended the  first  two  meetings,  serving  as  interpreter 
as  well  as  representative  of  the  governor.  When  the 
convention  began  to  suggest  other  matters  than  the 
repair  of  fortifications  or  the  preservation  of  the  rights 
of  Ferdinand  VII,  Lopez  protested  and  retired  to 
Baton  Rouge.  Yet  at  the  request  of  De  Lassus  he 
returned  to  that  body  until  he  had  finished  translating 
a  copy  of  the  new  ordinance.  John  W.  Leonard  also 
represented  the  Spanish  party,  but  Lopez  suspected 
his  loyalty.  Lopez  sent  Morales  copies  of  the  docu- 
ments that  he  translated.  Possibly  by  this  means  he 
and  his  fellow-intermediary,  Eulogio  de  las  Casas, 
the  magazine  guard,  hoped  to  secure  themselves  from 
disagreeable  consequences  if  the  higher  officers  should 
ever  attempt  to  investigate  the  untoward  happenings 
at  Baton  Rouge.^^ 

By  this  time  De  Lassus  seemed  ready  to  come  to 
a  direct  understanding  with  the  convention.  On 
August  19  he  gave  a  dinner  to  its  members,  to  which 

^'^  Mather  and  Hickey  to  De  Lassus,  Aug.  15,  1810,  Legajo 
185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 
11  Summary,  f.  'jd,  cf.  n.  21,  p.  334. 


370  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

he  invited  other  citizens ;  the  latter,  however,  did  not 
generally  attend.  Besides  the  commandant,  the  offi- 
cial staff  was  represented  by  St.  Maxent,  Crocker, 
Morejon,  the  younger  Grand  Pre,  and  Leonard.  At 
this  feast  there  were  many  toasts  to  Ferdinand  VII, 
with  an  expression  of  hope  for  his  speedy  restoration 
to  the  throne.  The  occasion  closed  with  a  salute  of 
twenty-one  guns.  A  few  days  later  another  feast  oc- 
curred at  the  house  of  Mr.  Foulquier,  some  distance 
from  Baton  Rouge,  at  which  the  executive  and  his 
secretary  met  the  deputies.  At  this  gathering,  accord- 
ing to  the  testimony  of  one  witness,  the  list  of  toasts 
included  one  to  the  president  of  the  United  States. 
It  was  then,  apparently,  that  De  Lassus  announced 
his  acceptance  of  the  proposed  ordinance.^^ 

In  addition  to  these  two  large  gatherings,  there 
were  frequent  small  dinners  at  which  De  Lassus  en- 
tertained two  or  four  guests  from  Bayou  Sara.  Phile- 
mon Thomas,  commander  of  the  militia,  was  fre- 
quently present.  Not  all  of  these  gatherings  were 
harmonious.  At  the  conclusion  of  a  stormy  session 
attended  by  some  eight  or  ten  persons,  the  executive 
was  overheard  to  say :  "If  I  do  not  govern  well, 
take  this  baston  and  govern."  Among  the  officials. 
Las  Casas,  and  Juan  Metzinger,  lieutenant  of  ar- 
tillery, refused  to  attend,  for  they  felt  that  no  good 
Spaniard  could   countenance  such  proceedings.     Las 

^-  Summary,  fs.  53,  104. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  37 1 

Casas  was  also  unwilling  to  supply  the  powder  for 
the  salute  on  the  19th,  and  finally  did  so  only  on  ex- 
press orders  from  De  Lassus.  Celestino  de  St.  Max- 
ent,  according  to  Metzinger's  later  testimony,  re- 
ported Crocker's  alleged  exactions  to  the  executive 
and  was,  in  effect,  told  to  mind  his  own  business. 
Crocker  himself  later  tried  to  show  that  he  had  re- 
monstrated with  De  Lassus  about  the  ruined  condi- 
tion of  the  fort,  but  the  other  excused  it  because  of 
lack  of  funds.^^  This  statement,  however,  has  the 
appearance  of  being  an  afterthought. 

While  the  convention  was  preparing  its  statement 
for  De  Lassus,  additional  alarming  tidings  came  from 
Bayou  Sara,  the  storm  center.  A  certain  John  Mur- 
dock  discovered  a  broadside  affixed  to  a  tree  and 
reported  the  matter  to  a  constable.  When  this  official 
arrived  at  the  spot,  the  paper  had  been  removed;  but 
Lennan,  the  curate,  later  secured  a  copy  and  sent  it  to 
De  Lassus.  At  the  same  time  Estevan,  the  com- 
mandant, expressed  his  anxiety  over  the  critical  situ- 
ation in  which  he  was  placed,  and  begged  De  Lassus 
to  send  him  a  boat  in  which  he  and  his  garrison  of 
"  four  unhappy  soldiers "  might  retire  if  necessary. 
He  was  ready  to  sacrifice  himself,  but  he  did  not  care 
to  have  his  men  become  unnecessary  victims  of  public 
vengeance.  He  also  suggested  that  De  Lassus  should 
get  a  "  proper  person  "  to  translate  the  broadside  and 

13  Summary,  fs.  60,  y6,  77,  205,  247-251. 


372  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

strive  to  counteract  any  possible  mischief  from  it."^^ 
The  anonymous  proclamation  that  aroused  Este- 
van's  apprehension  was  signed  "  The  friend  of  the 
people."  It  began  by  saying  that  the  man  who  de- 
stroyed it  deserved  to  live  forever  under  a  despotic 
government.  The  writer  then  urged  the  people  of 
Florida  to  declare  themselves  independent,  just  as  the 
people  of  Spanish  America  were  doing.  He  drew 
unfavorable  contrasts  between  the  administration  of 
justice  in  their  territory  and  in  the  United  States,  and 
cited  cases  of  forcible  imprisonment  from  which  re- 
lease was  secured  only  by  bribery.  Those  who  knew 
republican  institutions  should  not  exhibit  less  cour- 
age than  the  residents  of  other  Spanish  colonies.  He 
referred  sarcastically  to  Ferdinand  VH,  absent  on  a 
visit  to  his  friend  Bonaparte,  and  intimated  that  the 
Floridians  should  throw  ofif  allegiance  to  him  and  seek 
union  with  the  neighboring  American  territory.  The 
result  of  such  a  movement  would  be  to  encourage  im- 
migration from  the  United  States,  elevate  the  charac- 
ter of  the  people,  and  give  value  to  their  lands.  They 
had  already  taken  one  step  toward  self-government 
and  should  now  take  another.  Having  elected  men 
who  were  recognized  as  of  firm  character,  just  prin- 
ciples, and  republican  spirit,  they  should  further  their 
efforts  to  the  uttermost.     Spanish  oppression  was  no 

i*Estevan  to  De  Lassus,  Aug.  14,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  373 

more.  They  might  freely  communicate  with  each 
other  and  adopt  a  form  of  government  that  afforded 
them  protection  and  liberty.  For  this  purpose,  let 
them  form  httle  parties  among  their  friends  and  send 
to  other  representatives  the  report  of  their  action.  In 
this  way  the  convention  would  know  that  the  people 
were  ready  to  sustain  them  in  every  step  toward  in- 
dependence and  would  proceed  to  that  end  with  firm- 
ness and  decision.  As  their  representatives  had  al- 
ready heard  from  those  who  wished  to  continue  the 
Spanish  system,  they  should  now  be  given  the  views 
of  the  friends  of  liberty  and  justice.  Such  com- 
munications would  be  kept  secret  so  that  their  authors 
need  fear  no  betrayal. 

The  writer  of  this  broadside  stated  that  he  was 
known  to  many  of  his  fellow-citizens,  although  he 
withheld  his  name.  Along  with  others  he  had  long 
sufifered  the  evils  flowing  from  despotism.  He  as- 
sured them  that  the  party  in  favor  of  independence 
was  growing,  and  that  their  "brothers  of  the  United 
States "  would  fervently  rejoice  in  their  return  to 
liberty  and  a  system  of  "  pure  republicanism."  They 
should  repose  confidence  in  their  delegates  and  sus- 
tain their  actions,  and  thus  avoid  the  necessity  of 
calling  another  convention  before  they  were  ready  to 
choose  an  independent  legislative  body.^^ 

This  information   from  Bayou  Sara  naturally  in- 

15  Robertson,  5172. 


374 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 


creased  the  distrust  with  which  De  Lassus  regarded 
the  delegates  who  came  from  that  locahty.  A  com- 
munication received  from  Shepherd  Brown  called  into 
question  the  loyalty  of  those  from  St.  Helena  and  Tan- 
chipaho.  The  people  of  these  localities  were  aroused 
by  a  report  that  the  former  commander,  Hevia,  was 
about  to  resume  control  on  the  Ticfau.  Their  atti- 
tude and  the  report  of  disturbances  in  New  Feliciana 
also  led  Brown  to  distrust  his  militia  officers.  The 
representatives  from  his  locality  had  joined  their  com- 
panions in  accepting  the  proposed  legislative  reforms, 
and  this  exerted  a  prejudicial  effect  upon  their  con- 
stituents. Yet  Brown  felt  that  the  greater  portion  of 
the  people  would  be  loyal,  and  only  feared  that  French 
refugees  might  cause  serious  disturbance  in  case  hos- 
tilities should  occur. ^^ 

Following  Brown's  missive  came  a  more  alarming 
dispatch  from  Estevan.  He  reported  that  members 
of  the  convention,  since  their  adjournment,  were  car- 
rying on  a  sort  of  referendum  among  their  constituents. 
As  they  knew  De  Lassus  could  not  grant  their  de- 
mands, their  action  was  a  virtual  "Hfting  of  the 
mask."  Captain  Johnston,  Estevan  had  just  learned, 
had  ordered  his  company  to  be  ready  to  join  with 
others  in  a  march  on  Baton  Rouge.  Those  who  were 
concerned  in  this  movement  were  largely  "laborers, 

16  Brown  to  De  Lassus,  Aug.  19,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba  (Robertson,  5174). 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  375 

low  tavern  keepers,  and  traders,  captained  by  the 
enemies  of  our  government."  More  than  half  the 
people  were  opposed  to  this  action,  but  they  dared  not 
show  their  disapproval,  nor  could  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties support  them.  In  a  later  letter  Estevan  promised 
to  declare  who  were  the  enemies  and  who  the  friends 
of  the  Spanish  regime.  At  present  his  Hfe  was  in 
danger  and  he  was  without  resources.  De  Lassus, 
therefore,  need  not  be  surprised  to  hear  that  he  had 
taken  refuge  at  Pointe  Coupee.^'^ 

On  the  following  day,  August  21,  De  Lassus  as- 
sembled a  general  junta  in  the  government  house  at 
Baton  Rouge,  to  consider  the  critical  situation.  There 
were  present  on  this  mournful  occasion  Gilbert  Leon- 
ard, Celestino  de  St.  Maxent,  Raphael  Crocker,  Fran- 
cisco Morejon,  Luis  de  Grand  Pre,  Cristobal  de 
Armas,  and  other  officers  of  the  military  establish- 
ment. De  Lassus  told  them  that  he  adopted  this 
course  to  avoid  any  calumniating  attacks  on  his  own 
character.  Although  without  resources,  he  had  sought 
by  all  means  possible  to  avoid  insults  to  his  flag.  At 
the  time  of  his  accession  to  office  he  had  warned  his 
superiors  what  must  inevitably  happen.  He  could 
not  depend  on  the  militia  in  case  of  a  popular  move- 
ment, and  therefore  needed  veteran  troops.  Early 
in  1809  he  had  reported  that  the  fort  was  useless ;  and 

1''' Estevan  to  De  Lassus,  Aug.  20,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles 
de  Cuba  (Robertson,  5775). 


376  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

although  nothing  alarming  had  since  occurred,  he  had 
received  no  reenforcements  nor  any  reply  to  his  re- 
ports. 

He  had  absolutely  nothing  with  which  to  undertake 
repairs.  The  government  owed  both  its  employees 
and  its  contractors,  but  the  storehouses  were  nearly 
empty  and  the  treasury  was  absolutely  without  funds. 
Notwithstanding  his  utmost  efforts  he  could  obtain 
no  credit  even  for  urgent  needs.  All  the  patriotic 
contributions  consisted  only  of  promises  to  pay. 
When  the  first  rumors  of  disturbances  in  Bayou  Sara 
arose,  he  requested  assistance  from  his  superiors,  but 
so  far  without  response.  His  action  in  sending  special 
representatives  to  that  district  had  resulted  in  a  con- 
vention from  which  arose  the  present  demand  for  a 
constitution.  He  had  reported  this  to  the  consul  at 
New  Orleans,  but  also  without  result.  The  new  con- 
stitution at  least  professed  loyalty  to  Ferdinand  VH. 
If  he  did  not  accept  it,  he  would  expose  his  flag  to 
greater  insults  and  his  employees  and  himself  to  vio- 
lence. With  his  existing  forces  he  could  not  check 
the  movement.  The  disturbers  of  peace,  joined  by 
roving  vagabonds,  would  lay  siege  to  the  fort  at  the 
first  moment  of  opposition  and  visit  their  rage  on  the 
peaceful  inhabitants.  The  militia  officers  informed 
him  that  their  men  were  on  the  point  of  rebellion, 
and  he  had  advised  his  superiors  of  this  condition. 
He  thought  that  the  Floridas,  like  the   rest  of  the 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  377 

Spanish  dominions,  were  menaced  by  French  in- 
trigues, so  that  he  need  expect  no  aid.  In  fact,  when 
he  informed  them  that  the  one  drummer  of  his  force 
had  died,  they  asked  him  for  the  drum.  His  request 
for  powder  in  the  preceding  February  had  ehcited 
nothing  more  substantial  than  a  premise  to  send  some. 
Thus  at  each  salute  his  artillery  approached  useless- 
ness,  even  if  it  had  not  already  reached  that  point 
through  lack  of  carriages  and  other  fittings.  Pending 
the  decision  of  his  superiors,  De  Lassus  believed  that 
he  was  under  the  necessity  of  accepting  the  program 
of  the  convention,  in  order  to  save  the  province  from 
civil  strife.  He  and  his  colleagues  thought  that  they 
could  safely  do  so,  with  the  exception  of  the  provision 
for  salaries,  as  long  as  the  delegates  maintained  an 
appearance  of  loyalty  and  seemed  to  be  working  to 
preserve  the  province  for  Ferdinand  VH.  On  the 
first  indication  of  a  contrary  purpose,  he  and  the  others 
would  repair  to  the  fort  and  defend  themselves  to  the 
last  extremity.  Such  was  the  decision  reached  by  the 
assembled  company  after  two  hours'  deliberation.^^ 

This  qualified  approval  did  not  indicate  that  these 
subordinates  assumed  any  of  the  responsibility  belong- 
ing to  De  Lassus.  One  who  is  inclined  to  believe  that 
the  latter  did  not  overestimate  the  difficulties  of  his 
position  may  still  speculate  on  the  action  of  a  more 

18  Report  of  the  Junta  in  Baton  Rouge,  Aug.  21, 1810,  Legajo 
185,  Papeles  de  Cuba  (Robertson,  5176). 


378  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

determined  executive.  De  Lassus  then  had  the  tacit 
support  of  his  associates  with  the  possible  exception 
of  Juan  Metzinger  and  Luis  de  Grand  Pre.  His 
superiors  were  later  inclined  to  doubt  his  absolute  lack 
of  resources.  They  wondered  why  he  had  not  told 
the  others  of  Shepherd  Brown's  offer  to  bring  five 
hundred  men  to  his  defense.  But  it  seems  likely,  as 
Crocker  explained,  that  he  lacked  confidence  in  the  in- 
habitants even  of  that  jurisdiction.^^  Then,  too,  he 
may  have  feared  that  such  an  appeal  would  result  in  a 
bloody  outbreak,  which  he  hoped  to  prevent  by  tem- 
porizing. In  time  he  might  receive  sufficient  aid  to 
restore  conditions  as  before.  Owing  to  the  fact  that 
the  great  majority  of  the  people  were  Americans,  he 
could  not  hope  to  overawe  one  portion  by  appealing 
to  the  uncertain  loyalty  of  another. 

On  the  day  following  this  meeting  the  members 
of  the  convention,  with  but  one  dissenting  vote,  passed 
a  resolution  which  may  be  regarded  as  a  fresh  attempt 
to  grasp  power  for  themselves.  Disguising  it  as  a 
practical  expression  of  loyalty  to  Ferdinand  VII,  they 
told  De  Lassus  that  in  such  a  time  of  danger  as  now 
threatened  the  Spanish  monarchy,  they  wished  to  con- 
tribute to  its  necessities.  They  could  best  do  so  by 
assuming  their  own  expenses,  and  this  would  neces- 
sitate some  changes  in  their  form  of  government.  It 
would  be  well  to  allow  the  people  to  select  represen- 

19  Summary,  f  s.  206,  228-230. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  379 

tatives,  who  should  apportion  the  taxes  and  also  es- 
tablish new  judicial  districts,  where  rich  and  poor 
might  receive  equal  justice  without  delay.  By  speed- 
ily approving  their  general  plan,  he  would  create  con- 
fidence, stimulate  their  eagerness  to  assist  the  mother- 
country,  and  enable  them  to  avoid  threatening  dangers. 
They  assured  De  Lassus  of  their  anxiety  in  behalf  of 
the  national  cause  and  their  readiness  to  obey  the 
laws  of  their  legitimate  sovereign  when  he  should  be 
restored  to  the  throne.^"  This  action  may  have  been 
taken  at  a  gathering  held  at  Foulquier's  house. 

Urged  on  by  the  supporters  of  the  new  constitution 
and  with  the  tacit  consent  of  his  associates,  De  Lassus, 
on  August  23,  sanctioned  the  measures  taken  by  the 
assembly  for  public  security  and  better  administra- 
tion of  justice.  This  action,  proclaimed  as  a  joint 
agreement  pending  the  decision  of  the  captain-gen- 
eral, gave  these  measures  the  force  of  law.  In  the 
interim  the  executive  begged  all  good  citizens  to  re- 
main peaceful,  for  he  and  the  representatives  were 
working  in  their  behalf.  They  had  no  intention  of 
punishing  those  who  had  hitherto  been  guilty  of  dis- 
order, yet  they  would  do  so  in  the  case  of  future  dis- 
turbers of  the  peace.  The  name  of  Philemon  Thomas 
appears  among  the  signatures  and  that  of  William 
Cooper    is    lacking.      On    the    sam.e    date    Rhea    in- 

20  Representation  to  De  Lassus,  Aug.  22,  1810  (Robertson, 
S179). 


380  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

formed  De  Lassus  that  the  convention  would  continue 
to  hold  its  meetings  at  the  house  of  a  certain  Egan 
until  they  could  finish  the  business  on  hand,  but 
would  notify  him  if  they  deemed  it  necessary  to  con- 
tinue their  sessions  longer  or  to  adjourn  elsewhere.^^ 
On  the  29th  the  members  adjourned  to  meet  again 
on  the  first  Monday  in  November.  Before  separat- 
ing they  took  some  further  significant  action.  With- 
out any  dissent  they  authorized  the  establishing  of  a 
printing-press  and  the  formation  of  a  medical  society. 
We  may  believe,  however,  that  the  last  named  organ- 
ization was  not  designed  to  purge  the  land  of  the  dis- 
orders that  beset  it.  Robert  Percy  of  New  Feliciana, 
Shepherd  Brown  of  Ticfau,  and  Fulwar  Skipwith  of 
Baton  Rouge  were  designated  as  associate  justices  to 
act  with  De  Lassus.  This  seems  to  be  the  first  time 
Skipwith's  name  is  mentioned  in  these  proceedings. 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  of  New  Feliciana  was  appointed 
sheriff,  and  Andrew  Steele  registrar  of  land  claims. 
Gilbert  Leonard,  Bryan  MacDermott,  and  Daniel 
Raynor  of  St.  Helena  were  to  be  civil  commandants. 
Philemon  Thomas  was  appointed  colonel  and  com- 
mandant of  all  the  militia,  with  Samuel  Fulton  as 
lieutenant-colonel,  George  Mather,  Jr.,  first  major, 
and  Reuben  Curtis  second  major.     Isaac  Johnson  was 

21  Robertson,  5178,  5180;  National  Intelligencer,  Oct.  i, 
1810;  Favrot,  in  Publications  of  the  Louisiana  Historical  So- 
ciety, Vol.  I,  Pt.  II,  44,  45. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  38 1 

major  of  the  cavalry,  which  was  to  comprise  three 
troops.  The  convention  was  also  to  nominate  judges 
according  to  the  system  in  vogue  in  the  United  States, 
and  Skipwith's  name  appears  in  the  list.  Thus  assum- 
ing control  of  the  purse,  the  sword,  and  the  scales  of 
justice,  the  convention  left  little  for  De  Lassus  to  do, 
yet  it  proffered  him  a  salary  of  three  thousand  dollars." 

In  his  next  letter  to  Secretary  Smith,  Governor 
Holmes  reported  that  contrary  to  general  expecta- 
tions, De  Lassus  had  sanctioned  the  measures  pro- 
posed by  the  convention.  By  doing  so  he  had  "di- 
vested himself  of  most  of  the  povv^ers  of  his  office," 
retaining  little  but  the  "name  and  salary."  "It  can 
scarcely  be  necessary  to  inform  you  that  this  sur- 
render of  authority  was  not  a  matter  of  choice  on 
[his]  part,"  he  added;  but  as  a  result  of  his  seeming 
compliance,  De  Lassus  and  the  convention  jointly  pub- 
lished their  proclamation  describing  the  new  order  of 
things.  A  knowledge  that  the  harmony  indicated  by 
the  joint  proclamation  was  a  forced  one  and  that  a 
majority  of  the  people  favored  American  intervention 
led  Holmes  to  predict  that  their  agreement  would  be 
of  short  duration. 

According  to  Holmes,  no  one  thought  that  the  terri- 
tory could  long  maintain  a  separate  existence  if  the  in- 
habitants should  declare  independence,  nor  escape  the 
resentment  of  Spain  if  that  power  should  regain  con- 

22  Summary,  f  s.  89,  206 ;  National  Intelligencer,  Oct.  i,  1810. 


382  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

trol.  But  they  were  determined  to  hazard  everything 
rather  than  submit  to  the  Spanish  officials.  The 
French  government  was  so  obnoxious  to  all  parties 
that  it  had  scarcely  an  advocate  in  the  province.  The 
friends  of  Great  Britain  were  numerous,  intelligent, 
and  active  in  seeking  proselytes,  and  especially  repre- 
sented the  commercial  advantages  to  be  gained  by 
union  with  that  power.  He  believed  that  the  Amer- 
ican party  were  determined  to  bring  the  subject  be- 
fore Congress  at  its  next  session,  unless  the  British 
agents  persuaded  them  to  act  otherwise.^^  It  is  inter- 
esting to  note  that  this  same  course  of  action — an  ap- 
peal to  Congress  supported  by  the  fear  of  British 
aggression — characterized  certain  stages  of  the  later 
annexation  movement  in  Texas  and  California. 

The  convention  had  appointed  a  committee  of  three 
to  act  with  De  Lassus  in  administrative  matters  until 
it  should  reassemble.  On  September  12  De  Lassus 
addressed  these  men,  Philip  Hickey,  Thomas  Lilley, 
and  Manuel  Lopez,  in  regard  to  a  proposed  change 
in  the  constitution.  He  wished  to  provide  for  a  mili- 
tary official  to  act  in  his  stead  in  the  case  of  his  absence 
or  disability.  This  would  make  no  substantial  change 
in  the  form  of  government  and  he  hoped  they  would 
agree  to  it.  The  commissioners  objected  because  it 
would  mean  that  such  an  official  could  perform  judi- 
cial as  well  as  military   functions.     They  suggested, 

23  Holmes  to  Smith,  Sept.  12,  1810  (Parker,  4381). 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  383 

therefore,  that  the  matter  should  be  submitted  to  the 
convention,  which  was  to  meet  before  the  superior 
judicial  tribunal  held  its  first  session.  As  in  previous 
cases,  De  Lassus  apparently  acquiesced,  although  he 
reiterated  his  intention  not  to  accept  any  salary  until 
he  heard  from  his  superiors.  In  case  any  vacancy 
should  occur  in  his  staff,  he  and  the  deputies  should 
determine  the  question  of  incumbent  until  the  conven- 
tion could  meet  or  the  captain-general  should  decide 
otherwise.-'* 

It  was  about  this  time  that  Captain  Piernas,  Folch's 
messenger,  reached  Baton  Rouge.  He  found  every- 
thing outwardly  peaceful,  very  likely  because  De 
Lassus  had  recently  accepted  the  new  constitution. 
De  Lassus  showed  Piernas  that  he  had  been  obliged 
to  take  this  step  in  order  to  preserve  public  tranquility. 
The  other  learned  that  not  all  the  subordinate  officials 
approved  their  commandant's  course.  They  did  not 
feel  that  matters  had  reached  such  an  extremity  as  De 
Lassus  had  represented  or  that  he  had  taken  all  the 
necessary  precautions.  Piernas  heard  no  specific  com- 
plaints against  his  administration,  nor  did  he  notice 
any  of  those  social  gatherings  devoted  to  the  entertain- 
ment of  the  delegation  from  Bayou  Sara.-'' 

Piernas  carried  back  to  Folch  a  long  explanatory 

2*  De  Lassus  to  Committee  of  Deputies,  Sept.  12,  1810,  Com- 
mittee to  De  Lassus,  Sept.  13,  1810,  Proclamation  of  De 
Lassus,  Sept.  14,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

25  Summary,  fs.  242,  243. 
26 


384  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

letter  from  De  Lassus.  The  latter  felt  assured,  he 
wrote,  that  if  the  authorities  in  Pensacola  had  been  in 
a  situation  to  aid  him  when  he  appealed  to  them  in 
July,  they  would  have  sent  him  reenforcements ;  but 
he  despaired  when  he  learned  that  both  Pensacola  and 
Mobile  were  threatened  by  American  invasion  and  by 
internal  revolt.  Because  of  this  double  peril  and  his 
own  inability  to  trust  the  surrounding  population,  he 
was  forced  to  communicate  through  the  consul  at  New 
Orleans,  and  had  done  so  early  in  August.  By  this 
time  he  was  forced  to  agree  with  the  convention  in 
order  to  avoid  more  serious  disturbances.  He  had 
hoped  that  the  members  of  the  convention  would  sim- 
ply voice  their  complaints  and  suggest  remedies,  but 
they  were  not  content  with  such  a  moderate  plan,  for 
they  evidently  had  contemplated  another  from  the  very 
beginning.  Yet  De  Lassus  had  to  agree  with  them 
pending  the  decision  of  the  captain-general,  otherwise 
the  discontented  element,  joined  by  vagabonds  and  de- 
serters from  the  American  territory,  would  have  over- 
whelmed the  rest  of  the  population  in  the  ruins  of  the 
fort. 

Before  he  was  forced  to  yield  to  necessity,  he  had 
hoped  to  be  relieved  of  command,  as  he  had  intimated 
to  the  captain-general.  He  trusted  that  Folch  would 
not  doubt  his  loyalty  to  their  unfortunate  sovereign. 
When  Governor  Claiborne  warned  him  that  the 
French  refugees  were  ])lanning  to  attack  the  colony, 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  385 

he  had  tried  to  ascertain  who  they  were,  but  he  did 
not  have  enough  loyal  Spaniards  in  his  garrison  to 
enable  him  to  ferret  them  out  or  restore  good  order. 
The  last  letter  he  had  received  from  Shepherd  Brown 
justified  his  course,  for  that  official  acknowledged 
that  his  earlier  proposal  to  assist  him  with  five  hun- 
dred men  would  have  been  pernicious  in  the  extreme, 
especially  after  it  was  rumored  that  Lieutenant  Hevia 
was  to  resume  command  in  St.  Helena.  He  had  tried 
to  reach  Folch  through  one  of  Brown's  messengers, 
but  had  received  no  word  as  to  the  result.  This 
caused  him  to  be  doubly  grateful  for  the  opportunity 
to  communicate  through  Piernas.  He  was  unable  to 
meet  Folch  at  the  Chifonte  as  the  other  suggested,  for 
the  people  would  interpret  such  a  movement  as  a  flight. 
However,  he  believed  that  Folch's  presence  there  would 
encourage  the  better  element  in  his  jurisdiction.^^ 

Morales  had  characterized  a  previous  letter  as  an 
unavailable  attempt  by  De  Lassus  to  save  his  reputa- 
tion. The  people  had  violated  Spanish  sovereignty  in 
electing  deputies,  and  De  Lassus  had  been  equally 
culpable  in  sanctioning  their  proposed  regulations. 
Folch,  his  former  friend,  believed  that  De  Lassus  had 
failed  in  every  way  to  forestall  a  revolutionary  move- 
ment and  had  omitted  ordinary  precautions  after  he 
was  duly  warned  of  its  existence.     He  employed  Philip 

26  De  Lassus  to  Folch,  Sept.  18,  1810,  Legajo  185,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


386  DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION 

Hickey  as  his  agent,  when  he  had  every  reason  to  dis- 
trust him.  He  made  no  attempt  to  use  Brown's  offer 
of  reenforcements.  He  permitted  discontent  to  be- 
come general  by  calHng  its  devotees  together  instead 
of  crushing  it  out  in  the  locality  of  its  origin.  The 
intendant  was  inclined  to  think  that  the  New  Orleans 
papers  were  right  in  charging  De  Lassus  with  com- 
plicity in  this  movement,  and  recommended  his  imme- 
diate removal  from  command.^^ 

Captain  Luis  Piernas  returned  to  Pensacola  during 
the  first  week  in  October.  He  bore  no  reassuring 
tidings  from  Baton  Rouge  and  definitely  alarming 
messages  from  the  district  farther  to  the  east.  Among 
other  missives  he  gave  Folch  a  letter  from  William 
Cooper,  dated  at  Tanchipaho,  September  12,  1810. 
The  latter  felt  bound  to  report  the  dangerous  situation 
at  Baton  Rouge.  The  inhabitants  of  Bayou  Sara,  who 
had  been  in  a  rebellious  condition  since  the  preceding 
spring,  had  finally  secured  permission  to  hold  a  con- 
vention which  Cooper  attended.  At  the  very  first 
meeting  some  of  the  members  were  ready  to  declare 
their  independence,  but  Cooper  and  a  few  others,  con- 
stituting a  vigorous  minority,  declared  in  favor  of 
the  Spanish  regime.  The  majority  appointed  a  com- 
mittee of  five  to  make  a  code  of  laws  depriving  the 
Spanish   officials  of  all  power.     From  that   moment 

^'^  Morales  to  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Treasury  Depart- 
ment, Sept.  12,  1810,  Legajo  267,  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Sept. 
29,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


DRIFTING    TOWARD    INSURRECTION  387 

Cooper  was  certain  that  the  malcontents  desired  to 
overthrow  the  existing  system.  The  greater  portion 
of  the  people  were  opposed  to  this  attempt,  but  De 
Lassus  had  put  it  out  of  Cooper's  power  to  support 
them.  Hence  they  earnestly  desired  the  presence  of 
Folch. 

Cooper  believed  that  the  convention  at  its  next  meet- 
ing would  overthrow  the  last  vestiges  of  the  Spanish 
system,  together  with  the  officials,  would  establish 
new  laws,  and  would  select  its  own  agents.  Accord- 
ingly he  and  Captain  Jones  desired  Folch's  presence 
and  protection  before  the  meeting  occurred,  in  order 
to  save  the  unfortunate  but  well-disposed  inhabitants  of 
the  country.  This  appeal  led  Folch  to  determine  upon 
going  to  St.  Helena  at  once,  with  a  force  of  one  htm- 
dred  and  fifty  men.  Pensacola  and  Mobile  would  be 
left  uncovered,  but  after  once  landing  in  the  West,  he 
could  readily  advance  along  the  lakes  toward  the  storm 
center.  In  order  to  make  this  movement  a  success, 
he  determined  to  ask  for  reenforcements.^®  Before 
he  sent  his  message,  however,  more  distressing  tid- 
ings caused  an  entire  change  in  his  plans. 

28  Cooper  to  Folch,  Sept.  12,  1810,  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Oct. 
8,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


CHAPTER  XI 

Baton  Rouge — Insurgent  and  Militant 

Up  to  the  middle  of  September,  1810,  the  interven- 
tionists at  Baton  Rouge  managed  to  conceal  their 
real  sentiments.  So  far  their  course  resembled  that 
pursued  by  similar  juntas  in  Spanish  America  and  in 
Spain  itself.  The  moderate  elements  were  satisfied 
and  the  more  radical  ones  appeased  by  measures  that, 
with  as  little  change  as  possible  in  the  old  system, 
assured  the  people  a  voice  in  their  affairs.  But  the 
apparent  calm  was  deceitful.  Both  Conventionalists 
and  commandant  were  sparring  for  time.  One  of 
the  former  charged  that  "the  violent  aristocrats  and 
the  old  American  Tories  "  were  arming  and  organiz- 
ing to  combine  with  the  force  that  Folch,  upon  De 
Lassus'  urgency,  was  leading  toward  Baton  Rouge. 
Known  French  and  American  sympathizers,  "  not  per- 
mitted to  carry  a  fowling  piece,"  trembled  for  their 
safety  and  prepared  for  flight.  John  Ballinger,  a  re- 
cent immigrant  from  Kentucky,  Thomas,  and  a  few 
more  resolute  spirits  determined  to  act  ere  Folch  could 
arrive,  and  raised  volunteers  for  the  capture  of  the 
fort,  with  or  without  an  order  from  the  convention. 
A  rumor  which  even  Skipwith  would  not  vouch  for 

388 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT      389 

credited  the  Spanish  governor  with  plans  to  stir  up 
the  slaves  and  enlist  the  Indians  against  the  popular 
party.^  The  volunteers  hardly  needed  this  threat  of 
civil  strife,  intensified  by  the  dread  of  Morro  Castle 
and  its  dungeons,  to  say  nothing  of  savage  pillage  and 
butchery,  to  spur  them  to  the  task  before  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  may  believe  the  testi- 
mony of  his  fellow-officials,  De  Lassus  made  no  at- 
tempt whatever  to  repair  the  fort  or  to  resist  an  at- 
tempted surprise.  His  secretary  Crocker  stated  that 
he  had  advised  the  governor  to  summon  all  the  in- 
habitants and  their  negro  slaves  for  the  purpose  of 
putting  the  fort  in  better  shape,  but  De  Lassus  re- 
fused to  do  so.  He  had  no  engineer,  and  he  was  un- 
willing to  incur  the  expense  without  authorization 
from  Morales.  Crocker  pointed  out  that  the  junta  at 
Pensacola  had  passed  a  resolution  which  would  jus- 
tify the  step,  but  the  executive  believed  that  his  only 
recourse  was  to  gain  time  by  pretended  concessions. 
Crocker  then  forbore  to  press  the  matter.- 

De  Lassus  himself  frequently  mentioned  the  ruined 
condition  of  fort  and  equipment.  There  were  large 
gaps  in  the  stockade  which  constituted  its  chief  de- 
fense. As  there  was  no  outer  ditch,  attack  was  pos- 
sible from  any  direction.     The  gate  marked  a  guard 

1  Ballinger  to  Toulmin,  Nov.  3,  1810,  Skipwith  to  Constit- 
uents, Apr.  I,  181 1,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 

-  Confession  of  Rafael  Crocker,  Aug.  13,  1812,  Summary, 
fs.  246-250. 


390      BATON    ROUGE INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

station  rather  than  an  essential  point  for  defense. 
The  arsenals  and  storehouses  were  inadequately  sup- 
plied with  provisions  and  munitions  of  war,  and  the 
officials  in  charge  did  not  reside  within  the  fort. 
There  were  twenty  cannon  in  good  condition tonflhe^ 
walls  and  four  others  scattered  through  the  fort.  Two 
of  these,  pointing  toward  the  river,  were  loaded  with 
round  shot,  and  two  loaded  with  grape  pointed  toward 
the  plain.  Other  testimony  doubled  these  figures. 
Two  others  were  charged  with  powder  for  the  pur- 
pose of  giving  an  alarm,  but  the  others  were  usually 
unloaded  except  when  used  for  salutes,  as  was  the 
case  on  September  20.  Salutes  to  American  gun- 
boats and  American  officials  passing  up  and  down  the 
river  were  of  frequent  occurrence,  although  De  Lassus 
complained  that  he  had  little  powder  on  hand.  Offi- 
cers and  men  alike  displayed  a  lamentable  ignorance 
about  the  artillery.^ 

The  garrison  was  in  as  distressing  a  condition  as 
the  fort.  Later  evidence  showed  that  there  were 
fourteen  members  of  the  Louisiana  regiment  within 
the  defenses  on  the  morning  of  September  3.     There 

3  Summary,  f  s.  7-103,  passim.  The  testimony  on  which  these 
and  the  statements  in  the  following  paragraph  are  based  come 
largely  from  De  Lassus'  subordinates,  including  private  sol- 
diers and  non-commissioned  oflficers.  These  references  are 
so  numerous  and  so  complicated  that  it  seems  advisable  not 
to  give  what  would  be  only  a  catalogue  of  numbers.  Single 
definite  references  will,  however,  be  indicated. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       39I 

were  four  others  in  the  hospital  and  two  absent  from 
command.  In  addition  to  these  regulars,  whose  poor 
condition  De  Lassus  had  frequently  reported,  ten  or 
twelve  men  formed  a  militia  guard,  changed  at  fre- 
quent intervals,  in  which  the  commandant  had  little 
confidence.  A  corporal  and  three  artillerymen  under 
Lieutenant  Metzinger  had  charge  of  the  ordnance. 
The  lieutenant  had  quarters  within  the  fort,  but  the 
corporal  and  one  artilleryman  were  married  and  lived 
outside,  as  did  the  magazine  guard  and  his  assistant. 
Nor  did  they  entrust  their  keys  to  the  keeping  of  any 
officials  within.* 

The  physical  condition  of  this  force  was  not  flat- 
tering, nor  was  its  regimen  well  adapted  to  preserve 
discipline.  The  militia  lived  in  the  village  and  came 
to  the  fort  only  when  detailed  for  guard  duty.  De 
Lassus  had  a  corporal  and  three  men  around  his 
house,  and  they  were  changed  every  other  day.  The 
other  men  comprising  the  detail  of  thirty-two  privates 
and  non-commissioned  officers  from  the  Louisiana 
regiment  were  on  detached  duty  or  at  the  hospitals. 
Estevan  and  three  soldiers  were  at  Bayou  Sara  until 
just  before  the  attack.  Captain  Crocker  had  a  soldier 
cutting  wood  for  him  under  contract  some  months 
previous  to  that  event.  During  this  time  the  soldier 
did  not  perform  regular  guard  duty  more  than  twice 
a  month,  but  he  noted  that  Crocker  paid  into  the  piquet 

*  Summary,  f  s.  2,  218. 


392      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

fund  the  money  due  for  his  services.  Grand  Pre  had 
not  resided  in  the  fort,  nor  did  De  Lassus  on  succeed- 
ing him;  nor  did  Crocker  or  St.  Maxent  or  Lieuten- 
ant Morejon.  Lieutenants  Luis  de  Grand  Pre  and 
Metzinger  were  the  only  commissioned  officers  within 
the  enclosure. 

About  the  middle  of  September  it  was  currently  re- 
ported that  the  people  of  Bayou  Sara  intended  to  take 
"  friendly "  possession  of  the  fort,  relieve  De  Lassus 
of  his  command,  and  administer  justice  in  the  name 
of  Ferdinand  VIL  The  reason  for  this  step  was  the 
alleged  tyrannical  course  of  the  commandant  and 
Crocker.  It  was  commonly  believed  that  the  former 
knew  of  this  plan  and  of  the  way  in  which  the  people 
regarded  his  subordinate  and  himself.  After  occu- 
pying the  fort,  the  Bayou  Sara  contingent  would  re- 
pair it  and  pay  off  the  troops.  Metzinger  later  re- 
ported a  variation  of  this  rumor  to  the  effect  that  a 
party  of  French  brigands  was  being  organized  in  New 
Orleans  to  attack  the  fort.  The  Bayou  Sara  militia 
were  to  come  down  and  assist  in  its  defense,  so  that 
if  they  were  seen  approaching  the  fort  they  were  not 
to  be  fired  upon.  This  was  evidently  designed  to 
allay  suspicion  if  they  approached  in  the  night. ^  At 
least  the  Spaniards  so  interpreted  it.  Despite  these 
rumors  De  Lassus  made  no  attempt  to  repair  the  fort 
and  took  no  other  precautions.     Estevan,  who  reached 

^  Summary,  f.  207. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       393 

Baton  Rouge  with  his  slender  force  on  September  21, 
found  everything  quiet  there  with  no  signs  of  prep- 
arations against  attack.  It  is  little  wonder  that  wit- 
nesses who  daily  observed  its  unchanging  defenseless 
condition  later  charged  De  Lassus  with  complicity 
in  its  capture. 

Estevan  was  relieved  of  the  command  at  Bayou 
Sara  through  the  influence  of  the  convention.  In 
obedience  to  order  he  turned  over  the  property  and 
the  stores  there  to  Major  John  H.  Johnston,  and  with 
his  four  men  reached  Baton  Rouge  the  following  day. 
Francisco  Lennan,  who  had  served  as  curate  at  Bayou 
Sara,  accompanied  him.  When  they  left  the  region 
they  noticed  nothing  out  of  the  ordinary.  The  people 
were  not  gathering  arms,  but  they  already  had  them 
or  readily  obtained  them  from  the  Americans.  There 
were  rumors  that  they  were  to  meet  and  choose  new 
officials  on  the  following  Sunday.  On  their  arrival 
Estevan  was  ill,  and  took  up  his  quarters  at  a  private 
house  where  one  of  his  soldiers  attended  him.*^ 

On  the  day  that  this  guard  left  Bayou  Sara  (Thurs- 
day, September  20),  De  Lassus  held  his  last  social 
meeting  with  the  representatives  of  that  district. 
Thomas  and  some  twelve  others  met  with  the  execu- 
tive, Crocker,  and  Leonard.  None  of  the  immediate 
officers  of  the  garrison  were  present,  although  some 
had  previously   attended   similar   functions.     At  this 

^  Summary,  f  s.  4-27,  passim. 


394     BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

meeting  there  was  a  salute  of  twenty-one  guns,  doubt- 
less to  commemorate  the  harmony  which  existed  be- 
tween the  people  of  Bayou  Sara  and  the  executive 
since  his  last  concessions.  Yet  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  stock  of  powder  was  very  low,  with  no  pros- 
pect of  its  being  replenished,  this  salute  seems  highly 
indiscreet.  Some  of  the  guests  from  Bayou  Sara 
hastened  from  this  assemblage,  while  the  salute  to 
harmony  was  still  ringing  in  their  ears,  to  organize 
the  revolt  that  was  at  length  to  break  their  absurd 
union  with  the  Spaniard.'^ 

The  conspirators  naturally  threw  the  onus  of  this 
revolt  on  De  Lassus.  Thomas  had  intercepted  a  letter 
from  the  executive  to  Shepherd  Brown,  which  the 
latter  was  to  forward  to  Folch.  In  this  De  Lassus 
urged  the  governor  to  send  an  armed  force  to  his 
relief.  While  the  self-constituted  leaders  of  his  for- 
mer subjects  treated  him  with  outward  courtesy,  they 
had  deprived  him  of  all  vested  authority  and  would 
resist  any  independent  action  on  his  part.  The  execu- 
tive's appeal  was  most  natural  and  so  was  the  subse- 
quent action  of  his  opponents.  They  affected  to  be- 
lieve that  he  intended  to  apprehend  them  and  send 
them  to  Pensacola  on  a  galley  recently  arrived  at  Gal- 
veztown.  Concealing  their  purpose  from  De  Lassus 
during  their  last  conference,  possibly  held  with  a 
design  to  lull  his  suspicions,  they  hastened  their  prep- 

■^  Summary,  fs.  12-54. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       395 

arations  with  secrecy  and  effectiveness.  Two  days 
were  necessary  to  bring  their  plans  to  fruition.  A 
majority  of  the  convention  came  together  on  Septem- 
ber 22,  and  ordered  Philemon  Thomas  to  assemble 
as  many  of  the  militia  as  he  could  and  march  against 
Baton  Rouge. ^ 

For  De  Lassus  the  22d  was  a  day  of  frequent  but 
unnoticed  warnings.  He  spent  the  morning  at  the 
house  of  Phihp  Hickey,  who,  with  his  relatives,  the 
elder  and  younger  Mather,  showed  De  Lassus  in  an 
unmistakable  manner  the  hostility  of  the  people  at 
Baton  Rouge.  Morejon  reported  that  on  this  morn- 
ing a  messenger  from  Bayou  Sara  intimated  that  the 
people  there  cherished  the  same  hostile  intent.  Be- 
tween four  and  five  in  the  afternoon  another  person 
arrived  with  a  similar  message.  John  Murdock  of 
Bayou  Sara  had  sent  one  messenger  by  water  and  the 
other  by  land.  Crocker,  the  secretary,  afterwards  tes- 
tified that  he  did  not  know  of  either  of  these  mes- 
sages until  after  the  attack,  nor  did  De  Lassus  take 
any  precautions  as  a  result  of  the  warning.  Such  con- 
duct seems  absolutely  criminal,  and  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing that  the  executive  was  held  responsible  for  the 
ensuing  events. 

On  the  fatal  night  of  the  22d  the  doomed  fort  con- 
tained a  little  garrison  of  twenty-eight  men,  including 

®  Favrot,  in  Publications  of  the  Louisiana  Historical  So- 
ciety, Vol.  I,  Part  II,  45,  46. 


396      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

Lieutenants  Grand  Pre  and  Metzinger.  These  offi- 
cers seemed  destined  by  their  presence  to  be  the  vic- 
tims of  De  Lassus'  neglect  and  resentment.  The  ten 
miHtiamen  were  stationed  at  the  guard-house  with 
three  sentinels  on  duty.  Two  of  the  four  artillery- 
men were  present,  with  four  or  possibly  eight  of 
their  twenty-four  pieces  loaded,  but  without  necessary 
utensils  for  firing  them.  Fourteen  non-commissioned 
officers  and  privates  of  the  Louisiana  regiment,  in- 
cluding two  of  Estevan's  squad,  were  in  the  citadel. 
From  a  defensive  standpoint  this  part  of  the  fort  was 
certainly  ill  named.  On  the  side  nearest  the  town 
the  gate  stood  wide  open  and  remained  so.  Fre- 
quent gaps  in  the  opposite  wall  made  that  part  of  the 
defense  useless,  and  there  was  no  ditch  to  render  the 
approach  more  difficult.  The  magazines  were  locked 
and  the  officers  in  charge  of  them  were  sleeping  in 
town.  This  was  the  condition  when  at  one  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  23d  a  third  messenger  from 
John  Murdock  reached  Baton  Rouge  and  informed 
Estevan  that  the  insurgents  planned  to  attack  the 
fort  before  daybreak.  Estevan  immediately  sent  word 
to  Morejon,  who  in  turn  informed  De  Lassus.  It  was 
then  nearly  two  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

The  messenger  who  went  to  inform  De  Lassus 
paused  on  his  way  to  arouse  the  corporal  of  the 
guard  and  to  chide  him  sharply  because  of  his  care- 
lessness when  the  enemy  was  so  close  at  hand.     De 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       397 

Lassus'  house  was  only  two  hundred  paces  from  the 
fort,  yet  about  a  half  hour  elapsed  before  he  ap- 
peared, in  company  with  More] on,  and  sent  the  cor- 
poral with  his  guard  to  the  house,  bidding  him  tell 
any  who  inquired  that  he  was  within  the  fort.  But 
he  did  not  remain  there  or  take  any  precautions  for 
its  defense.  Morejon  later  testified  that  before  De 
Lassus  sent  this  guard  to  his  house  they  went  to- 
gether to  arouse  Crocker;  after  De  Lassus  arranged 
for  the  guard,  they  went  again  to  Crocker's  house  to 
order  him  immediately  to  the  fort.  As  the  executive 
and  .Morejon  started  in  that  same  direction,  and  while 
they  were  still  a  square  away,  they  heard  the  shouting 
and  firing  with  which  the  attack  began.  Crocker 
later  claimed  that  he  was  then  not  half  dressed.^ 

The  warnings  of  the  day  had  been  only  too  true. 
In  obedience  to  the  orders  given  him  that  morning, 
Thomas  directed  Major  Johnston  to  assemble  the  cav- 
alry while  he  himself  hastened  to  Springfield.  Here 
he  found  assembled  a  grenadier  company  of  forty-four 
men  under  command  of  Colonel  John  Ballinger,  "fit 
to  fight  a  Battle  for  the  freedom  of  the  world."  The 
readiness  of  this  body  suggests  that  all  arrangements 
for  this  attack  must  have  been  made  by  the  20th,  or 
just  after  the  conference  of  that  date  with  De  Lassus. 
The  leaders  secured  arms  from  the  American  side. 
At   one  on   the  morning  of   the   23d   the    forces   of 

^  Summary,  passim. 


398      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

Thomas,  Ballinger,  Captain  George  Du  Passau,  with 
twenty-one  horsemen  from  Bayou  Sara  under  Major 
Johnston,  and  Captain  Griffith,  and  five  or  six  other 
"patriotic  gentlemen,"  numbering  about  eighty  in  all, 
joined  together  for  the  attack  upon  the  fort.  Thomas 
Lilley  was  later  reported  to  be  in  this  attacking  force, 
and  some  of  the  Spaniards  testified  that  the  rebels 
completed  their  preparations  at  his  house.  When  all 
was  ready,  they  made  the  attack  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  morning.^" 

From  the  arrival  of  Murdock's  third  messenger,  an 
hour  before,  great  uncertainty  prevailed  among  the 
officers  in  the  fort.  The  subordinates  claimed  that 
De  Lassus  himself  took  no  extra  precautions,  and 
that  his  only  visit  to  the  fort,  which  few  speak  of, 
was  to  secure  a  guard  for  his  own  house.  The  ar- 
tillery was  useless  with  the  keepers  of  the  magazine 
outside  of  the  fort.  Luis  de  Grand  Pre  did  not  credit 
the  tidings  of  the  proposed  attack,  yet  he  assembled 
the  members  of  the  Louisiana  regiment  under  his 
command,  and  attempted  to  unite  them  with  the  hand- 
ful of  militia  at  the  guard-house.  A  sergeant  hastily 
summoned  from  the  outside  was  assisting  in  this 
maneuvre  when  the  attack  occurred.  The  sentinel 
in  the  rear  gave  the  challenge  "  Quien  vive,"  while 

^°  Summary,  f  s.  223-225 ;  National  Intelligencer,  Oct.  26, 
1810;  Favrot,  Publications  of  the  Louisiana  Historical  Society, 
Vol.  I,  Part  III,  18;  Ballinger  to  Toulmin,  Nov.  3,  1810,  Madi- 
son Papers,  MS. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       399 

his  fellow  at  the  powder  magazine  exclaimed,  "  Here 
they  are  now."  It  was  then  too  late  to  unite  the  two 
small  groups  that  comprised  the  defenders  of  the 
fort.  The  enemy  had  crept  upon  them  under  cover 
of  the  darkness  and  fog,  before  the  sentinel  gave  his 
first  challenge. 

Shouting  "  Hurrah,  Washington,"  and  bidding  the 
disorganized  defenders  lay  down  their  arms  and  sur- 
render, the  attacking  force,  horse  and  foot,  swarmed 
through  the  undefended  gate  and  the  numerous  gaps 
in  the  palisade  without  giving  time  for  any  opposition. 
Thomas  said  that  his  men  had  orders  not  to  fire  until 
they  received  a  shot  from  the  garrison.  The  Span- 
iards stated  that  the  members  of  the  attacking  party 
were  firing  their  pistols  as  they  advanced.  Both  state- 
ments may  be  true.  Thomas  insisted  that  his  order 
was  "  strictly  attended  to  by  the  volunteers,  until  they 
received  a  charge  of  musketry  from  the  guard-house  " 
a  few  yards  away,  which  "  was  briskly  returned." 
Spanish  testimony  indicates  that  Grand  Pre  gave  the 
order  to  fire,  and  possibly  he  and  one  soldier  dis- 
charged their  arms.  However,  whatever  he  said  or 
did  was  the  signal  for  his  own  doom,  for  he  fell 
almost  immediately,  mortally  wounded  by  two  pistol 
shots  and  a  sabre  cut.  At  the  same  time  a  soldier, 
Manuel  Matamoras,  was  killed  and  two  militiamen, 
Francisco  Ximenes  and  Andres  Martinez,  were 
wounded.  Lieutenant  Metzinger,  who  was  at  his 
27 


400 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 


quarters,  reached  the  scene  in  time  to  receive  two 
pistol  balls.  Not  a  single  member  of  the  attacking 
party  was  injured.  In  his  report  Thomas  stated  that 
the  firmness  and  moderation  of  his  men  were  "  equal 
to  the  best  disciplined  troops."  Ballinger  claimed 
that  two  thirds  of  the  enemy  fled  at  the  beginning  of 
the  attack." 

Even  the  small  loss  of  life  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fenders seems  unnecessary.  This  handful  of  disor- 
ganized men,  surrounded  and  overwhelmed  by  num- 
bers, had  no  opportunity  to  defend  themselves.  The 
attacking  forces,  according  to  Thomas's  report  and 
the  testimony  of  most  of  the  Spaniards,  numbered 
about  eighty.  Less  than  half  of  them  were  mounted, 
but  they  had  numbers  in  their  favor  and  also  the  ele- 
ment of  surprise.  Still  one  must  not  expect  too  much 
of  untrained  volunteers,  who  reahzed  that  they  could 
not  take  many  chances.  Grand  Pre  had  given  the 
order  to  fire,  and  his  fate  was  only  what  every  soldier 
must  expect.  There  is  much  to  justify  the  suspicions 
of  Metzinger,  who  narrowly  escaped  being  a  fellow 
victim,  that  both  were  sacrifices  to  the  neglect,  if  not 
the  resentment,  of  De  Lassus.  A  month  before  they 
alone  had  opposed  his  policy  in  yielding  to  the  con- 
vention.    There  seems   to   be   a   sort   of   sentimental 

^1  Thomas  to  Rhea,  Sept.  24,  1810,  quoted  by  Favrot,  in  Pub- 
lications of  the  Louisiana  Historical  Society,  Vol.  I,  Part  III, 
18;  Ballinger  to  Toulmin,  Nov.  3,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       40I 

fitness  in  the  death  of  Grand  Pre,  for  a  suspicion, 
however  unfounded,  rested  on  his  grandfather's  repu- 
tation. He  may  have  felt  that  the  family  honor  de- 
manded an  exhibition  of  reckless  bravery  and  loyalty. 
His  last  full  measure  of  devotion,  accentuated  by  the 
brutal  details  of  his  untimely  death,  evoked  real  regret 
in  the  region  where  his  ancestor's  mildness  and  justice 
were  fondly  remembered.  In  vivid  contrast  stood  the 
cowardly  course  of  De  Lassus,  a  course  that  caused 
even  his  friend  Folch,  who  had  not  adequately  sup- 
ported Grand  Pre,  to  abandon  any  attempt  at  de- 
fending him. 

Meanwhile  what  was  happening  outside  the  fort? 
According  to  the  later  testimony  of  Morejon,  De 
Lassus  and  he  were  about  a  square  away  when  the 
attack  began.  They  both  ran  in  that  direction,  but 
when  they  reached  the  vicinity,  they  found  the  rebels 
already  in  possession  and  venting  their  glee  in  shouts 
of  "  Uurra !  Waschintown ! "  Several  parties  of 
horsemen  coming  from  the  fort  met  Colonel  De  Lassus 
face  to  face.  "Alas  what  is  this?"  he  exclaimed. 
He  soon  learned,  for  they  seized  him  with  some  dis- 
play of  violence  and  conducted  him  into  the  enclosure. 
Morejon  dropped  into  a  convenient  gully,  where  he 
found  the  corporal,  Andres  Martinez,  who  had  been 
wounded  but  who  had  escaped  through  one  of  the 
embrasures.  Morejon  then  started  in  the  direction  o'f 
his  own  house,  and  soon  encountered  Crocker  with 


402      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

four  or  five  men  as  a  nucleus  for  a  force  to  retake 
the  fort.  Morejon  told  him  that  it  was  useless,  but 
gave  notice  where  he  could  be  found  if  needed.  Later 
the  two  came  together  on  the  outskirts  of  the  town, 
where  they  watched  the  rebel  cavalry  going  from 
house  to  house,  evidently  in  search  of  stragglers. 
The  two  again  separated  and  Morejon  did  not  see 
Crocker  again.  Crocker  later  stated  that  at  one  time 
he  succeeded  in  rallying  a  party  of  twenty  men  to 
retake  the  fort,  but  the  enemy  were  pursuing  him  too 
closely  to  render  this  possible ;  so  after  vainly  attempt- 
ing to  secure  some  of  his  household  goods,  he  took 
refuge  with  relatives  across  the  Mississippi.^- 

After  capturing  the  fort  and  apprehending  the  com- 
mandant, a  party  of  thirty  mounted  men  accompanied 
by  eight  or  ten  on  foot  came  to  his  house,  where  the 
corporal's  guard  was  stationed.  Firing  their  guns 
and  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  guard,  the  in- 
surgents forced  the  doors,  called  for  lights,  and  began 
a  noisy  search  through  the  house.  When  they  discov- 
ered the  strong  box  with  the  six  thousand  dollars  that 
De  Lassus  had  received  but  neglected  to  distribute, 
they  broke  into  cheers.  Posssibly  the  contents  of  this 
box  determined  in  a  measure  the  time  for  attacking 
the  fort.  The  members  of  the  party  did  not  touch  the 
money  themselves  but  delivered  it  to  their  officials, 

12  Testimony  of  Francisco  Morejon,  twenty-sixth  witness, 
Summary,  f.  lOO  ff .,  also  declaration  of  Crocker,  ibid.,  f.  211  fT. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       403 

who  had  it  duly  counted  in  the  presence  of  Spanish 
and  rebel  representatives.  Meanwhile  a  party  of  in- 
surgents led  by  Thomas  compelled  Las  Casas  under 
threats  to  give  up  the  keys  of  the  magazine.  Major 
Johnston  dragged  the  Spanish  flag  through  the  village 
dust,  while  it  was  replaced  by  the  rebel  banner,  a 
blue  flag  with  a  white  star  in  the  center.  The  same 
cheers  of  "  Uurra !  Waschintown !  "  accompanied  its 
raising. 

The  insurgents  displayed  considerable  irritation  at 
failing  to  find  Crocker.  His  wife  experienced  some 
annoying  surveillance  at  their  hands,  and  temporarily 
the  pair  suffered  the  confiscation  of  their  property. 
Even  this  was  in  large  measure  recovered  when  the 
American  authorities  took  possession  of  the  region. 
Crocker's  enemies  reported  that  he  had  prepared  for 
the  overturn  by  transferring  his  property  to  his  father- 
in-law.  Later  Crocker  came  to  New  Orleans  to  join 
a  force  that  proposed  to  recapture  the  fort.  Then  he 
went  to  Pensacola  and  tried  to  reach  Havana.  His 
actions  did  not  betray  any  great  fear  of  his  superiors. 
He  frankly  informed  them  that  he  went  to  American 
territory,  where  his  father-in-law  lived,  because  the 
insurgents  were  too  closely  on  his  track  to  risk  an 
attempt  to  reach  Shepherd  Brown  in  St.  Helena.  In 
view  of  his  subsequent  long  imprisonment  and  com- 
paratively mild  punishment,  his  conduct  creates  a  more 


404      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

favorable  impression  than  that  of  his   superior,  De 
Lassus.^^ 

Of  the  other  Spanish  officials,  Morejon  crossed  the 
river  and  ultimately  reached  New  Orleans,  where  he 
reported  to  the  vice-consul.  Gilbert  Leonard  was  ar- 
rested after  four  days,  but  permitted  to  remain  in  his 
home.  He  was  afterwards  drafted  for  the  Mobile  ex- 
pedition, but  he  found  a  convenient  refuge  across  the 
river  while  his  son  served  in  his  place.  Later  he  settled 
in  the  community,  and  on  the  following  Fourth  of  July 
an  orator  mentioned  his  name  as  one  dear  to  every 
Floridean.^*  Las  Casas,  the  magazine  guard,  left 
without  orders  to  guide  him,  remained  in  Baton  Rouge 
till  the  following  December  and  kept  a  serviceable 
diary  of  the  chief  events  that  took  place  there. ^^  The 
wounded  Metzinger  remained  four  days  in  Baton 
Rouge  and  then  went  to  New  Orleans  for  treatment. 
From  this  city  he  petitioned  for  his  pay  and  for  reten- 
tion in  the  royal  service,  but  wished  to  remain  in  New 
Orleans  until  cured. ^®    The  priest  Lennan  went  to  the 

^2  Summary,  passim. 

^^West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  126,  Library  of  Congress. 
This  collection,  an  important  source  for  the  following  events, 
forms  part  of  the  Pickett  Papers,  one  of  the  more  recent 
acquisitions  of  the  Library.  Possibly  the  papers  were  turned 
over  to  Mr.  Pickett  by  some  of  the  later  West  Florida  Claim- 
ants. That  gentleman  seems  to  have  been  active  in  present- 
ing to  Congress  claims  of  all  sorts.     See  p.  659. 

^^  Summary,  f.  75  flf. 

16  Ibid.,  fs.  202-210. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       405 

house  of  Celestino  de  St.  Maxent,  on  Bayou  Manchac 
about  five  leagues  from  the  fort.  He  reported  that 
St.  Maxent,  taking  no  measures  to  escape,  was  ar- 
rested ;  and  that  Estevan  retired  to  his  home  about 
eight  leagues  from  the  fort.  Lennan  himself  went 
across  the  river  to  the  house  of  Crocker's  father-in- 
law — evidently  a  popular  refuge — but  finally  reached 
Pensacola  by  way  of  New  Orleans. ^^  The  regular 
soldiers  were  imprisoned  in  the  fort  as  fast  as  appre- 
hended, but  were  soon  released  and  mostly  found  their 
way  to  Pensacola.  The  militia  were  disarmed  and 
kept  in  their  homes. 

Governor  Holmes  was  not  greatly  surprised  when, 
on  September  24,  Abner  L.  Duncan  placed  in  his 
hands  some  papers  that  indicated  an  immediate  rup- 
ture between  the  convention  and  De  Lassus.  One  of 
these  may  have  been  a  copy  of  the  order  to  take  the 
fort.  At  midnight  of  the  25th  Duncan  again  called 
and  informed  him  that  the  Conventionalists  had  cap- 
tured Baton  Rouge  and  with  a  force  of  some  two 
hundred  and  fifty  men  were  preserving  order  there. 
Duncan's  information  was  derived  from  Dr.  R.  David- 
son of  Pinckneyville,  whose  letter  was  accompanied  by 
a  numerously  signed  petition  requesting  a  military 
patrol.^*     The   promptness   with   which   this   request 

^^  Summary,  f.  25  ff. 

IS  Holmes  to  Smith,  Sept.  26,  1810,  Governor's  Correspond- 
ence, Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 
This  with  its  enclosures  is  not  listed  in  Parker. 


406       BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

followed  the  capture  of  Baton  Rouge  conveys  the  im- 
pression that  Duncan  and  Davidson  had  already  de- 
cided upon  this  step  and  that  they  may  have  designed 
it  to  exert  some  influence  below  the  line.  Davidson 
even  suggested  the  size  of  the  patrol  and  the  com- 
manding officers. 

Colonel  Hugh  Davis  of  Homochitto  furnished  an- 
other report  of  the  capture.  From  the  neighboring 
part  of  West  Florida  the  men  had  fiocked  in  such 
numbers  to  support  the  "American  cause"  in  Baton 
Rouge  that  their  unprotected  families  appealed  to 
Davis  for  protection.  He  professed  to  fear  a  revolt 
among  the  negroes,  encouraged  by  the  Spanish  fac- 
tion, which  in  time  would  spread  into  Mississippi  and 
cause  a  "  Santo  Domingo "  there.  Many  American 
citizens  refrained  from  joining  the  insurgents  only  out 
of  respect  for  the  law.  H  the  convention,  as  seemed 
likely,  should  deliver  up  all  deserters  and  fugitives 
from  justice,  it  would  be  well  to  have  a  military  patrol 
on  the  line  to  apprehend  them  and  protect  the  law- 
abiding  citizens. ^^ 

Following  this  double  appeal.  Holmes  at  once  re- 
quested Colonel  Cushing  to  employ  one  or  more  com- 
panies of  regulars  in  protecting  American  interests 
near  Pinckneyville,  while  he  prepared  the  militia  for 
any   emergency.      In   case   of   slave   insurrection   the 

I''  Davis  to  Holmes,  Sept.  25,  1810,  Mississippi  Territorial 
Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  9. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       407 

latter  were  to  patrol  the  line  and  apprehend  and  exam- 
ine all  slaves,  but  in  no  case  to  cross  the  line  or  appre- 
hend white  persons.  Evidently  Holmes  did  not  expect 
many  Americans  to  take  part  with  the  insurgents. 
Contemporary  newspaper  reports  seem  to  indicate  a 
contrary  situation.-*' 

On  September  29  Holmes  received  from  the  state 
department  the  long  overdue  instructions  of  July  21, 
together  with  a  duplicate  of  those  of  July  12  and  those 
sent  to  Robertson.  He  now  learned  that  he  had  an- 
ticipated the  wishes  of  the  administration  during  the 
past  anxious  weeks  and  that  he  might  meet  the  pres- 
ent crisis,  with  its  possibility  of  Indian  disturbance  or 
slave  insurrection,  with  still  greater  vigor.  Accord- 
ingly he  prepared  to  embody  all  the  militia  along  the 
border,  where  his  measures  met  with  an  alacrity  that 
was  promising,  though  somewhat  suspicious.  With- 
out deviating  from  the  neutrality  he  had  marked  out 
for  himself,  he  later  confessed  that  the  presence  of 
the  American  regulars  and  militia  doubtless  assisted 
in  quieting  opposition  to  the  convention.  Order  was 
so  thoroughly  maintained,  both  above  and  below  the 
line,  that  the  commanding  officer  soon  withdrew  the 
patrol  of  regulars  to  Fort  Adams.^^ 

20  Holmes  to  Gushing,  Sept.  26,  1810  (Parker,  4386,  4387); 
Holmes  to  Davis,  Sept.  27,  1810,  Proceedings  Executive  Coun- 
cil, Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  I;  Nashville  Clarion  and  Ga- 
zette, Oct.  19,  1810. 

21  Holmes  to  Smith,  Oct.  3,  1810  (Parker,  4383). 


408      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

In  reporting  the  capture  of  Baton  Rouge  to  Folch, 
Crocker  attributed  that  event  to  the  action  of  the  con- 
vention party  in  forcing  the  people  of  the  upper  and 
lower  regions  near  that  center  to  act  with  those  of  the 
upper  district  against  the  Spanish  authorities.  He 
understood  that  the  settlers  along  the  Amite  and  the 
Comite  and  in  the  district  of  St.  Helena,  and  the  better 
elements  generally,  were  in  favor  of  the  Spanish 
regime.  He  expected  Michael  Jones  and  Shepherd 
Brown  to  lead  the  opposition  to  the  new  system  and 
to  let  Folch  know  of  conditions  in  their  respective  dis- 
tricts. Four  days  later  Brown  himself  informed 
Folch  that  the  leaders  in  St.  Helena  were  determined, 
pending  instructions  from  Folch,  to  oppose  the  insur- 
gents. If  the  latter  should  come  in  person  to  lead 
them,  he  assured  him  of  fjve  hundred  loyal  men  who, 
with  a  few  regulars,  would  reestablish  royal  author- 
ity in  Baton  Rouge.  With  his  lack  of  resources,  de- 
lay was  critical,  for  the  insurgents  were  disarming  the 
loyal  citizens  and  strengthening  themselves  daily.  He 
had  only  a  small  force  at  one  little  post,  but  expected 
to  begin  building  another  small  fort  at  Springfield  on 
the  Nictalbany.--  Communication  from  St.  Helena 
or  from  New  Orleans,  by  land  or  water,  was  so  diffi- 
cult that  the  first  week  of  October  had  passed  before 
Folch    received    the    distressing    information    that    he 

22  Crocker  to  Folch,  Sept.  24,  1810,  Legajo  63,  Brown  to 
Folch,  Sept.  28,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       409 

already  anticipated.  This  was  speedily  confirmed  by 
an  eye-witness  of  the  capture  of  the  fort.  His  first 
impulse  was  to  lead  a  small  force  to  St.  Helena,  rally 
its  inhabitants,  restore  order  elsewhere,  and  punish 
the  insurgents.  Morales  advised  a  less  precipitate 
policy.  More  alarming  tidings  from  Pass  Christian 
that  the  insurgents  had  already  entered  St.  Helena  and 
forced  Shepherd  Brown  to  flee  to  New  Orleans,  and 
that  the  American  general,  Hampton,  had  prepared 
eight  hundred  men  for  some  secret  service,  gave  point 
to  his  advice.  Accordingly  on  October  13  he  sum- 
moned a  council  of  war.-^ 

Folch  did  not  fear  American  intervention.  He  be- 
lieved that  when  the  people  of  Baton  Rouge  learned 
that  they  would  have  to  pay  taxes  under  the  new 
regime — a  practice  not  required  by  the  Spaniards — 
they  would  gladly  rally  round  him.  Aided  by  them 
and  by  a  small  force  of  regulars,  he  could  easily  quell 
the  insurrection.  It  was  true  he  lacked  resources,  a 
lack  that  he  had  thus  far  vainly  asked  Mexico  to 
supply,  but  he  was  ready  to  barken  to  the  demand 
for  protection  against  domestic  violence.  He  pro- 
posed to  fit  out  the  two  small  vessels  in  his  service — 
the  Comet  and  the  Vivora — and  at  once  to  gather 
provisions  for  two  hundred  men  on  credit,  without 
awaiting  the  decision  of  the  captain-general.     His  as- 

23  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Oct.  8,  1810,  Legajo  1569,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


410      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

sociates  approved  his  plans ;  but  before  the  end  of  the 
week,  some  refugees  who  wished  to  settle  in  Mobile 
informed  him  that  Brown  had  fled.  The  insurgents, 
to  the  number  of  three  hundred,  were  advancing  to 
the  Pearl,  and  planned  by  the  capture  of  Mobile  to 
complete  the  independence  of  West  Florida.  The 
people  of  Pascagoula  made  no  attempt  to  defend  them- 
selves against  their  reported  excesses.  These  tidings, 
although  exaggerated,  caused  Folch  to  abandon  all 
thought  of  an  expedition  westward.  He  determined, 
however,  to  take  up  his  station  at  Mobile,  while  his 
subordinates,  with  the  voluntary  assistance  of  the  resi- 
dents of  Pensacola,  prepared  its  fortifications  for  ef- 
fective resistance.^* 

Acting  upon  the  advice  of  the  council  of  war,  Folch 
requested  aid  from  both  Mexico  and  Havana.  From 
the  former  he  received  some  money  but  no  troops. 
Someruelos  could  do  even  less.  When  the  captain- 
general  learned  of  the  earlier  events  at  Baton  Rouge, 
he  agreed  with  his  subordinates  that  De  Lassus  had 
not  done  his  duty  and  should  be  deprived  of  his  com- 
mand. He  approved  of  Folch's  earlier  plan  for  re- 
storing order  in  the  Baton  Rouge  jurisdiction ;  for  if 
the  insurgents  gained  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  they 
might  send  out  corsairs  to  prey  on  Spanish  commerce. 
When  Folch's  difficulties  increased,  however,  he  could 

24  Morales  to  Hormazas,  reservado,  Oct.  15,  i8io,  Legajo 
267,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       41I 

send  him  no  aid  and  could  only  second  his  subordi- 
nate's application  to  Mexico.  From  distant  Cadiz,  in 
the  following  July,  came  the  same  complaint  of  lim- 
ited resources.  As  Mexico  was  also  in  the  throes  of 
revolution,  the  captain-general  was  advised  to  do  what 
he  could  by  appealing  to  the  savages.  At  the  same 
time  the  Spanish  representatives  should  make  due 
complaint  to  the  American  government.-^  It  was  not 
strange  that  in  view  of  the  failure  of  all  outside  as- 
sistance, the  despairing  Folch  was  himself  later 
tempted  to  abandon  his  struggle  against  domestic  and 
foreign  enemies. 

Meanwhile,  as  the  reports  showed,  the  insurgents 
were  not  idle.  Every  man  that  could  be  spared  from 
the  plantations  rallied  at  Baton  Rouge  to  support  the 
convention.  Thither  came  reports  of  opposition  gath- 
ering head  in  St.  Helena,  of  Folch's  coming,  of  pos- 
sible Indian  uprising  or  slave  insurrection ;  but  for  all 
that  the  men  were  generally  in  high  spirits.  On  Oc- 
tober 2  Thomas  received  a  welcome  order  to  lead  fifty 
men  against  some  of  Folch's  troops  that  were  expected 
on  Bayou  Manchac,  and  to  disperse  the  malcontents 
further  eastward.  These  formed  a  party  numbering 
about  eighty  that  Shepherd  Brown  had  succeeded  in 
enlisting.  Some  sixteen  of  these  were  left  in  the 
stockade  at  Springfield,  while  Brown  used  the  others 
to  reconnoitre  the  country.     After  four  or  five  days 

25  Summary,  f  s.  103,  104. 


412      BATON    ROUGE INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

he  returned,  evidently  dispirited  at  his  failure  to  raise 
his  boasted  five  hundred  loyalists,  and  advised  his  fol- 
lowers to  disperse  and  save  themselves.  He  set  them 
the  example,  by  taking  boat  for  New  Orleans,  but 
was  later  captured  and  suffered  a  brief  imprisonment. 
Shortly  after  Brown's  flight  Thomas  and  his  party 
appeared  before  the  stockade  on  the  Nictalbany.  Its 
slender  garrison  fled  across  the  river  without  any 
show  o'f  resistance,  while  its  leader  was  captured, 
and  afterwards  killed  when  he  attempted  to  escape. 
A  Captain  Michael  Jones,  earlier  called  a  loyalist,  made 
common  cause  with  the  rebels.  These  killed  the  stock 
and  destroyed  the  property  of  William  Cooper,  and  in 
other  ways  showed  their  animus  against  him  because 
of  his  record  as  a  former  notorious  Tory  in  North 
Carolina.  The  convention  desired  to  avoid  all  bloody 
proscriptions  and  there  was  comparatively  little  con- 
fiscation or  looting  of  property.  With  these  successes 
in  St.  Helena  all  opposition  practically  ceased,  al- 
though about  the  middle  of  October  there  was  an  in- 
effectual attempt  to  stir  up  a  mutiny  at  Baton  Rouge 
and  release  De  Lassus.  The  dragoons  from  Bayou 
Sara  quickly  quelled  the  mutineers  and  banished  them 
from  the  province.^^ 

26  Moses  Hooker  to  Holmes,  Oct.  i,  1810,  Samuel  L.  Win- 
ston to  Holmes,  Oct.  2,  1810,  Mississippi  Territorial  Archives, 
MS.,  Vol.  9;  National  Intelligencer,  Oct.  31,  Nov.  9,  1810; 
Summary,  f.  226;  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Oct.  23,  1810,  Legajo 
1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       413 

The  formal  inquiry  into  the  fall  of  Baton  Rouge 
began  at  Pensacola  in  March,  1811.  In  the  following 
December,  while  summarizing  the  testimony  already 
taken,  the  fiscal  at  Havana  severely  blamed  De  Lassus 
and  Crocker  for  the  type  of  government  they  main- 
tained and  for  their  failure  to  keep  the  fort  in  a  defen- 
sible state.  In  the  latter  charge,  Metzinger  and  the 
unfortunate  Grand  Pre  were  also  implicated.  It  was 
necessary  to  give  the  three  survivors  a  chance  to  defend 
themselves.  When  the  examination  was  resumed,  in 
June,  1812,  Crocker  alone  submitted  to  it  in  detail. 
An  attempt  to  secure  the  presence  of  Metzinger  and 
De  Lassus  in  Havana  was  unsuccessful.  The  latter 
refused  point  blank  to  obey  the  summons,  while  the 
other  pleaded  ill  health  on  account  of  his  wound. 
After  a  long  delay,  in  August,  1814,  a  courtmartial 
fixed  upon  the  death  penalty  for  the  absent  De  Lassus, 
a  year's  suspension  for  Metzinger,  and  six  months' 
further  arrest  for  Crocker.  This  sentence  ultimately 
received  royal  approval.  De  Lassus  was  thus  made 
the  scapegoat  for  a  catastrophe  which  he  could  not 
prevent,  but  throughout  which  he  had  certainly  not 
acted  a  laudable  part."'^ 

Following  the  successful  coup  at  Baton  Rouge,  the 
members  of  the  convention  assembled  at  St.  Francis- 
ville  and  formally  declared  the  independence  of  West 

2'''  The  evidence  submitted  during  this  series  of  examina- 
tions is  collected  in  the  Summary  to  which  we  have  made 
extended  references. 


414      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

Florida.  In  justifying  this  step  they  mentioned  their 
earHer  desire  to  remain  faithful  to  Ferdinand  VII. 
To  this  end  they  had  agreed  jointly  with  De  Lassus 
upon  certain  regulations  for  the  protection  of  their 
territory.  These  regulations,  voluntarily  sanctioned 
by  him,  constituted  a  solemn  compact,  which  he  tried 
later  to  use  against  them  and  thereby  encompass  their 
ruin.  His  action  absolved  them  from  allegiance  to  a 
government  that  could  no  longer  protect  them.  In 
formally  declaring  their  independence,  they  made  the 
customary  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  Uni- 
verse, calling  upon  him  to  witness  the  rectitude  of 
their  intentions."^ 

Governor  Folch,  for  one,  was  not  greatly  impressed 
by  this  solemn  procedure.  Rather  he  regarded  their 
whole  attitude  as  thoroughly  snake  like.  Most  of  those 
who  signed  the  declaration,  as  he  professed  to  believe, 
were  fugitives  from  the  United  States.  An  appeal 
to  the  Supreme  Being  from  such  people  was  a  profa- 
nation that  would  cause  any  government  to  hesitate 
long  before  recognizing  them.  Moreover  the  course 
of  De  Lassus  could  not  be  regarded  as  violating  their 
joint  measures.  He  was  forced  to  sanction  them,  and 
in  doing  so  he  went  beyond  his  powers."^ 

One  may  not  agree  with  Folch's  harsh  criticism, 
and  yet  he  may  doubt  the  sincerity  of  the  declaration. 

28  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III,  396. 

29  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Nov.  i,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       415 

The  letters  of  Skipwith  and  of  Barrow  and  the  con- 
current action  of  their  associates  show  conclusively 
that  it  was  a  logical  step  toward  American  interven- 
tion. It  is  true,  as  Skipwith  pointed  out,  that  the 
people  of  West  Florida  had  as  much  right  to  declare 
themselves  independent  as  had  the  people  in  certain 
other  Spanish  colonies.  The  failure  of  the  United 
States  during  the  past  seven  years  to  make  good  its 
claim  to  the  Perdido  gave  the  residents  of  the  disputed 
territory  the  opportunity  to  declare  it  free.  But  this 
was  not  their  main  purpose.  They  wished  annexation 
to  the  United  States,  and  to  this  wish  the  declaration 
would  serve  as  a  convenient  cloak.  They  must  act 
so  as  to  create  the  impression  that  its  government  had 
not  countenanced  their  measures,  and  thus  it  could  re- 
ceive the  province  from  them  with  undisputed  title.^" 
In  their  formal  address  to  the  American  govern- 
ment, accompanying  their  declaration  of  independence, 
the  members  of  the  convention  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  policy  of  the  American  government,  as  well  as  the 
safety  and  happiness  of  its  people,  would  lead  to  the 
immediate  incorporation  of  West  Florida  into  the 
American  union.  Congress  had  so  often  declared 
them  to  be  true  children  of  the  United  States  that  it 
could  not  now  abandon  them  to  foreign  or  domestic 
foes.     Holmes,  who  acted  as  their  intermediary,  called 

30  Skipwith  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Dec.  5, 

1810,  same  to  John  Graham,  Dec.  23,  1810,  Jan.  14,  Apr.  11, 

181 1,  Barrow  to  Bedford,  Oct.  10,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 
28 


4l6       BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

Secretary  Smith's  attention  to  the  fact  that  through 
this  appHcation  "the  views  of  our  government  have 
been  in  a  great  measure  reahzed."  Evidently  he  had 
in  mind  Claiborne's  letter  to  Wykoff.^^ 

While  the  sentiment  at  Baton  Rouge  was  over- 
whelmingly in  favor  of  annexation,  its  exponents  de- 
sired some  voice  in  the  terms  on  which  it  should  be 
brought  about.  In  his  letter  to  Madison,  October  lo, 
1810,  John  Rhea  asked  for  the  pardon  of  all  deserters 
from  the  American  army,  and  a  loan  of  $100,000  to 
be  repaid  from  the  sale  of  public  lands.  The  members 
of  the  convention  claimed  all  the  unoccupied  lands  in 
the  territory,  for  they  had  risked  their  lives  to  wrest 
the  country  from  Spain.  Presumably  the  United 
States  had  relinquished  its  own  claim  by  acquiescing 
for  seven  years  in  continued  Spanish  control.  If  the 
United  States  granted  their  request  for  annexation, 
they  were  willing  to  be  admitted  into  the  Union  as  a 
separate  State,  or  to  form  part  of  a  neighboring  ter- 
ritory, preferably  Orleans.  The  United  States  cer- 
tainly could  not  give  them  back  to  the  Spanish  Regency 

31  Holmes  to  Smith,  Oct.  3,  1810  (Parker,  4383)  ;  American 
State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III,  396.  It  is  well  to  note 
that  in  the  latter  source  there  is  no  mention  of  communica- 
tions from  Holmes  bearing  dates  of  September  26  and  Octo- 
ber 3,  1810.  Yet  Madison  could  not  have  received  Holmes' 
later  communication  of  October  17  in  time  to  use  it  as  the 
basis  of  his  proclamation  on  the  27th.  Evidently  the  president 
had  some  reason  for  concealing  the  existence  of  the  earlier 
communications  from  Holmes. 


BATON    ROUGE INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       417 

or  Junta,  for  it  had  never  recognized  that  body.  Na- 
poleon could  not  interfere,  for  he  had  incited  the 
Spanish  colonies  to  free  themselves;  nor  could  Great 
Britain,  for  annexation  to  the  United  States  would 
keep  the  country  out  of  the  hands  of  the  French 
exiles.^^ 

Madison  hardly  needed  Rhea's  latter  assurances  to 
determine  him  in  favor  of  intervention.  Nor  did  the 
War  and  State  departments  perceive  any  difficulty  in 
extending  pardon  to  deserters  and  other  refugees. 
But  no  loan  was  forthcoming,  nor  could  the  insur- 
gents expect  the  United  States  to  waive  its  claim  to 
the  vacant  land  between  the  jMississippi  and  the  Per- 
dido.  Its  forbearance  in  enforcing  the  claim  had  not 
in  the  least  militated  against  it.  The  government 
could  not  abandon  to  the  exclusive  use  of  West  Flor- 
ida lands  which  were  for  the  benefit  of  all.  It  would, 
however,  treat  all  actual  settlers  with  its  usual  liberal- 
ity and  would  give  prompt  attention  to  special  needs. ^^ 

While  this  decision,  when  known,  would  probably 
check  their  zeal,  the  devotees  of  annexation  deter- 
mined at  the  outset  to  leave  no  means  untried  to  bring 
it  about.  Skipwith  approached  the  administration 
through  Boiling  Robertson  in  New  Orleans,  General 
John  Mason  in  Virginia,  and  John   Graham  in  the 

32  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III,  395,  396. 

33  Smith  to  Holmes.  Nov.  15,  1810,  Domestic  Letters,  MS., 
Vol.  15,  452,  453  (Parker,  4398)- 


41 8      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

State  Department  itself.  On  the  very  day  that  Rhea 
dispatched  his  second  missive  William  Barrow  re- 
ported to  his  friend  Bedford  what  "rapid  strides" 
they  had  lately  made  toward  annexation,  and  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  the  United  States  would  pro- 
tect them  and  annex  them  to  one  of  the  neighboring 
territories.  The  present  convention  was  wholly  in 
favor  of  this  step ;  but  another  body  might  not  be  so. 
While  liberty  then  had  an  "  enchanting  sound  "  and  they 
were  all  in  high  spirits,  militiamen  were  proverbially 
fickle.  Those  of  West  Florida  might  grow  weary, 
or  the  convention  might  become  divided,  despite  the 
good  intentions  of  its  present  members.  It  therefore 
behooved  the  United  States  to  act  promptly.  Bed- 
ford reported  the  substance  of  this  letter  to  Governor 
Blount,  and  sent  a  copy  to  Madison  with  the  remark 
that  although  the  revolution  in  West  Florida  was  still 
an  experiment,  it  was  working  out  as  predicted.^* 

Barrow's  letter  seems  to  have  been  so  timed  as  to 
give  weight  to  Rhea's  application.  Early  in  the  fol- 
lowing month  John  Ballinger,  commanding  the  fort  at 
Baton  Rouge,  wrote  to  Toulmin  with  the  same  object. 
After  reviewing  the  events  that  led  the  insurgents  to 
declare  their  independence,  and  giving  some  subse- 
quent details,  he  mentioned  the  diversion  in  their 
councils   over   the   policy  of   pursuing  the   campaign 

34  Barrow  to  Bedford,  Oct.  19,  1810,  Bedford  to  Madison, 
Nov.  8,  1810,  Skipwith  to  Graham,  Jan.  14,  Apr.  11,  1810,  Skip- 
with  to  his  Fellow  Citizens,  Apr.  i,  181 1,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       419 

against  Mobile  with  vigor  or  awaiting  action  by  the 
United  States.  With  regard  to  the  latter  policy  he 
said :  "  I  know  the  minds  of  the  people,  their  preju- 
dices and  their  Resources — and  to  you  as  an  American 
officer  as  a  friend  to  the  Government  I  wish  to  drop 
some  hints.  I  wish  the  president  and  the  whole  Con- 
gress knew  the  minds  of  the  people  here  as  well  as  I 
do.  Some  may  propose  one  thing  and  some  another, 
but  the  Great  Mass  of  the  People  wants  nothing  more 
than  to  become  American  Citizens.  But  they  would 
prefer  death  Rather  than  again  be  subject  to  any  of 
the  dependencies  of  Spain.  The  United  States  cer- 
tainly has  it  in  their  power  to  obtain  this  Country  and 
if  they  do  not  do  so  the  people  will  accept  of  any  other 
protection  that  they  can  obtain.  Succours  are  now 
offered  by  the  French  equal  to  our  present  wants. 
And  many  true  Americans  who  are  well  acquainted 
with  the  Cautious  Policy  of  the  United  States  have  no 
confidence  in  their  interference  and  are  willing  to 
accept.  But  the  Majority  will  not  consent  to  any 
propositions  till  they  hear  from  the  United  States. 

"  I  could  say  much  more.  But  I  shall  conclude  by 
praying  that  the  United  [States]  may  save  this  Coun- 
try from  the  fangs  of  Joseph  Napoleon."^^ 

Toulmin  brought  this  letter  to  Folch's  attention,  and 
added  to  it  a  stirring  appeal :   "  O,  that  I  had  the 

35  Ballinger  to  Toulmin.  Nov.  3,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 
This  is  partly  quoted  in  Toulmin  to  Innerarity,  Nov.  15,  1810, 
American  Historical  Review,  II,  702. 


420      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

tongue  of  an  angel,  never  would  I  cease  to  vibrate  in 
the  ears  of  the  Spanish  officers  that  by  manly  efforts 
on  their  part  they  should  struggle  to  awaken  the 
U[nited]  S[tates]  from  their  lethargy."  As  an  in- 
direct result  of  his  action  and  of  the  Spanish  gover- 
nor's conditional  proposal  to  surrender  his  province 
to  the  Americans,  Folch  became  an  indirect  ally  of  the 
insurgents  who  were  working  for  annexation. 

While  awaiting  the  response  to  their  appeals  for 
immediate  annexation,  the  Conventionalists  proposed 
to  change  as  little  as  possible  the  frame  of  govern- 
ment agreed  upon  with  De  Lassus.  Yet  the  members 
had  to  maintain  the  semblance  of  political  control. 
Accordingly  they  assumed  the  powers  exercised  by  De 
Lassus  and  placed  their  seal  upon  such  public  prop- 
erty as  fell  into  their  hands.  This  included  the  chest 
containing  the  six  thousand  dollars,  which  was  to 
serve  as  the  basis  for  their  finances.  To  those  who 
had  any  claim  on  the  money  they  issued  script,  re- 
deemable in  the  future  at  ten  per  cent  interest.  They 
also  provided  for  a  graduated  land  tax  to  be  levied 
by  the  alcaldes  of  the  various  jurisdictions.  A  sug- 
gestive piece  of  legislation  was  the  repeal  of  the  tax 
on  slaves,  when  introduced  by  actual  or  prospective 
residents  of  the  new  State,  In  place  of  the  unwieldy 
body  of  five  or  six  hundred  militia  that  Thomas  com- 
manded, the  convention,  on  October  8,  authorized 
John  Ballinger  to  enroll  one  hundred  and  four  regu- 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       42 1 

lars  for  duty  in  the  fort.  This  structure  was  to  be 
made  smaller  and  more  defensible.  The  military  com- 
mittee tried  to  secure  clothing  by  loan  or  otherwise 
from  the  federal  officer  in  Mississippi  Territory,  but 
evidently  without  success.  After  appointing  John  W. 
Leonard,  Edmund  Hawes,  and  John  H.  Johnston  as  a 
committee  of  public  safety,  with  power  to  draft  a  new 
constitution,  the  convention  took  a  recess.^^ 

On  October  lo  this  committee  issued  an  address  to 
the  people  of  Mobile  and  Pensacola.  In  this  docu- 
ment they  averred  that  distance  had  hitherto  prevented 
common  deliberation,  and  announced  the  appointment 
of  Reuben  Kemper  and  Joseph  White  as  commission- 
ers to  bring  about  united  action  with  their  brethren 
in  Mobile  and  Pensacola.  Although  they  had  not  yet 
ventured  to  legislate  for  those  unrepresented  districts, 
their  object  was  to  secure  the  liberty  and  happiness  of 
all  the  people  of  West  Florida.  For  this  reason  they 
wished  Mobile  and  Pensacola  to  authorize  the  present 
convention  to  act  for  them  or  to  send  deputies  of  their 
own  to  that  body.  They  promised  to  observe  good 
faith  in  all  measures  that  served  the  common  end.^^ 

Reports  that  originated  with  the  refugee  James  Hor- 
ton,  a  former  opponent  of  Kemper,  and  others  of  his 
sort,  had  already  alarmed  the  people  of  these  districts. 

3^  Summary,  fs.  51,  78,  225,  226;  West  Florida  Papers,  MS., 
29,  Library  of  Congress ;  National  Intelligencer,  Nov.  9,  1810. 

2^  Address  of  the  Convention,  Oct.  10,  1810,  Legajo  55,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba. 


422      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

They  were  told  that  a  force  of  sixteen  hundred  men, 
intent  upon  murder  and  plunder,  had  crossed  the 
Pearl.  Despite  this  manifest  exaggeration,  many 
from  Mobile  crossed  the  bay  or  took  refuge  within 
the  fort.  Some  who  were  of  French  descent  re- 
quested permission  to  move  above  the  line,  from  which 
direction  the  Spaniards  apprehended  double  danger — 
from  the  American  government  as  well  as  from  the 
filibusters.  In  view  of  the  general  fear,  Folch  wrote 
the  captain-general  that  he  must  either  display  greater 
energy  against  his  enemies  or  evacuate  the  province.^^ 
While  Kemper  was  on  his  way  from  Baton  Rouge 
to  Mobile,  rumor  credited  him  with  the  capture  of 
the  Spanish  post  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pascagoula. 
This  was  not  true;  but  a  part  of  the  people  of  that 
region  did  attempt  to  cooperate  with  him  against  the 
authorities  at  Mobile.  On  November  lo  a  number  of 
them  issued  a  statement  that  they  were  no  longer 
Spaniards,  but  were  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  form- 
ing for  themselves  equal  and  just  laws  (which  they 
had  not  recently  enjoyed),  just  as  the  people  of  Baton 
Rouge  had  done.  Thereupon  they  proceeded  to  or- 
ganize themselves  "  into  a  form  of  government  on  pure 
Republican  principles  Calculated  to  secure  the  happi- 
ness and  prosperity  of  the  People."  They  selected 
officials  who  should  adopt  regulations  in  accordance 

2^  Kemper  to  John  Rhea,  Oct.  28,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers, 
MS.,  25,  26,  Library  of  Congress ;  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Oct. 
25,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       423 

with  the  "principals"  of  the  Baton  Rouge  Conven- 
tion and  should  correspond  with  that  body  or  any  of 
its  agents.  Among  the  thirty-four  signers  of  this 
declaration  were  Sterling  Dupree,  William  Eubanks, 
Solomon  Armstrong,  and  John  H.  Gray,  who  were 
conspicuous  in  the  succeeding  events.  Sterling  Du- 
pree  was  selected  as  captain  and  Eubanks  as  second 
lieutenant  of  the  military  organization  that  they 
formed.^^ 

Unable  longer  to  trust  the  Spanish  officials,  who 
had  "  deviated  "  from  the  path  of  justice,  these  new 
insurgents  applied  to  Kemper  for  assistance  through 
Gray,  a  man  "  well  calculated  for  that  business." 
Kemper  was  more  than  gratified  to  receive  their  ap- 
plication, and  immediately  wrote  Dupree  that  the 
action  at  Pascagoula  merited  the  "highest  applause 
of  the  convention."  He  sent  copies  of  its  declaration 
of  independence  and  of  its  address  for  distribution. 
Along  with  these  he  sent  a  copy  of  the  commission 
just  issued  to  Joseph  P.  Kennedy,  which  was  to  serve 
as  a  model  for  other  volunteers ;  and  asked  Dupree  to 
give  him  any  information  that  would  strengthen  their 
cause  in  the  region.  Gray  would  inform  him  when 
"  the  star  [would]  rise  and  shine  upon  the  [region] 
south  of  31  north  latitude."  Upon  the  suggestion  of 
Colonel  John  Caller  he  was  sending  Major  William 

39  Perez  to  Folch,  Nov.  14,  1810,  Legajo  63,  Papeles  de  Cuba; 
Dupree  to  Kemper,  Nov.  12,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS., 
44,  Library  of  Congress. 


424      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

Hargreave,  a  justice  of  the  Baldwin  County  Court,  to 
act  with  Caller  as  Dupree's  counsellor,  and  he  urged 
Dupree  to  follow  their  guidance  closely.  Such  volun- 
teers as  he  enrolled  were  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance 
annexed  to  the  declaration.  He  was  not  to  abuse  those 
opposed  to  the  Conventionalists,  but  to  secure  their 
property  against  loss  and  give  them  a  fair  trial,  espe- 
cially in  cases  that  involved  personal  animosity.*"  If 
we  may  judge  from  later  reports,  Dupree  did  not  fol- 
low these  instructions  very  closely.  Gray's  report  was 
so  favorable  that  Kemper  authorized  the  raising  of  an 
additional  company  of  volunteers  with  Solomon  Arm- 
strong as  captain. 

Under  the  personal  direction  of  Gray  and  Har- 
greave, Dupree  administered  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  residents  on  the  upper  Pascagoula,  who  readily 
took  it,  and  organized  a  military  force  to  capture  the 
fort  at  its  mouth.  The  commander  of  its  slender  gar- 
rison had  already  placed  his  men  and  munitions  on 
vessels,  ready  to  sail  for  Mobile  as  soon  as  the  foe  ap- 
proached. In  response  to  additional  inquiries  from 
Dupree,  Kemper  expressed  his  pleasure  at  the  ready 
response  of  the  people  of  Pascagoula  to  his  sugges- 
tion, and  advised  the  furnishing  of  volunteers  with 
wholesome  provisions  to  be  paid  for  at  nominal  prices. 
Arms  and  military  stores  for  the  battalion  must  be 
obtained  by  capture  or  confiscation,  giving  in  each  case 

4°  Kemper  to  Dupree,  Nov.  12,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers, 
MS.,  44,  45,  Library  of  Congress. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       425 

the  necessary  receipts,  and  requiring  the  same  from 
each  volunteer  to  whom  they  were  entrusted.  Har- 
greave  and  Kennedy,  whose  "hart"  was  with  them, 
would  give  Dupree  all  necessary  advice." 

Hargreave  not  only  assisted  Dupree  to  organize  his 
force,  but  accompanied  him  down  the  Pascagoula  when 
he  occupied  the  fort  at  its  mouth  and  plundered  some 
of  the  neighboring  inhabitants.  On  his  return  Toul- 
min,  who  had  heard  of  his  activity  below  the  line, 
issued  a  warrant  for  his  arrest,  but  could  find  neither 
sheriff  nor  deputy  in  Baldwin  County  to  serve  it.  As 
we  shall  see,  Hargreave  met  his  punishment  else- 
where.*- His  more  fortunate  but  equally  culpable  as- 
sociate, Kennedy,  openly  boasted  to  Toulmin  of  their 
prospective  force  of  sixty  or  more  volunteers  on  the 
Pascagoula,  although  he  had  to  confess  that  only  a 
half  of  this  number  lived  below  the  line.  Kemper 
promptly  warned  Dupree  not  to  communicate  with 
him  through  the  post-office,  in  which  Toulmin  served, 
but  to  send  word  through  Benjamin  O'Neal,  whose 
father  had  been  one  of  his  adherents  at  Bayou  Sara 
in  1804.  He  was  as  safe  as  John  Johnson,  Sr.,  an- 
other intermediary,  and  more  conveniently  located.*^ 

41  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Dec.  6,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ; 
Dupree  to  Kemper,  Nov.  18,  1810,  Kemper  to  Dupree,  Nov.  21, 
1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  54,  Library  of  Congress. 

42  Cf.  p.  484. 

43  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Nov.  22, 1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ; 
Kemper  to  Rhea,  Nov.  23,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  55, 
Library  of  Congress. 


426       BATON    ROUGE INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

Dupree's  course  at  Pascagoula  was  the  subject  of 
much  subsequent  controversy.  Some  six  years  later 
he  wrote  to  Monroe,  asking  for  compensation  for  his 
men  and  himself  because  they  had  risked  their  prop- 
erty and  lives  to  add  that  region  to  the  United  States. 
Other  testimony  indicates  that  the  risk  largely  con- 
cerned the  property  and  lives  of  others.  At  the  end 
of  November,  1810,  the  very  month  in  which  Dupree 
enlisted  in  the  service  of  the  convention,  Joseph  Collins 
presented  a  petition  to  that  body  at  St.  Francisville  in 
behalf  of  his  client,  Elizabeth  Wilson.  She  charged 
that  on  November  2  Dupree,  Armstrong,  and  eight 
others,  all  armed,  seized  some  slaves,  private  papers, 
and  $700  in  cash  belonging  to  her.  This  indicates  that 
Dupree  was  already  embarked  in  lawless  plundering 
for  which  Kemper's  commission  gave  him  a  welcome 
cover  of  legality.  In  seizing  the  fort  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Pascagoula,  his  followers  were  charged  with  loot- 
ing the  store  of  Joseph  Krebs,  the  Spanish  syndic. 
They  seized  some  vessels,  loaded  them  with  plunder 
and  slaves,  and  sent  them  up  the  river  to  his  own  habi- 
tation. There  was  also  a  report  that  some  of  Dupree's 
neighbors  seized  him  with  the  intention  of  delivering 
him  to  the  Spanish  authorities,  but  a  party  under  Arm- 
strong rescued  him.  Armstrong  was  killed  in  the 
skirmish.**     These  events  could  not  have  given  the 

4*  Petition  of  Elizabeth  Wilson,  Nov.  28,  1810,  West  Florida 
Papers,  MS.,  60,  Library  of  Congress;  Meek  MSS.,  Depart- 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       427 

members  of  the  convention  a  very  high  opinion  of  their 
new  ally. 

Nor  were  Dupree's  operations  calculated  to  give  the 
French  denizens  of  the  Pascagoula  a  high  opinion  of 
the  American  government.  For  a  time,  indeed,  there 
was  a  prospect  that  they  might  appeal  to  the  French 
minister  for  redress.  Dtipree  not  only  plundered 
these  inoffensive  people  to  the  extent  of  some  ten  or 
twelve  thousand  dollars,  under  pretext  that  he  was 
confiscating  the  king's  property,  but  continued  his 
exactions  after  receiving  copies  of  the  proclamations 
issued  by  the  president  and  Governor  Holmes.  He 
restored  a  part  of  his  plunder,  but  disposed  of  the  rest 
above  the  line.  By  conveying  his  property  to  his 
brother  and  availing  himself  of  James  Caller's  in- 
fluence, he  escaped  the  natural  consequences  of  his 
course.^^  The  incident  presented  another  complica- 
tion when  the  American  government  moved  to  occupy 
West  Florida.  That  the  situation  was  due  to  Span- 
ish incompetency  as  well  as  American  ambition  does 
not  relieve  the  United  States  from  the  major  responsi- 
bility for  it. 

On    October   24   the    convention    reassembled    and 

ment  of  Archives  and  History,  Montgomery,  Alabama;  Toul- 
min  to  Madison,  Dec.  6,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ;  Dupree 
to  Monroe,  Nov.  16,  1810,  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol. 
52,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Claiborne,  Mississippi, 
I,  30s,  306. 

4'5  E.  Lewis  to  Monroe,  Feb.  15,  1812,  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  36,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


428      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

adopted  a  constitution  based  on  that  of  the  United 
States.  This  was  to  go  into  force  the  following 
month,  and  meantime  the  members  appointed  an  exec- 
utive committee  of  five,  of  whom  John  H.  Jchnston 
had  served  on  the  previous  committee.  His  associates 
were  John  Mills,  Philip  Hickey,  John  Morgan,  and 
William  Barrow.  This  body  made  St.  Francisville  its 
headquarters,  but  kept  in  close  touch  with  Ballinger 
at  Baton  Rouge.  The  members  charged  him  to  keep 
the  state  prisoners  and  to  maintain  a  strict  discipline 
in  his  garrison,  numbering  one  hundred  and  fifteen 
men.  They  cautioned  him  to  guard  against  surprise 
and  fire.  He  was  permitted  to  salute  the  American 
gunboats  passing  up  and  down  the  river.  His  com- 
missary was  to  repair  "  the  King's  barge  "  and  lay  in 
a  stock  of  provisions.  More  significant  was  the  order 
to  transfer  six  pieces  of  artillery,  two  hundred  mus- 
kets, and  some  ammunition  from  Baton  Rouge  to 
Bayou  Sara.  Evidently  the  revolutionary  leaders  did 
not  wholly  trust  the  population  around  the  former 
place.^^ 

In  accordance  with  their  plan  to  reduce  Mobile,  the 
executive  committee,  on  November  12,  authorized 
Philemon  Thomas  to  embody  a  force  of  six  hundred 
and  eighteen  militia  for  instant  service  in  any  part  of 

46  Morphy  to  Secretary  of  Audiencia,  Mexico,  Nov.  14, 
1810,  Historia,  MS.,  Vol.  330,  Archivo  General,  Mexico ;  West 
Florida  Papers,  MS.,  28,  Library  of  Congress;  Summary,  fs. 
78,  80. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       429 

the  territory.  He  was  to  appoint  the  necessary  field 
officers  when  the  force  should  be  mustered  for  a 
formal  campaign,  provide  for  the  payment  of  the  men 
as  regulars,  and  resort  to  a  draft  if  the  number  of 
volunteers  failed  to  equal  the  desired  quota.  In  this 
operation  they  proposed  to  use  a  part  of  the  six  thou- 
sand dollar  fund ;  and  in  addition  their  agents  in  New 
Orleans,  under  the  guarantee  of  Abner  L.  Duncan, 
contracted  for  supplies  to  the  value  of  a  thousand 
dollars.*^ 

The  new  authorities  in  West  Florida  suspected  the 
loyalty  of  the  French  refugees.  In  their  behalf  C.  M. 
Audibert  assured  the  convention  that  their  previous 
attachment  to  Bonaparte  was  feigned,  in  order  to 
worry  the  Spaniards.  They  were  now  ready  to  shed 
their  blood  in  defense  of  the  common  cause,  and  by 
wise  distribution  of  some  of  the  vacant  lands  among 
them,  they  might  be  enlisted  in  driving  the  enemy  out 
of  the  province.  By  the  middle  of  October  the  con- 
vention was  ready  to  undertake  this  task.  As  Mobile 
was  within  the  limits  claimed  by  the  United  States,  its 
reduction  would  strengthen  their  request  for  annexa- 
tion. For  the  sake  of  completeness  they  were  also 
ready  to  undertake  the  siege  of  Pensacola. 

Some  of  the  leaders  of  the  convention  were  not  in 
favor  of  the  Mobile  campaign.  They  preferred  to 
await  action  by  the  United  States  on  their  application 

*^  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  42,  Library  of  Congress. 


430      BATON    ROUGE INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

for  annexation  rather  than  pursue  further  aggressions 
against  the  Spaniards.  This  may  account  for  the  sig- 
nificant change  in  the  membership  of  the  executive 
committee  after  the  second  session  in  October.**  In 
pursuance  of  the  determination  they  agreed  to  supple- 
ment Kemper's  efforts  by  two  agents  in  New  Orleans. 
These  men  were  to  purchase  and  equip  two  vessels  to 
prey  upon  Spanish  provision  vessels  on  the  lakes  and 
the  Gulf,  and  were  also  to  enlist  French  and  other 
privateers  in  the  same  service.  Having  provided  these 
with  the  customary  commissions,  they  might  hope  to 
provision  their  own  army  from  the  prizes  and  pay  all 
the  expenses  of  the  campaign,  especially  if  they  cap- 
tured the  vessels  carrying  money  from  Pensacola  to 
Mobile. 

The  New  Orleans  merchants,  as  usual,  were  will- 
ing to  profit  by  these  irregular  operations,  but  they 
demanded  more  tangible  security  than  West  Florida 
paper.  If  the  commissioners  furnished  this  they  could 
obtain  two  schooners,  valued  at  $50,000.  In  addition 
the  commissioners  would  need  $3000  for  equipment  and 
bounties.  They  could  obtain  experienced  men,  who 
would  give  a  good  account  of  themselves  in  storming 
a  fort,  but  they  must  pay  them  ten  or  twelve  dollars 
apiece  on  enlisting.  They  must  also  advance  the 
privateers  a  supply  of  ammunition,  to  be  repaid  from 
captures.     Accordingly  they  urged  the  immediate  es- 

'^^  See  p.  428. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       43 1 

tablishment  of  an  arsenal  at  the  mouth  of  the  Amite 
whence  they  might  obtain  regular  supplies  and  whither 
they  might  convey  their  prize  cargoes. 

These  agents  encountered  serious  opposition  from 
British  and  Spanish  interests.  Like  Kemper,  they 
were  hampered  by  a  failure  to  receive  information  or 
definite  instructions  from  Baton  Rouge.  But  their 
most  serious  difficulty  was  a  lack  of  money  or  credit. 
Abner  L.  Duncan  vigorously  seconded  their  efforts, 
but  was  unable  to  dispose  of  the  West  Florida  state 
paper.  Even  the  appointment  of  John  McDonough 
as  a  second  agent  did  not  afford  any  material  relief. 
The  possibility  of  raising  some  money  by  buying  goods 
on  credit  and  selling  them  at  auction  for  cash  appealed 
to  Mills  and  Audibert  as  the  only  way  out  of  their 
difficulty,  despite  the  ruinous  discount  involved  in  the 
process.  As  the  latter  pointedly  reminded  Skipwith, 
the  new  governor,  "  Arms  and  men  cannot  be  provided 
with  prayer  and  war  cannot  be  made  without  money." 
They  even  determined  to  commission  their  recruits  to 
attack  the  Spanish  provision  vessels  in  pirogues. 
But  this  modest  method  of  initiating  naval  opera- 
tions was  denied  them.  The  unexpected  tidings  of 
the  American  intervention  suspended  their  functions 
although  it  did  not  put  an  end  to  their  anxieties.  The 
owner  of  the  two  schooners  for  which  they  had  bar- 
gained was  unwilling  to  release  them  from  their  con- 
tract, although  he  received  on  it  nothing  more  substan- 
29 


432      BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

tial  than  West  Florida  securities.  They  could  not  pay 
other  bills  they  had  incurred,  to  say  nothing  of  a  thou- 
sand dollar  draft  from  Samuel  Baldwin,  the  naval 
agent.  The  disgusted  commissioners  seized  the  first 
opportunity  to  retire  from  so  dishonorable  a  situation, 
and  in  this  inglorious  way  brought  to  an  untimely  end 
the  naval  operations  of  West  Florida.*^ 

Nor  did  the  principals  of  this  embryo  State  have  a 
more  agreeable  experience.  On  Saturday,  November 
ID,  the  people  of  West  Florida  elected  their  senators 
and  representatives.  At  their  first  meeting  the  for- 
mer classified  themselves  by  lot.  The  senators-to-be 
from  Mobile  were  to  constitute  the  first  class ;  John 
H.  Johnston  and  John  Rhea  the  second  class ;  and 
Philemon  Thomas  and  Champney  Terry  the  third 
class.  Leonard  was  made  president  pro  tempore  of 
the  Senate  and  Dudley  Avery,  speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives.  On  November  26  the  legislative 
assembly  elected  Fulwar  Skipwith  as  governor  of  the 
State.^" 

As  Skipwith  afterwards  explained,  this  honor  was 
not  of  his  seeking.  After  losing  his  place  in  Paris 
through  Armstrong's  vindictiveness,  he  had  come  to 
West  Florida  to  recover  his  family  fortune,  jeopard- 

4»  Mills  and  Audibert  to  Skipwith,  Dec.  4,  6,  7,  10,  14,  1810, 
West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  73-93,  Library  of  Congress. 

^0  Morphy  to  Secretary  of  Audiencia,  Mexico,  Nov.  14,  1810, 
Historia,  MS.,  Vol.  330,  Archivo  General,  Mexico ;  Summary, 
f.  80. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       433 

ized  by  his  brother-in-law's  mismanagement.  Aside 
from  a  share  in  the  Maison  Rouge  grant  in  Louisiana, 
he  had  no  other  property  interests  than  his  estate  at 
Montesano,  near  Baton  Rouge.  He  was  in  no  sense 
a  mere  land  speculator  as  his  enemies  charged.  His 
former  official  position  and  his  connection  with  the 
Randolph  faction  in  Virginia  politics  made  him  a  de- 
sirable acquisition  to  the  American  contingent  in  West 
Florida.  De  Lassus  had  been  friendly  to  him  but 
would  not  grant  him  a  legal  residence.  In  common 
with  most  of  the  reform  leaders,  he  had  favored  the 
"  compromise  "  agreed  upon  with  De  Lassus  and  had 
accepted  the  office  of  associate  judge  under  that  agree- 
ment. He  supported  the  declaration  of  independence 
from  principle  and  because  he  believed  that  this  was 
the  best  way  to  turn  the  province  over  to  the  United 
States.  He  accepted  the  governorship,  not  from  van- 
ity, but  because  he  hoped  with  the  aid  of  Dr.  Andrew 
Steele  and  other  patriots  to  avoid  anarchy  and  confu- 
sion until  annexation  could  be  consummated.^^ 

In  his  inaugural  address  Skipwith  did  not  content 
himself  with  "ordinary  profession,"  but  advised  the 
legislative  assembly  to  adopt  a  better  judicial  sys- 
tem, an  improved  militia  establishment,  and  a  more  just 
system  of  representation  and  apportionment  of  taxes. 
The  last  named  object  was  especially  necessary  in  view 

51  Skipwith  to  Graham,  Dec.  23,  1810,  Jan.  14,  181 1,  Skipwith 
to  Claiborne,  Dec.  10,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


434       BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

of  the  measures  already  under  way  for  the  reduction 
of  Mobile  and  Pensacola.  He  reminded  his  hearers 
that  they  had  a  "natural  right"  to  independence,  but 
that  neither  gain  nor  the  implied  promise  of  protection 
led  them  to  take  this  momentous  step.  Having  dis- 
played a  sincere  desire  for  reform  and  a  determina- 
tion to  adhere  to  a  policy  once  initiated,  he  urged  his 
hearers  to  continue  a  course  so  honorable  to  them- 
selves, and  closed  by  promising  them  his  hearty  co- 
operation. 

If  Skipwith  was  conscious  of  playing  a  farcical 
part,  he  was  wholly  serious  withal.  A  careful  perusal 
of  his  turgid  address  and  subsequent  voluminous  let- 
ters gives  one  the  impression  that  while  he  was  no 
great  genius,  he  was  wholly  sincere  in  pursuing  his 
tortuous  program  of  annexation.  One  extract  from 
his  inaugural  address  is  illuminating:  "Wherever  the 
voice  of  justice  and  humanity  can  be  heard  our  declara- 
tion and  our  just  rights  will  be  respected.  But  the 
blood  which  flows  in  our  veins  like  the  tributary 
streams  which  form  and  sustain  the  father  of  rivers, 
encircling  our  delightful  country,  will  return  if  not 
impeded  to  the  heart  of  our  parent  country.  The 
genius  of  Washington,  the  immortal  founder  of  the 
liberties  of  America,  stimulates  that  return,  and  would 
frown  upon  our  cause  should  we  attempt  to  change  its 
course. "^- 

^^  A  copy  of  the  address,  printed  at  Natchez,  is  among  the 
Madison  Papers. 


BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT       435 

The  new  executive  found  much  to  employ  his  time 
during  the  week  following  his  inauguration.  Kemper 
and  the  commissioners  in  New  Orleans  were  urgent 
in  their  demands.  On  November  28  the  draft  for 
the  Mobile  expedition  began.  On  the  30th  the  cap- 
tain of  the  artillery  reported  upon  its  condition.  On 
the  following  day  the  militia  board  filled  the  vacancies 
in  the  list  of  officers  and  made  the  necessary  assign- 
ments. On  December  3  Skipwith  nominated  Samuel 
Baldwin  of  St.  Helena  purser  and  naval  agent  to  take 
charge  of  the  armament  being  prepared  at  Springfield 
and  in  the  Chifonte  River.  On  the  4th  he  gave  in- 
structions to  Joseph  Collins,  who  was  to  command  the 
naval  forces.  After  examining  the  artillery  at  Baton 
Rouge  to  determine  what  he  could  use  against  Mobile 
and  Pensacola,  Collins  was  to  go  to  Springfield  and 
Chifonte  and  confer  with  Baldwin  upon  the  vessels 
for  this  service.  At  New  Orleans  he  was  to  arrange 
with  Mills  and  Audibert  for  their  purchase  and  equip- 
ment. When  ready  he  was  to  proceed  with  the  squad- 
ron to  Dog  River  in  Mobile  Bay  and  cooperate  with 
the  land  forces  there.  He  was  not  to  molest  the  prop- 
erty of  friendly  persons,  but  could  make  lawful  prize 
of  the  enemy's  possessions.  All  captures  must,  how- 
ever, be  brought  before  a  prize  tribunal  to  be  estab- 
lished on  Mobile  Bay  or  on  the  Chifonte. 

On  December  5  some  fifty-five  men  marched  away 
from  the  garrison  at  Baton  Rouge  to  join  the  forces 


436     BATON    ROUGE — INSURGENT    AND    MILITANT 

assembling  at  John  Stuart's  plantation.  They  left 
twenty-five  men  behind  them  in  the  fort  under  Lieu- 
tenant Charles  Johnson.^^  On  the  same  day  Skipwith 
began  a  letter  to  President  Madison,  to  whom  he  said 
that  he  feared  the  wishes  of  the  people  of  West  Flor- 
ida had  not  been  properly  presented.  De  Lassus' 
course  had  made  necessary  their  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence, but  at  the  same  time  the  greater  part  of  the 
inhabitants  realized  that  their  only  hope  for  the  future 
lay  in  annexation  to  the  United  States.^*  Before  he 
could  dispatch  his  explanatory  missive,  he  learned  that 
the  United  States  had  already  taken  steps  to  bring 
this  annexation  about,  but  in  a  way  hardly  satisfactory 
to  himself  or  his  associates. 

53  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  62-70,  Library  of  Congress ; 
Summary,  f.  80. 

54  Skipwith  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Dec.  5, 
1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


CHAPTER  XII 

Filibustering  Operations  on  the  Mobile 

Baton  Rouge  was  the  political  storm-center  of  West 
Florida,  but  the  Mobile  region  was  seldom  free  from 
a  secondary  tempest.  This  was  true  during  the  trying 
days  that  we  have  described  in  the  three  preceding 
chapters ;  but  along  the  Mobile  it  was  peril  from  with- 
out rather  than  from  within  that  worried  the  Spanish 
authorities.  In  1810  there  were  indeed  rumors  that 
some  malcontents  in  Pensacola  planned  to  assassinate 
Folch  and  Morales,  but  nothing  happened.^  The 
transfer  of  troops  and  munitions  of  war  to  the  Amer- 
ican garrison  on  the  Tombigbee  gave  rise  in  1809  to 
some  correspondence  between  Wilkinson  and  Folch, 
and  between  the  latter  and  Someruelos.  Porter  and 
Folch  had  at  the  same  time  discussed  the  reciprocal 
return  of  deserters.  They  in  time  drifted  into  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  American  claim  to  West  Florida. 
Someruelos,  to  whom  Folch  referred  both  questions, 
warned  him  to  avoid  fruitless  discussions  that  could 
only  stir  up  bad  feeling.     He  did  tell  him  that  de- 

^  St.  Maxent  to  Someruelos,  reservado,  No.  157,  July  10, 
1810,  Legajo  1574,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

437 


438     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

serters  could  not  be  returned  without  a  special  treaty 
to  that  effect.^ 

In  February,  1809,  Macon  of  Georgia  introduced 
into  Congress  the  irritating  topic  of  Mobile  commerce. 
This  gave  Foronda  a  chance  to  deny  that  the  Amer- 
icans had  any  right  to  navigate  that  stream  without 
paying  duty,  as  the  inhabitants  of  its  upper  courses 
desired.  In  a  month  he  in  turn  protested  against  the 
detention  of  Spanish  vessels  at  New  Orleans.  When 
Claiborne  later  permitted  them  to  proceed  to  Baton 
Rouge  as  a  special  favor.  Morales  asserted  that  he  did 
so  simply  because  his  government  claimed  West  Flor- 
ida.^ Holmes,  newly  settled  in  his  post,  feared  that 
the  Spanish  adherents  among  the  Choctaws  proposed 
to  unite  with  the  Creeks  in  an  attempt  to  cut  off  Amer- 
ican travel  between  Nashville  and  points  in  his  terri- 
tory. Echoes  of  the  feud  between  the  Kemper  and 
Horton  families  disturbed  both  sides  of  the  border  at 
Pinckneyville,  and  led  Holmes  to  employ  regulars 
there  for  patrol  duty.'*  Of  internal  disturbance  at 
Pensacola  or  at  Mobile  there  was  little  evidence.     The 

2  Folch  to  Someruelos,  June  23,  1809,  Legajo  1566,  same  to 
same,  July  7,  1809,  Legajo  1567,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

3  Foronda  to  Madison,  Feb.  12,  1809,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Morales  to  Garaj^  Aug. 
14,  1809,  Legajo  267,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  cf.  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III,  341. 

4  Holmes  to  Cushing,  Sept.  21,  1809,  same  to  Smith,  Oct.  22., 
1809,  Proceedings  Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Territory, 
MS.,  Vol.  I. 


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FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS   ON    THE    MOBILE     439 

timely  arrival  of  some  fifty  thousand  pesos  from  Mex- 
ico gave  the  overwrought  Folch  a  little  relief.^ 

In  August,  1809,  Folch  gave  the  captain-general  an- 
other view  of  the  ever-present  American  peril.  Be- 
tween two  and  three  thousand  boats  annually  de- 
scended the  Mississippi,  each  one  manned  by  at  least 
four  persons.  This  meant  a  reverse  current  of  six 
thousand  men  returning  overland  through  Baton 
Rouge.  He  could  keep  them  out  only  by  erecting  two 
powerful  military  posts  on  the  Nictalbany  and  the 
Chifonte.  Another  stream  of  these  undesirable  immi- 
grants, from  Georgia,  the  Carolinas,  and  even  Virginia, 
passed  through  Pensacola  and  Mobile,  whence  they 
took  passage  by  sea  to  New  Orleans  and  points  to  the 
westward.  If  he  attempted  to  force  them  back  after 
their  long  overland  journey,  he  would  only  cause  them 
to  combine  in  armed  bands,  with  Indian  recruits,  and 
betake  themselves  to  the  unprotected  harbors  for  em- 
barkation. If  resistance  should  lead  to  the  death  of  a 
single  Indian,  a  war  with  the  savages  would  result. 
With  his  present  forces  he  could  not  make  headway 
against  a  combination  of  Indians  and  frontiersmen,  and 
judged  it  better  to  allow  the  latter  free  use  of  the 
Florida  highways.  This  was  one  of  the  inconveni- 
ences brought  upon  them  by  the  cession  of  Louisiana. 

This  exterior  peril  seemed  to  cause  little  disturb- 

5  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Aug.  3,  1809,  Legajo  1567,  Relation 
of  Donation,  etc.,  1809,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


440    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

ance  at  Pensacola  or  at  Mobile.  Subsequently  there 
were  some  rumors  of  personal  violence  to  Folch  and 
Morales,  as  we  have  seen.  But  in  November  the 
timely  arrival  of  some  fifty  thousand  pesos  from 
Mexico,  supplemented  by  contributions  from  loyal  resi- 
dents of  the  two  settlements,  gave  the  despairing 
officials  some  relief.^  In  the  following  spring,  there- 
fore, Folch  judged  the  occasion  opportune  for  a  neces- 
sary trip  to  Havana.  Thus  he  was  away  from  his 
post  during  the  initial  events  that  led  up  to  the  Baton 
Rouge  Convention.  His  absence  also  encouraged  an 
alarming  movement  nearer  home. 

On  June  20,  1810,  Perez,  the  commandant  at  Mobile, 
wrote  Maximiliano  de  St.  Maxent,  who  was  tempo- 
rarily taking  Folch's  place,  that  the  American  settlers 
in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Stoddert  had  formed  what  they 
called  the  "  Mobile  Society."  It  numbered  two  hun- 
dred men  who  intended  to  attack  and  capture  the  fort 
at  Mobile,  plunder  the  establishment  of  Forbes  and 
Company,  and  commit  other  excesses.  The  head  of 
the  association  was  a  lawyer,  Joseph  Pulaski  Ken- 
nedy ;  and  Zenon  Orso,  a  resident  &'f  Mobile,  was  im- 
plicated in  it.  Perez  had  obtained  a  partial  confession 
from  the  latter,  and  also  a  letter  from  Kennedy,  invit- 
ing Orso  to  join  the  society.  In  the  letter  Kennedy 
stated  that  if   Orso  wished  to  become  a  subject  of 

6  Morales  to  Saavedra,  Nov.  30,  1809,  Legajo  2330,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     441 

Napoleon  and  of  Joseph,  he  had  only  to  say  so.  But 
he  summoned  him  to  strike  for  liberty  and  appointed 
a  place  for  a  personal  conference.'^ 

Perez  did  not  arrest  Orso,  but  placed  him  under 
surveillance  in  the  hope  of  gaining  further  informa- 
tion. As  soon  as  St.  Maxent  received  his  report,  he 
ordered  the  immediate  arrest  and  examination  of 
Orso,  and  also  of  a  certain  Powell  at  whose  house 
Kennedy  had  promised  to  meet  the  former.  He  pre- 
pared to  send  Perez  twenty-five  additional  men  from 
the  Louisiana  regiment,  and  authorized  him  to  summon 
fifty  Choctaws  to  act  as  scouts  and  spies,  and  to  em- 
ploy confidential  agents  to  watch  the  movements  of  their 
American  neighbors.  Furthermore  he  advised  Perez 
to  seize  and  secure  Kennedy  if  he  could  do  so  without 
disagreeable  complications.  St.  Maxent  also  referred 
the  occurrence  to  Colonel  Richard  Sparks,  the  com- 
mandant at  Fort  Stoddert,  whose  course  during  the 
past  year  had  had  a  deterrent  effect  upon  border  out- 
breaks. In  view  of  the  harmonious  relations  between 
their  respective  governments,  he  requested  Sparks  to 
take  the  necessary  measures  for  breaking  up  the 
project.  This  was  Sparks's  first  intimation  of  the  plot, 
but  he  answered  that  he  would  watch  for  its  manifesta- 
tions and  observe  the  course  of  its  reputed  leader,  who 
was  well  known  to  him.     At  the  same  time  he  called 

'^  Kennedy  to  Orso,  June  7,  1810,  American  Historical  Re- 
view, II,  700.  A  Spanish  translation  is  enclosed  in  Perez  to 
St.  Maxent,  June  20,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


442    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

St.  Maxent's  attention  to  the  numerous  deserters  from 
his  forces  in  the  Mobile  district.* 

As  a  result  of  his  investigations,  Sparks  soon  be- 
came convinced  that  the  society  existed,  and  he  took 
measures  to  suppress  it.  He  immediately  communi- 
cated this  information  to  St.  Maxent,  who  made  prep- 
arations to  receive  the  invaders  should  they  attempt 
an  attack.  Judge  Toulmin,  who  had  at  first  doubted 
the  reality  of  the  plan  because  he  did  not  credit  its 
leaders  with  sufficient  prudence  to  keep  it  concealed, 
afterwards  changed  his  mind,  but  thought  that  the  pre- 
cautions of  Sparks  and  the  Spaniards  had  caused  its 
abandonment.**  The  friends  of  the  leaders  were  at 
least  anxious  to  save  them  from  prosecution  by  a 
temporary  suspension  of  legal  processes. 

While  reassuring  the  Spaniard,  Sparks  made  a  de- 
tailed report  of  this  "  General  and  Public  Combina- 
tion "  to  Secretary  Eustis.  He  expected  the  conspira- 
tors to  attempt  the  seizure  of  the  stores  and  ammuni- 
tion at  Fort  Stoddert,  thereby  putting  the  American 
forces  out  of  commission,  and  then  to  attack  Mobile 
and  Pensacola.  Some  of  the  most  popular  characters 
of  the  vicinity  were  at  its  head  and  the  people  gen- 
erally regarded  it  with  favor.     He  had  not  been  able 

8  St.  Maxent  to  Perez,  June  22,  1810,  St.  Maxent  to  Sparks, 
June  22,  1810,  Sparks  to  St.  Maxent,  June  27,  1810,  Legajo 
1568,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

s  Sparks  to  St.  Maxent,  June  30,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE    443 

to  learn  the  date  of  the  projected  attack,  but  he  be- 
lieved it  to  be  near,  for  its  projectors  were  using  every 
possible  intrigue  to  gain  adherents.  Many  turbulent 
and  ambitious  characters  who  had  previously  shown  no 
bond  of  union  except  their  hostility  to  the  Spaniards 
now  displayed  a  sudden  and  suspicious  unanimity  in 
giving  public  dinners  to  officers  and  men  of  their  mili- 
tia companies.  A  group  of  settlers  from  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee  had  recently  been  forced  to  pay  duties 
at  Mobile,  and  Sparks  believed  that  this  event  added 
to  the  popularity  of  the  hostile  propaganda.  The  im- 
migrants had  been  detained  so  long  that  their  provi- 
sions and  money  were  exhausted.  Their  destitution 
upon  arriving  at  Fort  Stoddert  excited  the  pity  of  the 
inhabitants  and  increased  the  resentment  against  the 
Spaniards,  to  whom  the  people  attributed  the  slow 
growth  of  their  community. 

In  addition,  the  inhabitants  also  resented  the  presi- 
dent's action  in  regard  to  the  navigation  of  the  Tom- 
bigbee  and  the  Mobile.  Recently  the  representatives 
from  Tennessee  had  presented  an  address  remonstrat- 
ing against  the  necessity  of  making  a  long  detour  by 
way  of  the  Mississippi,  New  Orleans,  and  Mobile,  in- 
stead of  a  much  shorter  overland  journey  from  the 
bend  of  the  Tennessee  through  the  Indian  country. 
The  savages  daily  used  these  rivers  to  trade  with  the 
Spaniards  and  were  always  ready  to  ally  themselves 
against    the    Americans.     Citizens,    the    petitioners 


444     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

claimed,  were  entitled  to  equal  privileges  with  In- 
dians. It  will  be  noted  that  they  reverted  to  the  earlier 
plan  of  Zachariah  Cox.  The  Indian  agents,  particu- 
larly Benjamin  Hawkins,  were  thought  to  be  opposed 
to  this  agitation,  but  Governor  Holmes  was  in  sym- 
pathy with  it.^" 

A  fourth  and  still  more  important  cause  for  popular 
discontent,  according  to  Sparks,  was  the  cunning  art 
of  certain  demagogues  in  fomenting  disturbances.  In- 
stead of  attempting  leadership  in  the  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  the  country,  they  preferred  "  the  first  position 
in  the  ranks  of  rebellion  and  [sought]  to  gain  wealth 
and  position  through  general  anarchy."  Accordingly 
they  represented  the  general  government  as  looking 
upon  the  people  of  this  section  with  "unfriendly  views" 
and  charged  that  its  conduct  was  dictated  by  a  "  cold, 
jealous  policy"  that  was  not  conducive  to  popular 
attachment.  By  this  means  they  had  been  only  too 
successful  in  stirring  up  resentment. 

Sparks  stated  that  the  Spanish  officials  were  re- 
enforcing  Mobile  and  seeking  to  gain  the  assistance  of 
the  Creeks  and  the  Choctaws.  At  the  same  time  his 
garrison  was  in  a  most  miserable  condition.  "  Deaths, 
desertions,  and  discharges"  would  soon  leave  him 
without  men.  The  soldiers  had  an  "unaccountable 
aversion "  to   Fort  Stoddert  and  would  not  reenlist 

10  Nashville  Clarion  and  Gazette,  Aug.  lo,  17,  1810;  Holmes 
to  Caller,  Aug.  22,  1810,  Proceedings  Executive  Council,  Mis- 
sissippi Territory,  MS.,  Vol.  I. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     445 

there,  while  the  same  cause  produced  a  remarkable 
number  of  desertions.  He  suggested  that  his  garri- 
son should  be  increased  to  four  full  companies  of  in- 
fantry and  one  of  artillery.  If  this  were  done  at  once 
he  might  overawe  the  projected  expedition.  In  a 
postscript  Sparks  described  the  leader  of  the  "  Mobile 
Society,"  Kennedy,  as  a  leading  lawyer,  "  once  the 
son-in-law  of  Abraham  Baldwin,  Sr.  .  .  .  and  also 
brother-in-law  to  Joel  Barlow.  .  .  .  He  is  a  young 
man,  educated  in  the  Eastern  States,  ambitious,  in- 
triguing, and  popular ;  and  although  without  r-eal  tal- 
ents, yet  in  a  seditious  intrigue,  or  for  the  low  arts 
that  secure  popularity,  he  must  be  acknowledged  emi- 
nent. He  is  a  man  of  engaging  address,  popular  man- 
ners, and  daring,  and  although  I  doubt  his  capacity  to 
conduct,  yet  I  am  well  assured  he  is  seconded  by  a 
character  who  has  been  several  years  a  resident  of  this 
country  and  well  calculated  to  meet  any  deficiency  of 
the  first."^^ 

Sparks  may  have  referred  to  Colonel  James  Caller. 
Some  two  weeks  later  Toulmin  got  possession  of  a 
letter  showing  that  Kennedy  expected  Caller  to  raise 
four  hundred  men  for  an  attack  on  Mobile  in  co- 
operation with  a  certain  McFarland.  Kennedy  was 
going  to  Georgia  to  arouse  public  opinion  there  in 
favor   of   the  expedition.      Carson   and   Laval    were 

11  Sparks  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  July  12,  1810,  Papers 
Relative  to  Revolted  Spanish  Provinces,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls 
and  Library,  Department  of  State. 

30 


446     FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

others  who  were  mentioned  as  "  warm  in  the  business." 
After  taking  Mobile  the  insurgents  proposed  to  hold 
it  for  the  government  or  deliver  it  to  the  military 
authorities  at  Fort  Stoddert.  As  the  national  authori- 
ties would  do  nothing  for  them,  the  people  must  act 
for  themselves.  They  incurred  the  danger  of  prosecu- 
tion ;  but  as  all  were  equally  involved  Kennedy  ex- 
pected only  a  brief  imprisonment,  especially  with  a 
patriotic  judge.  He  was  willing  to  risk  this,  in  view 
of  the  certainty  of  success. 

In  transmitting  this  report  to  Governor  Holmes, 
Toulmin  was  uncertain  whether  it  indicated  Kennedy's 
full  assurance  of  success,  or,  in  view  of  the  increasing 
hazard,  a  discreet  way  of  backing  out.  In  either  case, 
as  he  later  stated,  the  preparations  of  the  Spaniards 
rendered  the  plot  abortive. ^^  Holmes  had  already 
written  to  Colonel  Caller,  on  July  31,  telling  him  of 
rumors  about  the  hostile  expedition  and  expressing 
the  sincere  hope  that  there  was  no  foundation  for 
them.  Such  an  attempt  would  be  bad  for  the  individ- 
uals concerned  and  would  compromise  the  country  at 
large.  Accordingly  he  relied  on  Caller's  vigilance  and 
patriotism  to  prevent  an  attempt  so  disastrous  to  his 
immediate  neighborhood.  Besides  this  tactful  appeal 
to  Caller's  better  judgment,  he  instructed  Judge  Toul- 
min that  the  United  States  would  discountenance  such 

^2  Toulmin  to  Holmes,  July  28,  1810,  Proceedings  Executive 
Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  Vol.  i ;  Holmes  to  Smith, 
July  31,  1810  (Parker,  4373)- 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     447 

an  assumption  of  authority  by  all  means  within  its 
power.  He  hoped  that  there  was  no  reason  to  ap- 
prehend such  an  unlawful  aggression,  which  could 
only  be  disastrous  to  people  and  country  alike.  He 
also  reported  these  rumors  to  Secretary  Smith,  but 
added  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  substantiate  them, 
and  said  that  he  believed  that  if  such  an  expedition 
had  ever  been  contemplated  it  was  now  abandoned. 
He  assured  the  secretary,  however,  that  he  would  em- 
ploy all  means  in  his  power  to  discover  and  suppress 
any  such  action.^? 

Meanwhile  the  arrest  of  Orso  and  Powell  at  Mobile 
led  Kennedy  to  show  his  ability  to  stir  up  trouble,  if 
not  to  profit  from  it  after  it  was  under  way.  Under 
date  of  July  19  he  wrote  Cayetano  Perez,  the  com- 
mandant at  Mobile,  that  he  knew  the  other  possessed 
a  copy  of  his  incriminating  letter.  In  the  name  of  the 
Mobilefia,  he  informed  the  other  that  no  American 
citizens  would  attempt  to  attack  the  fort  without  the 
consent  of  the  general  government.  If  this  should  be 
given,  Kennedy  would  do'  his  duty  as  a  public  official, 
after  giving  Perez  due  notice  of  his  purpose.  The 
Spaniards  would  be  unable,  by  a  threat  of  Choctaw 
help,  to  continue  terrorizing  the  Americans,  "  who  are 
free  men  and  soldiers."  Although  the  latter  desired 
the  good  fortune  of  the  subjects  of  the  "  ex-king  of 

13  Holmes  to  Toulmin,  July  30,  1810,  same  to  Caller,  July 
31,  1810,  Proceedings  of  Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Ter- 
ritory, MS.  Vol.  I. 


448    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

Spain,"  they  objected  to  further  restriction  simply  be- 
cause the  Spaniards  held  territory  that  his  government 
lawfully  claimed.  He  was  svirprised  at  the  arrest  of 
Orso  and  Powell  and  absolved  them  from  any  knowl- 
edge of  the  Mobile  Society.  To  relieve  the  Spaniards 
of  any  unfounded  fears,  he  told  Perez  that  he  was 
preparing  to  visit  other  parts  of  the  United  States  and 
would  not  return  until  October.^* 

Toulmin  mentioned  Kennedy's  intention  to  visit 
Georgia.  It  was  also  confirmed,  but  hardly  in  a  way 
to  quiet  Spanish  apprehension,  by  a  letter  that  James 
Innerarity  wrote  his  brother  John  at  Pensacola.  In- 
nerarity  believed  that  Kennedy  was  going  to  Georgia 
to  secure  aid  for  the  society  of  bandits  of  which  he  was 
head.  The  four  hundred  members  of  this  society  were 
supposed  to  have  some  connection  with  the  insurgent 
leaders  at  Baton  Rouge,  and  they  were  not  omitting 
their  preparations  during  Kennedy's  absence.  Al- 
though Kennedy  was  not  likely  to  get  much  assistance 
from  the  Georgians  as  a  whole,  a  man  there  of  violent 
temper,  named  Troup,  was  supposed  to  favor  the 
cause.  In  time  Folch  learned  of  these  facts,  and  in 
reporting  them  to  his  superior  emphasized  his  lack  of 
resources  to  meet  the  emergency,  and  suggested  that 
Someruelos  should  appeal  to  the  American  govern- 

1*  Kennedy  to  Perez,  July  19,  1810,  American  Historical  Re- 
view, II,  700. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     449 

ment  to  break  up  the  plot.^^  Governor  Holmes  was 
much  concerned  for  the  deluded  citizens  whom  Toul- 
min  and  Sparks  implicated  in  it.  The  national  gov- 
ernment would  undoubtedly  direct  its  attention  to  the 
serious  events  that  were  then  under  way  in  West 
Florida.  Any  private  attempt  to  invade  the  province 
might  injure  the  people  of  Mississippi,  particularly 
those  residing  on  the  Mobile.  "  I  entreat  you  there- 
fore," he  wrote  Toulmin,  "  to  impress  upon  the  public 
mind  the  danger  that  would  attend  such  an  expedition 
as  you  seem  to  think  may  be  in  contemplation."^^ 

In  time  President  Madison  learned  the  substance  of 
the  reports  from  Sparks  and  Toulmin.  He  informed 
John  Graham,  who  was  now  chief  clerk  of  the  State 
Department,  that  Sparks's  letter  should  form  the  basis 
for  instructing  Governor  Holmes  to  do  his  part  in 
maintaining  the  laws.  As  for  Toulmin's  missive,  he 
suggested  that  the  State  Department  should  exam- 
ine the  law  applying  to  such  illegal  expeditions,  in 
order  to  determine  how  to  suppress  this  one.  He  later 
wrote  to  Toulmin  that  information  was  less  definite 
in  regard  to  the  expedition  and  he  was  glad  of  it. 
Such  attempts  were  unlawful,  and  as  chief  executive 
it  was  his  duty  to  employ  force  against  them  and  to 
make  an  example  of  their  leaders.     Secretary  Eustis, 

15  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Aug.  2,  i8io,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 

16  Toulmin  to  Holmes,  Aug.  9,  1810,  Proceedings  Executive 
Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  Vol.  i. 


450    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

who  also  received  copies  of  the  correspondence,  em- 
powered General  Hampton  to  reinforce  the  garrison 
at  Fort  Stoddert  at  discretion,  and  if  necessary  to 
make  use  of  some  troops  operating  in  another  capacity 
on  the  Muscle  Shoals.  He  felt  that  the  mere  coming 
of  reinforcements  would  disperse  the  incipient  in- 
surgents.^^ 

Governor  Holmes,  of  Mississippi,  already  preoccu- 
pied with  the  situation  at  Baton  Rouge,  was  deter- 
mined that  the  Spaniard  should  not  have  all  the  ad- 
vantage in  the  controversy  arising  on  the  Mobile  fron- 
tier. In  August  one  of  his  militia  officers  had  written 
him  that  the  commandant  at  Mobile  had  assembled 
there  a  considerable  number  of  Choctaws  to  assist  in 
defending  it  against  the  projected  attack.  The  Span- 
iards were  also  expecting  the  arrival  of  British  troops 
to  assist  them  in  occupying  American  territory. 
Holmes  objected  to  an  appeal  to  any  foreign  govern- 
ment or  to  the  Indians  under  American  jurisdiction. 
The  Spaniards  had  no  right  to  interfere  with  the  latter, 
much  less  request  their  help,  for  this  would  imply  that 
the  Indians  might  live  within  the  United  States  and 
yet  act  independently  of  its  government.  He  re- 
quested Folch,  therefore,  not  to  appeal  to  them  again. ^^ 

i'^  Madison  to  Graham,  Aug.  lo,  24,  1810,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  34,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Madison 
to  Toulmin,  Sept.  5,  1810,  Aladison,  Writings,  II,  482. 

1^  Holmes  to  Folch,  Sept.  4,  1810,  Proceedings  Executive 
Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  Vol.  i. 


FILIBUSTERING  OPERATIONS   ON    THE   MOBILE     45 1 

While  penning  this  remonstrance  Hohnes  notified 
the  militia  officers  within  the  disturbed  area  that  he  was 
greatly  concerned  over  the  persistent  rumors  regard- 
ing the  filibustering  attack.  The  citizens  would  retard 
the  object  they  had  in  view  by  taking  up  arms  to  re- 
lieve themselves  of  commercial  exactions  at  Mobile. 
The  United  States  could  not  permit  such  conduct  with- 
out abandoning  its  constitution  and  laws,  and  no  por- 
tion of  the  country  could  rightly  demand  such  a  sacri- 
fice. He  held  out  the  hope  that  the  administration 
was  considering  its  relation  to  West  Florida  and  that 
the  next  Congress  would  doubtless  act  on  the  subject. 
Everything  would  be  satisfactorily  settled,  if  no  hos- 
tility occurred  on  the  frontier.  Meanwhile  individuals 
should  not  hazard  their  fortunes  and  reputations  in 
this  manner.  He  asked  the  militia  officers  to  aid  the 
civil  authorities  in  restraining  the  few  who  were  likely 
to  attempt  it.  He  addressed  Colonel  Sparks  and  Judge 
Toulmin  in  the  same  tenor.  Later  Perez  reported  to 
Folch  that  Colonel  Caller  had  already  gathered  a  force 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  and  would  soon  increase 
it  to  three  hundred,  but  he  was  not  able  to  learn  how 
he  proposed  to  use  it.^*^ 

In  reporting  to  the  secretary  of  state  what  he  had 
done,  Holmes  reiterated  his  belief,  based  on  recent  ad- 

^9  Holmes  to  the  Colonels  of  the  6th,  8th,  and  9th  Regiments, 
Sept.  8,  1810,  Proceedings  Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Ter- 
ritory, MS.,  Vol.  I ;  Perez  to  Folch,  Oct.  26,  1810,  Legajo  63, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


452     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

vices  from  Toulmin,  that  the  proposed  expedition  had 
been  abandoned.  The  project  had  been  a  very  gen- 
eral subject  for  conversation  and  many  favored  it  as  a 
means  of  removing  the  unpopular  restrictions  at  Mo- 
bile, yet  he  did  not  think  that  any  considerable  number 
were  ready  to  engage  in  it.  The  alarm  aroused  by 
the  project  in  Mobile  and  Pensacola  had  first  led  him 
to  think  otherwise  and  to  use  his  influence  with  the 
leading  characters  of  the  region  in  order  to  break  it 
up.  To  this  end  he  asked  Colonel  Gushing  to  send 
additional  regulars  to  Fort  Stoddert.  The  latter  offi- 
cer told  him  that  he  would  need  an  order  from  the 
secretary  of  war  to  do  so,  but  prepared  a  detachment 
for  service  there  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 
Holmes  reported  to  the  secretary  that  the  regulars 
were  in  good  shape  and  that  three  or  four  hundred 
might  be  spared  for  this  purpose.  He  hoped  that 
they  would  not  be  needed,  but  assured  the  secretary 
that  he  would  use  his  utmost  endeavors  to  prevent 
any  violation  of  the  law.-° 

Toulmin  acted  before  the  governor's  second  warn- 
ing reached  him.  In  September,  1810,  he  addressed 
a  most  emphatic  charge  to  the  grand  jury  of  Washing- 
ton County  on  the  subject  of  illegal  expeditions.  Ap- 
preciating the  disadvantages  under  which  the  country 
labored,  he  thought  it  was  absolutely  absurd  for  the 
people  to  try  to  avenge  themselves  by  unlawful  means. 

20  Holmes  to  Smith,  Sept.  12,  1810  (Parker,  4381). 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     453 

Such  action  was  not  possible  on  the  ground  that  West 
Florida  belonged  to  no  prince  or  state,  as  some  claimed. 
It  was  true  that  the  United  States  had  thus  far  re- 
fused to  acknowledge  the  representative  of  Ferdinand 
VII  or  of  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  at  the  same  time  had 
remained  on  good  terms  with  both.  Others  claimed 
that  West  Florida  as  far  as  the  Perdido  belonged  to 
the  United  States.  The  judge  was  one  of  these,  but 
if  the  government  chose  to  waive  its  rights,  he  did  not 
believe  the  people  of  the  territory  should  undertake 
to  uphold  them.  If  the  American  government  must 
obtain  this  territory  through  the  people  of  the  Tombig- 
bee,  such  dependence  did  not  speak  well  for  its  power. 
Its  course  toward  the  Burr  and  ]\Iiranda  expeditions 
did  not  lead  him  to  think  that  the  government  was 
ready  to  encourage  this  undertaking.  The  Spanish 
representative  might  draw  a  different  conclusion,  but 
as  the  judge  warned  his  hearers,  there  was  no  assur- 
ance that  the  government  would  wink  at  such  offenses 
in  the  future.  Even  if  the  remote  situation  of  the  dis- 
trict rendered  its  people  secure  from  federal  interfer- 
ence, he  himself  was  bound  by  his  oath  to  restrain  such 
illegal  attempts. 

The  judge  went  on  to  say  that  the  expedition  would 
exert  an  evil  effect  upon  foreign  powers.  If  they  saw 
that  the  citizens  had  little  respect  for  the  national  gov- 
ernment, they  would  be  emboldened  to  stir  up  mis- 
chief among  them,  just  as  the  Spanish  emissaries  had 


454    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

formerly  done  in  Kentucky.  As  the  frontier  repre- 
sentatives of  the  nation,  the  inhabitants  along  the 
Tombigbee  were  under  obligations  to  keep  the  peace. 
They  were  already  implicated  in  the  Yazoo  affair,  and 
any  violence  on  this  occasion  would  tend  to  fix  that 
charge  more  definitely.  They  should  not,  therefore, 
betray  themselves  by  encouraging  such  an  enterprise.^^ 
This  wholesome  advice  seemed  to  have  the  effect  of 
temporarily  checking  the  expedition,  but  it  did  not 
make  Toulmin  any  more  popular  with  the  leaders  or 
with  their  deluded  followers. 

Meanwhile  Someruelos  sent  a  full  report  of  the 
Mobile  Society  to  De  Onis  in  Philadelphia  and  asked 
him  to  bring  the  affair  to  the  attention  of  the  admin- 
istration. The  captain-general  hoped  that  the  United 
States  would,  through  its  military  forces  on  the  Tom- 
bigbee, keep  the  people  of  the  vicinity  from  insultinj 
the  Spanish  authorities  rather  than  take  occasion  to 
reinforce  its  various  garrisons.  De  Onis  communi- 
cated this  letter  at  once  to  Secretary  Smith  by  conduct 
of  Bernaben,  the  consul  at  Baltimore.  De  Onis  said 
that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  United  States  would 
allow  its  citizens  to  disturb  a  neighboring  friendly 
power.  As  the  most  innocent  occurrences  might  cause 
disquietude  and  uncertainty,  he  wished  the  president 
to  know  what  American  citizens  were  planning  against 
the  Spanish  dominions.     At  the  same  time  his  protest 

21  National  Intelligencer,  Nov.  7,  13,  1810. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     455 

was  to  be  regarded  as  proof  of  the  utmost  friendship 
for  the  United  States.  The  captain-general  preferred 
to  proceed  thus  rather  than  send  reenforcements  to 
the  Floridas ;  for  despite  all  explanations,  such  a  move- 
ment was  bound  to  be  misinterpreted.  De  Onis  also 
mentioned  a  rumor  that  the  American  officers  on  fur- 
lough were  ordered  to  rejoin  their  commands  and  as- 
sist in  the  capture  of  Pensacola.  He  asked  for  an 
immediate  disclaimer  of  this  in  order  to  quiet  West 
Florida  officials.^-  In  his  letter  to  the  captain-general, 
De  Onis  added  that  Bonaparte  was  evidently  trying  to 
force  the  Americans  to  take  Florida,  either  through  a 
cession  or  through  a  sale  carried  on  by  his  brother 
Joseph.  By  this  bribe  he  would  keep  the  Americans 
from  supplying  Cadiz  with  provisions.  De  Onis  also 
thought  that  the  administration  was  working  with 
Napoleon  to  deceive  the  people  in  regard  to  the  Berlin 
and  Milan  decrees  and  thus  force  a  war  with  Great 
Britain. 

Some  ten  days  later  De  Onis  reported  that  the  sec- 
retary of  state  had  first  denied  the  existence  of  the 
Mobile  Society  and  then  acknowledged  that  he  had 
heard  of  it  through  the  War  Department.  The  secre- 
tary assured  him  that  the  American  government  would 

22  De  Onis  to  Captain-General,  Sept.  30,  1810,  Legajo  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba;  Bernaben  to  Smith,  Oct.  i,  1810,  Spanish 
Notes,  MS..  II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives.  The  name 
of  this  Spanish  official  is  also  spelled  "  Bernabue  "  and  "  Ber- 
nabeu." 


456     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

do  its  Utmost  to  keep  its  citizens  from  breaking  the 
peace  between  the  two  nations.  Yet  De  Onis  was  not 
ready  to  confide  wholly  in  this  assurance.  There  were 
many  contradictions  in  the  secretary's  statement,  and 
he  had  no  scruples  in  denying  what  he  had  said  a 
day  or  two  before.  It  would  not  be  strange  if  the 
American  government  used  Napoleon's  method  and 
attempted  to  gain  possession  of  the  Floridas  at  one 
blow,  so  he  advised  the  captain-general  to  reenforce 
both  provinces.-^ 

As  a  result  of  these  assurances  the  captain-general 
informed  his  subordinates  at  Pensacola  that  the  Amer- 
ican government  was  about  to  strengthen  its  garrisons 
on  the  Tombigbee  in  order  to  prevent  any  action  by  the 
Mobile  Society ;  and  that  it  would  oppose  every  at- 
tempt of  its  citizens  to  compromise  the  peace  and  har- 
mony that  existed  between  the  two  nations.  It  would 
not  merely  reprimand,  but  would  also  punish  vigor- 
ously every  individual  who  attacked  Spanish  vessels 
or  Spanish  territory.^*  Some  three  weeks  before  this 
assurance  was  penned,  however,  the  president  of  the 
United  States  took  measures  that  thoroughly  neutral- 
ized it.  The  action,  as  we  shall  see,  followed  the 
events  that  were  then  occurring  in  the  vicinity  of 
Baton  Rouge. 

23  De  Onis  to  Captain-General,  Oct.  lo,  1810,  Legajo  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 

2*  Someruelos  to  Commandant  of  Pensacola,  Nov.  19,  1810, 
Legajo  1574,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     457 

Kemper's  mission  as  agent  of  the  convention  opened 
a  second  series  of  filibustering  operations  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Mobile.  Most  of  the  residents  of  that  town 
viewed  his  approach  with  alarm,  and  especially  so  soon 
after  Kennedy's  project.  The  alarm  was  heightened 
when  he  came  alo'ne,  for  his  associate  White  was  de- 
tained by  illness.  Possibly  the  latter  had  been  chosen 
for  the  diplomatic  task,  while  Kemper  was  to  work 
among  the  American  settlers  on  the  Tombigbee.  His 
absence  did  not  deter  Kemper,  who,  as  he  later  wrote 
a  fairly  kindred  spirit,  "  done  as  you  yourself  under 
similar  circumstances  would  have  done,  imbarked  Hart 
and  soul  devoted  to  the  prosecution  of  the  wish  of  our 
infant  but  beloved  country."^'' 

At  Fort  Stoddert,  which  he  reached  on  October  24, 
Kemper  was  hospitably  received  by  Colonel  Sparks, 
"  an  old  acquaintance,"  whom  he  found  "  warm "  in 
his  cause.  Even  Toulmin,  to  whom  he  bore  letters  of 
introduction,  did  not  at  first  oppose  him.  As  court 
was  then  in  session  at  St.  Stephens,  he  had  no  oppor- 
tunity for  immediate  interviews  with  private  citizens. 
He  learned  that  there  were  only  about  fifty  soldiers 
in  the  fort  at  Mobile  and  that  part  of  the  artillery 
there  consisted  of  painted  logs.  During  the  dry  season 
the  surrounding  ditch  was  useless.     A  company  of 

25  Kemper  to  Jackson,  Nov.  7,  181 5.  Papers  in  Relation  to 
Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library;  Perez 
to  Folch,  Oct.  31,  1810,  Legajo  63,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  National 
Intelligencer,  Dec.  15,  1820. 


458     FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

infantry  from  Baton  Rouge  would  suffice  to  take  it. 
The  officers  at  Fort  Stoddert  assured  him  that  by 
raising  his  standard  a  mile  below  the  line  he  would 
speedily  enroll  enough  men  from  above  to  do  this. 
He  expected  to  gain  as  recruits  the  one  hundred  and 
fifty  or  two  hundred  citizens  in  Mobile  capable  of 
bearing  arms.  The  officers  might  resist,  although 
there  was  little  prospect  of  their  receiving  reinforce- 
ments from  Havana  or  gaining  Indian  assistance.  But 
an  item  in  the  National  Intelligencer  predicted  a 
bloody  encounter  should  the  insurgents  attempt  to  cap- 
ture the  fort  without  artillery.-^ 

Judge  Toulmin,  for  one,  did  not  share  Kemper's  op- 
timism, although  he  did  not  openly  tell  him  so.  In  a 
letter  to  Madison  he  commended  the  temperate  tone 
of  the  convention  address  to  the  people  of  Mobile,  and 
believed  that  Kemper  would  have  a  chance  to  bring  it 
to  their  attention.  All  classes  of  people  there  desired 
a  change  in  government,  but  few  were  ready  to  run 
the  risk  of  advocating  it  openly  or  welcomed  the  pros- 
pect of  attendant  anarchy.  Ultimate  annexation  to 
the  American  Union,  which  was  the  aim  of  the  Baton 
Rouge  Convention,  was  popular  in  Mobile.  Toulmin 
believed  that  the  Spanish  officials  there  would  even  de- 
liver their  posts  directly  to  the  United  States,  although 
overtures  to  that  effect  from  General  Matthews  of 

-*'  Kemper  to  John  Rhea,  Oct.  28,  29,  1810,  West  Florida 
Papers,  MS.,  25,  26,  Library  of  Congress. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     459 

Georgia,  special  agent  of  the  secretary  of  war,  had 
failed  to  elicit  a  definite  response.^^ 

To  avert  possible  hostilities  and  to  bring  about  a 
"  union  of  interests  "  between  the  "  Mobilians  "  and  the 
"  Floridians  "  on  the  Mississippi,  Toulmin  determined 
on  an  indirect  appeal  to  Folch.  His  son-in-law.  Cap- 
tain James  B.  Wilkinson,  sent  to  James  Innerarity  an 
account  of  Kemper's  presence  and  mission.  He  felt 
that  "  the  star  of  the  West "  would  attract  myriads  of 
"  Boatmen  and  sharp-shooting  Kentuckians,"  who 
would  be  influenced  less  by  plunder  than  by  "  an  imag- 
inary glory  and  the  novelty  of  the  thing."  While  he 
did  not  know  the  attitude  of  the  American  cabinet, 
he  advised  his  correspondent  to  ascertain  whether  in 
case  of  "extreme  necessity"  the  Spaniards  would  ac- 
cept the  assistance  and  protection  of  the  United  States. 
He  promised  to  write  more  when  he  learned  Kemper's 
"genuine  object,"  and  solemnly  assured  his  friend  that 
"our  Government  are  perfect  strangers  to  the  meas- 
ures pursued  at  Baton  Rouge."^® 

Toulmin  also  advised  Innerarity  that  the  people  of 
West  Florida  should  apply  directly  to  the  American 
government  for  protection.  This  was  the  only  way  to 
checkmate  the  Conventionalists  and  paralyze  foreign 
intrigues.      The   cautious    merchant   was    inclined   to 

2^  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Oct.  31,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 

28  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Oct.  30,  1810,  enclosing  Wilkinson's 
letter,  Legajo  1568,  Folch  to  Perez,  Nov.  2,  1810,  Legajo  55, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


460     FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

think  that  it  would  be  treasonable  to  hint  at  such  a 
thing.  Yet  if  Folch  were  in  Mobile  he  would  not 
hesitate  to  broach  the  subject,  for  he  believed  the 
Spanish  governor  would  weigh  the  suggestion  sensibly 
and  calmly.  The  merchant  wrote  Captain  Wilkinson 
that  he  preferred  American  control,  if  a  change  had 
to  take  place,  but  for  the  present  he  was  satisfied  with 
their  existing  government.  He  and  his  friends  re- 
garded an  invasion  from  the  west  as  a  portent  of  the 
"  anerky "  that  Kemper  threatened.-^  His  attitude, 
as  Toulmin  believed,  was  typical  of  the  majority  at 
Mobile.  They  were  alarmed,  but  cautious,  and  ready 
to  welcome  American  control.  The  officials,  as  he 
ascertained  during  a  recent  visit,  were  courteous,  but 
not  inclined  to  political  discussion. 

Meanwhile  Kemper,  according  to  the  commandant 
at  Mobile,  was  attracting  adherents  to  his  party  and 
inflaming  their  spirits.  On  November  3  he  commis- 
sioned Joseph  P.  Kennedy  colonel  in  the  service  of 
the  West  Florida  Convention.  This  was  a  promotion, 
on  paper,  for  Kennedy  ranked  only  as  a  major  in  the 
Mississippi  militia.  The  new  colonel  could  appoint  his 
subordinates  and  with  them  determine  such  rules  and 
articles  of  war  as  seemed  necessary.^"     This  free  and 

29  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Oct.  31,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ; 
Kemper  to  Rhea,  Nov.  5,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  36, 
Library  of  Congress. 

30  Kennedy  to  the  Convention  of  the  State  of  West  Florida, 
Nov.  3,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  32,  Library  of  Con- 
gress. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     46 1 

easy  method  of  procedure  was  in  keeping  with  the 
temper  of  the  leaders,  the  character  of  their  respective 
followers,  and  the  outcome  of  their  quixotic  cause. 
By  this  act  Kemper  definitely  arrayed  himself  against 
Judge  Toulmin  and  the  element  in  the  American  set- 
tlements that  stood  for  law  and  order. 

On  the  same  day  that  he  gained  this  doubtful  re- 
cruit, Kemper  determined  to  let  the  Spaniards  know 
more  definitely  his  "genuine  object."  After  some 
difficulty  he  secured  a  messenger,  who  bore  to  Caye- 
tano  Perez,  the  commandant  at  Mobile,  a  copy  of  the 
address  prepared  by  the  convention.  Perez  received 
this  missive  on  the  evening  of  November  6,  subjected 
the  messenger  to  a  rigorous  examination,  and  then 
dismissed  him  without  a  reply.  On  the  same  evening 
he  referred  the  communication  to  Folch  and  asked 
him  how  it  should  be  answered. 

In  keeping  with  the  address  Kemper  offered  to  en- 
ter into  any  friendly  arrangement  with  Perez  for  or- 
ganizing the  people  of  Mobile  along  with  Baton  Rouge 
into  a  free  and  independent  government.  Since  Bona- 
parte had  annihilated  the  mother-country,  they  had 
"  a  natural  Right  by  the  Laws  of  God  and  Nations  " 
to  adopt  such  a  government  as  the  majority  of  the 
people  should  choose.  The  inspired  "  Republicans " 
of  Baton  Rouge,  he  wrote,  "are  free  and  are  deter- 
mined not  only  to  make  you  so  but  every  individual  in 
West  Florida."  Upon  Perez  would  rest  the  responsi- 
31 


462    FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

bility  for  the  ensuing  bloodshed  should  he  reject  their 
offer.  At  the  same  time  Kemper  promised  him  and  his 
officials  the  same  rank  and  pay  they  then  enjoyed.^^ 

Kemper's  appeal,  with  its  combined  bribe  and  threat, 
gave  point  to  the  previous  American  offers  of  help. 
Folch  determined  to  address  himself  to  the  proper 
border  authorities.  He  asked  Colonel  Sparks  to 
break  up  Kemper's  hostile  projects  within  Amer- 
ican territory,  and  thus  merit  the  approval  of  his 
superiors  and  "cement  the  union  and  harmony  that 
exists  between  [their]  respective  governments."  In 
behalf  of  this  double  object  he  enclosed  the  same 
request  in  a  letter  to  Holmes.  Sparks  promised  "to 
exert  every  legitimate  power "  he  possessed  to  sup- 
port a  good  understanding  "  between  his  Catholic  Maj- 
esty and  the  United  States."  Toulmin  also  seconded 
his  efforts  by  writing  to  Holmes  and  to  the  president.^^ 

The  receipt  by  Sparks  of  a  packet  from  Pensacola 
aroused  Kemper's  suspicions.  Could  he  have  known 
of  its  contents,  as  indicated  above,  and  of  the  letters 
of  Innerarity,  he  would  have  felt  still  more  uncom- 
fortable.    The  failure  to  receive  a  direct  reply  from 

31  Kemper  to  Perez,  Nov.  3,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers, 
MS.,  34,  Library  of  Congress.  The  same  accompanies  Perez 
to  Folch,  Nov.  6,  1810,  Legajo  55,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

32  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Nov.  22,  1810,  enclosing  Folch's 
letter  of  the  13th  to  Sparks,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ;  Folch  to 
Holmes,  translation,  Mississippi  Territorial  Archives,  MS., 
Vol.  9. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     463 

Perez  was  ominous.  He  inferred  that  a  reinforce- 
ment of  twenty  men  had  given  that  officer  greater  con- 
fidence and  led  him  to  prepare  for  vigorous  resistance. 
Yet  he  beheved  that  the  people  would  welcome  a 
change  in  government.  More  disquieting  was  the  pos- 
sibility of  opposition  from  the  American  authorities. 
General  George  Matthews  was  in  the  vicinity  on  some 
mysterious  errand  that  seemed  to  oppose  his  own. 
Colonel  John  McKee,  the  Choctaw  agent,  who  was 
later  to  be  closely  associated  with  Matthews,  told 
Kemper  that  he  did  not  favor  his  plans,  although  he 
would  do  nothing  against  them.  Kemper  assured  him 
that  the  convention  would  "  maintain  the  Independ- 
ents of  the  Floridas  throughout."  Sparks  let  him 
know  that  Folch  had  requested  the  aid  of  American 
troops.  Kemper  regarded  such  a  possibility  as  "a 
discreable  [sic]  movement "  for  himself  and  for  every 
citizen  of  Florida. 

Against  these  possible  discouragements  Kemper 
balanced  his  new  recruit,  Kennedy.  The  latter  was 
the  most  popular  man  in  the  community,  was  familiar 
with  legal  and  military  matters,  and  had  influential 
friends  in  the  United  States  and  in  West  Florida, 
where  two  of  his  brothers  resided.  They  were  on 
good  terms  with  the  Spanish  officials,  but  would  join 
the  insurgent  standard  as  soon  as  he  gave  the  word. 
As  proof  of  his  influence  Kennedy  himself  wrote  that 
he  was  to  command  the  five  companies  of  the  Missis- 


464    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

sippi  militia  which  Holmes  was  shortly  to  call  into 
service  in  his  district.  He  loved  his  country  and  the 
cause  of  Florida,  between  which  he  detected  no  con- 
flict of  interests,  and  vowed  never  to  prove  a  traitor 
to  either.  Unable  to  remain  silent  when  men  were 
fighting  for  liberty,  the  convention  might  absolutely 
depend  on  him :  "  my  fortune  shall  be  your  fortune, 
your  country  shall  be  my  country." 

Kennedy  approved  Kemper's  plan  to  reduce  both 
Mobile  and  Pensacola.  Then  the  convention  should 
make  Mobile  its  capital  and  send  ministers  to  propose 
annexation  to  the  United  States.  If  the  latter  re- 
sponded favorably  the  convention  had  nothing  to  fear ; 
if  not,  it  would  know  what  to  do.^^  His  statement 
shows  that  he  and  Kemper,  Matthews  and  McKee, 
Toulmin  and  Sparks,  the  West  Florida  convention  and 
the  Madison  administration  were  all  working  for  a 
common  end,  although  frequently  at  cross  purposes. 
The  people  of  the  border,  aroused  by  a  decade  of 
controversy,  only  awaited  the  beckoning  hand  of  a 
real  leader.  Judge  Toulmin  and  his  friends  doubted 
if  Kennedy  were  the  man  of  the  hour.  Needless  to 
say  Kemper  did  not  agree  with  them. 

Beheving  that  "Prompt  and  Inerjectick"  measures 
were  in  order,  the  two  disturbing  spirits  planned  to  raise 
their  "  star  "  below  the  line  on  Sunday,  November  25. 

33  Kemper  to  Rhea,  Nov.  5,  6,  10,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS., 
36-41,  Library  of  Congress. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     465 

Here  Kennedy  promised  to  meet  the  convention  troops 
with  two  (Kemper  said  ten)  companies  of  recruits 
from  "the  upper  country,"  which  was  unanimous  in 
voicing  its  good  wishes.  With  a  force  of  five  hundred 
men  and  two  eighteen-pounders  from  Baton  Rouge, 
they  would  "play  Don  Galves  on  the  fort."  The 
failure  to  answer  Kemper's  summons  led  them  to  ex- 
pect a  show  of  resistance,  but  they  had  no  doubt  of 
easy  success.  The  speedy  reduction  of  the  fort  would 
be  followed  in  two  or  three  months  by  the  occupation 
of  Pensacola  and  St.  Augustine. 

These  energetic  conspirators  contracted  for  a  boat, 
powder,  lead,  and  necessary  provisions.  To  pay  for 
these  they  drew  upon  Abner  L.  Duncan  of  New  Or- 
leans, who  was  thus  to  suffer  the  inevitable  punish- 
ment for  too  great  friendliness.  Edward  Morgan  of 
New  Orleans,  their  "  friend  E.  Randolph  "  of  Pinck- 
neyville,  and  John  Johnson,  Sr.,  a  "good"  resident 
near  Fort  Stoddert,  acted  as  intermediaries.  As 
Judge  Toulmin  was  postmaster  at  the  last  named  settle- 
ment, they  were  forced  to  entrust  many  of  their  joint 
notes  to  a  special  messenger,  "  Major  John  Mills," 
who  was  to  be  rewarded  by  a  suitable  commission  in 
the  Floridian  forces. 

Notwithstanding  their  apparently  thorough  organi- 
zation, they  waited  in  anxious  suspense  for  some  cheer- 
ing word  from  Baton  Rouge.  A  copy  of  the  proposed 
constitution  for  West  Florida  might  serve  to  "  tran- 


466     FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

quilize  "  the  people  of  Mobile  and  bring  them  to  sup- 
port the  revolution.  Kemper  did  not  know  whether 
they  would  resist  or  not,  but  expected  through  spies 
to  learn  their  views  and  those  of  the  residents  of  Pen- 
sacola  before  the  eventful  Sunday  when  he  raised  his 
standard  below  the  line.  He  was  concerned  over  the 
failure  to  hear  from  Duncan,  but  that  agent  was  even 
then  forwarding  the  supplies  that  the  convention  had 
recently  ordered.  The  prospect  of  obtaining  a  twelve- 
pounder  from  Pascagoula  gave  him  some  comfort. 
Whatever  happened  now,  as  he  and  Kennedy  wrote, 
their  cause  was  "  afloat "  and  they  "  must  not  look 
back."3* 

Kemper  was  much  encouraged  by  the  attitude  of 
the  American  settlers  above  the  line.  At  St.  Stephens 
everybody  seemed  to  favor  his  cause  except  Toulmin. 
Those  residing  near  Fort  Stoddert,  in  the  fork  of  the 
Alabama  and  Tombigbee,  generally  promised  him  their 
support.  Most  of  them  were  recent  arrivals  from 
Georgia,  who  bitterly  resented  the  commercial  policy 
of  the  Spaniards  and  looked  to  Kemper  to  relieve 
them  from  its  exactions.  In  the  Tensaw  settlement 
they  supported  him  almost  unanimously.  Their  offi- 
cials openly  encouraged  him,  and  in  some  cases  as- 
sured him  that  by  going  below  the  line  he  would  place 
himself  beyond  the  reach  of  American  laws,  gain  a 

34  Kemper  to  Rhea,  Nov.  19,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers, 
MS.,  46,  Library  of  Congress. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     467 

share  in  the  plunder  of  the  campaign,  and  obtain  six 
hundred  and  forty  acres  of  land  at  its  close.  Some  of 
the  militia  officers  even  resigned  their  commissions  to 
take  the  same  rank  in  the  service  of  West  Florida.^^ 

In  all  of  these  settlements  the  filibusters  encountered 
one  determined  opponent.  Toulmin,  "  the  old  Exiled 
Briton,"  as  Kemper  called  him,  warned  the  prospec- 
tive recruits  that  by  taking  part  in  the  expedition  they 
jeopardized  their  persons  and  property  and  might  in 
the  end  find  themselves  under  British  jurisdiction. 
In  the  Tensaw  settlement  he  tried  to  induce  one  of  the 
leaders,  a  certain  "Major"  Buford  from  South  Caro- 
lina, to  change  his  course.  The  latter  promised  to  do 
so,  but  later  showed  that  his  promise  was  worthless. 
Kemper  had  a  "war  talk"  with  the  judge,  called  him 
an  "  old  fool  "  for  interfering  with  his  "  speculations," 
and  threatened  him  with  the  vengeance  that  he  visited 
on  all  who  crossed  his  path.  As  Toulmin  had  already 
incurred  the  animosity  of  the  restless  elements  in  the 
region  by  his  course  the  preceding  summer,  threats  and 
hard  names  did  not  deter  him  from  his  self-imposed 
public  service.  In  the  existing  state  of  public  opinion 
he  doubted  the  efficacy  of  the  ordinary  legal  processes. 
Sol  he  made  his  reports  directly  to  the  president,  and 
to  Kemper's  disgust  circulated  a  letter  from  Madison 
in  which  the  latter  expressed  his  disapproval  of  the 
earlier  proposed   expedition.      Still  Kemper  did   not 

^■'  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Nov.  22,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


468     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

regard  Toulmin's  course  as  especially  injurious.  But 
the  judge  thought  that  the  other  was  exceeding  the 
instructions  of  the  convention.  He  believed  that  that 
body  had  given  Kemper  blank  commissions  under  the 
impression  that  a  considerable  American  population 
lived  below  the  line.  Accordingly  he  wrote  his  friend 
John  Ballinger  at  Baton  Rouge  pointing  out  the  lam- 
entable effects  that  might  be  expected  from  Kemper's 
methods.  He  was  inclined  to  think  that  Kemper  would 
gain  few  followers,  possibly  a  hundred  in  all.  These 
would  be  "barely  enough  to  begin  the  work  of  mis- 
chief." They  could  not  take  the  fort  at  Mobile,  but 
by  a  futile  attack  might  jeopardize  the  people  and  the 
property  in  its  vicinity.  To  avoid  this  possibility  he 
urged  that  his  friends  induce  the  Spanish  officials,  if 
possible,  to  make  a  direct  application  to  the  American 
government  for  assistance.  For  all  of  these  efforts 
Jnnerarity  believed  that  every  inhabitant  in  West  Flor- 
ida owed  him  a  debt  of  gratitude. 

In  his  stormy  interview  with  Toulmin,  Kemper  had 
reiterated  his  determination  to  raise  the  "  star  "  below 
the  line  on  November  25,  whatever  the  number  of  his 
followers.  He  assured  Toulmin  that  Colonel  Sparks 
had  told  him  that  his  cause  was  just  and  that  thou- 
sands would  flock  to  his  assistance.^"  The  leaders 
needed  all  the  encouragement  of  this  sort  they  could 
gather.     On  November  23  Robert  Caller,  Jr.,  informed 

36  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Nov.  22,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


FILIIUTSTKUINC:    OPEKATIONS    ON    Till',    MOlUr.R     ^(h) 

Kennedy  (hat  \\v  oould  not  niect  liini  that  eveninj^, 
altliouj^li  ho  wonld  he  present  at  "  llnnker  IliM"  (the 
name  adopted  for  their  rendezvous)  on  the  lolh)w- 
ing^  Sunday.  "  Don't  blot  me  out  of  your  books  yet," 
he  implored.  His  report  of  recruits  was  not  particu- 
larly encouraf:[in<:^.  Captain  Jones  in  [\\v  "  fori-;  "  had 
a  full  eonipanv,  Captain  MolTel  ahoni  fifty  nun,  and 
a  third  ofiicer,  twenty-two.  One,  N.  ( lilniore,  "was 
abusinjT  the  expedition  with  .all  his  nii^ht."  Keiuiedy 
himself  intimated  that  he  nii^hl  In-  late  in  reaehin<:^  the 
rallying  place,  and  he  forwarded  some  powder,  K'ad, 
drums,  his  own  trunk  containing;  the  colors,  and  (ill- 
omened  harl)in<,H'r)  a  barri'l  of  whiskey.'''' 

Ketu|)er  had  ])lanned  to  rally  his  followers  on  the 
east  side  of  tlu'  Mobile,  so  as  more  readily  to  cut  oil" 
Spanish  assistance  from  Pensacola.  F>ut  h'olch,  leaving 
the  latter  i)lace,  reached  Mobile  November  Ji,  and  this 
move  gave  the  affair  a  dilVireiit  aspect.  Yet,  (Uler- 
mining  to  pursiu'  the  plan  agreed  upon,  Kemper  sent 
one  of  his  followers,  Samuel  McMullen,  to  observe  the 
governor's  forces  and  to  report  upon  the  disposition  of 
the  i)eople.  Cater  he  learm-d  that  h'olch's  presence 
did  not  seem  to  make  them  enthusiastic  in  the  Spanish 
cause.  lie  interpreted  this  as  a  willingness  on  their 
part  to  submit  to  the  convi'ulion.  from  I'ensacola,  to 
which  town  he  had  si-nt  "  M.ajor  "  I'arsons  with  copies 

•'^  KcMiipcT  to  McMillan,  witii  enclosures,  Nov.  _'.?,  iHio,  West 
Florida  Pa|)crs,  MS.,  53,  54,  Library  of  Coiififrcss. 


470     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

of  the  proclamation,  came  an  agent  to  report  sickness 
among  the  officers  of  the  garrison  and  an  utter  lack  of 
precautions  against  attack.  Many  a  resident,  like  the 
agent's  father-in-law,  was  ready  "to  turn  his  jacket" 
when  the  insurgents  arrived,  or,  like  himself,  had  de- 
termined to  move  above  the  line  and  await  results. 
"  Our  Cockade  is  mounting,"  exultingly  wrote  Kem- 
per ;  but  he  went  on  to  report  the  "  villainous  exer- 
tions "  of  Judge  Toulmin,  that  "base  Devil  filled  with 
deceptive  and  Bloody  Rascality. "^^ 

Some  details  of  Toulmin's  "  Rascality  "  appear  in  a 
later  report  of  Toulmin  to  the  president.  He  could 
no  longer  depend  on  the  militia  officers  to  restrain  their 
men,  as  be  had  done  the  preceding  summer,  for  most 
of  them  had  already  joined  the  filibusters.  Judicial 
processes  were  futile,  for  no  jurymen  would  convict 
their  fellow-citizens  for  undertaking  an  expedition 
against  the  Spaniards.  Even  Governor  Holmes  had 
failed  to  answer  his  recent  warnings.  The  main  pur- 
pose of  his  associates  and  himself  was  to  maintain  the 
honor  and  dignity  of  the  government.  They  wished 
to  do  so  in  a  legal  way.  Therefore  they  had  advised 
the  imperilled  Spaniards  to  appeal  directly  to  the 
United  States  for  protection.^*^ 

John  Ballinger  had  recently  written  from  Baton 
Rouge  that  the  convention  was  divided  over  the  ad- 

38  Ibid. 

39  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Nov.  28,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     47 1 

visability  of  attacking  Mobile.  This  led  Toulmin  a 
second  time  to  write  to  Innerarity  and  urge  "  manly  " 
efforts  by  the  Spanish  officers  to  awaken  the  United 
States  from  its  lethargy.  His  argument  was  clear  and 
compelling :  "  Could  the  proposition  for  the  transfer  of 
Florida  come  from  the  Floridian  authorities,  and  that 
from  the  highest  source,  surely  the  cautious  policy  of 
the  American  government,  would  hold  out  no  longer — 
and  knowledge  of  such  an  overture  would  be  such  an 
appeal  to  the  patriotism  and  Americanism  of  the  New 
Baton  Rouge  assembly  that  they  could  not  resist."^" 
As  we  have  seen,  Folch  had  already  made  overtures 
of  this  sort  to  Sparks  and  Holmes.  He  now  came  on 
to  Mobile  to  continue  them,  and  possibly  to  escape  the 
scrutiny  of  the  officious  Morales.  Thus  it  was  pos- 
sible for  Innerarity  to  present  the  situation  directly  to 
him.  The  executive  informed  the  merchant  that  he 
had  already  taken  "  decisive  steps  "  as  mentioned  above, 
and  that  these  afforded  the  only  means  of  allaying  the 
prevailing  discontent.  Furthermore  he  had  advised 
the  captain-general  to  deliver  Florida  to  the  United 
States,  "  in  trust  until  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  in 
which  an  equivalent  to  Spain  should  be  determined 
and  agreed  upon."  Folch  felt  that  the  preliminaries 
to  such  a  treaty  were  already  under  way,  and  that  he 
was  justified  in  asking  the  American  authorities  to 

*^  Toulmin  to  Innerarity,  Nov.  15,  i8io,  American  Historical 
Review,  II,  701,  702. 


472     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

break  up  the  plundering  expedition  then  forming  on 
the  Tensaw  and  the  Tombigbee.  In  addition  to  these 
statements  Folch  told  Innerarity  that  if  the  Amer- 
icans above  the  line  gave  no  assistance,  directly  or 
indirectly,  to  the  agents  of  the  convention,  he  would 
immediately  abolish  the  commercial  duties  of  which 
they  complained.  This  action  was  to  take  place  on 
the  very  day  he  received  word  that  the  people  of  the 
three  counties  involved  entirely  repudiated  the  expedi- 
tion of  Kemper  and  Kennedy.  I  f  this  concession  did  not 
wrest  the  arms  from  their  hands,  he  could  only  oppose 
force  to  force  and  continue  the  duties  as  before. 
Only  a  desire  to  prevent  the  shedding  of  blood  "  be- 
tzveen  men  who  will  probably  soon  become  citizens  of 
the  same  community  "  prompted  him  to  make  this  offer. 
In  transmitting  it,  Innerarity  hoped  it  would  be  suc- 
cessful in  stopping  Kemper  before  he  crossed  the  line.*^ 
The  terms  of  Folch's  offer  were  rather  too  sweep- 
ing to  be  effective.  In  the  turbulent  American  popu- 
lation some  would  inevitably  be  found  to  violate  the 
essential  condition  that  no  direct  or  indirect  aid  should 
be  given  to  the  Conventionalists.  Perhaps  the  wily 
Spaniard  anticipated  this  but  hoped  by  his  specious 
offer  to  persuade  the  Americans  to  suppress  all  filibus- 
tering. He  feared  this  rather  than  the  more  regular 
efforts  of  the  Baton  Rouge  insurgents.     His  previous 

*i  Folch  to  Sparks,  Nov.  20,  1810,  enclosed  in  Toulmin  to 
Madison,  Nov.  28,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ;  American  His- 
torical Review,  II,  703. 


FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     473 

hints  about  giving  up  his  province,  under  certain  con- 
tingencies, were  in  keeping  with  the  assurances  he  now 
gave,  and  naturally  tended  to  give  the  Americans  more 
confidence  in  them.  They  would  doubtless  feel  that 
he  was  yielding  to  the  inevitable  and  immediately  ex- 
tend to  him  the  assistance  he  craved.  This  protection 
from  Kemper's  cohorts  would  in  turn  serve  to  justify 
his  action,  should  his  superiors  be  inclined  to  criticise. 
Above  all,  some  unexpected  turn  might  even  yet  en- 
able him  to  maintain  his  precarious  foothold,  and  this 
security  would  more  than  atone  for  any  apparent  mo- 
mentary weakness. 

Accepting  Folch's  statement  in  good  faith,  Innerar- 
ity  wrote  that  it  would  be  lamentable  to  have  his  inten- 
tions frustrated  by  rash  lawlessness  or  a  cold  calculat- 
ing policy  on  the  part  of  the  American  government. 
He  urged  Toulmin  to  use  every  effort  with  Sparks  to 
prevent  the  effusion  of  blood.  If  they  were  successful 
the  people  of  Mobile  would  hail  the  American  flag 
with  joy;  if  not,  with  mourning.  Colonel  Gushing 
was  on  his  way  to  Fort  Stoddert,  and  when  he  reached 
Mobile,  Folch  would  explain  his  intentions  "  more 
fully."  Innerarity's  brother  John,  residing  in  Pensa- 
cola,  also  wrote  that  the  additional  force  Gushing  was 
bringing  with  him  ought  to  save  the  province  from 
anarchy.  Then  within  two  months  it  might  honorably 
be  annexed  to  the  United  States.  Such  an  end,  how- 
ever, depended  wholly  on  the  prompt  action  of  the 


474    FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

American  government,  and  those  interested  in  secur- 
ing this  were  sending  William  Simpson  to  New  Or- 
leans as  their  agent. 

Like  every  other  good  citizen  of  the  region,  Toul- 
min  regarded  the  commercial  duties  at  Mobile  as  bur- 
densome, and  was  ready  "  to  go  to  any  length  wider 
the  authority  of  the  government  to  get  rid  of  them." 
The  offer  of  Folch  seemed  too  good  to  lose.  He  wrote 
Innerarity  that  the  leaders  of  the  expedition  were 
simply  using  public  resentment  for  their  own  advan- 
tage, and  he  disliked  to  have  the  concession  appear  to 
come  about  as  a  result  of  their  lawlessness.  He  de- 
termined to  increase  his  efforts  in  behalf  of  peace. 
At  first  he  planned  to  go  to  McCurtin's  Bluff  (their 
"Bunker  Hill")  and  attempt  to  reason  with  the  men 
in  the  ranks.  Not  being  able  to  obtain  a  boat  for  this 
purpose,  he  contented  himself  with  sending  two  private 
soldiers  with  letters  to  the  leaders.  In  addition,  act- 
ing under  a  former  order  of  the  War  Department, 
Captain  Gaines  decided  to  visit  Folch  and  urge  him  to 
express  his  intention  in  a  public  proclamation.  This 
would  remove,  in  a  regular  way,  every  pretext  for  ac- 
tion  by   filibusters. 

Before  Gaines  reached  Mobile,  Folch  had  sent 
Sparks  a  second  request  to  restrain  the  lawless  charac- 
ters that  threatened  him  with  ruin.  He  even  author- 
ized the  American  officer  to  send  troops,  if  necessary, 
to  McCurtin's  Bluff,  or  to  any  other  point  within  West 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     475 

Florida.  This  permission,  he  said,  ought  to  restrain 
effectually  the  "  extravagant  restlessness  "  of  a  "  mere 
handful  of  people  who  disgrace  humanity,"  remove 
any  possible  misconception  of  the  policy  of  the  Ameri- 
cans, and  preserve  the  existing  harmony  between  their 
nations. 

On  the  following  day,  in  the  course  of  a  personal 
interview,  Gaines  promisesd  Folch  that  the  American 
authorities  would  punish  their  restless  citizens.  On 
his  part  Folch  agreed  to  levy  no  further  duties  on 
American  goods  within  his  district  (including  Pasca- 
goula).  He  was  led  to  make  this  concession  because 
of  the  desire  expressed  by  the  Am.erican  authorities, 
through  Gaines,  to  preserve  harmonious  relations  with 
the  neighboring  officials.  Moreover  he  professed  to 
believe  that  a  negotiation  was  then  under  way  for  the 
cession  of  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States.*^ 

Toulmin,  as  we  have  seen,  was  unable  to  accompany 
Gaines  as  far  as  the  rendezvous  of  the,  filibusters.  It 
was  well  that  he  did  not  go,  for  Kemper  arrested  his 
messengers,  under  the  pretext  that  they  were  deserters, 
and  later  made  an  insolent  demand  on  Sparks  for  the 
correspondence  that  he  and  Toulmin  had  carried  on 
with  the  Spaniards.  Now  that  the  outlaws  were  under 
the  protection  of  the  "  star "  and  beyond  American 
jurisdiction  they  might  have  visited  upon  the  judge  the 
resentment  they  had  been  storing  up  against  him  since 

*2  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Nov.  28,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


476     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

the  previous  summer.  They  especially  resented  his 
criticism  of  Kennedy,  whose  acts,  according  to  Toul- 
min,  "  would  have  hung  him  in  any  other  country." 

The  arrest  of  the  messengers  and  the  news  of  Folch's 
latest  offer  spurred  Toulmin  and  Sparks  to  renewed 
activity.  While  the  latter  sent  an  officer  to  recover 
his  men  and  invited  the  insurgent  leaders  to  a  confer- 
ence, the  judge  addressed  himself  to  Major  Buford 
and  Colonel  John  Caller.  The  former  had  not  proved 
dependable  in  breaking  up  the  expedition,  of  which 
he  was  now  reported  to  be  a  member,  but  Toulmin 
hoped  he  would  now  take  advantage  of  this  oppor- 
tunity to  serve  his  country.  John  Caller,  though  a 
brother  of  James,  whose  similar  attempt  Toulmin  had 
previously  defeated,  was  a  justice  of  Washington 
County,  and  because  of  his  age  and  position  should 
have  assisted  in  maintaining  the  law  rather  than  break- 
ing it.  But  in  this  hope  Toulmin  was  disappointed. 
Buford  reported  Toulmin's  communication  so  as  to 
convey  the  impression  that  the  judge  favored  the  ex- 
pedition. The  judge  later  tried  to  institute  legal  pro- 
ceedings against  both  these  men,  but  was  unable  to 
convince  the  county  attorney  that  his  evidence  was 
sufficient  to  justify  the  step.*^ 

Kemper's  shrewd  but  somewhat  terrifying  person- 
ality doubtless  attracted  some  followers  to  his  stand- 
ard ;   his    extravagant   promises   of    aid    from   Baton 

*^  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Dec.  6,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     477 

Rouge  gained  more;  but  the  compelling  motive  with 
most  of  his  recruits  was  resentment  at  the  rigorous 
Spanish  commercial  policy.  Yet  among  the  sixty  or 
seventy  misguided  men,  largely  recent  settlers  on  the 
public  lands  about  the  "  forks "  or  on  the  Tensaw, 
that  attended  the  initial  rally  at  McCurtin's  Bluff,  there 
were  few  that  possessed  property,  or  paid  duties  to 
the  Spanish  government  or  any  other.  A  former  Ken- 
tuckian,  Dr.  John  Barry,  who  was  regarded  as  an  ac- 
complice, gave  Toulmin  some  information  of  their 
movements.  The  men  were  in  high  spirits  (evidently 
Kennedy's  barrel  had  arrived)  ;  they  forced  all  with 
whom  they  came  in  contact  to  declare  their  sentiments, 
and  breathed  out  threatenings  against  their  opponents, 
among  whom  they  regarded  Toulmin  as  chief.  A 
report  that  the  military  authorities  might  hold  up  a 
boatload  of  provisions  led  Kemper  to  order  it  to  pass 
directly  in  front  of  the  fort.  "  Let  them  stop  it  if  they 
dare,"  was  his  challenge.  But  those  in  charge  more 
prudently  conveyed  it  by  the  eastern  channel  of  the 
Mobile. 

Kemper's  followers,  not  numerous  enough  to  for- 
tify any  one  place,  maintained  what  he  called  a  "mov- 
ing camp  "  on  the  eastern  shore  of  Mobile  Bay.  He 
tried  to  rally  the  neighboring  people  to  his  standard, 
but  the  general  effect  of  his  presence  was  to  terrorize 
them  and  force  many  to  seek  safety  in  Mobile  or  above 
the  line.  Toulmin  was  credibly  informed  that  "  re- 
32 


478    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

spectable  legal  characters  in  New  Orleans  "  had  ad- 
vised the  convention  to  reduce  Mobile.  Yet  if  Kem- 
per were  acting  as  the  agent  of  that  body,  the  judge 
could  not  understand  why  he  also  tried  to  involve 
American  citizens.  As  irregular  levies  the  latter  were 
absolutely  inefficient.**  Possibly  Kemper  designed  to 
involve  the  leaders  on  the  Tombigbee  so  thoroughly 
that  in  case  the  United  States  did  not  recognize  the 
convention  they  must  make  common  cause  with  it  and 
add  their  settlements  to  the  new  state  of  West  Florida. 
Governor  Holmes  was  too  far  away  to  deal  effec- 
tively with  the  problem,  which  thus  rested  upon  Toul- 
min.  He  might  prosecute  the  ringleaders,  although 
at  some  personal  peril ;  but  the  legislature  was  about 
to  abolish  the  district  court  over  which  he  presided 
and  institute  separate  county  courts,  which  undoubt- 
edly would  favor  the  filibusters.  He  doubted  his 
authority  to  detain  boats  bound  below  the  line,  but 
he  might  force  those  in  charge  to  furnish  bail  for 
their  good  behavior.  Under  these  conditions  he  could 
only  appeal  to  Madison.  So,  too,  could  his  enemies, 
as  E.  Lewis  demonstrated  in  a  long  and  intemperate 
missive  assailing  Toulmin  as  a  foreigner,  whose  par- 
tiality  tended   to   make   all   laws   contemptible.     His 

**  Ibid. ;  Kemper  to  Jackson,  Nov.  17,  1815,  Papers  in  Rela- 
tion to  Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library, 
Meek  MSS. ;  Mendieta  to  Folch,  Nov.  29,  1810,  Legajo  1568, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     479 

animus,  however,  plainly  put  him  in  the  camp  of  the 
filibusters. 

In  his  letter  of  December  6  Toulmin  had  naively- 
mentioned  with  surprise  a  prevalent  report  that  the 
American  government,  through  the  territorial  officials, 
was  encouraging  disturbances  in  West  Florida  in  order 
to  annex  the  region.  Could  he  have  seen  Claiborne's 
famous  letter  to  Wykofif  he  might  have  been  less  aston- 
ished, but  considerably  crestfallen.  The  aims  of  the 
American  government,  however,  in  furthering  the  pro- 
ceedings at  Baton  Rouge  smacked  of  greater  regularity 
than  Kemper's  filibustering  projects.  The  Louisiana 
Gazette  pointed  out  the  fact  that  the  latter  might 
prevent  the  formal  cession  of  the  Floridas  to  the 
United  States.  This  possibility  caused  Madison  great 
concern.  Kemper's  lawless  attempt  was  not  only  "  re- 
pugnant to  his  wishes  "  but  contravened  his  plan  to  oc- 
cupy West  Florida.  The  administration  organ  warned 
the  outlaws  that  their  expedition  might  lead  the  people 
of  Mobile,  who  were  anxious  to  become  American 
citizens,  to  seek  a  French  protectorate.  By  this  means 
they  might  save  themselves  from  conquest  by  the 
Baton  Rouge  Convention  or  from  plunder  by  banditti 
nominally  in  its  employ.*^ 

Folch    speedily    learned    that    the    insurgents    had 

45  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Dec.  22,  1810,  E.  Lewis  to  Madison, 
Dec.  10,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. ;  National  Intelligencer, 
Dec.  22,  1810;  Morphy  to  Audiencia,  Nov.  14,  1810,  Historia, 
MS.,  Vol.  330,  A.  G.,  Mexico. 


480     FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

burned  a  dwelling  and  a  sawmill  and  committed  other 
atrocities.  He  did  not  think  they  were  strong  enough 
to  capture  the  fort,  although  they  might  sacrifice  the 
town  in  a  desperate  attempt  to  do  so.  After  raising 
the  standard  the  marauder  suggested  a  joint  confer- 
ence upon  the  best  method  of  securing  the  liberty  of 
West  Florida.  This  insult  proved  to  be  the  last  straw. 
The  long-suffering  executive  immediately  wrote  the 
captain-general  that  he  absolutely  lacked  all  means  to 
cope  with  existing  conditions.  His  superior  had  failed 
to  respond  to  his  repeated  requests,  because,  as  Folch 
believed,  he  was  wholly  unable  to  do  so.  He  himself 
could  not  work  miracles,  so  unless  he  received  some 
assistance  before  the  first  of  January  he  would  deliver 
up  his  province  to  the  Americans.*" 

Folch  at  once  informed  Colonel  McKee  of  his  inten- 
tion to  treat  directly  with  the  president  for  the  delivery 
of  his  province.  The  increasing  perils,  he  wrote, 
warned  him  to  carry  on  this  negotiation  in  more  posi- 
tive terms  than  he  had  employed  in  his  letters  to 
Holmes  and  Sparks.  He  felt  confident  that  McKee, 
from  his  personal  knowledge  of  frontier  conditions, 
could  give  the  president  much  valuable  information. 
Prompt  action  was  necessary  to  forestall  the  dangers 
that  threatened  both  American  and  Spanish  jurisdic- 
tions   from    French    agents   and    Florida    insurgents. 

^'^  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Nov.  30,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


FILIBUSTERING  OPERATIONS   ON    THE   MOBILE     48 1 

Folch  therefore  asked  McKee  to  be  his  personal  mes- 
senger to  Washington.  McKee  at  once  conferred  with 
Colonel  Sparks  and  Judge  Toulmin.  To  these  men 
Folch's  letter  seemed  the  culmination  of  hints  that  the 
Spaniard  had  given  during  the  past  two  years.  These 
hints  had  already  brought  an  American  commissioner, 
General  George  Matthews,  to  the  border.  They  deter- 
mined, therefore,  that  McKee  should  proceed  at  once 
to  Washington  with  Folch's  ofifer.  At  the  same  time 
Toulmin  sought  to  disabuse  the  president  of  the  im- 
pression, for  which  he  was  partially  responsible,  that 
McKee  was  a  former  accomplice  of  Burr.^^ 

Folch  had  already  given  Sparks  permission  to  use 
his  troops  below  the  line,  should  such  a  course  be  nec- 
essary in  order  to  restrain  the  insurgents.  The  Amer- 
ican commander  had  courteously  declined  to  avail  him- 
self of  this  permission,  without  express  orders  from 
his  superiors,  but  Folch's  desire  to  make  some  agree- 
ment for  delivering  his  province  to  the  American  gov- 
ernment caused  Sparks  and  his  associates  to  conceive 
high  hopes  from  the  Spaniard's  most  recent  offer. 
Yet  there  was  no  indication  that  Folch  had  lost  his 
usual  finesse.  He  proposed  nothing  more  than  to 
treat  for  the  delivery  of  his  province.  It  is  true  that 
in  his  letter  to  Someruelos,  he  had  actually  threatened 
to  abandon  it  unless  he  were  reinforced  before  the 

"  Folch  to  McKee,  Dec.  2,  1810,  McKee  to  Eustis,  Dec.  5, 
1810,  Letters  Received,  MS.,  War  Department;  Toulmin  to 
Madison,  Dec.  6,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


482    FILIBUSTERING    OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

first  of  the  year.  If  the  captain-general  did  not  ap- 
prove his  purpose,  he  might  forestall  it  by  a  speedy 
response.  His  failing  to  respond  earlier  had  led  Folch 
to  his  resolution,  and  now  Someruelos  would  be  forced 
to  share  with  him  the  responsibility  for  making  it.  If 
negotiations  were  under  way  for  the  transfer  of  the 
province  to  the  Americans,  neither  would  be  held 
blamable.  On  the  other  hand  any  trifling  aid  would 
furnish  a  pretext  for  withdrawing  his  offer.  Until 
that  event  the  Americans  would  have  to  defend  him 
from  the  Baton  Rouge  insurgents  and  their  irregular 
helpers. 

Although  professing  willingness  to  surrender  his 
province  to  a  legitimate  government,  Folch  first  wished 
to  chastise  all  rebels  in  it.  After  Kemper's  challenge 
he  made  two  unsuccessful  attempts  to  attack  him  on 
the  east  side  of  Mobile  Bay.  The  filibuster  main- 
tained his  "  moving  camp  "  altogether  too  well.  But 
the  fates  worked  against  the  rebels  even  better  than 
the  governor  hoped.  Sparks,  possibly  as  a  result  of 
Toulmin's  "unfortunate  interference,"  had  invited 
Kemper  to  confer  with  him  in  regard  to  Folch's  offer 
to  suspend  the  duties  at  Mobile.  Kemper  delayed 
nearly  a  fortnight  before  complying.  The  delay  leads 
one  to  suspect  that  he  did  not  accept  the  invitation 
until  prospective  failure  led  him  to  seek  some  pretext 
for  disbanding  his  followers.  If  so,  further  disap- 
pointment was  in  store  for  him.     Toulmin  placed  him 


FILIBUSTERING  OPERATIONS   ON    THE   MOBILE    483 

under  arrest,  along  with  Caller  and  Kennedy,  whom 
family  illness  had  called  from  the  disintegrating  camp 
on  Saw  Mill  Creek.^'s 

Kemper  asserted  that  Toulmin  immediately  apprised 
Folch  of  their  detention.  But  the  Spanish  executive 
had  other  information  of  their  whereabouts.  On  the 
morning  of  December  10,  with  a  force  of  one  hundred 
regulars  and  militia  (American  accounts  add  a  score 
or  two),  he  embarked  on  the  river,  and  late  in  the 
afternoon  landed  about  a  half  league  from  their  sup- 
posed camp.  After  a  wide  detour  he  approached  the 
spot  shortly  after  nightfall  without  being  discovered. 
Possibly  the  whiskey  of  which  the  remnant  of  the 
band,  some  two  dozen  in  number,  had  liberally  par- 
taken did  its  part  in  concealing  the  approach  of  the 
Spaniard's  force.  The  surprise  was  not  complete,  for 
an  im^patient  soldier  discharged  his  gun  too  soon,  and 

48  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Dec.  22,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 
J.  F.  H.  Claiborne  states  (Mississippi  I,  308),  that  Kemper 
was  arrested  on  the  instigation  of  Silas  Dinsmoor,  the  Indian 
agent,  "an  accomplished  but  mischief  making  man."  The 
Mississippi  historian  believed  that  the  arrest  was  uncalled  for. 
Kemper  was  acting  for  a  de  facto  government  and  in  his 
opinion  had  attempted  nothing  more  than  had  the  leaders 
at  Baton  Rouge.  If  he  could  have  turned  Mobile  over  to  the 
federal  authorities,  as  they  turned  over  Baton  Rouge,  he 
would  have  been  as  honored  as  they.  The  facts  as  narrated 
above  will  show  that  Kemper  did  not  act  on  so  high  a  plane 
as  the  others,  nor  did  the  latter  receive  what  they  regarded 
as  their  desserts  for  delivering  Baton  Rouge  to  the  Americans. 


484     FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE 

this  gave  the  outlaws  a  chance  to  kill  two  of  Folch's 
men  and  wound  four.  The  filibusters  claimed  that  the 
first  notice  they  had  of  the  enemy  was  a  general  volley 
as  they  lay  around  their  fires.  Folch  killed  four  of 
their  number,  wounded  three,  and  made  seven  pris- 
oners. In  addition  he  seized  their  provisions,  stand- 
ards, and  a  large  boat.  In  this  inglorious  fashion  the 
"  star  "  of  West  Florida  disappeared  from  the  Mobile. 
A  few  of  the  survivors  were  ordered  to  join  the  in- 
surgents on  the  Pascagoula.  On  their  way  thither 
they  had  a  slight  brush  with  a  party  of  fifty  Spaniards, 
whom  they  chased  toward  Mobile.  This  feat  gratified 
their  wounded  pride,  but  it  did  not  repair  the  greater 
damage  caused  by  their  unauthorized  acts.^^ 

An  interesting  aftermath  to  the  fight  at  Saw  Mill 
Creek  was  the  effort  put  forth  by  the  friends  of  Har- 
greave  and  Sibley,  two  of  Folch's  captives,  to  obtain 
their  release.  Claiborne  actively  interested  himself  in 
their  behalf,  with  the  approval  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment, and  John  Ballinger  and  John  Sibley  seconded 
his  efforts.  During  the  second  struggle  with  Great 
Britain  the  treatment  accorded  them  caused  the  news- 
papers to  threaten  war  against  Spain.  Diplomats 
exerted  themselves  to  secure  their  release,  or  at  least 

*8  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Dec.  11,  1810,  Legajo  1568,  Papeles 
de  Cuba;  John  Nicholson  to  Rhea,  Dec.  17,  1810,  West  Florida 
Papers,  MS.,  96,  Library  of  Congress;  Nashville  Clarion  and 
Gazette,  Feb.  i,  181 1. 


FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS    ON    THE    MOBILE     485 

to  mitigate  their  sufferings.  As  time  wore  on  their 
more  fortunate  leaders,  among  them  Kennedy,  felt 
called  upon  to  explain  how  they  escaped  a  like  fate. 
Apodaca  later  released  Sibley  and  some  others. 
Kemper  made  two'  journeys  to  Washington  in  an  at- 
tempt to  secure  aid  for  the  remaining  captives,  and  ap- 
pealed to  Andrew  Jackson  to  assist  him.  He  drew  an 
affecting  picture  of  the  aged  Hargreave,  a  Revolution- 
ary veteran,  who  before  1810  had  never  breathed  other 
than  free  "American  ayre,"  then  loaded  with  irons 
and  exposed  to  insult,  and  forced  to  hard  labor  in  the 
streets  of  Havana.^"  Truly  the  way  of  the  filibuster 
was  like  that  of  other  transgressors. 

Holmes  had  exerted  himself  so  strongly  against  the 
expedition  of  the  preceding  summer  that  he  was 
greatly  chagrined  to  learn  that  Kemper  and  his  asso- 
ciates had  persuaded  even  a  few  to  take  part  in  their 
ill-considered  enterprise.  The  prosecution  of  these 
leaders,  he  reported,  developed  some  irritation ;  but 
in  view  of  the  president's  measures  he  did  not  ex- 
pect any  further  attempt  against  Mobile. ^^  Kemper 
himself,  in  despair,  wrote  to  the  West  Florida  Conven- 
tion chiding  it  for  failing  to  send  him  instructions, 
and  shortly  thereafter  learned  that  his  agency  was  ter- 

50  Kemper  to  Jackson,  Nov.  17,  1810,  Meek  MSS. ;  cf.  n.  44. 

51  Holmes  to  Toulmin,  Dec.  26,  1810,  Proceedings  Executive 
Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  Vol.  i. 


486    FILIBUSTERING   OPERATIONS   ON    THE    MOBILE 

minated  by  the  demise  of  that  body.^-  His  only  re- 
course was  to  turn  his  animus  against  Judge  Toulmin, 
about  whom  poHtical  controversy  long  continued  to 
rage,  or  to  attempt  further  unavailing  filibustering 
efforts  against  the  hated  Spaniards. 

52  Kemper  to  Rhea,  Dec.  i6,  25,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers, 
MS.,  94,  98,  Library  of  Congress. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

American  Intervention  in  West  Florida 

Popular  interest  in  the  fate  of  West  Florida  early 
manifested  itself  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  Neigh- 
borhood and  personal  connections  and  commercial  pos- 
sibilities— for  the  people  of  those  States  wished  an 
outlet  by  way  of  the  Tennessee  and  the  Mobile — largely 
accounted  for  this  interest.  In  the  summer  and  early 
fall  the  newspapers  suggested  a  series  of  county  meet- 
ings for  preparing  addresses  to  the  president  on  the 
subject  of  annexation.  It  was  thought  that  he  was  in- 
different to  the  subject,  but  that  he  would  not  inter- 
fere in  measures  to  assist  the  people  of  West  Florida 
to  gain  their  freedom,  provided  such  measures  did  not 
"  compromit  the  peace  of  the  nation."  He  would  not 
interfere,  did  they  but  know  it,  even  without  the  pro- 
viso. 

Those  who  favored  this  expression  of  public  opinion 
went  on  to  point  out  that  while  the  administration  was 
waiting  for  the  people  of  West  Florida  to  declare  and 
maintain  their  independence  or  for  Napoleon  to  dis- 
pose of  the  territory  for  a  nominal  sum,  British  agents 
might  carry  away  the  prize.     Premature  report  already 

487 


488     AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

credited  them  with  occupying  Pensacola.^  Gallatin 
expected  Great  Britain  to  oppose  the  independence  of 
the  Spanish  colonies,  at  least  as  long  as  she  was  war- 
ring in  Spain's  behalf ;  and  in  case  of  repulse  in  the 
Peninsula,  he  expected  her  to  set  up  a  nominal  regency 
in  Cuba,  where  she  could  favor  her  own  commercial 
interests  at  the  expense  of  the  Americans  and  inter- 
fere at  will  in  the  Floridas.  His  only  suggestion,  in 
that  event,  was  to  send  Erving  to  Havana  to  circum- 
vent English  diplomacy  there. ^ 

Eustis,  the  secretary  of  war,  was  interested  in  re- 
straining the  filibusters  at  Mobile,  so  as  to  advance 
Matthews's  mission,  Paul  Hamilton  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment, in  September,  prophesied  "  occurrences  very 
interesting  to  the  United  States  "  in  the  Floridas,  and 
declared  that  these  occurrences  must  lead  his  chief  to 
exercise  "much  circumspection  and  no  little  firm- 
ness."^ As  Madison  was  not  conspicuous  for  the  latter 
quality,  Holmes's  report  of  the  capture  of  Baton  Rouge 
put  him  in  a  quandary.  He  wrote  his  mentor  Jeffer- 
son that  he  doubted  if  he  possessed  adequate  powers  to 
deal  with  the  problem,  or  if  he  ought  to  do  so  before 
the  approaching  session  of  Congress.  The  successful 
faction  at  Baton  Rouge  had  as  yet  made  no  advances 

^Nashville  Clarion  and  Gazette,  Aug.  17,  1810;  National 
Intelligencer,  Oct.  12,  30,  1810. 

2  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  Sept.  17,  1810,  Jeflferson  Papers,  MS., 
Library  of  Congress. 

3  Hamilton  to  Madison,  Sept.  20,  1810,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     489 

to  him,  but  he  expected  them  to  do  so,  or  to  address 
Great  Britain.  In  the  latter  event  he  felt  that  he  might 
fairly  take  possession  of  Baton  Rouge,  especially  if  the 
British  manifested  any  tendency  to  interfere  as  they 
had  done  at  Caracas.  If  he  did  so,  he  expected  to 
arouse  their  resentment  and  possibly  bring  about  a 
war  in  which  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain,  com- 
promising their  differences,  would  combine  against  the 
United  States.* 

The  remote  possibility  that  he  might  indirectly  be- 
come the  peacemaker  of  Europe  did  not  deter  Madi- 
son from  acting  when  he  received  from  Holmes  a 
copy  of  the  declaration  and  address  issued  by  the  con- 
vention at  Baton  Rouge.  He  wisely  determined  to 
abandon  any  thought  of  awaiting  action  by  Congress 
some  five  weeks  hence.  He  must  initiate  measures  for 
taking  possession  of  the  territory  at  once,  not  so  much 
to  prevent  foreign  intervention  as  to  maintain  order 
among  the  turbulent  factions  composing  its  population. 
Fortunately  Claiborne,  the  chosen  agent  of  his  policy, 
was  still  at  hand  for  advice  and  personal  instructions. 
On  October  27,  therefore,  he  issued  the  momentous  proc- 
lamation that  translated  into  concrete  action  the  plaus- 
ible arguments  of  the  past  seven  years.  West  Florida 
formed  part  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase.  Thus  the 
president  reiterated  the  familiar  claim.  The  fact  that 
the  United  States  had  since  1803  acquiesced  in  Spanish 

*Hunt,  Madison,  VIII,  109. 


490    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

occupancy,  had  not  vitiated  this  claim.  The  present 
crisis  threatened  it,  and  moreover  interfered  with  en- 
actments against  the  slave-trade.  The  laws  of  the 
United  States  which  sanctioned  temporary  occupation 
by  Spain  also  contemplated  ultimate  occupation  by 
the  United  States.  With  this  in  view  he  directed  Gov- 
ernor Claiborne  to  take  possession  of  the  territory ; 
and  invited  the  people  to  respect  him,  to  obey  the  laws, 
and  to  preserve  order,  with  assurance  of  adequate 
protection.^ 

On  the  same  day  Smith  directed  Claiborne  to  repair 
at  once  to  Mississippi  Territory  and  there  consult  with 
Governor  Holmes  about  taking  possession  of  the  re- 
gion. After  creating  a  favorable  impression  by  dis- 
tributing copies  of  the  proclamation,  he  was  to  or- 
ganize the  militia,  form  parishes,  and  establish  the 
necessary  courts.  For  any  additional  powers  he  was 
to  look  to  the  legislature  of  Orleans  Territory,  to 
which  West  Florida  was  to  be  annexed.  "  Should, 
however,  any  particular  place,  however  small,  remain 
in  possession  of  a  Spanish  force,"  the  secretary  warned 
him,  "  you  will  not  proceed  to  employ  force  against  it, 
but  you  will  make  immediate  report  thereof  to  this 
Department."  Should  the  people  of  the  territory  op- 
pose its  occupation  by  force,  the  commander  of  the 
regular  troops  was  to  aid  him.  Smith  promised  ade- 
quate protection  to  the  people  of  the  territory  about 

■*  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III,  395. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA    49 1 

to  be  occupied,  provided  they  acquiesced  in  the  inter- 
vention, but  his  statement  that  the  region  "  will  not 
cease  to  be  a  subject  of  fair  and  friendly  negotiation 
and  adjustment  was  likely  to  arouse  their  concern." 
Shortly  after  Claiborne's  departure  Rhea's  second 
communication  reached  the  State  Department.  Smith 
at  once  informed  Holmes  of  his  qualified  assent  to  the 
requested  pardon  for  deserters,  but  warned  him  not 
to  encourage  Rhea's  other  proposals.  The  instructions 
of  the  president,  as  we  have  seen,  were  to  the  same 
effect.^ 

While  awaiting  the  results  of  its  policy,  the  ad- 
ministration sought  to  prepare  the  public  for  it.  A 
few  days  before  the  opening  of  Congress,  the  National 
Intelligencer  quoted  a  letter  of  October  30  from  Wash- 
ington, Mississippi,  urging  the  earliest  possible  atten- 
tion of  the  government  to  the  situation  in  West  Flor- 
ida, on  account  of  the  danger  to  American  interests 
from  foreign  interference.  There  was  a  strong  British 
party  in  the  region,  but  every  true  American,  judging 
from  the  recent  border  activity,  was  prepared  to  resist 
its  efforts.  The  representatives  of  the  people  there 
were  preparing  to  adopt  a  new  constitution  and  to 
prosecute  a  military  campaign,  but  they  would  joy- 
fully acquiesce  in  any  "  claim  of  dominancy  the  United 
States  might  set  up." 

*•  Smith  to  Claiborne,  Nov.  5,  1810,  Domestic  Letters,  MS., 
Vol.  15,  458,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  Department  of 
State. 


492    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

A  few  days  later,  in  an  obvious  attempt  to  forestall 
criticism,  the  Intelligencer  stated  that  the  affairs  of 
West  Florida,  though  important,  would  probably  not 
require  any  immediate  action  by  Congress.  Citizens 
would,  however,  "look  with  anxiety  for  any  commu- 
nication of  the  executive."^  Later  in  December  the 
administrative  organ  quoted  the  opinion  of  a  New  Or- 
leans correspondent,  that  the  only  rational  course  to 
pursue  was  to  take  possession  to  the  Perdido.  More- 
over, if  there  was  the  most  remote  possibility  of  East 
Florida's  falling  into  the  possession  of  any  European 
power  whatever,  the  United  States  should  add  Pensa- 
cola  and  St.  Augustine.  Commercial  and  strategic 
reasons  rather  than  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  territory 
itself  dictated  this  course.  In  case  of  war  with  Great 
Britain  the  United  States  must  occupy  those  ports  or 
yield  New  Orleans.  They  afforded  excellent  harbor 
facilities  and  gave  easy  access  to  the  Creeks  and  the 
Choctaws.^ 

Before  Madison  revealed  his  hand,  even  the  opposi- 
tion papers  hinted  that  prompt  action  was  needed  to 
forestall  foreign  intervention.  The  New  York  Even- 
ing Post  regarded  an  independent  West  Florida  as 
preposterous,  and  looked  upon  either  Great  Britain  or 
France  as  a  troublesome  neighbor.  The  Freeman's 
Journal  of  Philadelphia  thought  the  declaration  vio- 

■^  National  Intelligencer,  Nov.  27,  Dec.  i,  1810. 
8  Ibid.,  Dec.  25,  1810. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     493 

lated  the  vested  rights  of  the  United  States  under  the 
West  Florida  Claim,  a  claim  that  "  would  assume  a 
serious  aspect  under  an  energetic  government."  In 
any  event  Florida  must  one  day  become  a  part  of  the 
United  States.  The  Alexandria  Gazette  also  referred 
to  the  claim  to  the  Perdido,  hinted  that  the  principal 
hindrance  to  taking  possession  arose  from  the  "  Presi- 
dent's love  or  fear  of  Bonaparte,"  and  wished  to  have 
the  question  referred  to  Congress.  Thus  the  opposing 
press  as  well  as  the  administration  organ  was  firm  in 
demanding  prompt  and  energetic  measures,  although 
each  defined  these  in  its  own  way.^ 

Meanwhile  the  agents  of  the  administration  were 
preparing  to  carry  out  its  policy.  On  December  i 
Claiborne  reached  Washington,  Mississippi,  and  in  two 
days  the  printed  copies  of  the  president's  proclamation 
were  ready  for  distribution.  The  two  executives  re- 
garded the  majority  of  the  people  of  West  Florida  as 
anxious  to  accept  its  provisions,  but  felt  that  it  was 
necessary  to  provide  against  intriguing  factions  and 
outside  adventurers.  For  this  purpose  Colonel  Cov- 
ington was  to  follow  Claiborne  closely  with  four  hun- 
dred troops — all  that  he  could  transport  at  once — 
while  Colonel  Pike  was  to  hold  the  remainder  as  a  re- 
serve. Claiborne  was  to  proceed  down  the  river,  while 
Holmes  went  overland  to  St.  Francisville,  where  he 
would  candidly  explain  to  the  legislature  then  in  ses- 

»  Quoted  in  National  Intelligencer,  Dec.  27,  1810. 
33 


494    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

sion  there  the  reasons  for  the  president's  policy,  and 
endeavor  to  reconcile  the  members  to  it.^*' 

After  securing  the  adjournment  of  the  Mississippi 
legislature  without  arousing  undue  curiosity  and  ex- 
citement, and  after  ordering  the  militia  officers  to  hold 
their  commands  in  readiness,  including  those  near 
Mobile,  Holmes  set  out  for  St.  Francisville  on  the 
evening  of  December  4.^^  On  the  same  evening  Clai- 
borne reached  Fort  Adams  and  began  to  prepare  his 
own  escG'rt.  He  also  instructed  Colonel  Sparks,  at 
Fort  Stoddert,  to  distribute  the  proclamation  in  the 
vicinity  of  Mobile  and  to  prepare  his  troops  to  take 
possession  of  that  place.  This  step  was  necessary,  for 
the  two  executives  had  heard  that  Folch  had  recently 
received  reinforcements  from  Vera  Cruz.  This  might 
lead  the  Conventionalists — or  more  properly  speaking, 
the  filibusters  under  Kemper  and  Kennedy — to  attempt 
some  desperate  act,  which  the  regulars  and  militia 
should  prevent.^^ 

Claiborne  also  anticipated  difficulty  with  the  con- 
vention unless  the  United  States  should  assume  the 
debt  it  had  created  and  legalize  the  land  sales  made 
since  1803.  His  messengers  were  accordingly  in- 
structed, when  distributing  their  proclamations,  to  as- 
certain the  opinion  of  its  members,  the  strength  of  its 

10  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Dec.  i,  2,  3,  1810  (Parker,  7656-7664). 
^1  Holmes  to  Smith,  Jan.  i,  1811  (Parker,  4405).     This  is  a 
detailed  account  of  Holmes'  movements  in  West  Florida. 
12  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Dec.  5,  1810  (Parker,  7666). 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA    495 

forces,  particularly  in  the  fort  at  Baton  Rouge,  and 
the  strength  and  condition  of  the  Spanish  and  insur- 
gent forces  at  Mobile  and  Pensacola.  One  messenger 
was  to  go  to  St.  Francisville,  where  he  was  to  report 
to  Holmes  on  the  7th,  and  the  other  to  Baton  Rouge. 
The  former  was  to  state  that  Claiborne  was  on  the 
way,  and  that  he  brought  no  troops  with  him  but  had 
arranged  to  have  them  follow  him.^^ 

On  the  same  day  that  Holmes  and  Claiborne  were 
giving  the  final  touches  to  their  plans  for  intervention, 
the  unconscious  executive  of  the  short-lived  state  was 
urging  the  president  to  hasten  that  step,  albeit  not  as 
his  neighbors  were  proposing  to  take  it.  Despite  the 
efforts  from  various  sources  to  bring  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  American  executive,  Skipwith  apprehended 
that  he  had  not  yet  been  properly  informed  in  regard 
to  the  wishes  of  the  people  in  West  Florida.  He  ex- 
plained that  while  the  majority  favored  the  declara- 
tion of  independence,  they  realized  that  their  only  sure 
hope  for  the  future  rested  on  union  with  the  United 
States.  This  belief  led  them  to  accompany  their  decla- 
ration with  an  appeal  to  that  power  for  protection,  and 
the  greater  part  of  the  people  still  hoped  for  union 
on  terms  of  mutual  advantage.  He  referred  to  their 
previous  willingness  to  be  received  as  a  separate  State 
or  Territory  or  to  be  incorporated  with  one  of  the 
neighboring  units.     In  the  latter  case  he  suggested  that 

^3  Claiborne  to  King,  Dec.  5,  1810  (Parker,  7665). 


496     AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

it  would  be  advantageous  to  unite  them  with  Orleans 
Territory,  for  then  the  American  element  would  pre- 
dominate in  the  proposed  new  State.  The  present 
military  expedition  against  Mobile  rendered  more 
necessary  than  ever  the  loan  they  had  previously  re- 
quested. Aided  by  this  they  could  expel  all  Spanish 
troops  from  West  Florida,  unless  these  were  strongly 
reinforced.  In  this  remote  contingency  he  requested 
the  active  cooperation  of  American  troops.  The 
authorities  of  West  Florida  had  not  yet  sent  an  agent 
to  treat  with  the  secretary  of  state,  preferring  to  await 
some  hint  of  American  views.  If  the  president  pre- 
ferred to  begin  negotiations  through  commissioners 
from  the  vicinity,  such  a  course  would  be  more  prompt 
and  equally  advantageous.^* 

Skipwith's  letter  was  answered  with  stunning  swift- 
ness. Even  before  he  sealed  it  he  learned  that  Clai- 
borne's agents  were  distributing  copies  of  Madison's 
proclamation  and  sounding  the  people  in  regard  to 
possible  resistance.  Such  action  showed  little  defer- 
ence to  the  recently  installed  authorities  of  West 
Florida.  In  the  steps  so  far  taken  these  men  had  acted 
wholly  within  their  rights  and,  as  they  believed,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  wishes  of  the  American  people  and 
so  as  to  clear  the  American  government  of  any  sus- 
picion of  complicity.     Accordingly  it  was  with  a  feel- 

^^  Skipwith  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Dec.  5, 
1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  ^^,  Library  of  Congress. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     497 

ing  of  bitter  resentment  that  the  members  of  the  legis- 
lative assembly  hastily  gathered  to  listen  to  Skipwith's 
unmailed  letter  and  to  unite  with  him  in  expressing 
toward  the  proclamation  "  the  mutual  sentiments  and 
honest  feelings  of  freemen."  In  the  first  place  they 
exonerated  Skipwith  of  undue  ambition  and  of  attach- 
ment to  any  foreign  power.  They  had  a  right  to  self- 
government,  despite  the  "  imperative  tone  "  in  which 
the  president  summoned  them  to  submit  to  the  Or- 
leans executive.  They  resented  the  implied  threat 
that  foreign  ministers  might  still  determine  their  polit- 
ical status.  They  were  not  greatly  affected  by  the 
thought  that  their  independence  might  jeopardize  the 
revenue  laws  of  the  United  States.  While  desiring 
annexation  they  wanted  it  on  fair  and  honorable  terms, 
and  not  by  virtue  of  any  right  under  the  Treaty  of 
1803.  The  form  of  annexation  proposed  by  them  was 
the  only  one  that  could  give  the  United  States  a  per- 
fect title  to  the  territory.  They  were  ready  to  unite 
with  the  people  of  Orleans  on  such  terms  as  Skipwith 
proposed,  but  they  would  not  betray  their  constituents 
and  dishonor  their  cause  by  accepting  Madison's  pro- 
posals. They  closed  by  assuring  Skipwith  of  their 
readiness  to  unite  with  him  in  "  proper  resistance."^^ 

In  addition  to  this  address  to  Skipwith,  signed  by 
eleven  members  of  the  assemibly,  the  senate  empow- 
ered the  executive  to  ascertain  from  Claiborne  why  he 

IS  Address  to  Skipwith,  ibid.,  7. 


498    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

was  approaching  West  Florida  with  a  hostile  force,  and 
whether  he  was  authorized  to  suspend  operations  pend- 
ing another  appeal  to  the  president.  In  case  he  re- 
fused to  answer,  the  messenger  was  to  assure  Clai- 
borne that  Skipwith  and  the  members  of  the  assembly 
"  were  determined  sooner  to  perish  under  the  falling 
star  of  Florida  than  to  submit  to  the  sacrifice  and  dis- 
grace of  any  of  [their]  followers,  not  even  the  Deser- 
ters from  the  American  Army,  or  suffer  [themselves] 
to  be  given  up  to  any  Foreign  Power."^^ 

Truculent  as  this  resolution  was,  Osborne,  Clai- 
borne's messenger,  claimed  it  represented  merely  the 
views  of  Skipwith,  Thomas,  and  a  few  others.  The 
majority  would  gladly  accept  American  authority, 
coupled  with  American  citizenship,  even  if  thrust  upon 
them  in  this  indecorous  fashion.^'''  The  main  causes  of 
their  discontent,  as  Holmes  speedily  learned  after  his 
arrival  at  St.  Francisville  on  December  6,  were  the 
debt,  the  land  claims,  and  the  deserters.  For  the  last 
named  Holmes  promised  immunity  for  the  present, 
and  he  believed  they  would  ultimately  be  pardoned. 
He  could  give  no  positive  assurances  in  regard  to  the 
other  points,  but  he  referred  to  the  previous  liberal 
policy  of  the  United  States  toward  actual  settlers. 

Assuming  that  the  Floridians  were  already  Amer- 
ican citizens,  he  pointed  out  how  injurious  and  futile 

18  Skipwith  to  John  H.  Johnston,  Dec.  8,  i8io  (Parker,  7670) 
1^  Osborne  to  Claiborne,  Dec.  6,  1810  (Parker,  7669). 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     499 

opposition  would  prove.  In  defending  the  proclama- 
tion he  called  their  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  was  an 
executive  act,  in  which  the  president  had  only  the 
Louisiana  Treaty  and  some  acts  of  Congress  to  guide 
him.  Therefore  he  could  not  recognize  the  authority 
of  the  Florida  legislature.  As  for  the  implication  that 
by  "  fair  and  friendly  negotiation "  the  Floridians 
might  again  be  subjected  to  Spanish  authority,  he  bade 
them  dismiss  it  at  once.  It  merely  showed  the  hon- 
orable motives  of  the  administration.  He  believed 
thoroughly  that  the  United  States  had  a  right  to  the 
territory,  and  whatever  adjustment  might  follow,  the 
nation  would  never  surrender  a  foot  of  it.  By  such 
arguments,  in  the  course  of  a  strenuous  afternoon,  he 
succeeded  in  appeasing  all  but  a  few  malcontents. 

Holmes  was  asked  to  make  a  formal  call  on  Skip- 
with  but  declined  to  do  so.  At  the  same  time  he  de- 
clared his  willingness  to  discuss  the  occupation  with 
any  gentleman.  Skipwith  then  called  at  his  lodgings. 
Holmes  tried  to  show  him  how  unavailing  and  mis- 
chievous it  would  be  to  resist  the  United  States.  Pro- 
fessing his  desire  for  annexation,  Skipwith  complained 
that  the  method  of  the  executive  favored  the  Spanish 
authorities  at  the  expense  of  the  actual  residents. 
Since  the  United  States  had  abandoned  its  right  to  any 
part  of  West  Florida,  the  people  of  that  region  would 
not  now  submit  unconditionally  to  the  control  of  the 
American  government.     After  a    fruitless   interview 


500    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

they  separated,  Skipwith  and  some  companions  depart- 
ing for  Baton  Rouge,  where  the  legislative  assembly 
was  next  to  gather.  Had  he  remained  to  meet  Clai- 
borne, that  executive  was  prepared  to  adopt  a  most 
conciliatory  interpretation  of  the  president's  instruc- 
tions. 

In  the  evening  the  convention  army,  consisting  of  a 
hundred  dragoons  and  a  corps  of  riflemen,  reached 
St.  Francisville,  having  been  recalled  from  the  Mobile 
campaign  in  consequence  of  this  new  development. 
Holmes  likewise  conversed  with  the  officers  and  men, 
and  convinced  them  that  it  was  consistent  with  their 
honor  and  duty  to  support  the  United  States.  As 
most  of  the  force  came  from  Bayou  Sara,  the  original 
seat  of  revolt,  its  submission  indicated  the  peaceful  oc- 
cupation of  the  whole  region.^^ 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th  Holmes  and  Osborne, 
accompanied  by  John  H.  Johnston,  crossed  the  river  to 
confer  with  Governor  Claiborne  at  Pointe  Coupee. 
The  prominence  of  Johnston,  who  acted  as  Skipwith's 
representative,  gave  point  to  his  profession  of  attach- 
ment to  the  Union.  Claiborne  told  him  that  he  would 
respect  Skipwith  as  a  citizen,  but  that  he  could  not 
recognize  him  as  executive  of  West  Florida.  More- 
over he  gave  Johnston  "  permission  "  to  tell  the  people 
that  he  came  among  them  with  the  most  friendly  views, 
and  should  proceed  to  carry  out  the  president's  proe- 
ms Report  of  Holmes  to  Smith,  cf.  note  11. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     50I 

lamation  in  this  spirit.  Johnston  then  verbally  deliv- 
ered Skipwith's  ultimatum.  As  governor  of  West 
Florida  he  would  retire  to  Baton  Rouge,  and  there, 
"  rather  than  surrender  the  country  unconditionally 
and  without  terms,  he  would,  with  twenty  men  only, 
if  a  greater  number  could  not  be  procured,  surround 
the  Flag-Staff  and  die  in  its  defense."^'' 

Johnston  accompanied  the  bellicose  message  with  as- 
surances of  his  own  devotion  to  the  United  States  and 
an  urgent  request  for  Claiborne  to  visit  St.  Francis- 
ville.  He  assured  the  Orleans  executive  that  he  would 
find  a  troop  of  cavalry,  a  company  of  riflemen,  and  a 
concourse  of  citizens  ready  to  welcome  him.  Osborne 
crossed  the  river  and  brought  back  a  similar  request, 
whereupon  Holmes  and  Claiborne  passed  over  to  the 
opposite  bank. 

On  his  landing  in  West  Florida  the  citizens  received 
Claiborne  "  with  great  respect,"  while  the  cavalry  and 
infantry  escorted  him  to  the  center  of  the  town.  Then 
as  his  escort  took  position  around  the  West  Florida 
flag,  Claiborne  stepped  forward,  read  the  president's 
proclamation,  and  commanded  the  flag  to  be  removed. 
It  was  lowered  amid  respectful  cheers,  and  a  like  salute 
greeted  the  American  flag  that  replaced  it.  Claiborne 
then  erected  the  region  into  a  parish  and  appointed 
the  necessary  officers.  Thus  the  vv'caltliiest  and  most 
populous  section  of  West  Florida  passed  without  dis- 
19  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Dec.  7,  1810  (Parker,  7668). 


502     AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

turbance  into  the  possession  of  the  United  States.  In 
accomphshing  this  result  the  loyal,  tactful,  and  ener- 
getic efforts  of  Holmes  proved  most  helpful. -° 

The  occupation  of  Baton  Rouge,  the  next  under- 
taking to  present  itself,  promised  greater  difficulty. 
After  conferring  with  Claiborne,  Holmes,  again  serv- 
ing as  avant  courier,  departed  for  Baton  Rouge  by 
land,  accompanied  by  "  a  few  gentlemen  of  respect- 
ability "  from  Bayou  Sara  and  an  escort  of  the  former 
West  Florida  cavalry.  Claiborne  descended  the  river 
with  the  detachment  of  troops  under  Covington  as 
soon  as  the  latter  arrived.  He  hoped  to  conciliate  Skip- 
with  and  persuade  him  to  abandon  his  ill-advised  re- 
sistance, rather  than  appeal  to  military  measures.  The 
American  deserters  in  the  fort  were  likely  to  prove  the 
most  difficult  problem,  but  he  intended  to  take  no 
measures  to  punish  them  if  they  would  lay  down  their 
arms.  Holmes  hoped  that  his  escort  would  exert  a 
tranquilizing  influence  on  their  former  colleagues  in 
the  lower  district. 

Skipwith  reached  Baton  Rouge  a  day  ahead  of 
Holmes.  He  found  that  John  Ballinger,  the  com- 
mander of  the  fort,  had  arrested  Claiborne's  other 
messenger.  King.  Ballinger  was  under  the  impres- 
sion that  the  proclamation  that  King  was  distributing 
must  be  a  forgery  designed  by  the  Spanish  commander 
at  Mobile  to  check  and  confuse  the   force  destined 

20  Ibid. ;  Report  of  Holmes  to  Smith. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA    503 

against  that  town.  The  apprehension  of  Spanish 
dagger  and  Indian  tomahawk  was  still  so  strong  that 
Ballinger's  inference  and  action  were  wholly  natural. 
Skipwith  immediately  released  the  messenger,  but  he 
still  felt  too  resentful  to  counsel  submission.  Per- 
sonally he  desired  to  maintain  peace  and  order  in  the 
region,  while  working  for  its  honorable  "  return  to  the 
bosom  of  [his]  parent  Country."  At  the  same  time 
he  strove  to  secure  that  country  "  a  fair  and  legitimate 
title  "  to  the  disputed  territory  of  West  Florida.  He 
expressed  these  sentiments  in  a  postscript  to  his  letter 
to  Madison,  begun  only  four  days  before,  and  resent- 
fully reviewed  the  surprising  events  of  the  interim 
which  seemed  to  neutralize  his  desire.  He  and  his 
liberty-loving  associates,  he  assured  the  president, 
would  resist  dishonor,  repel  any  "  wanton  outrage  "  to 
their  feelings,  and  "  assert  the  rights  of  their  adopted 
country  "  should  circumstances  require  it.-^ 

Tidings  of  King's  arrest  and  of  the  prospective  re- 
sistance of  the  garrison  at  Baton  Rouge  reached 
Holmes  and  his  company  at  the  end  of  their  first  day's 
journey.  On  the  morrow,  when  within  a  few  miles 
of  the  town,  the  Mississippi  executive  sent  forward 
some  of  the  former  West  Florida  officials  to  state  the 
object  of  his  visit  and  to  ascertain  if  he  might  enter  the 
town.     Although  halted  for  a  time  on  its   outskirts 

21  Skipwith  to  the  President,  Dec.  9,  1810,  West  Florida  Pa- 
pers, MS..  86,  Library  of  Congress. 


504    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

Holmes  encountered  no  resistance.  After  a  second 
conference  Skipwith  announced  that  he  and  his  fellow- 
legislators  had  abandoned  all  thoughts  of  resistance, 
but  he  could  not  speak  for  the  garrison  in  the  fort. 
Many  of  its  members  were  deserters  from  the  Amer- 
ican service  and  might  be  tempted  to  some  desperate 
step.  On  the  following  morning  Holmes,  accompanied 
by  Skipwith,  held  an  interview  with  its  commander, 
Ballinger,  Without  entering  into  any  express  stipu- 
lation, he  repeated  the  assurances  already  given,  and 
Ballinger  thereupon  expressed  his  willingness  to  sur- 
render the  fort.  Almost  immediately  word  came  that 
five  gunboats  with  the  American  regulars  on  board  had 
been  sighted  some  two  miles  above  the  town.  On 
reaching  the  spot.  Holmes  found  that  Colonel  Coving- 
ton had  already  landed  his  force  of  two  hundred  and 
forty-five  men  with  due  precaution  against  attack,  and 
informed  him  that  he  need  expect  no  resistance.  To 
Claiborne,  who  accompanied  the  troops.  Holmes  bore 
a  letter  from  Skipwith  expressing  the  latter's  gratifi- 
cation at  his  prospective  annexation  to  the  United 
States.  The  superseded  executive  defended  his  course 
thus  far,  and  protested  against  Claiborne's  methods  as 
an  outrage  against  the  flag  and  the  constitution  of 
West  Florida.  Yet  as  a  native  of  the  United  States  he 
could  never  sign  an  order  that  would  lead  to  the  shed- 
ding of  a  drop  of  American  blood.  He  would  not 
bid  the  Florida  troops  lower  their  own  flag,  but  di- 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     505 

rected  them  not  to  resist  the  measures  of  the  Amer- 
icans. He  requested  amnesty  for  such  as  were  de- 
serters and  recommended  the  whole  force  if  Claiborne 
needed  its  assistance.-^ 

The  gratified  Claiborne  readily  promised  not  to  mo- 
lest the  deserters,  and  agreed  that  some  simple  but  re- 
spectful ceremony  should  mark  the  lowering  of  the 
West  Florida  flag.  At  half  past  two  that  afternoon 
the  conventionalist  force  of  some  four  hundred  men 
marched  out  of  their  fort,  stacked  their  guns,  and  saluted 
the  emblem  whose  descent  marked  the  close  of  the 
short-lived  republic  of  West  Florida.^^ 

In  this  peaceful  manner  the  two  executives  were 
able  to  anticipate  the  wishes  of  the  administration  and 
establish  American  control  in  Baton  Rouge  without 
any  disagreeable  complications.  In  this  delicate  task, 
as  well  as  in  the  preliminary  events.  Governor  Holmes 
had  showed  himself  a  discreet  and  effective  inter- 
mediary. Having  accomplished  his  part  he  modestly 
retired  to  his  post,  content  with  the  honor  of  partici- 
pating in  an  event  so  conducive,  as  he  believed,  to  his 
country's  welfare. 

In  keeping  with  his  instructions,  Governor  Clai- 
borne immediately  provided  for  local  governments  and 
organized   the   militia.      He   divided   the  jurisdiction 

^2  Skipwith  to  Claiborne,  Dec.  10,  1810,  Monroe  Papers, 
Lenox  MSS. 

-3  Report  of  Holmes  to  Smith ;  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Dec.  12, 
1810  (Parker,  7671)  ;  Summary,  fs.  67,  80.     Cf.  note  21,  p.  334. 


506    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

into  four  parishes,  appointing  Richard  Steele  judge  in 
Feliciana  and  George  Mather  in  East  Baton  Rouge. 
In  St.  Helena  and  St.  Tammany  (the  last  named  re- 
placing the  St.  Ferdinand  of  the  Spanish  regime  and 
including  settlements  on  the  Bogue  Chitto  and  Tan- 
chipaho)  he  had  difficulty  in  finding  suitable  men  for 
the  judicial  positions.  In  the  other  parishes  he  was 
overwhelmed  by  applicants  for  office.  He  noted  some 
attempt  to  discriminate  against  those  who  had  not 
made  common  cause  with  the  convention,  but  selected 
his  appointees  largely  from  the  patriotic  American 
contingent.^* 

There  was  some  dissatisfaction  over  the  parish  divi- 
sions as  well  as  over  Claiborne's  "  palatine  "  method  in 
forming  them.  Philemon  Thomas,  the  "  Ajax  "  of  the 
defunct  government,  professed  that  his  object  was  ac- 
complished. Skipwith  refused  to  accept  the  office  of 
justice  of  the  peace;  but  as  his  first  resentment  cooled 
he  acknowledged  that  Claiborne  had  treated  him  per- 
sonally with  courtesy  and  the  whole  people  with  more 
than  magnanimity.  There  was  liable  to  be  some  latent 
dissatisfaction  in  regard  to  the  land  bounties  promised 
to  the  forces  of  the  convention,  the  debts  of  that  body, 
and  the  vacant  lands  of  the  province.  Claiborne  wrote 
that  those  who  felt  themselves  aggrieved  would  prob- 
ably memorialize  Congress.  The  land  grants  by  Grand 
Pre  and  Morales  also  presented  many  difficulties,  al- 

24  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Dec.  17,  23,  24  (Parker,  7673,  7680- 
82,  7684). 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     507 

though  Claiborne  was  relieved  to  find,  contrary  to  his 
earlier  impression,  that  Skipwith  was  not  involved  in 
them. 

The  concluding  resolution  of  the  West  Florida  leg- 
islature seemed  unduly  hostile.  But  once  having  fully 
submitted,  Skipwith  assured  the  Orleans  executive 
that  he  might  absolutely  rely  on  the  American  element 
in  the  population  in  case  of  invasion,  and  likewise  on 
the  French  and  French-Canadian.  Claiborne  acknowl- 
edged that  most  of  the  population,  including  the  more 
influential  elements,  were  virtuous,  but  there  were 
some  with  British  preferences  and  others  who  objected 
to  any  stability  or  justice  in  government.  "  A  more  het- 
erogeneous mass  of  good  and  evil,"  he  wrote  with  some 
reserve,  "  was  never  before  met  in  the  same  extent  of 
territory."  Of  late  the  Spanish  officials  had  seemed 
to  encourage  the  worst  element.  The  revolt  had  been 
started  by  the  opposite  class,  but  the  more  vicious, 
Claiborne  believed,  were  gaining  power  and  would 
shortly  have  controlled  affairs  had  the  American 
authorities  not  intervened.  If  the  latter  had  delayed 
two  weeks  longer,  the  convention  troops  might  have 
reduced  Mobile  and  included  that  region,  too,  within 
the  new  acquisition.  Many  "  aspiring  individuals  "  at 
first  naturally  displayed  resentment  at  the  failure  of 
their  plans.^^ 

25  Claiborne  to  Smith,  ibid. ;  Skipwith  to  Graham,  Dec.  23, 
1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  100,  Library  of  Congress; 
same  to  same,  Jan.  i,  181 1,  ibid.,  105  ff. 


508    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

Claiborne  showed  marked  attention  to  De  Lassus, 
whom  Skipwith  released  just  before  the  Americans 
took  possession.  That  chagrined  official  took  refuge 
across  the  river,  where  for  obvious  reasons  he  pre- 
ferred to  remain  rather  than  face  his  accusers  in 
Havana.  Claiborne  also  took  the  first  occasion  that 
presented  itself  to  inform  Someruelos  of  his  action  at 
Baton  Rouge  and  to  assure  the  captain-general  that 
it  betokened  no  hostility  whatever  toward  the  Spanish 
government.  But  he  was  unable  to  persuade  the  other 
that  his  course  was  wholly  friendly.^^  In  view  of 
recent  occurrences  at  Mobile,  it  was  far  more  im- 
portant to  know  how  Folch  regarded  it.  The  Intel- 
ligencer published  a  premature  report  that  he  would 
evacuate  Mobile  without  opposition,  and  Claiborne 
urged  Colonel  Cushing  to  hasten  his  journey  to  Mobile, 
so  as  to  prevent  a  clash  between  the  Spaniards  and 
the  frontiersmen  that  might  jeopardize  this  result.^^ 

Cr^  :jnel  James  Caller,  from  the  Tombigbee,  chanced 
to  be  in  Natchez  on  the  eve  of  Holmes's  departure  for 
West  Florida.  To  him  the  governor  entrusted  copies 
of  the  proclamation,  and  ordered  him  and  his  associate 
Carson  to  prepare  their  militia  for  cooperation  with 
the  regulars.  His  arrival  at  Fort  Stoddert  on  the 
afternoon    of    December    13    caused    great    rejoicing 

26  Claiborne  to  Captain-General  of  Cuba,  Dec.  20,  1810 
(Parker,  7681). 

27  Parker,  7692. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     509 

among  the  neighboring  "  honest  people,"  as  Kemper's 
followers  called  themselves.  Colonel  Sparks,  "  amiable 
old  officer  favorable  to  [their]  views,"  immediately 
sent  a  copy  of  the  proclamation  to  Folch.  This  paper 
and  the  colonel's  statement  that  he  had  been  ordered  to 
get  his  troops  ready  to  act  in  accordance  with  it  caused 
an  appreciable  rise  in  land  values  at  Mobile.^* 

Some  of  the  "  Tories,"  that  is,  Toulmin  and  his 
friends,  thought  that  Sparks  was  interpreting  his  in- 
structions too  freely.  To  them  he  seemed  to  be  as- 
suming the  offensive  with  needless  haste,  and  they 
doubted  the  expediency  of  inviting  the  cooperation  of 
the  militia.  The  colonel's  course  may  have  been  par- 
tially determined  by  Caller,  who  in  turn  had  been 
urged  thereto  by  F.  L.  Claiborne,  brother  of  the  execu- 
tive. The  latter  had  claimed  that  the  proclamation 
would  justify  Sparks  in  hurrying  down  to  Mobile  with 
the  regulars  and  militia  and  taking  possession  without 
delay.  Coming  from  such  a  source  the  advice  would 
be  entitled  to  great  weight.^^ 

To  Sparks's  surprise  Folch  answered  that  he  could 
not  deliver  up  the  province  to  the  Americans.  He  re- 
ferred Sparks's  note  to  Someruelos  and  then  started 
to  Pensacola,  evidently  to  confer  with  Morales  and  his 

28  Holmes  to  officers  at  Ft.  Stoddert,  Dec.  4,  1810,  Proceed- 
ings Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  Vol.  i ; 
Nicholson  to  Rhea,  Dec.  17,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS., 
96,  Library  of  Congress. 

29  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Jan.  23,  181 1,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 

34 


5IO     AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

other  colleagues  over  the  latest  development.     As  the 
intendant  later  observed,  the  American  government  had 
at  length  thrown  off  the  mask  which  had  hitherto  con- 
cealed its  intrigues  at  Baton  Rouge.^'^     This  revelation 
caused  a  complete  reversal  in  Folch's  position.     A  few 
weeks  before,  he  had  offered  to  transfer  his  province  to 
the  Americans  on  his  own  authority,  and  had  come  to 
Mobile  in  order  to  carry  out  his  purpose  unhampered. 
But  such  a  transfer,  after  the  president's  procedure, 
meant  a  yielding  to  the  untenable  American  claim  that 
he  had  so  long  opposed.     Moreover,  in  connection  with 
the  events  at  Baton  Rouge  it  would  bear  all  the  marks 
of  direct  collusion.     Kemper's  mad  foray  gave  him 
an   adequate   pretext    for   withdrawing   his   offer   of 
peaceful  surrender.     A  recent  subsidy  from  Mexico 
enabled  him  to  meet  his  most  pressing  financial  obli- 
gations.    But  with  a  force  of  seven  hundred  men  on 
its  way  from  Baton  Rouge  to  attack  Mobile,  with  eight 
gunboats  loaded  with  troops  approaching  from  Mobile, 
and  with  the  commander  at  Fort  Stoddert  preparing 
to  descend  the  river  with  his  regulars  and  militia,  he 
needed  additional  reinforcements  and  money  to  meet 
the  perils  that  confronted  him.     While  Morales  be- 
sought the  authorities  to  send  these  at  once,    Folch 
wrote  Perez,  who  had  reported  the  forces  threatening 
to   overwhelm   them,   that   the  greater   the   attacking 

30  Folch  to  Sparks,  Dec.  14,  1810  (Parker,  7688);  Morales 
to  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Treasury,  Dec.  19,  1810,  Legajo 
267,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     5 II 

force  and  the  more  hopeless  the  defense,  the  more 
honorable  the  surrender.  Perez  was  to  husband  his 
slender  force  as  much  as  possible,  and  when  his  para- 
pets were  dismantled  and  his  artillery  was  useless,  he 
was  to  yield  on  the  best  terms  he  could  get.*^ 

It  v/as  natural  for  the  Spaniards  to  confuse  the 
West  Florida  forces  with  the  American,  as  Perez  had 
done,  and  to  exaggerate  the  menace  from  each.  Kem- 
per's course  at  this  juncture  served  to  confirm  this 
impression.  As  soon  as  he  learned  the  president's 
orders,  undeterred  by  recent  defeat,  former  failure  to 
receive  instructions,  or  recent  prosecutions,  he  be- 
stirred himself  to  collect  his  scattered  filibusters  from 
the  Tensaw,  St.  Stephens,  and  Pascagoula.  Designat- 
ing a  rendezvous  near  Mobile,  where  "  Major "  Orso 
with  a  small  contingent  awaited  them,  he  and  his  lieu- 
tenant, John  Nicholson,  boasted  that  their  flag  would 
be  hoisted  at  Mobile  before  that  of  the  United  States. 
Their  chief  purpose  was  to  "  take  a  pull "  at  the 
"  Dons  "  in  revenge  for  the  repulse  at  Saw  Mill  Creek. 
Then  they  hoped  to  have  the  "  satisfaction  of  receiving 
the  U[nited]  S[tates]  with  open  arms  at  Mobile  and 
of  joining  the  one  star  with  the  many." 

These  would-be  marauders,  professing  their  readi- 
ness to  "  hail  the  Goddess  of  Liberty  as  the  protectress 
of  our  rights  civil  and  personal,"  strove  to  deepen  this 

31  Perez  to  Folch,  Dec.  20,  1810,  Folch  to  Perez,  Dec.  21, 
1810,  Legajo  1569,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


512    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

mistaken  impression  of  their  activity.  They  repre- 
sented the  American  authorities  as  involved  in  the 
events  at  Baton  Rouge  and  as  not  approving  Toulmin's 
measures  to  repress  the  expedition  against  Mobile. 
In  view  of  Sparks's  activity  and  Cushing's  arrival  they 
anticipated  a  welcome  expenditure  of  powder  at  Mo- 
bile. The  people  were  ready,  when  Sparks  gave  the 
word,  to  drop  work,  and  to  feed  their  resentment 
against  the  Spaniards  by  investing  the  fort  at  Mobile.^^ 
Such  a  diversion  was  liable  to  produce  disagreeable 
complications.  Perez,  though  vain,  would  fight.  The 
first  shot  against  the  fort  would  be  the  signal  for  the 
destruction  of  the  town.  Sparks  accordingly  stationed 
Captain  Gaines  with  a  force  of  fifty  men  near  Mobile, 
and  through  a  special  messenger  induced  Kemper  to 
return.  He  and  his  followers  were  almost  imme- 
diately incorporated  in  the  territorial  militia,  whose 
officers  were  largely  their  partisans.^^  This  prompt 
clothing  of  the  whilom  outlaws  with  the  semblance  of 
respectability  served  still  more  to  confuse  the  Span- 
iards. Therefore  Sparks's  action,  while  preventing  the 
useless  shedding  of  blood,  did  not  disclose  any  real 
difference  between  the  filibusters  and  the  mihtiamen, 

32  Kemper  to  Rhea,  Dec.  i6,  1810,  Nicholson  to  Rhea,  Dec. 
17,  1810,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  96,  98,  Library  of  Con- 
gress; Toulmin  to  Holmes,  Feb.  3,  181 1,  Mississippi  Terri- 
torial Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  9. 

33  Nashville  Clarion  and  Gazette,  Feb.  i,  181 1;  Sparks  to 
Claiborne,  Dec.  21,  1810  (Parker,  7690). 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     513 

or  make  clear  the  attitude  of  the  administration  toward 
each  group. 

Sparks  expected  the  force  under  Gaines  not  only  to 
check  Kemper  but  to  secure  the  delivery  of  Mobile  to 
the  Americans.  Accordingly  on  December  22  Gaines 
sent  Captain  Luckett  to  notify  Perez  that  he  had  come 
to  take  possession  of  the  fort  agreeably  to  the  proclama- 
tion. He  supposed  that  the  Spaniard  had  already  made 
up  his  mind  on  this  point  and  requested  an  immediate 
answer.  He  emphasized  the  conciliatory  policy  thus 
far  pursued  by  the  United  States,  and  mentioned  the 
feeling  of  duty  and  attachment  that  prompted  the  offi- 
cers of  the  American  army  "to  support  a  measure 
adopted  by  their  beloved  President."  Perez  doubtless 
appreciated  this  new  challenge  from  the  "  Cock  of 
Stoddert,"  backed  up  as  it  was  by  pointed  references 
to  reinforcements  expected  from  the  Mississippi  and 
to  the  militia  from  the  Tombigbee. 

Perez  answered  that  he  had  no'  communication  from 
his  government  to  guide  him  in  forming  an  opinion  on 
this  momentous  subject.  He  advised  Gaines  to  sus- 
pend operations  until  they  could  hear  from  Folch,  then 
on  his  way  to  Pensacola.  Each  appointed  a  represen- 
tative to  interview  Folch,  and  mutually  agreed  to  take 
no  hostile  measures  pending  his  response.  Under  this 
agreement  Gaines  took  up  his  position  a  half  mile 
above  the  town.  Their  messengers  reached  Pensacola 
before  Folch  himself.     Possibly  Perez  anticipated  this 


514    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

and  wished  to  gain  time  thereby.  Folch  expressed 
surprise  when  he  heard  of  Gaines's  demand.  He 
thought  the  American  force  had  descended  the  river 
merely  to  save  Mobile  from  the  filibusters.  As  he  had 
previously  informed  Sparks,  he  could  deliver  up  his 
province  only  on  order  from  the  captain-general.^* 

To  Perez,  Folch  wrote  more  bitterly,  complaining 
that  the  landing  of  American  troops  within  the  do- 
minions of  His  Majesty  would  justify  him  in  using 
force  to  expel  them.  Perez  should  tell  Gaines  or  any 
other  American  officer  that  he  had  no  power  to  sur- 
render the  king's  territory,  but  was  obliged  to  defend 
it  to  the  last  extremity.  By  this  time  Perez  learned 
of  Cushing's  approach,  which  added  to  the  perils  con- 
fronting him,  and  reported  that  Gaines  had  offered  to 
grant  soldiers,  officers,  and  other  employees  the  most 
favorable  terms  possible.  He  was  sure  that  he  could 
not  escape  surrender,  even  if  each  man  should  prove  a 
lion  in  combat.  Moreover  by  useless  resistance  he 
would  lose  the  artillery  and  the  munitions  that  he 
might  otherwise  save.  Yet  he  had  warned  Gaines  not 
to  permit  a  larger  party  than  six  to  come  together  at 
one  time  within  gunshot  of  the  fort.^^ 

In  the  closing  month  of  1810  the  town  of  Mobile 

34  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Dec.  28,  1810  (Parker,  7687)  ;  Morales 
to  Secretary  of  State  for  Treasury,  Jan.  20,  1811,  Legajo  267, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 

35  Folch  to  Perez,  Dec.  25,  1810,  Legajo  63,  Papeles  de 
Cuba;  National  Intelligencer,  Jan.  26,  1811. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA    515 

was  liable  to  become  a  sacrifice  to  the  motley  forces 
threatening  it  from  without  and  within.  If  the  fili- 
busters did  not  plunder  it,  the  Spanish  commandant 
might  sacrifice  it  in  defending  his  fort.  To  prevent 
such  a  calamity  and  to  save  the  whole  region  from  an- 
archy and  pillage,  Judge  Toulmin  undertook  a  special 
mission  to  the  camp  of  Colonel  Gushing.  He  was  al- 
ready in  Mobile,  making  necessary  provision,  as  con- 
tractor's agent,  for  the  latter's  arrival,  when  he  learned 
that  Sparks  was  about  to  embody  the  territorial  militia 
and  move  down  the  river.  While  he  credited  Sparks 
with  good  faith,  he  thought  that  he  had  misinterpreted 
his  orders.  It  would  be  folly  to  attack  the  fort  before 
Gushing  arrived  with  gunboats  and  artillery,  and  it 
would  be  impossible,  with  such  levies,  to  avoid  some 
clash,  once  they  reached  its  vicinity. 

Toulmin  repaired  to  Gushing's  camp  as  soon  as  the 
latter  reached  Mobile  Bay,  represented  the  situation  in 
its  true  light,  and  induced  him  to  order  the  immediate 
mustering  out  of  the  militia.  He  paid  the  usual  pen- 
alty for  his  unpopular  but  patriotic  service.  His  ene- 
mies, terming  him  an  enemy  to  his  country  and  its  op- 
pressed people,  charged  him  with  neglecting  his  public 
duties.  More  serious  still  was  the  insinuation  that  he 
was  trying  to  prevent  the  surrender  of  Mobile  so  as 
to  favor  his  own  land  speculations.  But  the  judge, 
disregarding  temporary  odium  and  personal  threats, 
prided  himself  on  saving  Mobile,  preventing  the  shed- 


5l6     AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

ding  of  blood,  and  fulfilling  the  real  wishes  of  his  gov- 
ernment. The  administration  and  its  organ,  and  Con- 
gress as  well,  agreed  with  him,  and  refused  to  enter- 
tain charges  based  merely  on  malice  and  envy. 

The  local  resentment  against  Toulmin  long  continued 
to  show  itself.  He  and  Caller  had  a  personal  alter- 
cation at  the  disbanding  of  the  militia,  in  which,  so 
the  latter  claimed,  Toulmin  attacked  him  in  a  way 
"unbecoming  his  character  as  a  judge,  and  a  Gentel- 
man."  The  militiamen  resented  the  action  so  forcibly 
that  Caller  had  to  interfere  to  save  the  judge  from  vio- 
lence. Before  Kemper  left  the  Tombigbee  region,  late 
in  January,  1811,  he  and  his  cronies  held  what  Toul- 
min called  "high  courts  of  impeachment,"  in  which 
they  threatened  to  present  him  for  treason.  He  was 
less  disturbed  by  their  threats  than  by  the  working  of 
a  new  system  of  courts,  in  which  local  sentiment  would 
have  more  chance  to  interfere  with  conscientious 
officials. 

In  the  following  autumn  Toulmin's  enemies  packed 
the  grand  jury  of  Baldwin  County  and  returned  a 
presentment  against  him.  One  of  the  specifications 
stated  that  he  used  military  methods  in  examining  the 
charges  against  Kemper  and  Kennedy,  and  another 
that  he  corresponded  with  foreign  enemies.  Toulmin 
flattered  himself  that  his  course  had  been  fairly  ac- 
ceptable to  the  better  elements  of  the  community,  even 
if   his   reputation  had  not  been   proof   against   "the 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     517 

desperate  profligacy  of  a  Cataline  .  .  .  supported  by 
the  abandoned  intrigues  of  a  Robespierre."  This  pre- 
sentment, later  brought  before  the  legislature,  was  re- 
ferred to  a  committee  of  which  Kennedy  was  chair- 
man and  Caller  a  member.  These  worthy  but  "un- 
fortunate citizens,"  moved  by  a  love  for  "the  pure 
and  impartial  administration  of  Justice,"  secured  the 
passage  of  resolutions  embodying  the  charges  and  for- 
warded them  to  Congress  and  the  president.  Need- 
less to  say  their  enmity  overshot  its  mark.^^ 

After  the  introduction  afforded  by  the  preceding 
events,  Claiborne's  next  task  was  hardly  likely  to  com- 
mend itself  to  Folch.  Possibly  the  Orleans  executive 
did  not  greatly  care.  At  any  rate  it  was  December  27 
before  he  officially  informed  Folch  of  his  course  at 
Baton  Rouge  and  of  his  intention  to  occupy  the  country 
as  far  as  the  Perdido.  He  wished  the  other  to  regard 
his  action  as  wholly  friendly  and  calculated  to  advance 
the  best  interests  of  both  nations.  His  letter,  accom- 
panied by  a  copy  of  the  president's  proclamation,  was 
dated  some  three  weeks  after  he  had  informed  Sparks 

36  Caller  to  Holmes,  Jan.  7,  181 1,  Toulmin  to  Holmes,  Feb.  3, 
181 1,  Mississippi  Territorial  Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  9;  Toulmin 
to  Madison,  Jan.  23,  1811,  Feb.  27,  1811,  Madison  Papers,  MS.; 
National  Intelligencer,  Feb.  10,  181 1;  Holmes  to  Smith,  Feb. 
2,  1811,  Proceedings  Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Territory, 
MS.,  Vol.  I ;  Toulmin  to  Samuel  Postlewaite,  Oct.  21,  Nov.  11, 
181 1,  Claiborne  Letters,  E,  MS.,  Mississippi  Department  of 
Archives  and  History;  Mead  to  Madison,  Nov.  20,  181 1,  Madi- 
son Papers,  MS. 


5l8    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

of  his  intended  action.  The  delay  implies  that  he 
hoped  the  other  would  occupy  the  territory  at  once, 
as  his  brother  had  apparently  advised.  The  later  re- 
port of  Kemper's  irregularities  caused  him  to  warn 
Sparks  against  permitting  a  nominal  occupation  of 
Mobile  by  the  Conventionalists.  He  might  invite  the 
Spaniards  to  retire  from  their  post  there,  should  he 
think  them  disposed  to  do  so,  and  permit  them  to  take 
their  military  stores,  but  he  should  enter  into  no  formal 
capitulation  with  them.  He  was  to  take  this  action, 
however,  only  to  prevent  bloodshed.  If  the  Spanish 
commander  refused  to  yield  possession,  he  should  as- 
sure him  that  he  would  not  resort  to  forcible  measures 
without  further  orders.^^ 

On  January  6  Sparks  sent  a  messenger  to  Folch 
with  Claiborne's  missives.  Before  he  reached  Pensa- 
cola,  Captain  Luis  Piernas  arrived  there  with  a  hun- 
dred thousand  pesos  from  Mexico.  The  viceroy  could 
supplement  this  with  no  troops,  for  he  was  experienc- 
ing insurrection  in  his  own  dominions,  and  the  sum  was 
wholly  inadequate  to  meet  Folch's  pressing  problems  of 
defense;  but  the  timely  succor  afforded  him  a  con- 
venient pretext  for  retaining  what  he  had  professed 
to  regard  as  a  useless  province.  It  was  also  an  oppor- 
tunity to  reinstate  himself  with  his  superiors.  At  the 
same  time  the  arrival  of  Cushing  and  his  flotilla  before 
Mobile  warned  him  to  preserve  a  courteous  attitude 

3'  Claiborne  to  Folch,  Dec.  27,  1810  (Parker,  7694)  ;  same  to 
Sparks,  Dec.  28,  1810  (Parker,  7693). 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     519 

toward  the  Americans.  He  replied  to  Claiborne  that 
he  would  inform  the  captain-general  of  his  communi- 
cation, and  he  expressed  the  hope  that  in  the  interim 
the  other  would  do  nothing  to  disturb  the  existing  har- 
mony. Some  of  his  entourage  were  inclined  to  be  less 
courteous.  An  Indian  interpreter,  Manuel  Gonzales, 
acted  as  host  to  Carson,  the  messenger.  When  Carson 
expressed  surprise  at  the  prudence  so  far  exhibited 
by  the  Spaniards,  Gonzales  retorted :  "  Fire  the  first 
shot,  and  see  if  we  answer."^^ 

In  Claiborne's  message  both  Folch  and  Morales 
found  new  evidence  of  the  perfidy  of  the  American 
government.  Seizing  the  occasion  when  Spain  was 
beset  by  enemies  and  the  Floridas  were  bereft  of  de- 
fense, its  agents  stirred  up  insurrection  in  West  Flor- 
ida and  threatened  still  further  encroachments  in  the 
eastern  province.  Their  course  was  not  merely  per- 
fidious but  ungrateful,  for  Spain  had  assisted  the 
United  States  in  gaining  its  independence.  Folch 
could  only  suggest  an  appeal  to  American  cupidity, 
while  Morales  advised  his  superiors  to  press  a  claim 
for  the  territory  which  the  Americans  had  already 
occupied.  Meanwhile  they  both  waited  anxiously  for 
the  Americans  to  lay  aside  the  mask  altogether.^^ 

38  Sparks  to  Folch,  Jan.  6,  1811,  Legajo  1568,  Folch  to 
Sparks  and  to  Claiborne,  Jan.  10,  181 1,  Legajo  1569,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 

3^  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Jan.  12,  1811,  Legajo  1569,  Morales 
to  Secretary  ...  of  Treasury,  Jan.  20,  181 1,  Legajo  267,  Pa- 
peles de  Cuba. 


520    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

Late  in  January,  Toulmin  advised  the  president  to 
resort  to  diplomacy  in  order  to  gain  the  coveted  ter- 
ritory. Claiborne,  without  favorable  response  from 
Folch,  was  concerned  over  the  report  that  the  Spaniard 
was  about  to  cross  the  Perdido  with  reinforcements. 
As  the  Spaniards  now  controlled  only  the  environs  of 
Mobile,  this,  in  his  estimation,  would  constitute  an  in- 
vasion of  American  territory.*"  Fortunately  Folch 
was  in  no  condition  to  test  Claiborne's  theory.  Colonel 
Cushing,  reaching  the  vicinity  of  Mobile  with  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  men  and  a  convoy  of  gunboats,  encoun- 
tered no  such  "  warm  work  "  as  the  newspapers  had 
predicted.  His  most  important  task,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  was  the  disbanding  of  the  militia,  at 
Toulmin's  request. 

Although  this  act  meant  a  signal  favor  to  the  Span- 
iards, Perez  refused  to  give  Cushing  permission  to 
pass  the  town  without  an  order  from  Folch.  The 
American  oflficer  went  ahead  without  being  molested 
and  later  invited  Perez  to  a  formal  conference.  When 
this  failed  to  elicit  a  favorable  response,  Cushing  and 
his  suite  made  a  formal  call  on  the  Spaniards  and  thus 
established  relations  that  were  at  least  outwardly 
friendly.  Cushing  then  took  up  his  residence  in  town, 
and  although  he  attempted  to  exercise  no  authority 
beyond  the  limits  of  his  camp,  his  mere  presence  gave 
increased  confidence  to  those  residents  who  had  com- 

*°  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Jan.  30,  181 1  (Parker,  7715). 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     52I 

mitted   themselves   too  thoroughly   to  the  American 
cause. 

Perez  still  continued  his  vigilant  attitude  toward  the 
Americans.  Their  deserters,  even,  were  to  be  kept  in 
custody,  pending  the  decision  of  the  captain-general. 
The  cruises  of  the  American  flotilla  between  the  town 
and  Dauphine  Island  were  carefully  noted.  Both 
Spaniards  and  townspeople  were  mystified  when  on 
February  9  the  troops  proceeded  to  Fort  Stoddert. 
Early  in  the  following  month  the  flotilla  withdrew  to 
New  Orleans.  These  movements,  they  afterwards 
learned,  arose  from  the  fact  that  Gushing  and  some 
of  his  subordinates  had  to  report  for  court-martial  at 
Fort  Adams.  This  was  one  of  the  incidents  growing 
out  of  the  interminable  Wilkinson  enquiry.*^  Coving- 
ton, who  succeeded  Gushing,  was  permitted  to  anchor 
before  Mobile ;  but  Folch  instructed  St.  Maxent,  who 
was  now  in  charge  there,  not  to  allow  this  again  with- 
out express  order  from  Someruelos.*-  Thus  the  situa- 
tion still  contained  anxieties  for  the  Spaniards.  On 
the  other  side  of  the  line  came  reports  of  "rustling" 
cattle,  interference  with  the  Indians,  and  anticipations 
of  the  appearance  of  the  British  at  Pensacola.     But 

*i  Gushing  to  Perez,  Jan.  9,  1811,  Perez  to  Gushing,  Jan. 
10,  181 1,  Perez  to  Folch,  Jan.  19,  25,  27,  30,  Feb.  6,  9,  13,  iBii, 
Legajo  1569,  Papeles  de  Guba;  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Jan.  23, 
Feb.  6,  181 1,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 

42  St.  Maxent  to  Folch,  Mar.  19,  1811,  Legajo  63,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 


522    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

the  most  pressing  anxiety  of  the  Americans  was  the 
fate  of  the  unfortunate  members  of  the  Kemper  party, 
who  had  now  been  transferred  to  Havana. 

Meanwhile  the  administration  was  attempting  an- 
other "diplomatic"  move  in  relation  to  the  Floridas. 
In  1810  General  George  Matthews,  of  Georgia,  had 
been  given  a  commission  to  the  Spanish  authorities 
similar  to  Wilkinson's  of  the  previous  year.^^  Un- 
able to  visit  Folch  at  Pensacola  because  of  the  preva- 
lence of  yellow  fever  in  the  early  fall  of  1810,  he  came 
to  the  Tombigbee  country,  where  his  presence  aroused 
Kemper's  concern.  Finally  Matthews  secured  an  in- 
terview with  Folch  at  Mobile  and  explained  to  him  the 
president's  views.  The  latter  contemplated  a  union 
of  forces  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Spanish  colonies  to  prevent  European  nations  from 
gaining  a  foothold  in  the  new  world.  Folch  was 
equally  unwilling  to  have  the  Spanish  colonies  become 
subject  to  some  other  European  power  or  to  the  United 
States.  Matthews  thought  that  if  the  United  States 
should  make  some  provision  for  Spanish  officials,  it 
would  remove  the  great  obstacle  to  union  with  the 
Spanish  colonies.  Perhaps  Matthews's  suggestion  en- 
couraged Folch  to  offer  to  deliver  his  province  to  the 
Americans.  Colonel  John  McKee,  as  we  have  seen, 
bore  this  offer  to  Washington.** 

*3  Crawford  to  Smith,  Nov.  i,  1810,  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  34,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  cf.  p.  287. 
**  Cf.  p.  481. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     523 

Folch's  offer  and  Matthews's  earlier  report  aroused 
the  extravagant  hopes  of  the  president.  Prompt  ac- 
tion might  mean  the  acquisition  of  both  Floridas.  On 
January  3  he  sent  a  special  message  to  Congress  trans- 
mitting Folch's  offer.  He  accompanied  this  with  a 
British  protest  against  the  occupation  of  Baton  Rouge, 
thus  creating  the  impression  of  interference  that  the 
advocates  of  immediate  occupation,  among  whom  Jef- 
ferson was  chief,  so  sedulously  inculcated.  To  heighten 
this  impression  Madison  suggested  that  Congress  pass 
a  resolution  to  the  effect  that  it  "  could  not  see  without 
serious  inquietude  any  part  of  the  neighboring  terri- 
tory pass  from  Spain  to  another  foreign  power."  He 
also  asked  for  authorization  to  take  possession  of  any 
part  of  it  for  which  he  could  make  proper  arrange- 
ments with  the  local  authorities.^^  Within  two  weeks 
Congress  complied  with  the  president's  request,  but 
added  the  assurance  that  the  territory  should  still  be 
subject  to  negotiation.  It  authorized  the  executive  to 
make  such  use  of  the  army  and  navy  as  was  necessary 
and  to  incur  expense  up  to  a  hundred  thousand  dollars. 
The  secretary  of  state  officially  informed  Folch  that 
his  proposal  was  accepted  and  Matthews  and  McKee 
were  appointed  as  commissioners  to  carry  it  out.^^ 

McKee  gave  Folch  additional  details  of  the  pro- 
posed occupancy.     The  American  government  would 

^5  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III,  394,  395. 
*6  Smith  to  Folch,  Jan.  26,  28,  181 1,  Domestic  Letters,  MS., 
Vol.  16,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


524    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

accept  temporary  possession  of  East  Florida  and  of 
West  Florida  beyond  the  Perdido  in  order  to  assure  the 
region  adequate  protection.  Claiborne  had  supposedly 
taken  possession  up  to  the  Perdido;  but  if  Mobile 
was  unoccupied  he  and  Matthews  might  take  steps  to 
hold  it.  They  might  agree  to  redeliver  the  portion 
east  of  the  Perdido  to  its  lawful  sovereign.  In  case 
of  amicable  surrender  they  were  authorized  to  assume 
a  "  reasonable  amount "  of  the  current  local  debts  owed 
by  the  Spaniards,  regarding  these  debts  as  a  future 
lien  on  Spain,  and  to  spend  a  reasonable  sum  in  re- 
moving Spanish  troops  from  the  province.  They  were 
to  confirm  land  titles,  exercise  customary  religious  tol- 
eration, and  continue  local  customs  and  local  officials 
with  as  little  change  as  possible.  If  no  amicable  sur- 
render of  territory  should  occur,  and  they  had  reason 
to  suppose  that  "  a  foreign  power  "  intended  to  land 
troops  there,  they  were  to  preoccupy  such  territory 
by  force,  using,  however,  such  measures  as  would  com- 
promise their  government  as  little  as  possible.*^ 

McKee's  letter  from  Washington  was  the  precursor 
of  the  more  formal  communication  that  he  and 
Matthews  addressed  to  Folch  from  Fort  Stoddert.  In 
this,  dated  March  22,  they  requested  an  early  inter- 
view to  discuss  Folch's  previous  offer  in  view  of  the 
president's  instructions.     To  both  Folch's  reply  was  the 

*^  McKee  to  Folch,  Jan.  17,  1811,  Legajo  1569,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     525 

same.  His  superiors  did  not  approve  his  offer  to  sur- 
render his  province,  and  ordered  him  to  hold  it  at  all 
cost,  and  had  sent  him  fifty  thousand  dollars  to  enable 
him  to  do  so.  He  was  now  happily  relieved  of  any  im- 
mediate danger  of  invasion.  In  addition  to  these 
favorable  changes  in  local  conditions,  the  president's 
action  in  taking  possession  of  Baton  Rouge  was  re- 
garded as  distinctly  hostile.  Moreover  a  national 
Cortes  had  now  assembled  in  Spain,  and  the  American 
government  could  direct  negotiations  to  that  body.*^ 
Doubtless  Folch  had  never  seriously  intended  to  sur- 
render his  province  and  accordingly  welcomed  the  op- 
portunity to  withdraw  from  an  awkward  situation. 
Ralph  Isaacs,  the  militia  colonel,  who  acted  as  the  com- 
missioners' messenger,  attempted  to  reason  with  Folch. 
He  appreciated  the  Spaniard's  desire  for  harmony  ; 
but  in  view  of  Bonaparte's  ambition  and  Spain's  in- 
ability to  protect  her  colonies,  he  had  hoped  that  the 
other  would  unite  with  the  American  authorities  in  a 
joint  defiance  to  European  powers.  Folch  agreed  to 
support  such  a  policy  as  long  as  he  could  honorably  do 
so.*"  His  later  elaborate  defense  shows  that  he  meant 
little  by  this  evasive  promise.  He  assured  his  su- 
periors that  he  had  made  no  effort  whatever  to  in- 
gratiate himself  with  the  American  authorities,  and 

*8  Folch  to  McKee,  Feb.  27,  181 1,  same  to  Matthews  and 
McKee,  Mar.  26,  181 1,  Legajo  1569,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

*^  Isaacs  to  Matthews  and  McKee,  Mar.  31,  181 1,  Miscella- 
neous Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  35,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

35 


526    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

that  his  whole  purpose  was  to  paralyze  the  military 
preparations  that  the  Americans  were  industriously 
making  in  the  rear  of  the  insurgents.  In  this  aim  he 
was  successful,  although  at  the  time  neither  Mobile  nor 
Pensacola  was  in  a  position  to  offer  adequate  re- 
sistance.^" 

He  and  his  watchful  adversary,  Morales,  now  ex- 
pected the  American  government  to  resume  its  policy 
of  intrigue  in  behalf  of  the  desired  territory  and  to 
stimulate  a  revolt  in  the  region  that  still  acknowledged 
Spanish  authority.  There  were  rumors  of  dissatisfac- 
tion with  the  American  rulers  at  Baton  Rouge  and 
of  disturbances  at  Pascagoula,  where  they  had  not  yet 
fully  established  their  authority,  but  these  gave  the 
Spaniards  little  satisfaction.  Nor  did  they  anticipate 
any  advantage  from  the  insults  that  Kennedy  and  his 
party  were  heaping  on  Judge  Toulmin.  The  same  in- 
dividuals that  attacked  him  were  ready  to  rally  their 
followers  for  the  capture  of  Mobile,  as  Caller  readily 
assured  the  Mississippi  executive,  despite  Toulmin's 
effort  to  discourage  them.^^ 

Caller  had  noted  the  presence  of  Matthews,  McKee, 
and  others  of  the  same  set  that  had  "  swarmed  "  about 
Fort  Stoddert  the  preceding  summer,  and  doubted  if 

'opolch  to  Someruelos,  Feb.  4,  181 1,  Legajo  1569,  Papeles 
de  Cuba.  An  elaborate  defense  of  his  conduct  occurs  in  Le- 
gajo 5555,  Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 

'^  Morales  to  Sierra,  Mar.  31,  181 1,  Legajo  267,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     527 

it  was  their  purpose  really  to  serve  the  American  gov- 
ernment.^^ Thus  he  and  Folch  were  making  common 
cause  against  them.  But  Matthews  determined  to 
make  one  more  effort  in  behalf  of  his  mission,  and  in 
April,  181 1,  secured  a  personal  interview  with  Folch 
at  Pensacola.  Matthews  told  Folch,  so  the  latter  re- 
ported, that  nine  tenths  of  the  American  people  dep- 
recated the  position  of  their  government  toward  Spain. 
On  the  other  hand  he  claimed  that  the  existing  ad- 
ministration did  not  favor  France.  His  instructions 
simply  empowered  him  to  receive  the  province  from 
Folch  upon  the  condition  of  returning  it  when  Spain 
terminated  her  contest  with  France.  But  if  Spain 
then  preferred,  his  government  would  exchange  for  it 
land  in  the  western  part  of  Louisiana  or  make  some 
other  suitable  compensation. 

This  offer  by  Matthews,  if  correctly  reported, 
marked  a  recurrence  to  the  diplomatic  propositions 
that  the  American  government  had  vainly  made  for  the 
last  six  years.  It  was  accompanied  by  offers  equally 
tempting.  Matthews  was  empowered  to  render  full 
inventories  for  all  property  delivered;  to  pay  all  ar- 
rears in  the  salaries  of  the  clergy  and  the  civil  officials 
in  the  province ;  to  continue  at  full  pay  all  who  wished 
to  remain  in  the  province,  or  to  assume  their  trans- 
portation if  they  preferred  to  leave;  and  to  assure  the 

'^ 2  Caller  to  Holmes,  Apr.  4,  181 1,  Mississippi  Territorial 
Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  10. 


528    AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA 

people  full  religious  toleration  and  the  continuance  of 
such  Spanish  laws  as  were  not  contrary  to  those  of 
the  United  States.  These  offers  certainly  represent  a 
wide  interpretation  of  his  instructions,  and  if  he  really 
made  them,  show  the  importance  that  the  government 
attached  to  his  mission. 

But  he  utterly  failed  to  move  the  obdurate  Spaniard. 
Not  present  gain,  nor  the  fear  that  Napoleon  might 
subdue  the  mother-country,  nor  the  lure  of  Pan-Amer- 
icanism could  render  the  American  proposition  accept- 
able to  him.  He  pointed  out  to  Matthews  that  circum- 
stances had  so  changed  as  to  neutralize  his  former 
offer.  The  president's  proclamation,  which  also  re- 
leased him  from  that  offer,  was  a  positive  insult  to  his 
nation.  Much  as  he  desired  peace  he  preferred  war  to 
such  insult,  and  regretted  that  he  could  not  exact  com- 
plete satisfaction  for  it.  Perhaps  Folch  did  not  answer 
Matthews  so  brusquely  as  the  report  would  indicate, 
but  he  evidently  convinced  him  and  the  administra- 
tion as  well  that  it  was  useless  to  expect  a  peaceful 
transfer  of  the  Floridas  at  that  time.  The  secretary 
of  state  gave  the  commissioners  the  conventional  ex- 
pression of  thanks  for  their  efforts,  and  directed  them 
to  turn  their  task  over  to  Governor  Claiborne.  Mat- 
thews was  to  continue  his  functions  in  East  Florida 
if  he  thought  he  could   accomplish  anything.^^     He 

S3  Folch's  defense  in  Legajo  5555,  Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid  ; 
Morales  to  Sierra,  Apr.  30,  181 1,  Legajo  267,  Papeles  de  Cuba, 


AMERICAN    INTERVENTION    IN    WEST    FLORIDA     529 

did  think  so;  but  his  equivocal  course  there,  thor- 
oughly in  keeping  with  the  American  policy  in  West 
Florida,  does  not  properly  fall  within  the  limits  of 
our  subject. 

Domestic  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  16,  191,  192,  Bureau  of  Indexes 
and  Archives. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

In  Defense  of  Intervention 

The  little  coterie  of  diplomats  at  Washington  and 
the  near-by  centers  followed  with  keen  attention  the 
shifting  events  on  the  West  Florida  border.  Their 
reports  provoked  disquieting  rumors  in  the  distant 
European  capitals.  Madison  had  not  been  unmindful 
of  this  when,  a  week  before  his  proclamation,  he 
wrote  Jefferson  that  the  "  successful  party  "  at  Baton 
Rouge  might  address  itself  to  Great  Britain,  as  well 
as  to  the  United  States.  This  might  influence  the 
former  to  compose  its  differences  with  France  and, 
allied  with  that  power  and  Spain,  to  engage  in  a 
"  quadrangular  war  "  with  the  United  States.^  While 
the  alliance  seemed  more  threatening  in  prospect  than 
in  retrospect,  there  was  enough  possibility  of  Euro- 
pean intervention  to  give  point  to  his  proclamation. 
Morier,  the  British  charge,  was  unfriendly,  and  was 
vigorous  in  championing  the  Spanish  cause.  He 
charged  the  administration  with  trying  to  seduce  the 
inhabitants  of  West  Florida — mostly  renegade  Amer- 
icans— and  with  strengthening  its  garrisons  at  Fort 
Stoddert  and  St.  Stephens,  in  collusion  with  the  Mo- 

1  Hunt,  Madison,  VIII,  109. 

530 


IN   DEFENSE   OF    INTERVENTION  53 1 

bile  Association.  Secretary  Smith  with  some  difficulty 
finally  assured  Bernaben  that  the  contrary  was  the  case. 
This  organization,  the  British  representative  reported, 
was  appealing  to  Congress  through  a  member  from 
Georgia.  The  people  at  Baton  Rouge,  despite  their 
apparent  agreement  with  De  Lassus,  held  Ferdinand 
VII  "  in  most  sovereign  contempt "  and  disappointed 
Morier  by  showing  little  British  predilection.  The 
naval  officer  at  Jamaica,  he  suggested,  should  inquire 
into  the  mysterious  affair.- 

De  Onis  feared  that  a  French  force  of  twelve  thou- 
sand men,  said  to  be  preparing  against  South  Amer- 
ica, might  be  employed  against  the  Floridas  and  Mex- 
ico, with  Louisiana  as  a  basis.  Secret  cabinet  meet- 
ings, coupled  with  the  presence  of  Turreau  in  Wash- 
ington, led  him  to  surmise  some  sort  of  alliance  with 
the  "intrusive  Bonaparte."  Perhaps  the  latter  had 
already  sold  the  Floridas  to  gain  funds  for  his  urgent 
needs,  or  to  involve  the  United  States  in  a  war  with 
Great  Britain  and  Spain.^ 

The  French  government  certainly  needed  a  com- 
mercial alliance  with  the  United  States  against  these 
two  powers,  but  Madison  had  definitely  instructed 
Joel  Barlow,  the  new  American  minister,  not  to  make 

2  Morier  to  Wellesley,  Oct.  9,  Nov.  i,  i8li,  MS.,  British  For- 
eign Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  70. 

3  De  Onis  to  Captain-General,  Oct.  ig,  1810,  Legajo  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba;  De  Onis  to  Viceroy,  Oct.  iq,  1810,  Historia, 
MS.,  Vol.  161,  A.  C,  Mexico. 


532 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION 


the  Floridas  the  basis  of  such  a  transaction.  In 
August,  1810,  Petry  advised  Champagny,  now  the 
Due  de  Cadore,  to  use  them  to  balance  all  American 
claims  against  France  and  her  dependencies.  Such 
a  solution  would  relieve  Spain  of  an  unprofitable  de- 
pendency, give  France  commercial  privileges  on  the 
Mississippi  and  a  free  hand  in  the  Spanish  colonies, 
and  create  a  more  favorable  public  sentiment  through- 
out the  United  States.* 

As  the  American  government  still  refused  to  receive 
De  Onis  as  an  accredited  diplomat  he  had  to  make 
inquiries  through  Bernaben,  the  consul  at  Baltimore. 
On  the  other  hand  the  administration  usually  made 
A.  J.  Dallas  its  intermediary.  It  was  probably 
through  him  and  a  companion  that  Madison  chose 
to  let  the  Spaniard  know  of  the  fall  of  Baton  Rouge. 
At  the  same  time  his  messengers  told  De  Onis  that  the 
affair  was  utterly  unexpected  to  their  government. 
De  Onis  apparently  accepted  their  statement,  adding 
that  should  the  case  be  otherwise,  such  hatred  would 
be  aroused  in  Havana  and  Mexico  that  the  Americans 
would  lose  their  trade  there.  Morier  was  more  di- 
rect and  less  charitable.  He  believed  that  the  Amer- 
ican government  secretly  favored  the  insurgents  (a 
set  of  western  banditti)  in  order  to  gain  the  disputed 
territory  without  an  open  quarrel  with  Spain.^ 

4  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol. 
161,  270,  295. 

^De  Onis  to  Captain-General,  Nov.  2,  1810,  Legajo  1708,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba. 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION        533 

Early  in  December  De  Onis  a^ked  Dallas  some  dis- 
quieting questions.  He  wished  to  know  if  the  action 
of  the  governor  of  Mississippi,  in  embodying  his 
militia,  betokened  any  hostility  toward  Spain.  A  neg- 
ative reply  would  greatly  relieve  the  captain-general, 
as  well  as  himself,  and  prevent  any  unfortunate  mis- 
understanding on  the  border.  He  also  inquired  what 
measures  had  been  taken  to  punish  such  American 
citizens  as  took  part  in  the  rebellion.®  When  he  and 
Morier  learned,  through  a  clerk  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment, that  Claiborne  was  to  take  possession  of  West 
Florida  through  an  agreement  with  the  convention, 
they  advised  the  reinforcement  of  Pensacola  and  other 
measures  to  protect  their  respective  national  interests 
in  the  West  Indies.  Morier  favored  the  joint  occupa- 
tion of  Mobile  in  case  of  war  with  the  United  States, 
or  even  its  cession  to  Great  Britain.'^  In  this  sugges- 
tion, be  it  noted,  the  Englishman  assumed  the  role  of 
forcible  protector,  such  as  Iberville  and  Talleyrand 
formerly  essayed.  He  and  his  kind  did  much  to  jus- 
tify American  attempts  to  forestall  later  British  ac- 
tivity in  the  Floridas. 

Secretary  Smith  refused  to  discuss  the  situation  at 
Baton  Rouge  with  Morier  before  it  was  presented  to 
Congress.     He  intimated  that  the  United  States  and 

6  De  Onis  to  Dallas,  Dec.  4,  1810,  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  34,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

''  Morier  to  Wellesley,  Dec.  3,  1810,  MS.,  British  Foreign 
Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  70. 


534  IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION 

Spain  were  alone  concerned,  and  that  any  interference 
by  Great  Britain  would  be  disagreeable  to  the  Amer- 
ican government.  Madison  had  already  instructed 
Pinkney  to  inform  the  British  government  that  his 
proclamation,  called  out  by  the  crisis  in  West  Flor- 
ida, was  an  act  wholly  within  executive  authority. 
He  was  also  to  state  that  Congress  would  probably  not 
permit  East  Florida  or  Cuba  to  pass  into  the  control 
of  any  other  power  than  Spain,  and  to  express  the 
hope  that  Great  Britain  would  not  entangle  herself 
by  seizing  either.^  But  Pinkney  seems  to  have  left 
England  without  making  this  explanation. 

Madison's  instructions  to  Armstrong,  who  had  not 
yet  left  France,  were  equally  truculent.  In  placat- 
ing Napoleon  he  was  to  observe :  "  If  France  is  wise 
she  will  neither  dislike  [the  proclamation]  nor  pro- 
voke resentment  of  it  in  any  other  quarter."  To 
soften  this  curt  message  Armstrong  might  suggest 
that  France  should  "  patronize  "  the  independence  of 
the  Spanish  colonies.  Either  France  or  England  must 
profit  from  the  leadership  in  this  movement,  but  he 
did  not  explain  hov/  the  former  could  do  so  without  a 
navy.  His  suggestion  was  only  an  echo  from  Na- 
poleon and  hardly  likely  to  satisfy  the  originator. 
Spain  must  content  itself  with  even  less.  That  power 
must  remain  satisfied  with  the  statement  in  his  procla- 
mation that  "West  Florida  .  .  .  will  not  cease  to  be 

8  Madison  to  Pinkney,  Oct.  30,  1810,  Hunt,  Madison,  VIII, 

121. 


IN   DEFENSE   OF    INTERVENTION  535 

a  subject  of  fair  and  friendly  negotiation  and  adjust- 
ment."^ 

In  addition  to  a  personal  note  Madison  sent  Arm- 
strong more  complete  instructions  over  Smith's  signa- 
ture. Now  that  Spain  had  lost  control  over  her  colo- 
nies the  United  States  could  not  permit  disturbances 
to  remain  unchecked  in  her  immediate  neighborhood, 
especially  when  her  own  territorial  rights  were  thereby 
jeopardized.  Having  been  compelled  to  occupy  the 
region  as  far  as  the  Perdido,  he  was  still  willing  to 
discuss  the  "  right  of  sovereignty  involved."  This 
occupancy  meant  a  change  in  possession  but  not  in 
right,  and  was  to  be  viewed  as  "the  natural  conse- 
quence of  a  state  of  things  which  the  American  gov- 
ernment could  neither  foresee  nor  prevent."^*' 

Jonathan  Russell,  acting  charge  at  Paris,  laid  these 
matters  before  the  French  cabinet,  with  the  assurance 
that  his  government  was  willing  to  discuss  the  just 
claims  of  other  nations  in  a  "candid  and  equitable" 
manner.  His  representation  may  have  led  Cadore  to 
instruct  Serurier,  the  new  French  minister,  that  the 
emperor  would  not  oppose  the  American  occupation 
of  the  Floridas  or  the  independence  of  Spanish  Amer- 
ica."    After   Madison's   encouragement   the   French 

9  Madison  to  Armstrong,  Oct.  30,  1810,  Hunt,  Madison, 
VIII,  116. 

10  Smith  to  Armstrong,  Nov.  2,  1810,  Instructions,  MS.,  VII, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

11  Russell  to  Cadore,  Dec.  18,  1810,  Archives  des  Aflfaires 
£trangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  63,  288;  Cadore  to  Serru- 
rier,  Dec.  20,  1810,  ibid..  Vol.  64,  295. 


536  IN   DEFENSE   OF    INTERVENTION 

coupling  of  these  measures  seems  less  sinister.  Na- 
poleon could  the  more  readily  affect  a  benevolent  de- 
sire for  the  well-being  of  the  United  States.  At  the 
same  time,  by  an  acquiescence  in  regard  to  the  Flor- 
idas  he  might  secure  her  adherence  to  his  continental 
system. 

While  directing  its  defense  abroad,  the  administra- 
tion was  not  unmindful  of  its  opportunities  at  home. 
Turreau  had  not  yet  left  the  country,  and  Robert 
Smith  attempted  to  explain  to  him  the  latest  develop- 
ments in  this  wise:  "As  for  the  Floridas,  I  swear, 
General,  on  my  honor  as  a  gentleman,  not  only  that 
we  are  strangers  to  everything  that  has  happened  but 
even  that  the  Americans  who  have  appeared  there  as 
agents  or  leaders  are  enemies  of  the  Executive,  and 
act  in  this  sense  against  the  Federal  government  as 
well  as  against  Spain."  He  went  on  to  say  that  Skip- 
with,  Thomas,  and  Clark,  to  whom  he  attributed  an 
"intriguing  devotion"  to  England,  were  interested  in 
land  speculations  and  hoped  to  profit  from  the  trans- 
fer. It  was  easy  to  make  this  aspersion,  and  it  would 
carry  greater  conviction  had  not  Skipwith,  through  his 
friends,  Mason  and  Graham,  kept  the  administration 
informed  of  his  whereabouts  and  intentions.  More- 
over the  reports  of  Claiborne,  Boiling  Robertson,  Bar- 
row, Toulmin,  and,  above  all,  of  Governor  Holmes, 
had  enabled  Madison  to  size  up  the  situation  with  pre- 
cision and  take  his  measures  accordingly.     Smith  was 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  537 

therefore  hardly  within  the  bounds  of  truth  in  saying 
that  "  we  are  strangers  to  everything  that  has  hap- 
pened."^^  Possibly  Madison  did  not  inform  him  of 
all  that  occurred,  and  if  so,  the  president  and  his  pre- 
ceptor, Jefferson,  must  also  share  in  the  obloquy. 

Smith  trod  upon  more  certain  ground  when  he 
claimed  that  the  administration  acted  to  keep  England 
out  of  Pensacola  and  Baton  Rouge.  Such  a  position 
would  enable  that  power  to  close  "  our  outlets  by  the 
Mobile  and  the  Mississippi.  We  hope  your  govern- 
ment will  not  take  it  ill  that  we  should  defend  the 
part  of  Florida  in  dispute  between  Spain  and  us ;  and 
whether  our  pretensions  are  well  founded  or  not, 
your  interest,  like  ours,  requires  us  to  oppose  the  en- 
terprises of  England  in  that  country."  Turreau  as- 
sured Smith,  as  he  had  his  predecessor,  that  an  at- 
tempt by  England  to  possess  any  of  this  territory 
would  be  sufficient  to  cause  France  and  the  United 
States  to  compose  their  relatively  slight  disputes  and 
make  common  cause  against  her. 

Smith  also  used  the  fear  of  England  to  justify  his 
efforts  to  break  up  the  filibustering  efforts  against 
Mobile.  "  Whatever  power  may  direct  Spain,"  he 
pointedly  told  the  other,  the  United  States  could  not 
lose  sight  of  her  interests  there.  Claiborne,  who  had 
been  sent  posthaste  to  the  threatened  frontier,  would 

12  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  V,  313;  Turreau 
to  Champagny,  Dec.  6,  1810,  Archives  des  AflFaires  fitrangeres, 
fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  6z,  280. 


538         IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

oppose  any  British  adherents  there.  The  current  dis- 
patches of  Morier  and  De  Onis  show  that  there  was 
some  reason  to  apprehend  British  influences  in  the 
Floridas,  but  Turreau's  quahfied  approval  of  Amer- 
ican measures  was  probably  due  to  the  commercial 
situation  in  Europe.  West  Florida  was  a  cheap  price 
to  pay  for  acquiescence  in  Napoleon's  exactions. 

At  home  the  administration  faced  an  uncertain  pub- 
lic opinion.  Most  of  the  Federalist  papers  attacked 
Madison's  course  as  unconstitutional,  unjust  toward 
Spain,  and  Hkely  to  involve  the  United  States  in  a 
war  with  Great  Britain.  The  Virginia  Patriot,  tak- 
ing a  mixed  view,  regarded  his  action  as  belligerent, 
but  constitutional,  and  commendably  prompt  and  de- 
cisive. Moderation  in  pushing  claims  to  the  territory, 
while  Spain  was  in  control,  was  uncalled  for  after 
revolt  broke  out  there.  Neither  England  nor  Spain 
had  any  just  cause  to  complain  because  the  president 
ordered  troops  into  the  region.  To  call  such  action  a 
breach  of  the  constitution  was  to  make  "  a  bear  out  of 
a  bramble."  He  had  as  much  right  to  send  troops 
there  as  across  the  Mississippi,  where  we  had  similar 
territorial  claims. ^^ 

New  England  Federalism  was  inclined  to  take  a 
less  lenient  and  likewise  more  accurate  view  of 
the  executive  policy.  Northampton,  Massachusetts, 
adopted  resolutions  against  the  president's  action  as 

13  Quoted  in  the  National  Intelligencer,  Dec.  25,  1810. 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION         539 

unauthorized,  wasteful,  and  likely  to  involve  us  in 
warfare  with  a  magnanimous  nation  struggling  for  its 
very  existence.  In  the  Columbian  Sentinel,  John 
Lowe  attacked  the  executive  in  a  series  of  essays, 
afterward  published  in  pamphlet  form  as  "  The  Im- 
partial Inquirer."  His  main  contention  is  that  France, 
before  1763,  did  not  possess  exclusive  title  to  the  re- 
gion in  question.  Great  Britain  continually  disputed 
its  validity.  The  correspondence  between  Pitt  and 
Bussy,  and  between  Pitt  and  Vaudreuil,  before  1763, 
clearly  recognized  the  Indian  tribes  as  barrier  nations. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso, 
Lowe  favored  the  Spanish  interpretation  of  the  per- 
plexing three  clauses.  The  whole  question,  he 
averred,  was  too  complicated  for  all  but  lawyers,  but 
it  involved  a  moral  standard  that  should  obtain  among 
nations  as  among  individuals." 

Madison  informed  Congress,  when  it  met  in  De- 
cember, that  he  regarded  his  action  in  West  Florida 
as  legal.  He  defended  his  unusually  vigorous  course 
by  the  familiar  plea  that  events  there  threatened  the 
peace  of  the  Union  and  American  territorial  claims. 
He  did  not  doubt  that  Congress  would  take  the  same 
view  and  promptly  incorporate  the  territory  with  the 
Union.      Inspired   articles   in    the    Intelligencer   sup- 

1*  The  Impartial  Inquirer,  etc.  By  a  citizen  of  Massachu- 
setts (John  Lowe),  Boston,  181 1,  Library  of  Congress;  en- 
closure in  Morier  to  Wellesley,  May  9,  181 1,  MS.,  British  For- 
eign Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  74. 


540  IN   DEFENSE   OF    INTERVENTION 

ported  his  message,  by  presenting  a  resume  of  the 
American  claim  to  the  region  "  fairly  traced,"  and 
by  references  to  the  act  of  October,  1803,  authorizing 
the  president  to  take  possession  of  Louisiana,  and  to 
subsequent  legislation  for  organizing  Orleans  Terri- 
tory.^^ These  articles  followed  the  usual  American 
arguments  that  were  designed  to  establish  "an  un- 
disputed title"  to  West  Florida. 

Such  inveterate  critics  as  Senator  Pickering  ac- 
knowledged that  the  president's  course  seemed  bold ; 
but  Pickering  thought  it  rash  and  unwarranted.  The 
United  States  had  no  title  to  the  region ;  the  adminis- 
tration had  acquiesced  in  Spanish  occupancy  and  had 
consented  to  negotiate  its  claim.  At  a  word  from 
France  it  had  dropped  negotiation,  and  now  at  the  be- 
hest of  the  same  power  had,  he  believed,  inspired  the 
revolutionary  proceedings  there.  Ellicott  again  pro- 
nounced the  American  claim  untenable.  McHenry, 
the  former  secretary  of  war,  expressed  some  uneasi- 
ness over  the  disposal  of  the  region ;  and  Walter  Jones 
of  the  War  Department,  while  feeling  that  the  presi- 
dent had  acted  as  properly  as  could  be  expected, 
thought  he  had  gone  "  full  far  enough,  in  what  are 
called  acts  of  decision,  for  a  country  without  soldiers, 
without  discipline,  and  almost  destitute  of  the  means 
to  raise  them."^*' 

15  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  V,  317,  318;  Na- 
tional Intelligencer,  Dec.  8,  22,  25,  29,  1810. 

16  Pickering  to  McHenry,  Dec.  \T,  1810,  Steiner,  Papers  of 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  541 

The  president's  message  proved  a  disagreeable  con- 
firmation of  De  Onis  worst  surmises.  The  latter  at 
once  urged  the  frontier  officials  to  be  doubly  watch- 
ful of  their  remaining  holdings.  Not  diplomatically 
recognized  himself,  he  dispatched  Bernaben  to  Wash- 
ington to  deliver  a  personal  protest,  and  asked  Morier 
to  back  him  up.  The  Spanish  representative  was  per- 
suaded that  the  events  in  West  Florida  could  never 
have  disturbed  the  tranquility  of  neighboring  terri- 
tories if  the  American  government  had  taken  pains  to 
restrain  its  fractious  citizens,  as  it  had  promised  to  do. 
In  reply  Smith  assured  him  that  the  president's  action 
was  dictated  by  no  hostility  to  Spain,  as  Claiborne's  in- 
structions to  oflfer  no  violence  to  the  Spanish  forces 
showed ;  but  to  prevent  the  inhabitants  of  the  disputed 
area  from  asking  the  protection  of  France  or  England. 
The  intimation  that  Spain  could  not  adequately  de- 
fend her  possession  little  pleased  the  unrecognized 
Spanish  minister,  but  he  could  do  nothing  except  try 
to  work  on  Congress  and  to  enlist  Morier.^^ 

The  English  charge  had  not  intended  to  broach  the 
subject  without  further  instructions  from  home.  He 
thought  that  Turreau  was  already  giving  the  Amer- 
ican government  some  anxious  moments — perhaps  de- 
manding possession  in  the  name  of  Joseph  Bonaparte 

James   McHenry,   559;   Walter  Jones   to    (?),   Jan.   7,    1811, 
Lenox  MSS. 

i'^  Bernaben  to  Smith,  Dec.  10,  1810,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  De  Onis  to  Captain- 
General,  Dec.  20,  1810,  Legajo  1708,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

36 


542        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

— and  that  his  menaces,  with  some  aid  from  the  vice- 
roy, would  result  in  the  recovery  of  the  threatened 
district.  Upon  De  Onis'  request,  however,  he  asked 
Smith  why  West  Florida  could  not  as  well  be  the  sub- 
ject of  negotiation  in  the  hands  of  Spain  as  of  the 
American  government,  especially  when  the  latter  had 
to  commit  an  act  of  hostility  to  get  possession  of  it. 
After  once  discussing  its  status  it  was  certainly  an  act 
of  warfare  to  take  forcible  possession  of  it.  Further- 
more how  could  it  continue  to  be  the  subject  of  nego- 
tiation after  it  had  been  "  received  into  the  bosom  of 
the  American  family?" 

Although  Morier  spoke  in  behalf  of  his  country's 
ally,  he  had  no  explicit  instructions  to  guide  him,  and 
desired  to  speak  in  a  most  conciliatory  manner.  As  a 
sample  the  following  passage  seems  typical  of  British 
diplomacy  of  this  period.  Doubtless  those  whom  he 
addressed  deserved  it,  but  it  was  hardly  Hkely  to  con- 
ciliate them.  "  But  it  may  be  said  that  the  Spanish 
forces  in  Mexico,  in  Cuba,  or  at  Pensacola  are  un- 
equal to  quell  the  rebellious  associations  of  a  band  of 
desperados  who  are  here  known  by  the  contemptuous 
appellation  of  land  jobbers.  Allowing  as  much  (which 
you  will  agree  with  me,  Sir,  is  allowing  a  great  deal) 
would  it  not  have  been  worthy  of  a  free  nation  like 
this,  bearing  as  it  doubtless  does  a  respect  for  the 
rights  of  a  gallant  people  at  this  moment  engaged  in  a 
noble  struggle  for  liberty,  would  it  not  have  been  an 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION         543 

act  on  the  Part  of  this  Country,  dictated  by  the  sacred 
ties  of  good  neighborhood,  and  of  Friendship  which 
exists  between  it  and  Spain,  to  have  simply  ofifered  its 
assistance  to  crush  the  common  enemy  of  both,  rather 
than  to  have  made  such  interference  the  pretext  for 
wresting  a  province  from  a  friendly  power  and  that 
in  time  of  her  adversity. "^^ 

Morier  made  his  vigorous  protest  without  instruc- 
tions because  of  the  "  uncandid  proceedings  "  of  the 
American  officials.  He  hoped,  at  least,  to  make  them 
refrain  from  further  conquest.  As  Smith  assured  him 
that  Claiborne  was  ordered  not  to  attack  any  Spanish 
force,  he  anticipated  that  he  would  be  successful  in 
this,  provided  Folch  had  enough  micn  to  hold  Mobile 
against  the  Conventionalists.  The  American  govern- 
ment attempted  to  confine  the  discussion  to  Spain 
alone,  but  it  had  not  contended  for  this  till  after  that 
nation  had  broken  with  Bonaparte.  Accordingly  it 
could  not  object  to  a  remonstrance  from  Spain's  new 
ally.  By  instructing  its  minister  to  discuss  this  remon- 
strance in  London,  the  administration  tacitly  admitted 
British  interest  in  the  subject.  Morier  assumed  that 
the  whole  affair  arose  from  French  instigation.  Tur- 
reau's  formal  remonstrances,  belied  by  his  reported 
utterances,  merely  strengthened  his  assumption.^^ 

18  Morier  to  Smith,  Dec.  15,  1810,  MS.,  British  Legation,  V, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

i»  Morier  to  Wellesley,  Dec.  28,  1810,  MS.,  British  Foreign 
Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  70. 


544        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

Morier's  note,  carefully  censored,  accompanied  the 
president's  secret  message  on  the  Floridas.  Smith 
also  enclosed  a  copy  to  Pinkney,  and  requested  him 
to  explain  at  once  that  the  United  States  intended  no 
hostility  against  Spain.-"  It  was  doubly  necessary  to 
make  this  explanation,  for,  by  the  action  of  the  execu- 
tive and  Congress,  East  as  well  as  West  Florida  was 
shortly  brought  into  the  complicated  discussion. 

During  the  session  of  1810-11  this  discussion  as- 
sumed a  threefold  phase.  Congress  reviewed  the 
acts  of  the  president  and  his  subordinates  under  the 
proclamation  of  October  27;  considered  the  status  of 
the  remainder  of  West  Florida  and  of  East  Florida,  in 
accordance  with  the  secret  message  of  January  3 ;  and, 
finally,  attempted  to  dispose  of  the  territory  already 
acquired  and  that  in  prospect  in  such  manner  as  would 
be  agreeable  to  its  inhabitants  and  their  immediate 
neighbors.  These  points  promised  to  give  the 
"  Dashers,"  as  one  termed  the  ready  supporters  of  the 
administration,  full  employment. 

Senator  Giles  of  Virginia  introduced  a  bill  to  ex- 
tend Orleans  Territory  to  the  Perdido.^^  This  bill 
gave  an  opportunity  to  discuss  the  first  and  third 
phases  mentioned  above.  In  the  absence  of  its  spon- 
sor, Pope  of  Kentucky  opened  the  debate  on  the  bill, 

20  Smith  to  Pinkney,  Jan.  15,  1811,  Instructions,  MS.,  VII, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

21  Steiner,  Papers  of  James  McHenry,  560. 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  545 

December  27,  1810.  His  discussion  of  the  American 
title  to  the  region  lacked  both  originality  and  clarity. 
His  defense  of  the  expediency  of  the  proclamation 
was  clear  enough.  Spain  had  refused  to  pay  Amer- 
ican commercial  claims  and  was  entitled  to  no  consid- 
eration from  the  United  States.  As  Bonaparte  had 
favored  the  independence  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  he 
could  not  complain  if  the  United  Statees  should  annex 
the  Floridas,  Cuba,  or  any  other  portion  judged  expe- 
dient, provided  it  were  done  with  the  consent  of  the 
people  living  in  the  annexed  area.-^ 

Bradley  of  Vermont  presented  a  novel  argument  with 
even  less  to  support  it.  In  1803  France  had  no  real 
title  to  West  Florida,  but  her  representatives  implied 
that  she  had.  Now  that  the  French  were  absorbing 
Spain  and  her  possessions,  the  United  States  might 
legally  require  them  to  deliver  the  disputed  portion. ^^ 
On  the  following  day  Horsey  of  Delaware  quickly  dis- 
posed of  this  argument.  If  the  American  negotiators 
permitted  themselves  to  be  deceived  in  1803,  their 
country  must  now  bear  the  consequences.  Far  from 
being  expedient,  the  proclamation  was  an  unauthor- 
ized assumption  of  legislative  power  and  an  act  of 
war.  The  fact  that  all  Europe  was  relapsing  into 
barbarism  gave  the  United  States  no  Hcense  to  do  the 
same.     His  discussion  of  the  American  title  under  the 

22  Annals  of  Eleventh  Congress,  Third  Session,  37-42. 

23  Ibid. 


546        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

Treaty  of  1803,  it  is  needless  to  say,  was  diametrically 
opposed  to  that  of  Pope.-* 

Henry  Clay,  the  young  senator  from  Kentucky,  who 
was  filling  out  Adair's  term,  posed  as  the  chief  de- 
fender of  the  administration.  His  historical  sum- 
mary of  the  title  to  West  Florida  was  based  on  the 
grant  to  Crozat  and  the  local  agreement  to  observe 
the  Perdido  as  a  jurisdictional  boundary.  In  1800 
Spain  had  in  some  measure  controlled  Baton  Rouge, 
Feliciana,  and  Mobile  from  New  Orleans,  as  France 
had  done  before  her,  so  that  she  was  bound  to  cede 
this  territory  to  the  United  States  as  part  of  French 
Louisiana.  The  Act  of  October,  1803,  provided  for 
the  occupation  of  Louisiana,  not  merely  its  temporary 
government,  and  in  the  former  sense  the  president 
might  still  use  it  to  justify  his  proclamation.  West 
Florida  rendered  New  Orleans  susceptible  to  attack 
by  some  new  Burr  faction  or  a  foreign  enemy,  and 
its  own  weakness  was  a  constant  temptation  to  seize 
it.  Consequently  the  president's  action  was  wholly 
expedient.^^ 

The  eloquent,  if  illogical,  defense  by  Clay  typified 
the  new  American  spirit  of  which  he  was  later  so  bril- 
liant a  champion.  Pickering  of  Massachusetts,  in  so 
many  points  his  antithesis,  attempted  to  fix  on  the  ad- 
ministration the  charge  of  French  subserviency  that 

2*  Annals  of  Eleventh  Congress,  Third  Session,  43-55. 
25  Ibid. 


IN   DEFENSE   OF    INTERVENTION  547 

we  have  already  noted.  In  doing  so  he  quoted  Talley- 
rand's letter  of  December  21,  1804,  from  which  the 
Senate  had  not  yet  removed  the  pledge  of  secrecy. 
This  raised  a  point  of  order  that  led  to  his  censure, 
and  in  the  ensuing  wrangle  the  Senate  found  a  pre- 
text to  drop  the  unwelcome  subject.^® 

The  House,  meanwhile,  was  emphasizing  the  do- 
mestic phase  of  the  Florida  problem.  This  narrowed 
itself  down  to  a  struggle  between  Mississippi  and 
Orleans  for  the  despoiled  territory.  Many  were  un- 
willing to  have  the  latter,  now  about  to  become  a  State, 
control  both  the  Mississippi  and  the  Mobile.  Poin- 
dexter,  delegate  from  Mississippi,  wished  to  await  the 
result  of  the  debate  in  the  Senate.  His  proposal  arose 
less  from  a  desire  to  avoid  foreign  complications  than 
from  a  hope  that  he  might  thereby  advance  statehood 
for  Mississippi.  Troup  and  Bibb  of  Georgia  were 
averse  to  including  within  the  proposed  State  of 
Louisiana  an  area  that  the  president  had  declared  sub- 
ject to  future  negotiation.  Barry  of  Kentucky  wished 
to  reserve  to  the  general  government  the  power  to 
change  the  boundaries  of  the  State.  Sheffey  of  Vir- 
ginia thought  that  neither  the  executive  nor  the  treaty- 
making  power  could  give  away  territory. 

On  January  3  Bibb  proposed  a  resolution  annexing 
the  territory  to  Mississippi ;  Miller  of  Tennessee  sup- 
ported this,  because  it  would  divide  the  control  of  the 
chief  watercourses  and  still  provide  the  proposed  State 

26  Annals  of  Eleventh  Congress,  Third  Session,  43-55. 


548        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

of  Louisiana  with  a  white  population  predominatingly 
American.  His  colleague  Rhea  thought  that  the  treaty 
of  cession  forbade  the  annexation  of  a  part  of  the 
Louisiana  Purchase  to  any  other  state  or  territory 
east  of  the  Mississippi.  Finally,  on  January  lo, 
ShefYey  secured  the  passage  of  an  amendment  omit- 
ting the  disputed  region  from  the  proposed  State. 
In  this  form,  after  Josiah  Quincy's  famous  disunion 
speech,  the  bill  passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  yj  to 
36.^^  In  the  Senate,  Tait  of  Georgia  made  an  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  to  include  in  Louisiana  the  region  to 
the  Pearl.  On  February  20  the  president  signed  the 
enabling  act  for  the  new  State,  but  this  area  did  not 
yet  form  part  of  it.-^ 

De  Onis  believed  that  this  moderation  in  congres- 
sional action  was  partly  due  to  a  memorial  which  he 
had  published  under  the  pen-name  "  Verus."  In  this 
he  represented  the  whole  unjustifiable  course  of  the 
United  States  in  West  Florida  as  part  of  a  Machiavel- 
lian plot  instigated  by  Bonaparte.  His  arguments  had 
been  given  unexpected  pubhcity  in  the  Federalist 
newspapers.  Folch's  recent  defeat  of  the  insurgents 
had  likewise  placed  the  administration  in  a  very  em- 
barrassing   position.^^      The    "immaculate    Republi- 

2'f  Annals  of  Eleventh  Congress,  Third  Session,  486-514, 
534,  537- 

28  Ibid.,  103,  104;  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  V, 
320-326. 

29  De  Onis  to  Captain-General,  Jan.  5,  1811,  Legajo  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION         549 

cans,"  as  the  English  charge  termed  them,  having  ex- 
perienced great  difficulty  in  justifying  their  usurpa- 
tion, were  falling  back  on  the  plea  of  self-defense, 
and  were  inclined  to  be  guided  by  what  they  had 
previously  called  the  perfidy  of  European  nations. 
"Many,"  wrote  Morier,  "viewed  [the  West  Florida 
question]  as  big  with  fatal  consequences  to  the  Peace 
of  this  country."^** 

Both  Morier  and  De  Onis  received  conflicting  re- 
ports regarding  Claiborne's  course  in  Baton  Rouge  and 
at  Mobile  and  Pensacola.  Both,  however,  feared  that 
the  recent  secret  message  of  the  president  to  Con- 
gress concerned  East  Florida.  The  Democrats  were 
predicting  some  energetic  measures,  but  Morier  an- 
ticipated energy  in  nothing  but  words  from  a  country 
with  an  empty  treasury  and  an  army  of  five  thousand 
men,  of  whom  some  fifteen  hundred  only  were  in  the 
Southwest.  If,  therefore,  the  United  States  should 
occupy  the  Floridas,  as  he  thought  very  probable,  and 
thus  bring  on  a  war  with  Spain  and  England,  it  would 
not  be  difficult  to  blockade  the  Mississippi,  or  to  in- 
vade Orleans.  These  acts  would  distress  the  western 
country  and  lead  it  to  revolt  from  the  Union.  Besides 
encouraging  western  separatism,  he  suggested  the  pos- 
sibility of  working  among  the  slaves  of  the  Carolinas, 
Georgia,  and  Mississippi  and  of  sending  regiments  of 

30  Morier  to  Wellesley,  Jan.  12,  1811,  MS.,  British  Foreign 
Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  74. 


550        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

blacks  from  Havana  to  assist  them  in  their  struggle 
for  freedom.^^ 

By  the  middle  of  February  the  British  and  Spanish 
representatives  learned  that  Congress  in  its  secret 
session  had  authorized  the  president  to  occupy  East 
Florida,  as  they  had  feared,  and  that  Matthews  and 
McKee  were  already  at  work  on  the  border.  Through 
Dallas,  De  Onis  protested  that  Spain  had  never  given 
the  least  motive  for  an  act  so  contrary  to  interna- 
tional right.  Coming  so  soon  on  the  heels  of  the 
president's  proclamation,  it  was  likely  to  stir  up  trouble 
for  which  his  nation  could  not  be  held  responsible. 
The  administration  vouchsafing  no  reply,  the  incensed 
Spaniard  poured  out  his  wrath  to  the  viceroy  and  the 
captain-general.  Never  amid  all  her  recent  buflfetings 
had  the  mother-country  suffered  so  grievous  an  insult, 
delivered  under  the  cloak  of  friendly  righteousness. 
The  American  government,  while  disclaiming  any  part 
in  the  disturbances  in  the  Floridas,  had  deliberately 
initiated  them.  Nor  did  it  have  the  shame  to  conceal 
its  unjust  and  cowardly  spoliation  by  passing  a  law  to 
check  its  own  turbulent  border.  Condemning  the 
course  of  England  against  Denmark,  it  was  guilty  of  a 
grosser  outrage  toward  its  unfortunate  neighbor.  Its 
action  was  another  proof  of  Bonaparte's  domination. 
No  improvement  was  to  be  expected  from  the  present 

31  De  Onis  to  Captain-General,  Jan.  22,  181 1,  Morier  to 
Wellesley,  Jan.  24,  181 1,  cf.  notes  29  and  30  for  sources. 


IN   DEFENSE   OF    INTERVENTION  55 1 

administration,  but  the  time  might  soon  come  when  its 
head  would  bitterly  repent  of  his  unmoral  measures 
against  Florida.^- 

De  Onis'  best  ally,  Morier,  called  the  attention  of 
his  government  to  the  action  of  the  insurgent  leader. 
Smith  had  claimed  that  Skipwith  would  resist  the 
American  forces ;  but  when  the  latter  entered  Baton 
Rouge,  the  quondam  governor  of  the  insurgent  state 
quietly  retired  to  his  plantation.  This  confirmed 
Morier's  earlier  opinion  that  the  convention  was  sim- 
ply a  mock  government  used  by  the  Americans  to  cloak 
their  aggression.  Later  a  Federalist  newspaper  pub- 
lished a  copy  of  Claiborne's  incriminating  letter  to 
Wykofif,  which  in  the  view  of  this  editor  and  his  fel- 
lows and  of  the  British  charge  simply  confirmed  their 
opinion  of  the  administration's  hypocrisy.  Morier 
could,  however,  derive  some  satisfaction  from  the  fact 
that  Congress  had  as  yet  made  no  disposition  of  West 
Florida ;  that  Folch  still  retained  Mobile,  and  with 
reinforcements  might  restore  his  authority  to  its  pre- 
vious limits ;  and  that  Cushing  and  his  fellow-officers 
were  under  arrest  and  facing  a  court-martial.^" 

In  April  the  incompetent  Smith  gave  place  to  the 
more  promising  Monroe.  Bernaben,  the  useful  sub- 
ordinate oi  De  Onis,  immediately  subjected  the  new 

32  Bernaben  to  Monroe,  June  2,  181 1,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  De  Onis  to  Viceroy, 
Feb.  12,  181 1,  Historia,  MS.,  Vol.  161,  A.  G.,  Mexico. 

^^  Morier  to  Wellesley,  Feb.  16,  26,  May  9,  i8n,  of.  note  30. 


552        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

secretary  to  a  vigorous  resume  of  Spain's  injuries. 
The  United  States  permitted  France  to  hamper  her 
commerce  and  to  plot  insurrection  in  the  Spanish  col- 
onies on  her  ver>'  soil,  despite  the  present  and  past 
favors  that  she  received  from  Spain.  Moreover,  in- 
cited by  French  precedents  in  Europe,  she  had  stimu- 
lated revolt  in  Baton  Rouge  and  occupied  that  point 
when  Spain,  weakened  by  European  conflict,  could 
not  protect  herself.  After  this  territory  had  been  the 
subject  of  negotiation,  such  an  act  was  doubly  hostile. 
Spain  would  gladly  have  concluded  the  diplomatic 
dispute  had  not  political  conditions  for  which  she  was 
not  responsible  absolutely  prevented  her.  In  the  name 
of  the  Regency  he  requested  the  United  States  to  evac- 
uate any  part  of  West  Florida  in  its  military  posses- 
sion and  restore  conditions  as  they  were.  Otherwise 
his  nation  must  adopt  such  measures  as  its  interests 
and  power  required.^* 

This  vigorous  arraignment,  if  not  covert  threat, 
led  to  an  "  unofficial  conversation  "  between  the  new 
secretary  and  Bernaben.  Monroe  was  surprised  that 
the  latter  charged  the  United  States  with  unfriend- 
liness, but  he  answered  with  a  catalogue  of  complaints 
dating  from  GaJ^^'bqui's  mission.  Among  these  his 
own  exasperating"  negotiation  in   1805  played  a  con- 

2*  Bernaben  to  Monroe,  June  7,  181 1,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  cf.  also  report  in  Papers 
in  Relation  to  Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and 
Library. 


IN   DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  553 

spicuous  part.  As  for  West  Florida,  it  was  well 
known  that  his  government  had  no  agency  in  the 
revolt  there.  When  affairs  became  too  critical  for 
Governor  Folch,  he  tried  to  save  himself  by  offering 
to  surrender  his  province  to  the  United  States.  The 
latter  did  not  recognize  the  assumed  authority  of  the 
convention  but  suppressed  that  body,  and  by  doing  so 
preserved  Folch  in  the  residue  of  his  government. 
Though  it  had  the  right  and  the  power  to  force  him  to 
surrender  this,  according  to  his  promise,  it  refrained 
from  doing  so.  It  had  made  no  attempt  to  acquire  a 
title  through  this  series  of  events,  for  it  already  pos- 
sessed an  incontrovertible  one  under  the  Treaty  of 
1803,  nor  did  it  propose  in  any  way  to  recognize  the 
land  claims  of  the  revolutionists.  Anyhow  the  terri- 
tory east  of  the  Mississippi,  now  surrounded  by  the 
United  States,  could  be  of  little  use  to  Spain.  For 
that  power  to  persist  in  maintaining  it  only  indicated 
a  purpose  to  annoy  the  other.^^ 

The  pass  between  Bernaben  and  Monroe  indicated 
that  the  administration  henceforth  proposed  to  defend 
itself  with  greater  vigor,  if  not  with  less  speciousness. 
Pending  the  arrival  of  new  instructions  from  across 
the  Atlantic,  De  Onis  could  only  note  the  movements 
of  American  troops  toward  the  threatened  frontier  and 
speculate  upon  the  outcome  of  the  secret  action  of 
Congress,  which,  he  surmised,  must  concern  both  the 
Floridas.     It  was  rumored  that  Joseph  Bonaparte  was 

35  Ibid. 


554        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

to  sell  them  to  the  United  States,  through  Joel  Bar- 
low, the  new  minister  to  France.  He  feared  that  the 
administration  might  at  the  same  time  try  to  seize 
Texas,  which  it  also  claimed.  When  the  proposal  to 
occupy  East  Florida  revealed  the  full  import  of 
Folch's  ill-advised  offer,  he  urged  captain-general  and 
viceroy  alike  to  make  common  cause  against  American 
cupidity.  His  urging  was  supplemented  by  direct  or- 
ders from  the  Regency  to  aid  the  governor  of  West 
Florida  in  every  possible  way. 

That  body  also  instructed  Juan  Ruiz  de  Apodaca,  its 
representative  in  London,  to  inform  the  British  gov- 
ernment of  the  events  that  showed  such  marked  Amer- 
ican hostility  and  to  ask  it  to  intervene  in  behalf  of 
"a  more  regular  conduct."  Accordingly  the  British 
Cabinet  added  Apodaca's  request  to  the  burden  of  A. 
J.  Foster's  delicate  mission.  The  American  adminis- 
tration had  not  given  Morier  the  explanations  that 
Smith  had  promised,  but  rather  had  pressed  for  the 
surrender  of  Mobile  and  the  organization  of  the  in- 
vaded territory.  Foster  was  to  protest  against  any 
further  occupation  and  also  against  any  similar  action 
in  East  Florida,  where  the  United  States  had  no  claim 
whatever.  He  was  to  "  soften  "  this  protest,  make  no 
threats,  and  after  submitting  his  report,  await  further 
instructions.^^  Evidently  Jackson's  blustering  course 
had  taught  his  superiors  a  lesson. 

36  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office,  Spain,  ^2,  Vol.  177 ;  MS., 
British  Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  75. 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION         555 

When  Foster  arrived  he  and  Bernaben  cooperated 
to  give  the  administration,  early  in  July,  1811,  the 
discussion  on  West  Florida  that  Madison  had  invited 
in  his  proclamation.  The  Spaniard  accepted  the  re- 
port that  troops  were  still  being  sent  from  New  Or- 
leans to  West  Florida  as  evidence  that  the  govern- 
ment was  less  friendly  than  it  professed.  As  the  oc- 
cupation of  this  region  constituted  the  chief  obstacle 
to  negotiation,  he  demanded  its  evacuation  before 
Spain  could  even  consider  relinquishing  the  Floridas.^^ 
His  statement  may  mean  that  the  concession  would 
lead  his  government  to  act  as  it  did  in  1819,  but  there 
was  no  Jackson  in  the  field  to  force  such  a  treaty. 

In  a  personal  interview  with  Monroe,  Foster  "  urged 
with  as  much  force  as  temperate  language  would  ad- 
mit, the  ungenerous  treatment "  that  the  United  States 
had  visited  upon  Spain  in  her  extremity,  and  that,  too, 
in  defense  of  a  doubtful  claim.  Monroe  retorted  that 
the  area  geographically  belonged  to  the  United  States, 
and  that  his  country  had  an  unquestionable  right  to  it 
anyhow.  It  was  a  humane  act  on  the  part  of  the  ad- 
m.inistration  to  preserve  the  few  Spanish  soldiers  there 
from  the  insurgents.  Possibly  it  may  have  been  this 
that  inspired  Foster's  later  reference  to  Monroe's  "  ar- 
guments of  a  most  profligate  nature " ;  though  very 

^T)e  Onis  to  Captain-General,  May  21,  June  i,  July  i,  1811, 
Legajo  1708,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Bernaben  to  Monroe,  July  4, 
181 1,  Spanish  Notes,  MS.,  II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Ar- 
chives. 


556        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

likely  it  was  Monroe's  unkind  insinuation  that  in  its 
general  policy  the  United  States  was  more  scrupulous 
than  other  nations.  Certainly  it  had  not  assisted  the 
insurgents  in  South  America  in  order  to  advance  its 
commercial  interests  there. 

But  neither  counter-claim  nor  insinuation  could 
shake  Foster's  belief  in  the  validity  of  Spain's  posi- 
tion. The  conditions  in  West  Florida  did  not  render 
it  expedient  for  the  United  States  to  intervene,  nor 
could  the  executive  quote  one  invitation  from  the 
local  authorities  there  to  justify  the  forcible  occupation 
of  territory.  The  Spanish  government  would  never 
have  condoned  such  a  request.  He  doubted  the  genu- 
ineness of  Folch's  offer  to  surrender  his  province. 
This  led  him  to  ask  about  the  act  empowering  the 
president  to  take  possession  of  East  Florida — a  sub- 
ject which  he  had  not  originally  intended  to  broach. 
Monroe  at  first  affected  ignorance,  but  later  betrayed 
himself  by  laughter.  Yet  he  refused  to  state  what 
might  happen  should  a  hypothetical  Skipwith  or  a 
hypothetical  Folch  be  opportunely  located  there. 

Foster  believed  that  the  American  officials  were 
only  too  ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  needs  or  the 
fears  of  their  Spanish  neighbors,  as  they  had  done  in 
Folch's  case.  Also  land  speculators  were  settling  East 
Florida  for  the  purpose  of  stirring  up  rebellion  and 
calling  in  American  aid.  British  and  Spanish  success 
on  the  Peninsula  had  retarded  this  project;  but  noth- 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION         557 

ing  but  the  probability  of  war  with  Great  Britain 
would  cause  them  to  abandon  it.  He  regarded  Amer- 
ican occupation  of  East  Florida  as  a  disadvantage  to 
his  nation,  and  suggested  that  some  British  executive 
in  the  West  Indies  should  ofifer  to  aid  the  officials  there 
and  at  Mobile  against  any  insurgents.  Such  an  ofifer 
might  be  made  to  appear  spontaneous,  yet  it  would 
lead  timorous  Americans  to  hesitate  before  involving 
their  country  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain.  Anyhow, 
the  insurgents  were  generally  renegade  Americans 
who  could  not  claim  the  protection  of  their  own  gov- 
ernment.^^ 

In  his  formal  note  following  the  interview  Foster 
wisely  forbore  to  mention  East  Florida.  The  Amer- 
icans evidently  would  not  employ  force  there,  nor  were 
they  willing  to  do  so  at  Mobile,  where  the  old  commer- 
cial controversy  was  again  in  progress.  He  found 
sufficient  exercise  for  his  pen  in  discussing  the  occupa- 
tion of  Baton  Rouge  and  the  resultant  catalogue  of 
Spanish  complaints.  He  hoped  that  territorial  ambi- 
tion had  not  prompted  this  occupation,  or  the  present 
condition  of  Spain ;  but  at  best  it  was  an  ungenerous 
act.  As  the  American  government  evidently  did  not 
intend  to  change  its  policy,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  pre- 
sent "  the  solemn  protest "  of  his  own  government 
"against  an  attempt  so  contrary  to  every  principle  of 

38  Foster  to  Wellesley,  July  5,  Aug.  5,  181 1,  MS.,  British 
Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  76. 

37 


558         IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

public  justice,  faith,  and  national  honor,  and  so  in- 
jurious to  the  alliance  subsisting  between  His  Majesty 
and  the  Spanish  nation. "^'^ 

While  the  administration  resented  Foster's  inter- 
ference, Monroe  undertook  to  give  him  a  "  friendly  " 
explanation,  obviously  designed  for  the  public  that 
shortly  read  it.  He  repudiated  the  idea  that  his  col- 
leagues had  tried  to  take  advantage  of  Spain's  neces- 
sities, although  the  other  government  afforded  them 
numerous  precedents  for  such  a  policy.  Without 
enumerating  all  the  just  complaints  of  his  nation 
against  Spain,  he  mentioned  the  suspension  of  the  de- 
posit at  New  Orleans  and  the  commercial  spoliations. 
Although  the  United  States  did  not  depend  wholly  on 
them  for  justification,  she  did  not  expect  to  neglect 
them  entirely.  Great  Britain  and  France  had  made 
reparation  for  such  claims.  Some  six  years  before 
Spain  had  invited  the  United  States  to  negotiate  upon 
the  claim  to  the  Perdido.  In  accepting  this  invitation 
the  United  States  had  hoped  to  settle  that  and  all  other 
points  in  dispute  between  the  two  countries,  but  had 
been  disappointed.  Thus  he  naively  passed  over  his 
failure  at  Aranjuez.  Since  that  unsuccessful  nego- 
tiation, the  affairs  of  West  Florida  had  remained  in  a 
state  of  confusion  favorable  to  neither  nation,  but  the 
United  States  made  no  attempt  to  profit  by  this.     In 

39  Foster  to  Monroe,  July  2,  i8ii,  MS.,  British  Legation,  VI, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  559 

the  preceding  year,  however,  the  United  States  could 
not  be  indifferent  to  the  revolt  of  its  inhabitants  which 
threatened  her  rights  and  at  the  same  time  wrested 
the  province  from  Spain.  In  occupying  that  part  no 
longer  controlled  by  the  Spanish  troops,  his  nation 
consulted  Spain's  honor  as  well  as  her  own  rights. 
By  this  occupation  the  United  States  acquired  "no 
new  title  to  West  Florida.  It  wanted  none."  His 
government  proposed  to  adjust  amicably  "  all  the  other 
points  at  issue  "  as  soon  as  Spain  was  ready,  and  then 
"her  claim  to  this  territory  [might]  also  be  brought 
into  view  and  receive  all  the  attention  that  [was]  due 
it."*° 

Monroe  was  interpreting  the  president's  promise  to 
submit  the  West  Florida  question  to  future  negotia- 
tion in  a  way  that  had  occurred  to  few  of  his  con- 
temporaries. Yet  it  was  obviously  the  only  way  to 
justify  forcible  occupation.  The  man  who  had  clung 
so  tenaciously  to  the  West  Florida  claim,  in  opposition 
to  Talleyrand  and  Cevallos,  now  had  the  chance  to 
maintain  it  as  a  fait  accompli,  and  undoubtedly  took 
a  certain  malicious  pleasure  in  making  a  British  rep- 
resentative realize  this.  He  stated  that  Pinkney  had 
not  been  able  to  give  the  necessary  explanations  in 
London,  but  hoped  that  his  own  "frank  "  course  would 
completely  satisfy  the  British  government. 

Evidently  his   "  frankness "   did  not,   for  early  in 

40  Niles'  Register,  I,  188. 


560         IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

September,  1811,  upon  De  Onis'  initiative,  Fester 
asked  Monroe  to  explain  Matthews's  course  in  East 
Florida.  The  United  States  certainly  could  not  al- 
lege any  claim  there  to  justify  its  agent's  correspond- 
ence with  traitors  or  attempts  to  bribe  Spanish  sub- 
jects from  their  allegiance.  Some  two  months  passed 
before  Monroe  deigned  to  answer  this.  He  based  his 
defense  on  the  commercial  claims,  which  were  more 
valuable  than  was  East  Florida.  In  this  matter  the 
United  States  owed  something  to  its  citizens  as  well  as 
to  Spanish  honor,  so  it  could  not  permit  the  region 
to  pass  into  the  hands  of  a  third  power,  or  even  to 
remain  as  a  possible  temptation.  Its  action,  therefore, 
predicated  upon  the  consent  of  the  local  authorities, 
or  the  designs  of  a  third  power,  simply  afforded  an- 
other evidence  of  its  "just  and  amicable  views"  to- 
ward Spain,  and  its  representatives  abroad  had  been 
instructed  so  to  explain  it.  This,  Monroe  intimated, 
ought  to  close  the  discussion,  for  the  United  States 
would  pursue  its  just  and  honorable  course  only  so 
long  as  it  comported  with  national  honor  and  safety.*^ 
Monroe  was  evidently  very  "  warm  "  over  the  cor- 
respondence, as  Foster  reported  him,  and  seemed  to 
view  possible  hostilities  with  much  less  dread  than 
the  British  minister  anticipated.  The  British  cabinet 
was  content  to  rest  the  discussion  wholly  with  Foster, 
and  the  Regency  definitely  expressed  their  obligation 

*i  Niles'  Register,  I,  189,  190. 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  56 1 

for  his  services.  During  the  winter  of  1811-1812 
there  were  rumors  that  the  EngHsh  and  the  Spaniards 
would  unite  to  defend  the  Floridas  as  a  step  against 
the  general  independence  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  but 
the  cabinet  did  nothing  beyond  ordering  the  admiral 
on  the  American  coast  to  watch  hostile  demonstrations 
in  the  region.  In  the  spring  of  1812  Foster  renewed 
his  complaints  against  Matthews's  course  in  East  Flor- 
ida. Monroe  acknowledged  that  the  latter  was  ex- 
ceeding his  instructions,  and  later  reported  orders  to 
supersede  him,  but,  to  Foster's  mortification,  failed  to 
make  any  reference  to  West  Florida.  On  the  eve  of 
war  between  the  two  nations  Foster  made  a  last  at- 
tempt to  secure  recognition  for  De  Onis,  suggesting 
the  possibility  of  acquiring  the  desired  Floridas  in 
the  ensuing  negotiations.  But  Monroe  quoted  the  re- 
cent resolution  of  the  Spanish  Cortes  against  alienat- 
ing territory  as  an  effectual  bar  to  such  a  settlement.*^ 
The  outbreak  of  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  presented  a  new  problem  in  Anglo- 
Spanish  relations.  The  British  representative  in  Spain 
reported  the  event  to  the  Spanish  Council  of  State 
with  an  evident  desire  to  enlist  its  aid  in  the  conflict. 
A  long  series  of  unfriendly  acts  by  the  Americans, 

42  Foster  to  Wellesley,  Apr.  2,  1812,  MS.,  British  Foreign 
Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  85 ;  Foster  to  Castlereagh,  May  21, 
1812,  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5,  Vol.  86; 
Foster  to  Monroe,  Apr.  6,  June  6,  1812,  AIS.,  British  Legation, 
VII.  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


562  IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION 

culminating  in  the  occupation  of  Baton  Rouge  and 
Amelia  Island,  constituted  virtual  warfare  against 
Spain,  although  accompanied  by  no  formal  declara- 
tion of  hostilities.  The  Council  of  State,  however,  de- 
termined to  take  provisional  action  only.  Spanish  of- 
ficials were  to  adopt  every  precaution  against  Amer- 
ican aggression  and  should  even  ask  British  naval  offi- 
cers to  assist  in  protecting  their  shipping.  They 
should  express  to  Great  Britain  their  intention  to  fol- 
low her  lot,  but  at  the  same  time  express  a  desire  to 
keep  out  of  the  struggle  as  long  as  possible.*^  This 
decision  was  not  so  one-sided  as  it  seemed,  for  Great 
Britain  was  able  to  violate  the  pretended  neutrality  of 
the  Spaniards  whenever  it  suited  her  purpose  to  use  the 
Floridas,  while  open  hostility  on  the  part  of  Spain 
would  have  delivered  those  territories  immediately  to 
the  Americans. 

Although  avoiding  formal  warfare,  the  Spanish 
authorities  were  by  no  means  inclined  to  minimize 
their  resentment  against  the  Americans.  This  was 
voiced  by  Pedro  Labrador  in  a  report  to  the  Cortes  on 
December  31,  1812.  From  the  beginning  of  the 
struggle  of  Spain  against  Napoleon  the  American  gov- 
ernment had  shown  its  unfriendliness.  It  had  refused 
to  receive  De  Onis,  the  representative  of  the  Regency. 
It  had  intrigued  to  gain  possession  of  the  Floridas, 

43  Libro  de  Actos  del  Consejo  de  Estado,  13  d,  Aug.  6,  1812, 
Estado,  A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION        563 

and  finally  had  occupied  portions  of  them,  after  insti- 
gating revolt,  and  was  evidently  disposed  to  absorb 
the  rest.  These  and  similar  warlike  acts  elsewhere 
revealed  the  hostility  and  guile  of  the  American  gov- 
ernment and  the  rank  ingratitude  of  the  American 
people.** 

An  anonymous  memoir  of  the  period  sought  still 
further  to  arouse  the  Spaniards  against  "the  demo- 
cratic government  of  the  United  States."  Under  the 
Frenchified  Jefferson  and  Madison  its  authorities  had 
stimulated  the  revolt  in  West  Florida  in  1810;  had 
threatened  to  overwhelm  Spain  in  her  hour  of  neces- 
sity by  such  "  unworthy  pretexts  "  as  spoliations  and 
territorial  claims ;  and  had  recently  attempted  to  annex 
both  the  Floridas,  corrupting  officials  there  if  neces- 
sary to  accomplish  its  purpose.  From  this  scene  of 
intrigue  its  "  emissaries  and  democratic  agents  "  had 
spread  to  the  interior  provinces  of  Mexico,  where 
vagabond  invaders  were  following  them.  It  was  evi- 
dently the  intention  of  the  American  government  to 
aggrandize  itself  by  fraud  and  force,  ultimately  estab- 
lishing "  Democracy  and  its  companion  Atheism " 
throughout  New  Spain.  The  root  of  all  these  evils 
was  a  fraudulent  transaction  which  gave  the  United 
States  possession  of  Louisiana,  but  no  property  right 

4*  A  copy  of  this  report,  dated  at  Cadiz,  Dec.  31,  1812,  is 
found  in  Papers  in  Relation  to  Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bu- 
reau of  Rolls  and  Library. 


564  IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION 

there.  Nor  had  that  power  since  gained  the  allegiance 
of  its  people.  By  assisting  them  to  separate  from  the 
Eastern  States,  Spain  might  make  Louisiana  into  a 
friendly  barrier.  The  region  could  then  be  organized 
as  a  "  modern  monarchy  "  under  the  joint  guarantee  of 
Spain,  England,  Russia,  and  Sweden,  with  the  Flori- 
das  and  Texas  attached  to  it.  This  new  power,  like 
the  infant  Hercules,  would  "  strangle  the  serpent  of 
Democratic  usurpation "  and  effectively  restrain  all 
enterprises  against  Spanish  America.*^ 

The  author  of  this  curious  diatribe  may  have  been 
Richard  Rayneval  Keene,  a  land-hungry  aristocrat  of 
the  period,  who  seems  to  have  learned  little  from  sev- 
eral years'  residence  in  New  Orleans.  The  essential 
point  to  note  in  it  is  that  the  Spanish  authorities  were 
gradually  coming  to  transfer  their  concern  at  Amer- 
ican progress  from  the  Floridas  to  the  Louisiana- 
Texas  frontier.  The  contemporary  mission  of  John 
Hamilton  Robinson,  one  of  Monroe's  "  emissaries  and 
democratic  agents,"  to  Chihuahua  afforded  a  definite 
case  in  point.  He  was  provided  with  documents  to 
explain  the  course  of  the  American  government  in 
East  and  West  Florida,  but  his  real  purpose  was  un- 
doubtedly to  open  up  commercial  relations  with  Mex- 
ico. For  this  reason  the  Spaniards  regarded  his  mis- 
sion as  a  continuation  of  those  undertaken  by  Wilkin- 

4^  A  copy  of  this  memoir  is  filed  in  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  54,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  under  date  of 
Jan.  I,  1817. 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION         565 

son  and  Matthews.  Such  efforts  betokened  equal 
peril  to  Spain's  political  control  and  Britain's  com- 
mercial supremacy  .^^ 

France,  too,  had  an  interest  in  the  fate  of  the  Flor- 
idas,  as  well  as  in  the  future  of  Spanish  America. 
This  interest  continued,  as  before,  to  be  associated 
with  Napoleon's  general  commercial  policy.  Bassano, 
whose  devotion  to  the  Continental  System  had  given 
him  Cadore's  place,  must  be  brought  to  approve  re- 
cent American  action,  as  his  predecessor  had  appar- 
ently done.  To  this  task,  therefore,  Jonathan  Russell, 
the  charge  at  Paris,  addressed  himself  in  the  latter 
part  of  April,  1811. 

Mentioning  the  long-cherished  desire  of  the  United 
States  to  possess  the  Floridas,  for  which  its  commer- 
cial claims  against  Spain  afforded  a  fair  equivalent, 
Russell  stated  that  the  recent  revolts  in  the  Spanish 
colonies  rendered  annexation  absolutely  necessary. 
But  the  administration  was  uncertain  with  whom  to 
negotiate  for  a  perfect  title.  Certainly  any  power 
claiming  Spain  must  assume  her  debts,  and  in  lieu  of 
these  might  be  willing  to  trade  the  Floridas  or  make 
some  other  just  indemnity.  Having  established  this 
basis  for  a  bargain — which  it  must  be  confessed  is 
rather  one  sided — Russell  went  on  to  clinch  it  by  as- 

4S  For  Robinson's  mission  consult  my  article  on  "  Monroe 
and  the  Early  Mexican  Revolutionary  Agents  "  in  the  Annual 
Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association  for  the  year 
1911,  199-21S 


566  IN    DEFENSE   OF    INTERVENTION 

suring  Bassano  that  if  circumstances  compelled  the 
United  States  to  occupy  the  region,  France  would  not 
receive  harm,  nor  any  other  power  have  cause  to  ob- 
ject. The  United  States  would  have  the  means  to 
pay  the  claims  of  its  citizens  and  to  carry  out  its  cus- 
toms laws  more  effectually.*' 

As  these  customs  laws  bore  more  hardly  on  Great 
Britain  than  on  France,  Bassano  was  not  likely  to  ob- 
ject to  the  latter  point.  But  if  American  citizens  were 
to  profit  from  this  transaction,  and  the  United  States 
to  gain  the  desired  territory,  there  must  be  some  com- 
pensation for  France  as  well.  Of  course  the  assump- 
tion of  all  claims  against  that  power,  as  well  as  against 
Spain,  counted  for  something ;  but  in  addition  the 
Americans  had  formerly  been  willing  to  make  a  cash 
payment  to  France,  and  had  even  appropriated  ten 
million  francs  for  this  purpose.  They  might  now  be 
induced  to  pay  this  sum  or  even  to  double  it.  The 
transaction  might  easily  be  arranged  through  a  treaty 
with  Joseph  Bonaparte,  or  through  an  arrangement 
forcing  him  to  transfer  the  territory  to  France  and 
then  cede  it  to  the  United  States.  Bassano  showed 
that  France  had  never  supported  the  claim  to  West 
Florida  and  that  the  Americans  could  not  strengthen 
their  right  to  it  by  seizing  both  Floridas  as  security 
for  their  commercial  claims.     Nor  did  the  mere  verbal 

47  Russell  to  Bassano,  Apr.  30,  181 1,  Archives  des  Affaires 
fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  Supplement,  MS.,  Vol.  8,  249. 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  567 

promise  of  Cadore  not  to  oppose  this  occupation  estop 
France  from  receiving  the  sum  mentioned  above.*^ 

In  his  note  reviewing  the  discussion  with  Bassano, 
Russell  did  not  mention  any  compensation  for  France 
beyond  the  assumption  of  commercial  claims.*^  Ob- 
viously such  compensation  was  contrary  to  Madison's 
hope,  expressed  to  Barlow,  that  the  emperor  would 
make  no  unworthy  attempt  to  extract  money  from 
the  United  States  by  means  of  the  Floridas.  When 
Barlow  reached  Paris,  Petry,  Bassano's  subordinate, 
reported  that  the  American  bore  no  definite  instruc- 
tions on  the  subject.  Congress  had  simply  advised  the 
president  to  occupy  the  region  in  order  to  keep  Great 
Britain  out.  The  latter  power  also  desired  the  terri- 
tory as  a  counterpoise  to  Louisiana,  and  had  protested 
against  the  American  occupation  of  West  Florida. 
Its  possession  by  the  United  States  would  protect  the 
southeastern  border  and  give  both  the  United  States 
and  France  commercial  advantages  in  Mexico. ■''° 

About  this  time  the  French  vice-consul  at  Ports- 
mouth, Cazeaux,  submitted  a  memoir  in  which  he 
claimed  that  mere  commercial  advantages  alone  would 
not  pay  France  for  permitting  the  Americans  to  oc- 
cupy the  Floridas.     France  herself  could  derive  many 

48  Ibid.,  251 ;  unsigned  Note  sur  les  Florides,  probably  by 
Bassano  in  Archives  des  Affaires  fit'rangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS., 
Vol.  66,  34,  36,  37. 

49  Ibid.,  80,  81. 

50  Petry  to  Bassano,  Nov.  15,  181 1,  ibid.,  287. 


568  IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION 

advantages  from  seizing  the  region  where  some  French 
estabUshments  already  existed.  Possibly  he  had  Mo- 
bile and  its  vicinity  in  mind.  Evidently  the  Amer- 
icans were  determined  to  possess  all  the  territory  east 
of  the  Mississippi,  but  a  small  force,  say  three  frig- 
ates and  some  five  or  six  hundred  men,  would  cause 
them  to  abandon  their  purpose,^^  De  Onis  seems  to 
have  had  some  inkling  of  Cazeaux's  suggestion,  for  he 
earlier  mentioned  a  project  to  send  a  French  expedi- 
tion to  Amelia  Island, ^^  Some  months  later  an  un- 
signed memoir  reviewed  the  advantages  that  the 
United  States  would  gain  from  the  possession  of  the 
Floridas,  and  advised  that  France  in  return  for  her 
acquiescence  should  demand  commercial  privileges 
there,  as  well  as  in  Louisiana,  for  a  period  of  twelve 
years. •'"'^ 

Shortly  after  his  correspondence  with  Foster,  Mon- 
roe wrote  Barlow  that  Spain  owed  the  United  States 
more  than  East  Florida  was  worth,  and  that  his  coun- 
try should  look  to  that  province  for  compensation,  and 
in  no  case  permit  a  third  power  to  occupy  it.  On  the 
other  hand  West  Florida  belonged  to  her  by  a  title 
that  could  not  be  improved.^*     Perhaps  he  meant  the 

51  Memoir,  Dec.  14,  181 1,  ibid.,  383-390. 

^52  De  Onis  to  Captain-General,  Sept.  28,  1811,  Legajo  1708, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 

53  Archives  des  Afltaires  fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  Memoircs 
at  Documents,  MS.,  Vol.  10,  361-363. 

54  Monroe  to  Barlow,  Nov.  21,  181 1,  Instructions,  MS.,  VII, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION         569 

old  rule  that  possession  is  nine  points  of  the  law. 
With  such  divergent  views  the  French  and  Americans 
were  not  likely  to  agree  in  a  division  of  Spanish 
spoils.  In  May,  1812,  George  Poindexter  wrote  that 
Barlow  had  been  unable  to  arrange  a  satisfactory  ter- 
ritorial and  commercial  treaty  with  the  French  em- 
peror and  there  was  no  prospect  that  he  would  do  so.^^ 
Yet  even  in  the  midst  of  the  difficult  Russian  cam- 
paign there  was  an  attempt  to  settle  these  long-stand- 
ing disputes.  Possibly  in  view  of  impending  disaster 
elsewhere,  the  emperor  sincerely  desired  to  gain  the 
good-will  of  the  United  States.  Petry  at  Paris  sug- 
gested that  the  fifteen  million  acres  of  unoccupied  lands 
within  the  Floridas  ought  to  be  worth  at  least  three 
francs  an  acre  to  the  United  States.  Bassano,  now 
on  the  Russian  border,  wished  to  utilize  any  conces- 
sion on  the  part  of  France  in  order  to  gain  a  favorable 
commercial  treaty.  For  this  purpose  he  ordered  all 
documents  relating  to  the  Florida  controversy  to  be 
transferred  to  him  at  Wilna.  These  documents  ought 
to  show  that  when  France  received  Louisiana  it  in- 
cluded no  part  of  the  Floridas,  and  that  the  American 
representatives  had  frequently  expressed  such  a  belief. 
At  one  time  the  United  States  actually  provided  ten 
million  francs  for  their  purchase.     In  taking  posses- 

55  Poindexter  to  Mead,  Apr.  10,  May  24,  1812,  Claiborne 
Letters,  B,  MS.,  Department  of  Archives  and  History,  Jack- 
son, Miss. 


570        IN  DEFENSE  OF  INTERVENTION 

sion  of  the  disputed  area  the  United  States  had  prom- 
ised to  arrange  for  the  rights  of  all  interested  parties, 
and  this  promise  should  now  be  utilized  to  end  all 
claims  for  spoliations,  including  the  recent  ones  of 
which  Barlow  was  complaining.^*' 

Evidently  Bassano  believed  the  settlement  of  these 
claims  to  be  essential,  for  he  said  that  if  the  United 
States  persisted  in  its  refusal  to  discuss  West  Florida 
as  an  offset  to  the  spoliations,  he  might  use  the  un- 
settled western  boundary  as  an  additional  incentive. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  revolt  was  spreading  through- 
out her  colonies,  Spain  might  now  be  willing  to  relin- 
quish the  claims  to  the  Bravo,  although  he  did  not 
think  it  very  probable.^"  This  suggestion  of  the  per- 
plexed minister  indicated  that  the  diplomatic  interest 
formerly  centering  about  West  Florida  was  to  be 
transferred  further  afield.  Even  the  Spanish  officials 
recognized  this,  although  they  were  not  at  all  wilHng 
to  abandon  their  previous  contentions  in  regard  to  the 
Floridas. 

In  the  fall  of  1812  Barlow  left  Paris  for  distant 
Poland  in  the  vain  hope  of  settling  these  disputes  as 

'•6  Petry  to  Bassano,  July  31,  1812,  Archives  des  Affaires 
fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol.  68,  262;  cf.  also  Vol.  68, 
316,  and  Vol.  69,  86,  87,  336,  390-397. 

^^  Roux  to  Brennin,  Oct.  14.  1812,  Archives  des  Affaires 
fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  Supplement,  MS.,  Vol.  5,  416;  Bas- 
sano to  Serrurier,  Nov.  25,  1812,  Archives  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres,  £tats  Unis,  MS ,  Vol.  69,  390-392. 


IN    DEFENSE    OF    INTERVENTION  57 1 

well  as  the  wider  question  of  commercial  rights.  In 
a  sense  the  American  fell  a  victim  to  Napoleon's 
ruthless  policy  which  sacrificed  diplomats  as  readily 
as  divisions.  Before  his  death  in  the  little  Polish 
village  near  Cracow,  Barlow  knew  that  it  was  hopeless 
to  expect  from  the  whilom  giver  of  Louisiana  any 
settlement  of  its  complicated  boundaries. ^^ 

58  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  VI,  263-265. 


CHAPTER  XV 

Incorporation  and  Adjustment 

The  people  of  the  Baton  Rouge  district  were  anx- 
ious for  prompt  incorporation  into  the  American 
Union ;  the  American  people  generally  desired  to  re- 
ceive them.  The  question  of  adjustment,  therefore, 
seemed  relatively  simple.  There  were,  however,  some 
details  connected  with  the  later  Spanish  regime  and 
the  brief  period  of  independence  that  presented  diffi- 
cult problems.  Among  these  were  the  recognition  of 
land  sales  since  1803,  the  payment  of  the  convention 
debts,  and  pardon  for  the  deserters  from  American 
service.  These  points  had  aroused  Skipwith's  concern 
and  for  a  time  threatened  to  bring  him  into  armed  col- 
lision with  Claiborne.  Fortunately  his  better  judg- 
ment led  him  to  waive  them,  pending  action  by  the 
executive  and  Congress. 

Skipwith  desired  American  intervention  ;  but  he  was 
firmly  persuaded  that  he  and  his  associates  could  give 
the  United  States  a  better  title  to  the  region  than  did 
the  president's  proclamation,  which  foreign  nations 
were  not  likely  to  recognize.  He  did  not  explain  how 
he  expected  to  induce  them  to  recognize  his  embryo 
government.    Yet  when  the  occupation  was  an  assured 

572 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  573 

fact  he  acknowledged  that  Claiborne  had  been  mag- 
nanimous to  the  people  of  West  Florida  and  courteous 
to  himself.  He  assured  his  friend  Graham  that  in 
case  of  foreign  invasion  the  government  might  abso- 
lutely rely  upon  them,  French  and  American  alike. 

The  executive  of  the  short-lived  State  felt  doubly 
resentful  because  his  proud  eminence  made  him  the 
easy  target  of  newspaper  abuse,  in  which  the  "  chaste 
Intelligencer"  and  "the  unchaste  Aurora"  alike 
joined.  There  was  much  in  his  melodramatic  inter- 
views with  Holmes,  his  bombastic  messages  to  Clai- 
borne, and  the  concluding  address  of  his  legislative  as- 
sembly to  excite  their  mirthful  sarcasm ;  but  their  vic- 
tim writhed  under  Duane's  "libertine  abuse."  The 
revolutionists  were  neither  "  Burrites  "  nor  mere  land 
speculators.  Now  that  they  had  returned  "to  the 
bosom  of  their  Parent  Country,"  he  and  his  former 
legislative  companions  wished  their  address  to  be 
buried  in  oblivion  without  aspersion  upon  themselves 
or  censure  for  the  national  administration.^ 

Skipwith's  friends  regretted  the  false  position  in 
which  he  had  placed  himself.  Monroe  had  written  in 
regard  to  his  ruinous  controversy  wuth  Armstrong 
that  if  he  had  been  less  honest  he  would  probably  have 
been  more  fortunate.  From  distant  Rio  Janeiro, 
Thomas  Sumpter,  Jr.,  inquired  what  devil  possessed 

1  Skipwith  to  Graham,  Dec.  23,  1810,.  Jan.  14,  181 1,  Madison 
Papers,  MS. 

38 


574  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

Skipwith.  He  had  been  so  long  a  steadfast  friend  of 
his  country  that  it  was  grievous  to  see  him  attempting 
a  melodramic  role  in  such  poor  company.  James 
Bowdoin,  who  knew  his  tested  worth  in  Paris,  was 
concerned  to  think  that  his  action  in  West  Florida  had 
cast  a  shadow  on  his  reputation.^ 

Skipwith  believed  that  the  report  of  his  actions  as 
pubHshed  in  the  Intelhgencer  was  a  literal  extract  from 
Claiborne's  correspondence.  Claiborne  took  pains  to 
explain  that  this  was  not  the  case,  although  he  had 
furnished  the  facts  and  could  have  told  much  more. 
He  gave  Skipwith  full  credit  for  his  correct  course 
after  the  occupation.  In  his  second  letter  to  Graham, 
Skipwith  asserted  the  loyalty  of  his  friends  and  him- 
self to  the  Union,  despite  all  attempts  to  calumniate 
them.  He  had  opposed  Kemper's  operations  and  all 
attempts  to  enlist  American  citizens,  so  that  no  foreign 
government  might  have  the  least  reason  for  suspect- 
ing the  American  authorities  of  fomenting  the  insur- 
rection. Personally  he  had  supported  the  agreement 
with  De  Lassus  as  long  as  he  could,  and  had  later  as- 
sumed office  in  order  to  afford  the  United  States  an 
"  honorable  pretext "  to  take  possession  of  the  terri- 
tory. Until  that  end  should  be  reached  he  had  hoped, 
with  the  aid  of  Dr.  Steele  and  others,  to  preserve  order 
and  administer  justice. 

2  Monroe  Papers,  MS.,  XII,  1593,  1588,  Library  of  Con- 
gress; Hamilton,  Monroe,  IV,  512. 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  575 

Having  secured  the  desired  intervention  of  the 
United  States,  the  people  hoped  that  some  way  might 
be  devised  for  paying  the  expenses  of  their  independ- 
ent government  and  for  releasing  them  speedily  from 
a  territorial  organization.  Skipwith  preferred  an- 
nexation to  Orleans,  for  that  would  hasten  the  for- 
mation of  a  State  there.  Moreover  the  American  ele- 
ment in  West  Florida  would  neutralize  the  French  in- 
habitants, who  had  shown  little  progress  in  acquiring 
the  English  language  or  American  ideas,  and  would 
make  of  it  a  State,  entirely  free  from  Bonapartist 
intrigues.^ 

About  the  middle  of  January,  1811,  a  series  of  in- 
surrections among  the  slaves  of  the  German  Coast 
caused  great  alarm  in  Orleans  and  Mississippi  and 
aroused  some  uneasiness  in  the  newly  acquired  terri- 
tory.* Two  months  later  the  latent  discontent  mani- 
fested itself  in  a  more  dramatic  manner.  When  the 
residents  of  St.  Francisville  arose  on  a  Sunday  morn- 
ing they  beheld  the  flag  of  West  Florida  again  wav- 
ing from  the  top  of  the  flagstaff.  Evidently  its  reap- 
pearance some  sixty  feet  high  in  the  air  was  due  to  a 
mere  prank,  and  no  one  cared  to  remove  the  emblem 
by  climbing  the  pole  or  cutting  it  down.     Moreover 

3  Skipwith  to  Graham,  Jan.  14,  1811,  cf.  note  i. 

*  Butler  to  Holmes,  Jan.  15,  1811,  Mississippi  Territorial 
Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  9;  Holmes  to  Colonel  James  Wood,  Jan. 
17,  181 1,  Proceedings  Executive  Council,.  Mississippi  Terri- 
tory, MS.,  I. 


576  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

the  flagpole  was  private  property.  As  the  report 
spread,  considerable  uneasiness  developed.  Then  Gen- 
eral Hampton  happened  to  come  into  town,  and  or- 
dered the  flag  to  be  cut  down,  for  its  presence  seemed 
a  deliberate  insult  to  the  government.  When  there 
was  some  hesitation  to  injure  private  property,  he 
threatened  to  call  out  a  company  of  soldiers  for  the 
task.  The  civil  authorities  then  quickly  had  the  pole 
felled.  On  the  following  day  the  flag  was  solemnly 
interred  with  elaborate  military  ceremonies,  and  a  pre- 
tentious epitaph  was  placed  over  it.^ 

Scarcely  had  this  farce  ended  when  news  reached 
St.  Francisville  that  the  Orleans  legislature  had  re- 
fused to  seat  the  five  representatives  from  West  Flor- 
ida. This  act  seemed  to  be  in  keeping  with  Claiborne's 
previous  palatine  methods,  although  it  is  more  likely 
that  the  blame  should  be  given  to  Congress  because 
of  its  delay  in  attaching  the  district  to  Orleans.  The 
incensed  people  of  St.  Francisville  immediately  talked 
of  a  remonstrance  to'  the  president.  Some  attributed 
the  action  to  the  fact  that  the  assembly  was  composed 
largely  of  Frenchmen  who  hated  Americans  and  would 
be  only  too  glad  to  cause  trouble  in  West  Florida.  If 
that  was  what  they  were  to  expect  when  Orleans  be- 
came a  State,  they  hoped  that  the  people  of  Missis- 
sippi Territory  would  be  ready  to  meet  the  issue.* 

5  Nashville  Clarion  and  Gazette,  Apr.  2,  i8n. 
«  Ibid. 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  577 

Exaggerated  reports  of  these  incidents  led  the  Span- 
iards to  hope  for  respite  from  further  American  en- 
croachments. 

Skipwith  had  been  one  of  the  rejected  representa- 
tives. He  had  prepared  an  elaborate  defense  of  the 
whole  revolutionary  movement  to  present  to  the  legis- 
lature, and  later  had  contemplated  using  it  as  an  ad- 
dress to  his  constituents,  but  he  refrained  from  doing 
so.  In  his  draft  he  opposed  the  American  contention 
that  West  Florida  was  part  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase 
— a  contention  that  he  had  previously  assisted  his 
friend  Monroe  to  maintain.  He  reviewed  the  steps  by 
which  he  and  his  associates  had  made  themselves  inde- 
pendent, showing  that  no  other  course  was  open  to 
them.  He  commented  bitterly  upon  Claiborne's  hos- 
tile approach,  so  different  from  the  tone  of  his  letter 
to  Wykoff,  and  contrasted  his  tenderness  for  Spanish 
sensibilities  with  his  blunt  course  toward  the  conven- 
tion. Yet  its  members  desired  to  be  incorporated  in 
the  Union  and  had  no  alternative  but  submission. 
But  they  expected  Congress  to  better  Claiborne's 
procedure.'^ 

After  Monroe  became  secretary  of  state,  Skipwith 
felt  that  he  had  a  friend  at  court  who  would  give  him 
credit  for  integrity  of  motive.  Accordingly,  on  May 
18,  he  sent  Monroe  the  documents  giving  his  inter- 

7  Address  of  Skipwith,  West  Florida  Papers,  MS.,  ill  ff., 
Library  of  Congress. 


578  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

pretation  of  the  West  Florida  revolution.  When  it 
seemed  evident  to  himself  and  his  companions  that 
the  United  States  did  not  intend  to  occupy  the  country 
under  the  Louisiana  cession,  they  determined  to  pro- 
claim their  independence  for  the  sole  purpose  of  giv- 
ing themselves  to  the  United  States.  He  had  so  in- 
formed his  friends,  Mason  and  Graham,  and  expected 
them  to  impart  this  information  to  the  president.  He 
then  needed  only  a  hint  from  either  of  them  to  check 
or  extend  the  movement  as  was  desired.  Instead  of 
recognizing  his  agency  in  any  way,  the  administration 
permitted  its  own  paper  to  make  a  most  disgraceful 
attack  on  him.  He  had  as  yet  taken  no  steps  for  pub- 
lic vindication,  and  now  asked  nothing  of  the  admin- 
istration but  an  opportunity  to  defend  himself.  He 
had  mentioned  his  resentment  only  to  Dr.  Steele  and 
Boiling  Robertson,  who  supported  the  administration, 
and  he  requested  Monroe  to  show  his  present  letter 
only  to  his  friends  Mercer  and  Sumpter.* 

Monroe  requested  Boiling  Robertson  to  write  Skip- 
with,  but  delayed  his  own  reply  for  some  months. 
Probably  he  did  not  intend  to  neglect  his  former  inter- 
mediary, with  whose  misfortunes  he  sympathized,  and 
he  certainly  cherished  full  confidence  in  the  desire 
of  Skipwith  and  his  companions  to  advance  the  best 
interests  of  the  country.  With  reference  to  the  main 
point   of    Skipwith's   letter   he   thus   expressed    him- 

8  Skipwith  to  Monroe,  May  i8,  1811,  Lenox  MSS. 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  579 

self :  "  I  shall  say  but  little  relative  to  the  late  affair 
in  West  Florida.  I  shall  only  remark  that  it  was  im- 
possible for  the  U[nited]  S[tates]  to  accept  a  title  for 
it,  from  the  revolutionary  party.  They  would  have 
been  as  much  responsible  to  Spain,  or  any  other  gov- 
ernment claiming  Spain,  in  taking  it  from  the  revolu- 
tionists, as  if  they  had  driven  the  Spanish  troops  out 
by  those  of  the  U[nited]  States.  Spain  would  always 
have  said  that  this  party  was  put  in  motion  by  the 
U[nited]  States,  for  the  purpose  of  masking  their 
views.  In  taking  the  country  from  it,  they  would 
have  had  the  same  difficulty  to  keep  the  possession 
against  the  ultimate  possessor  of  Spain,  as  if  they  had 
taken  it  by  force.  If  war  had  been  the  consequence, 
it  would  have  fallen  on  the  U[nited]  States,  not  on 
the  revolutionary  party  in  Florida,  who  would  have 
disappeared  and  mingled  with  the  rest  of  their  fellow 
citizens.  In  taking  that  course  then  the  U[nited] 
States  would  have  gained  nothing  as  to  title  or  secur- 
ity; and  would  have  lost  in  character  and  likewise  in 
property  for  [in]  so  far  as  they  made  the  revolution- 
ists any  recompense  for  the  cession,  [just]  so  far  it 
would  be  an  entire  loss.'"*  We  may  regard  Monroe's 
argument  as  no  more  convincing  than  Skipwith's,  but 
he  was  defending  an  accomplished  fact,  not  a  theory. 
On  the  whole  he  offered  what  is  possibly  the  best  jus- 
tification for  the  course  pursued  by  the  administration 
in  the  Florida  intervention. 

9  Monroe  to  Skipwith,  Oct.  22,  1811,  Lenox  MSS. 


580  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

As  the  disputes  over  the  status  and  the  claims  of  the 
Baton  Rouge  district  were  gradually  transferred  to 
Washington  for  leisurely  settlement,  the  frontier  offi- 
cials turned  their  efforts  to  the  region  further  east- 
ward. The  situation  along  the  Pascagoula  especially 
demanded  attention.  When  Colonel  James  Caller  car- 
ried the  president's  proclamation  to  Fort  Stoddert,  he 
sent  a  copy  to  Sterling  Dupree,  who  was  then  in  the 
midst  of  his  plundering  course.  That  marauder  im- 
mediately hauled  down  the  convention  flag  and  hoisted 
that  of  the  United  States,  but  he  did  not  mend  his 
ways.  Moved  by  reports  of  his  action,  supplemented 
by  the  testimony  of  Captain  George  Farragut  and 
Joseph  Collins,  Claiborne  determined  to  send  troops  to 
repress  disorder  there  and  at  Bay  St.  Louis.  He 
commissioned  a  justice  of  the  peace  with  instructions 
to  organize  the  parishes  of  Biloxi  and  Pascagoula,  the 
latter  extending  to  Bayou  Batture  [Labatre?],  some 
twelve  or  fifteen  miles  beyond  Pascagoula  River,  and 
including  the  only  family  between  that  stream  and 
Mobile.  Commodore  Shaw  was  to  furnish  a  gunboat 
and  Captain  Farragut  was  to  accompany  him. 

Judge  Toulmin  hoped  that  this  action  would  repress 
lawlessness  along  the  Pearl  and  the  Pascagoula  and 
give  the  law-abiding  people  there  confidence  in  the 
American  government.  The  residents  along  the  Pearl 
seized  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  disturbing  element 
and  sent  him  to  New  Orleans.     It  would  have  been 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  58 1 

a  hard  task  to  apprehend  Dupree  and  compel  him  to 
disgorge  his  plunder,  for  he  had  already  partly  dis- 
posed of  it  or  divided  it  among  his  followers.  One 
slave  owner,  the  judge  reported,  was  despoiled  to  the 
extent  of  $30,000,  and  other  men  of  property  had  suf- 
fered in  proportion.  A  resident  named  Audry  lost  his 
son  in  an  encounter  with  the  brigands.  He  later  or- 
ganized his  neighbors,  and  pursued  and  killed  a  num- 
ber of  the  miscreants,  but  failed  to  capture  the 
leaders.^" 

It  was  high  time  to  suppress  lawlessness  in  the  re- 
gion. Claiborne's  justice,  Cuming,  found  his  presence 
there  "  unavailing,"  for  he  brought  no  military  escort. 
Dupree  was  unwilling  to  relinquish  his  arbitrary  con- 
trol, because,  as  Toulmin  claimed,  he  still  enjoyed  the 
support  of  James  Caller.  In  February  Perez  reported 
that  the  American  flag  was  flying  at  Pass  Christian. 
Major  John  Darrington  landed  there  with  some  three 
hundred  soldiers  and  later  sent  two  detachments  in 
pursuit  of  Dupree.^^  That  marauder,  with  his  stolen 
negroes,  took  refuge  in  Washington  County,  while 
John  Caller  and  his  militia  took  charge  at  Pascagoula, 
pending  the  arrival  of  the  American  troops.     Toulmin 

10  Claiborne  to  Smith,  Dec.  28,  1810,  Jan.  5,  1811  (Parker, 
7687,  7700-7703)  ;  Caller  to  Holmes,  Jan.  7,  181 1,  Mississippi 
Territorial  Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  9;  Meek  MSS.;  Toulmin  to 
Madison,  Jan.  23,  1811,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 

11  Meek  MSS.;  Perez  to  Folch,  Feb.  14,  181 1,  Legajo  63, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


582  INCORPORATION   AND  ADJUSTMENT 

asserted  that  the  failure  of  Claiborne  to  act  promptly 
and  with  sufficient  force  led  many  of  the  prominent  in- 
habitants to  doubt  if  the  United  States  really  intended 
to  take  possession  of  the  country.  They  began  to  talk 
of  again  tendering  their  allegiance  to  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment, but  Toulmin  advised  them  that  this  would 
once  more  precipitate  civil  strife. 

In  the  spring  of  this  year  Toulmin  visited  New  Or- 
leans and  Baton  Rouge,  and  on  his  return  reported 
general  conditions  to  Madison.  Aside  from  the  dis- 
turbance at  Pascagoula  and  the  discontent  already 
noted  at  Bayou  Sara,  the  majority  of  the  people  in  the 
recently  occupied  territory  expressed  unfeigned  satis- 
faction at  the  course  of  the  United  States.  In  the 
region  between  Baton  Rouge  and  Fort  Stoddert, 
through  which  a  definite  trail  now  ran,  settlements 
were  hardly  a  day's  journey  apart.  A  hundred  fami- 
lies had  recently  arrived  on  the  Pearl.  This  increased 
population  necessitated  the  prompt  establishment  of 
an  organized  government.  The  people  were  anxious 
to  know  in  what  territory  they  were  to  be  included 
and  how  far  occupancy  or  Spanish  title  would  be  re- 
spected.^^ 

Among  the  prospective  citizens  who  were  interested 
in  the  future  status  of  West  Florida,  James  Innerar- 
ity  occupied  a  prominent  place.     Toulmin  had  visited 

1- Toulmin  to  Holmes,  Feb.  3,  1811,  Mississippi  Territorial 
Archives,  MS.,  Vol.  9;  Toulmin  to  Madison,  Feb.  27,  May  14, 
181 1,  Madison  Papers,  MS. 


INCORPORATION   AND  ADJUSTMENT  583 

him  while  on  his  way  to  New  Orleans,  and  they  had 
evidently  talked  over  many  happenings  of  common 
interest  in  connection  with  the  caUing  out  of  the  mi- 
litia, Cushing's  conduct  in  countermanding  the  order, 
and  the  abuse  that  Toulmin  had  suffered  because  of 
his  agency  in  the  affair.  Colonel  Gushing  had  saved 
the  country  "  from  the  firebrands  of  the  Tombigbee," 
but  because  the  judge  had  set  his  face  against  the 
"  innocent  plans "  of  Kemper,  Caller,  and  Kennedy, 
"thus  slighting  their  patriotism,  and  snatching  from 
their  hands  the  prize  which  they  were  ready  to  grasp," 
they  "  abused,  denounced,  impeached,  and  burnt "  him 
in  effigy.  Innerarity  believed  that  they  would  have 
burnt  Mobile  in  reality  had  they  been  given  the  chance. 
Now  these  "worthies"  were  scrambling  for  the 
loaves  and  fishes  that  the  "  poor  sand-bank  and  quag- 
mire" had  to  offer.  Innerarity  contemplated  with 
little  enthusiasm  the  possibility  of  having  the  "  learned, 
intelligent,  upright,  and  brave"  Kennedy  for  a  judge 
or  Wilson  Carman  for  a  collector.  Referring  to  the 
bill  that  Giles  had  introduced  into  the  Senate  on  De- 
cember 8,  he  stated  that  the  people  of  Mobile  would 
welcome  temporary  union  with  Orleans  Territory  be- 
cause of  the  "  horror  and  dread  "  with  which  they  re- 
garded the  "Bigbians."  This,  however,  should  be 
only  a  temporary  arrangement,  for  they  had  no  "nat- 
ural connection "  or  common  interest  with  New  Or- 
leans, and  were  destined  to  become  commercial  rivals. 


584  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

For  this  reason  Mobile  ought  not  to  be  subject  to  her 
legislation.  The  provision  of  the  bill  in  regard  to  land 
grants  was  also  uncertain.  The  people  could  not  tell 
whether  it  included  those  made  up  to  the  receipt  of 
the  proclamation,  or  only  those  granted  previous  to 
December  20,  1803.^^ 

Toulmin  did  not  favor  even  the  temporary  subjec- 
tion of  Mobile  to  New  Orleans ;  but  when  he  was  in 
the  latter  city,  in  January,  181 1,  he  advised  Claiborne 
to  extend  his  jurisdiction  to  the  Perdido,  leaving  to 
the  Spanish  garrison  at  Mobile  only  so  much  of  its 
environs  as  it  could  reasonably  control.  The  Amer- 
icans might  then  use  the  east  channel  of  the  Mobile, 
which  was  preferable  to  the  other,  and  emptied  into 
the  bay  some  seven  miles  from  the  town,  without  in- 
terference from  the  Spaniards.  They  could  protect 
this  course  by  gunboats  and  a  suitable  garrison  on  its 
eastern  bank  or  at  the  mouth  of  Dog  River.  At  Clai- 
borne's request  Toulmin  indicated  such  boundaries  as 
would  give  the  Americans  control  over  an  additional 
area  about  fifty  miles  square. 

Claiborne  readily  acquiesced.  Moreover  he  wrote 
Monroe  that  the  Florida  revolutionists  had  once  pos- 
sessed this  area.  He  must  have  had  in  mind  merely 
Kemper's  operations.^*    A  few  days  later  the  neces- 

i^Innerarity  to  McKee,  Jan.  21,  181 1,  American  Historical 
Review,  II,  704,  705. 

1*  Toulmin  to  Madison,  May  14, 1811,  Madison  Papers,  MS.  ; 
Claiborne  to  Monroe,  June  7,  181 1   (Parker,  7740). 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  585 

sity  for  some  organization  became  apparent.  The 
military  agent  informed  Claiborne  that  a  schooner  with 
stores  for  Fort  Stoddert  had  not  been  allowed  to  pass 
Mobile.  This  promised  a  revival  of  the  wearisome 
commercial  wrangle,  but  if  passed  over  in  silence, 
would  invite  further  insults  to  the  American  flag. 
With  the  discretion  vested  in  him  Claiborne  felt  jus- 
tified in  attempting  to  meet  force  with  force,  and  asked 
Commodore  Shaw  to  provide  the  necessary  convoy  for 
vessels  that  he  proposed  to  send. 

Claiborne  also  learned  that  slaves  were  being  intro- 
duced into  Mobile  and  then  sold  within  the  United 
States.  This  traffic  constituted  another  reason  for 
taking  possession  of  the  region.  Pending  this  act,  he 
requested  Commodore  Shaw  to  extend  his  cruising 
ground  as  far  as  the  Perdido  and  to  capture  and  send 
to  New  Orleans  any  vessels  from  a  foreign  port  bound 
to  Mobile  with  slaves.  A  few  days  later  he  himself 
left  for  Biloxi  and  Pascagoula  to  establish  American 
authority  there  and  place  himself  near  the  scene  of 
prospective  danger.^^ 

The  weeks  that  had  passed  since  Folch  repudiated 
his  promise  had  not  brought  him  assured  peace.  Fili- 
busters and  rebels,  it  is  true,  no  longer  hovered  near 
Mobile,  but  American  regulars  afforded  him  scarcely 
less  anxiety.  With  them,  however,  he  could  maintain 
definite  relations.     Pending  the  decision  of  his  home 

15  Claiborne  to  Monroe,  June  11,  with  enclosure,  and  June 
16  (Parker,  7741,  7746). 


586  INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT 

government,  he  determined  to  avoid  every  chance  for 
colHsion  with  them.  He  would  thus  afford  the  crafty 
American  executive  no  pretext  for  further  encroach- 
ment. Whether  his  superiors  should  elect  to  nego- 
tiate or  to  resist  the  advance  of  the  Americans,  his 
continuance  in  the  fort  at  Mobile  would  be  an  advan- 
tage. Scant  resources,  intelligently  directed,  would 
enable  him  to  remain  there. 

Someruelos  had  advised  him  to  ask  aid  of  the  In- 
dians. Folch  replied  that  he  could  depend  only  on  the 
Seminoles,  who  mustered  barely  five  hundred  war- 
riors, while  the  four  principal  nations  in  American  ter- 
ritory encircled  them  with  twenty  thousand.  The  gov- 
ernor was  exaggerating  the  difficulties  that  surrounded 
him,  for  none  knew  better  than  he  that  a  large  propor- 
tion of  these  Indians  were  hostile  to  the  United  States. 
He  wrote  with  more  certainty  that  an  attempt  to  in- 
cite the  Indians  would  enable  the  president  to  control 
public  opinion  through  more  than  five  hundred  period- 
icals and  thus  force  from  Congress  the  necessary  sup- 
plies for  a  campaign  against  the  Floridas.  Moreover 
a  new  source  of  danger  increased  his  dependence  on 
the  Americans.  Vessels  bearing  various  insurgent 
flags  threatened  to  blockade  Mobile  and  Pensacola 
and  starve  out  his  garrisons.  He  had  asked  the  Amer- 
ican commodore  to  drive   these  vessels   away.^®     In 

16  Folch  to  Someruelos,  Apr.  i,  2,  1811,  Legajo  1569,  same  to 
same,  May  29,  1811,  Legajo  1570,  same  to  same,  June  24,  1811, 
Legajo  2330,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  587 

view  of  his  request,  the  action  of  his  subordinate  in 
detaining  an  American  vessel  at  Mobile  was  hardly 
conciliatory. 

Such  was  Folch's  situation  when  Claiborne  sent  his 
convoy  toward  Mobile.  The  movements  of  near-by 
American  troops  had  already  occasioned  frequent 
juntas.  Now  from  New  Orleans,  Morphy  reported 
that  the  people  there  were  on  tiptoe  with  expectation. 
They  anticipated  that  the  commander  at  Mobile  would 
again  refuse  to  permit  the  passage  of  the  convoy  and 
that  his  refusal  would  lead  to  serious  consequences. 
At  Pensacola  they  gave  this  report  no  credence,  but 
Collell  at  Mobile  took  it  more  seriously.  The  same 
vessel  to  which  he  had  refused  passage  was  now  to  be 
escorted  by  under  his  very  guns,  while  Claiborne 
brought  troops  from  Pascagoula  and  detachments 
from  Fort  Stoddert  hovered  in  the  immediate  back- 
ground. If  Collell  resisted  the  others  would  claim 
that  he  initiated  hostilities.  Nevertheless  he  deter- 
mined to  defend  his  ruined  fort  to  the  last.  St. 
Maxent,  who  was  assuming  charge  on  the  eve  of 
Folch's  departure,  notified  Collell  that  he  would  not 
modify  his  instructions,  but  advised  him  to  tell  the 
commander  of  the  opposing  squadron  that  he  proposed 
to  resist.^'' 

An  armed  schooner  and  eleven  gunboats  acted  as  a 

I''  Collell  to  St.  Maxent,  June  27,  181 1,  St.  Maxent  to  Collell, 
June  28,  181 1,  St.  Maxent  to  Somerueios,  June  28,  181 1,  Le- 
gajo  1570,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


588  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

convoy  for  two  vessels  loaded  with  stores.  They  were 
prepared  to  meet  any  opposition  with  "  firmness  and 
promptitude."  In  taking  this  measure  Claiborne  knew 
that  he  was  assuming  a  high  responsibility ;  but  he  had 
been  given  discretionary  powers,  and,  as  he  wrote 
Madison,  "  things  might  so  eventuate  "  that  he  would 
be  obliged  to  proceed  farther  than  he  had  at  first 
planned.  He  promised  to  do  nothing  rash,  but  he 
really  seemed  determined  to  bring  about  an  armed 
collision  and  to  occupy  Mobile.  The  expedition  thus 
represented  the  third  attempt  against  this  place  within 
less  than  a  year.  Kemper  had  threatened  it  with  his  fili- 
busters ;  Sparks  and  Gushing  had  invited  the  Spaniards 
to  abandon  it ;  now  Claiborne  dared  them  to  close  its 
approaches  against  the  Americans.  Under  such  provo- 
cation its  commander  must  employ  infinite  tact  and 
patience  or  resort  to  a  fatalistic  spirit  of  obedience. 

From  Pascagoula,  on  June  29,  1811,  Claiborne  ad- 
vised Folch  that  his  convoy  was  on  the  way.  He  was 
obliged  to  send  this  force  because  of  the  recent  deten- 
tion. He  informed  the  Spaniard  that  the  naval  com- 
mander would  not  prove  aggressive,  but  was  instructed 
to  repel  force  by  force.  If  Folch  wished  to  avoid 
hostilities,  he  should  refrain  from  opposing  his  pas- 
sage. The  right  of  the  United  States  to  the  free  navi- 
gation of  the  Mobile  was  too  evident  for  discussion, 
and  he  proposed  to  maintain  it.  Claiborne's  impa- 
tient, not  to  say  dictatorial,  tone  was  almost  a  chal- 


INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT  589 

lenge.  Evidently  he  was  weary  of  the  never-ending 
controversy.  He  wrote  Monroe  that  if  the  Spaniard 
opposed  the  passage  of  the  convoy,  he  would  hasten 
to  Fort  Stoddert  and  there  concert  further  measures 
with  its  commander.^^ 

Collell  declined  to  act  upon  Claiborne's  threatening 
missive,  but  sent  it  on  to  the  acting  governor.  Al- 
though wishing  to  preserve  the  existing  condition,  he 
would  oppose  the  passage  of  the  convoyed  schooner 
if  the  Americans  forced  him  to  do  so.  While  awaiting 
word  from  the  higher  authorities,  Lieutenant  Bain- 
bridge,  in  command  of  the  convoy,  sent  six  gunboats 
up  the  east  branch  of  the  Mobile  with  instructions  to 
drop  down  to  a  favorable  position  above  the  fort. 
The  Americans  then  threatened  the  beleaguered  garri- 
son from  two  directions,  while  Pascagoula  and  Fort 
Stoddert  afforded  adequate  reserves  should  they  be 
needed.^^ 

Folch,  who  was  still  at  Pensacola,  prepared  a  digni- 
fied answer  for  Claiborne,  and  one  as  spirited  as  the 
other  had  written.  The  United  States  had  invaded 
Spanish  territory  with  no  other  right  than  its  own  de- 
sire. Since  the  occupation  of  Louisiana  it  had  de- 
prived Spain  of  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 

18  Claiborne  to  Folch,  June  29,  1811,  Legajo  1570,  Papeles  de 
Cuba;  the  same  is  in  Claiborne  to  Monroe,  June  29,  i8ii 
(Parker,  7748,  7749)- 

19  Collell  to  Claiborne,  June  30,  1811,  Legajo  1570,  Papeles 
de  Cuba;  Nashville  Clarion  and  Gazette,  Aug.  18,  181 1. 

39 


590  INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT 

Though  allowed  to  convey  goods  to  the  Indians  only 
by  special  permission  of  the  Spaniards,  the  Americans 
had  claimed  the  free  use  of  the  Alabama  and  the  Tom- 
bigbee.  Unmindful  of  solemn  treaties  and  the  serv- 
ices that  Spain  had  rendered  them  in  obtaining  their 
independence,  they  now  threatened  with  force  those 
officials  who  would  not  patiently  submit  to  a  violation 
of  national  rights.  But  Spanish  officials  were  not  to 
be  intimidated.  If  the  naval  officer  should  attempt  to 
proceed  before  gaining  the  permission  of  the  captain- 
general,  the  commander  of  the  fort  might  oppose  him 
without  thereby  being  the  aggressor.  He  who  offered 
the  insult  was  the  aggressor,  not  he  who  repelled  it.^° 
Yet  Folch  was  not  inclined  to  begin  hostilities. 
Accordingly,  on  the  following  day,  he  ordered  St. 
Maxent  to  Pascagoula  for  a  personal  conference  with 
Claiborne.  He  was  to  propose  that  the  Americans 
should  send  Captain  Piernas  to  Havana  on  one  of 
their  swiftest  vessels  to  obtain  the  decision  of  the 
captain-general.  Failing  to  gain  Claiborne's  consent 
to  this,  he  was  to  propose  that  the  vessels  with  muni- 
tions should  sail  up  the  Tensaw,  beyond  cannon  shot 
of  the  fort;  or  if  past  Mobile,  they  should  do  so 
without  the  convoy.  If  Claiborne  rejected  all  their  pro- 
posals, he  evidently  wished  to  provoke  hostilities  and 
upon  him  should  rest  the  blame  for  a  rupture.     St. 

20  Folch  to  Claiborne,  July  2,  181 1,  Legajo  1570,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


INCORPORATION   AND    ADJUSTMENT  591 

Maxent  should  then  deliver  Folch's  challenge  to  Clai- 
borne and  return  immediately  to  inform  the  com- 
mander of  Mobile  of  his  answer.^^ 

Folch's  spirit  of  concession  was  seconded  by  St. 
Maxent,  who  immediately  sent  a  messenger  to  ask 
Claiborne  to  suspend  action  pending  his  arrival.  Clai- 
borne felt  that  national  honor  demanded  the  step  he 
had  taken,  and  he  was  not  ready  to  retrace  it.  But 
he  was  pleased  at  the  sign  of  yielding  on  the  part  of 
the  Spaniards,  and  requested  the  naval  officer  to  post- 
pone the  attempt  to  force  a  passage.  At  the  personal 
conference  with  St.  Maxent,  Claiborne  refused  to 
await  the  decision  of  the  captain-general  or  to  send  the 
vessels  up  the  Tensaw,  but  did  consent  to  withhold 
the  convoy  if  the  craft  were  permitted  to  pass  Mobile 
unmolested.  He  did  not  accept  this  concession  as  a 
favor,  but  as  a  right  to  which  all  American  vessels 
were  entitled.-- 

Lieutenant  Bainbridge  had  already  forced  a  solu- 
tion of  the  case  under  discussion.  While  Claiborne 
and  St.  Maxent  were  coming  to  an  agreement  at  Pas- 
cagoula,  he  with  four  gunboats  proceeded  to  tow  one 
of  the  schooners  past  the  fort.  In  view  of  this  direct 
challenge  the  distressed  Collell  called  a  council  of  his 
officers,  and  showed  the  futility  of  resistance  and  the 

21  Folch  to  St.  Maxent,  July  3,  1811,  Legajo  1580,  Papeles 
de  Cuba. 

22  Claiborne  to  Monroe,  July  5,  9,  181 1  (Parker,  7752-7754, 
7757. 


592  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

probable  loss  of  the  whole  colony,  for  which  he  would 
be  personally  responsible.  He  then  agreed  with  Bain- 
bridge  to  allow  the  passage  of  the  vessel  accompanied 
by  one  gunboat  only,  and  this  was  done  before  Cap- 
tain Farragut  arrived  with  the  agreement  between 
Claiborne  and  St.  Maxent.  To  add  to  the  confusion 
the  captain-general  shortly  forwarded  an  order  from 
the  Regency  revoking  the  privilege  of  sending  vessels 
with  provisions  and  munitions  to  Fort  Stoddert. 
This  order  was  based  on  resentment  for  the  occupa- 
tion at  Baton  Rouge  rather  than  on  a  knowledge  of 
actual  conditions  at  Mobile. 

Later  a  junta  de  guerre  at  Pensacola  agreed  to  make 
no  change  in  the  conditions  that  had  existed  since 
Folch's  concession  of  the  preceding  November.  The 
captain-general  and  the  Regency  both  agreed  that  this 
determination  was  prudent,  although  to  maintain  con- 
sistency they  disapproved  of  Collell's  course.^^  Yet 
it  was  evident  that  their  continuance  at  Mobile  de- 
pended upon  the  discretion  of  its  commandant  as 
much  as  upon  American  forbearance. 

In  October  the  doughty  Folch  was  finally  relieved 
of  his  trying  command.  A  year  later  he  was  in  Cadiz 
almost  penniless,  attempting  to  defend  himself  against 

23  Morales  to  Secretario  Interino  del  Despacho  de  Hacienda, 
Sept.  30,  1811,  Legajo  267,  Zuniga  to  Apodaca,  Dec.  14,  1812, 
Legajo  1793,  Collell  to  St.  Maxent,  July  6,  1811,  Legajos 
1570  and  2369,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Nashville  Clarion  and  Ga- 
zette, Aug.  18,  181 1. 


INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT  593 

the  imputation  of  treachery  to  Spanish  interests.  In 
February  the  Regency  exculpated  him  from  blame  in 
offering  to  deliver  his  province  to  the  Americans,  but 
at  the  same  time  they  refused  to  censure  Someruelos 
for  not  approving  this  act.  Five  years  later  Folch  was 
living  in  poverty  in  Havana,  still  striving  to  collect 
the  arrears  in  his  salary  and  to  relieve  his  reputation 
of  the  cloud  resting  upon  it.^*  He  had  fought  a  good 
fight  for  his  sovereign,  albeit  with  some  guile  and 
self-interest,  under  frontier  conditions  of  unusual  diffi- 
culty. At  times  he  had  seemed  to  waver  and  yield 
a  point,  but  he  had  thereby  prolonged  the  rule  of  his 
nation  if  not  her  true  interests.  Like  many  of  his 
fellow-servants,  in  his  declining  years  he  found  him- 
self an  unappreciated  sacrifice  to  stubborn  Spanish 
pride. 

While  Claiborne  was  in  the  vicinity  he  took  meas- 
ures to  organize  the  territory  as  Toulmin  had  sug- 
gested. By  proclamation  he  had  already  extended  the 
parish  of  Pascagoula  to  Dog  River  near  Mobile.  The 
Orleans  legislature  embarrassed  his  action  by  extend- 
ing it  to  the  Perdido.  He  now  appointed  a  justice 
of  the  peace  for  the  region  between  that  river  and 
the  Mobile  and  contemplated  sending  one  to  the  town 

24  Statement  of  Martin  Folch,  Oct.  4,  181 1,  Folch  to  Labra- 
dor, Nov.  I,  1812,  Carabajal  to  Depacho  de  Estado,  Feb.  26, 
1813,  Folch  to  Pizarro,  Apr.  i,  1818,  Legajo  5555,  Estado,  A. 
H.  N.,  Madrid. 


594  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

itself.  In  his  instructions  he  assigned  limits  running 
from  Dog  River  to  Bayou  des  Moulins  [Saw  Mill 
Creek],  and  told  the  justices  to  exercise  no  jurisdic- 
tion in  Mobile,  to  which  the  Spaniards  had  for  some 
time  exclusively  confined  themselves.-^  Rumors  that 
the  Spaniards  were  about  to  relinquish  the  territory  to 
the  Perdido,  or  that  the  Americans  were  on  the  point 
of  employing  their  forces  to  compel  them  to  do  so, 
continued  to  arouse  apprehensions  on  both  sides  of  the 
line.  But  the  American  army  was  too  thoroughly 
demoralized  by  the  courts-martial  then  in  progress  to 
take  any  offensive  action.-*^ 

When  in  a  dispute  over  a  custom's  bond  the  officials 
of  Washington  County  decided  that  Mobile  was  with- 
in the  limits  of  the  United  States,  St.  Maxent  promptly 
protested.  Claiborne  stated  emphatically  that  the  re- 
gion formed  part  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  and  that 
he  had  a  full  right  to  occupy  it.  For  his  part  he  in- 
quired if  there  was  any  truth  in  the  rumor  that  the 
Spaniards  were  fortifying  Dauphine  Island,  which 
was  included  in  the  same  claim.  The  inquiry,  por- 
tending occupation,  aroused  the  anxiety  of  Perez,  who 
now  commanded  Mobile.  The  corporal  and  four  sol- 
diers on  the  island  could  not  resist  if  the  Americans 

25  Claiborne  to  Monroe,  July  24,  181 1  (Parker,  7758,  7759). 

26  Morphy  to  Governor  of  Pensacola,  Dec.  30,  181 1,  Legajo 
2372,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  Aurora  (Philadelphia),  Dec.  20,  22, 
1811,  Jan.  16,  1812. 


INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT  595 

acted  upon  their  claim.  He  referred  the  letter  to  St. 
Maxent  for  answer.-^ 

Backed  by  a  decision  of  a  council  of  war,  the  acting 
governor  expressed  surprise  at  the  tone  assumed  by 
Claiborne.  Dauphine  Island  belonged  to  Spain  by 
right  of  conquest  since  1780.  As  St.  Maxent  made 
no  attempt  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Louisi- 
ana, he  did  not  welcome  Claiborne's  interference  in 
Florida.  The  American  executive  might  indeed  fol- 
low the  example  of  the  Tyrant  of  Europe  and  take 
possession  of  the  territory ;  but  so  far  he  had  not  done 
so,  and  he  ought,  therefore,  to  take  no  offense  at  an 
act  done  there  in  the  name  of  the  Spanish  sovereign. 
If,  however,  Claiborne  entertained  other  views  the 
Spaniard  would  take  the  necessary  steps  to  protect 
His  Majesty's  dominion.  Claiborne  expressed  equal 
surprise  at  the  other's  protests,  reiterated  the  claim  to 
the  Perdido,  and  stated  that  his  own  action  would 
depend  on  any  addition  to  the  forces  or  fortifications 
on  the  island.  His  government  would  brook  no  at- 
tempt by  the  other  to  strengthen  its  possession. ^^ 

In   March,    1812,    Claiborne   again   mentioned   the 

27  Claiborne  to  St.  Maxent,  Oct.  27,  1811,  Legajo  1571,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba;  Nashville  Clarion  and  Gazette,  Sept.  24,  181 1. 

28  Morales  to  Secretary  of  Hacienda,  Oct.  2,  1811,  Legajo 
267,  St.  Maxent  to  Someruelos,  Oct.  25,  181 1,  Legajo  1570, 
Papeles  de  Cuba;  cf.  Legajos  5554  and  5556,  Estado,  A.  H. 
N.,  Madrid,  and  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5, 
Vol.  85. 


596  INCORPORATION    AND   ADJUSTMENT 

American  claim  to  the  Perdido.  But  he  was  only  an 
executive,  and  although  always  ready  to  fulfill  his 
duties,  forbore  to  discuss  the  claim.  Evidently 
neither  executive  was  anxious  to  test  his  assertions 
unless  the  other  committed  an  overt  act.  The  authori- 
ties at  Pensacola  made  the  usual  appeal  to  Mexico  for 
assistance,  but  none  was  now  available.  The  contro- 
versy attracted  the  attention  of  the  British  minister  at 
Washington,  and  De  Onis  used  it  as  a  second  warning 
to  the  colonial  authorities  against  the  depraved  inten- 
tion of  the  Americans  to  gain  the  Floridas. 

In  the  latter  part  of  December,  1811,  while  this 
leisurely,  if  tart,  correspondence  was  in  progress, 
Morphy  warned  the  authorities  at  Pensacola  that  new 
dangers  threatened  Mobile.  General  Wilkinson,  re- 
leased from  the  court-martial  that  he  had  faced  for 
some  months,  was  to  resume  command  of  the  army  at 
New  Orleans.  With  an  adequate  land  force  and  gun- 
boats, he  proposed  to  blockade  Mobile  and  compel  its 
surrender,  if  possible,  without  bloodshed.  Wilkinson 
proposed,  by  occupying  this  place  and  Pensacola  be- 
fore the  British  could  do  so,  to  strengthen  the  defense 
o"f  New  Orleans.  Some  weeks  later  De  Onis  was  ask- 
ing Monroe  to  explain  this  rumor  and  others  of  simi- 
lar import.  General  Hampton,  he  said,  had  been  or- 
dered to  raise  the  American  flag  at  Mobile  and  Pensa- 
cola. The  passing  of  American  soldiers  eastward  by 
way  of  the  lakes,  and  the  increase  in  the  garrisons  at 


INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT  597 

Baton  Rouge  and  Fort  Stoddert,  gave  point  to  his  in- 
quiries. Moreover  the  Spaniards  expected  that  the 
American  government  would  employ  "  vagabonds  "  or 
Indians  to  initiate  its  campaign,  and  then  step  in  as  it 
had  done  at  Baton  Rouge.^^ 

While  Claiborne  was  wrestling  with  the  problems 
presented  by  his  new  constituents  and  his  persistent 
but  polite  Spanish  neighbors,  his  attention  was  also 
fixed  on  Washington,  where  Congress  had  perforce  to 
consider  the  same  problems.  When  that  body  con- 
vened in  the  fall  of  1811,  it  was  asked  to  consider  a 
petition  signed  by  George  Patterson  and  four  hundred 
and  ten  others  living  in  the  Baton  Rouge  district.  The 
petitioners,  so  their  opponents  claimed,  represented 
the  Tory  element  in  the  eastern  part  of  that  district. 
But  the  essential  point  was  that  they  desired  annexa- 
tion to  Mississippi  Territory,  with  which  they  formed 
a  natural  geographical  unit.  They  were  fairly  recent 
arrivals,  preponderatingly  American  in  stock,  and  had 
no  desire  to  be  used  to  counteract  the  French  element 
in  Orleans  Territory.  Moreover  they  desired  the  con- 
firmation of  their  land  grants,  most  of  which  were 
dated  subsequent  to  the  cession  of  Louisiana.^" 

Their  petition  was  in  keeping  with  a  resolution  pre- 

29  Morphy  to  Governor  of  Pensacola,  Dec.  30,  1811,  Legajo 
63,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  De  Onis  to  Monroe,  Feb.  22,  1812, 
Spanish  Notes,  MS.,  II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ; 
Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  I,  470;  Aurora,  Jan.   14,  16,  1812. 

30  American  State  Papers,  Miscellaneous,  II,  155. 


598  INCORPORATION    AND    ADJUSTMENT 

sented  by  Poindexter,  on  December  17,  in  favor  of 
statehood  for  Mississippi.  He  wished  the  proposed 
State  to  include  British  West  Florida  "  with  its  ancient 
limits."  The  American  claim  to  this  desired  area  was 
"reasonable."  Evidently  he  could  not  use  a  stronger 
term,  if  he  proposed  to  separate  West  Florida  from 
Louisiana  within  which  the  Americans  had  persis- 
tently included  it.  His  suggestion  was  to  create  a  new 
commonwealth  embracing  the  territory  from  the  Mis- 
sissippi to  the  Chattahoochee,  south  of  the  line  of  the 
Yazoo,  and  including  the  whole  of  the  Gulf  coast.^^ 
This  meant  a  longitudinal  rather  than  a  vertical  divi- 
sion of  the  territory  south  of  Tennessee.  It  likewise 
meant  the  virtual  relinquishment  of  the  claim  that 
West  Florida  formed  part  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase 
in  favor  of  a  British  claim  long  since  abandoned. 
However  "  reasonable  "  such  a  claim  might  be  made  to 
appear,  it  could  hardly  justify  the  risk  in  assuming  it 
at  that  late  day. 

Yet  if  the  administration  was  unwilling  to  abandon 
the  claim  that  West  Florida  formed  part  of  the  Louisi- 
ana Purchase,  it  did  not  necessarily  follow  that  all  of 
it  must  belong  to  the  new  State  of  Louisiana.  Months 
before,  Toulmin  had  proposed  that  the  area  should  be 
divided  between  Orleans  and  Mississippi  by  the  Pearl 
River.  Now  Claiborne  suggested  the  same.  As  an 
active  participant  in  the  race  for  statehood  between 

31  American  State  Papers,  Miscellaneous,  II,  163,  164. 


INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT  599 

the  two  territories,  he  wrote  Poindexter  that  he  did 
not  sympathize  with  his  efforts  to  take  the  whole  of 
West  Florida  from  Louisiana.  The  best  interests  of 
the  latter  required  an  extension  of  its  eastern  bound- 
ary. Personally  he  preferred  all  the  territory  to  the 
Perdido,  but  was  willing  to  compromise  on  the  area 
west  of  the  Pearl.  Mississippi  should  content  itself 
with  Pascagoula  and  the  growing  commerce  of  Mo- 
bile.^^  John  Ballinger,  who  was  then  in  Washington 
as  agent  for  the  former  Conventionalists,  took  essen- 
tially the  same  view.  He  contended  for  the  treaty 
limits ;  but  if  the  government  wished  to  cut  the  Louisi- 
ana Purchase  up  into  convenient  "  administrative  par- 
ticles," he  believed  that  the  Pearl  would  make  a  good 
boundary.  This  division  would  also  place  Patterson 
and  his  fellow  petitioners  in  Mississippi,  as  they  pre- 
ferred.^^ 

The  petitioners,  whom  Ballinger  personally  repre- 
sented, were  interested  in  statehood  and  land  titles,  as 
were  the  others,  and  in  addition  wished  the  American 
government  to  assume  the  debts  and  other  claims 
against  the  convention.  Many  of  them  had  accepted 
its  paper  or  loaned  their  credit  to  the  embryo  govern- 
ment, and  after  its  collapse  were  threatened  with  nu- 
merous  lawsuits.     Ballinger  represented  their  cause 

'2  Claiborne  to  Poindexter,  Jan.  6,  1812,  Claiborne  Letters, 
F,  MS.,  Department  of  Archives  and  History,  Jackson,  Miss. 

33  Ballinger  to  Monroe,  Dec.  26,  181I;  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  35,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


600  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

until  the  War  of  1812,  which  necessarily  postponed 
all  prospect  of  payment.  Reuben  Kemper  succeeded 
him,  and  pushed  their  claims  as  well  as  the  cause  of 
his  imprisoned  followers  for  several  years,  but  in  vain. 
Obviously  the  government  could  not  pay  these  claims 
without  recognizing  the  validity  of  the  convention's 
acts,  and  this,  as  Monroe  had  already  explained  to 
Skipwith,  was  impossible.  Those  who  had  brought 
about  the  occupation  of  West  Florida  by  the  United 
States  must  find  their  reward  in  the  success  of  their 
exploit. 

Yet  Ballinger  was  able  to  present  Monroe  with  a 
strong  argument  to  justify  the  acts  and  expectations  of 
his  companions  and  himself.  After  1803  the  Spanish 
officials  in  West  Florida,  realizing  the  uncertainty  of 
their  tenure,  had  used  their  offices  to  enrich  them- 
selves, betraying  alike  the  interests  of  sovereign  and 
people.  The  latter  could  only  look  to  the  American 
government  for  relief.  The  Mobile  Act  and  the  diplo- 
matic negotiation  abroad  encouraged  them  in  this  hope. 
When  the  government  later  acquiesced  in  the  con- 
tinued control  by  Spain,  tolerated  the  region  as  a 
refuge  for  deserters  and  fugitives  from  justice,  and 
applied  the  embargo  to  it,  they  began  to  lose  hope; 
and  when  the  administration  refused  to  receive  a  min- 
ister from  Spain,  they  abandoned  hope  altogether. 
At  the  same  time  the  increasing  exactions  of  colonial 
officials  forced  them  to  seek  redress.     At  first  they 


INCORPORATION    AND    ADJUSTMENT  60I 

cherished  no  idea  of  independence,  but  compelled  by 
the  suspicious  attitude  of  these  officials  to  choose  be- 
tween resistance  and  unconditional  submission,  they 
chose  the  more  honorable  alternative  and  overthrew 
their  oppressors.  Those  who  thus  acted  were  neither 
land  jobbers  nor  former  American  Tories,  as  some 
papers  characterized  them.  They  showed  their  Re- 
publican views  in  the  constitution  which  they  had 
adopted.  While  by  no  means  above  criticism,  it  was 
the  best  the  situation  afforded.  None  of  those  who 
acted  under  it  had  any  purpose  to  disturb  the  neigh- 
boring American  territory. 

Ballinger's  argument  to  justify  the  revolt  repre- 
sents the  best  interpretation  to  be  put  upon  that  move- 
ment and  suggests  the  similar  specious  pleas  of  Skip- 
with.  He  was  more  successful  in  treating  the  later 
views  of  his  constituents.  He  mentioned  without 
criticism  the  conflict  in  authority  which  might  follow 
from  the  continued  presence  of  Spanish  troops  at  Mo- 
bile. The  residents  of  the  occupied  territory  should, 
as  soon  as  their  numbers  warranted,  be  admitted  into 
the  Union  on  the  same  footing  as  the  people  of  the 
original  States.  They  preferred  to  be  attached  to 
Louisiana  rather  than  Mississippi,  and  resented  the 
oversight  of  Congress  in  failing  to  include  them  in  the 
recent  enabling  act.  This  omission  might  be  reme- 
died by  the  new  State,  but  in  the  meantime  his  fellow- 
citizens   desired   some   regular   form  of   government. 


602  INCORPORATION    AND    ADJUSTMENT 

If  necessary,  as  we  have  noted,  they  were  willing  to 
accept  the  Pearl  as  their  eastern  limit. 

Ballinger  divided  the  land  claimants  into  two 
classes :  the  large  speculators,  who  had  purchased  of 
Morales  since  1803,  and  those  holding  smaller  tracts 
(from  two  hundred  to  one  thousand  arpents)  under 
grant  from  Grand  Pre  or  other  local  commandants. 
Two  thirds  of  the  people  were  actual  settlers,  belong- 
ing to  the  latter  class.  If  their  holdings,  perfectly 
legal  under  Spanish  title,  were  not  confirmed,  great 
misery  and  dissatisfaction  would  result.  No  man  of 
ordinary  intelligence,  least  of  all  himself,  doubted  the 
American  claim ;  but  even  Spanish  officials  might  have 
been  led  to  doubt  whether  the  United  States  intended 
to  exercise  it.  Under  the  circumstances,  after  seven 
years'  abandonment  it  was  hardly  expedient  to  insist 
upon  it,  and  thereby  upset  all  property  claims  in  the 
region.  Even  a  donation  of  land  to  these  claimants 
would  be  only  a  partial  alleviation. 

The  unpaid  expenses  of  the  convention  amounted 
to  some  $40,000.  This  was  chiefly  owed  to  persons 
in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  for  horses,  provisions,  and 
outfit  for  the  troops.  Those  to  whom  these  sums 
were  due  could  ill  afiford  to  lose  them.  The  national 
government  was  rightly  bound  to  remunerate  them, 
for  its  act  prevented  the  convention  from  doing  so. 
If  the  United  States  should  intervene  at  St.  Augustine, 
as  was  possible,  and  prevent  the   Spanish  governor 


INCORPORATION    AND    ADJUSTMENT  603 

there  from  carrying  out  his  contracts,  it  would  legally 
be  bound  to  fulfill  them.  Ballinger  claimed  that  the 
principle  was  the  same  at  Baton  Rouge,  especially  for 
all  contracts  antedating  the  president's  proclamation. 
He  did  not  mention  the  fact  that  made  an  essential 
difference  in  status :  one  government  was  recognized, 
the  other  not.  In  view  of  the  disturbances  that  had 
prevailed  there  for  many  years,  he  contended  that  it 
would  be  good  policy  to  pay  these  debts.  In  a  crisis 
the  people  would  more  than  requite  the  obligation. 
But  if  those  who  had  assumed  these  expenses  should 
be  ruined  by  being  forced  to  meet  them,  it  would 
"palsy  the  energies  of  the  country,  stifle  its  patriots 
and  sink  it  into  original  nothingness."^* 

Whatever  justice  or  expediency  might  be  contained 
in  Ballinger's  plea,  the  American  government  could 
not  openly  recognize  it,  and  so  for  years  Ballinger 
and  Kemper,  backed  by  interested  petitioners,  strove 
in  vain  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  convention  debts. 
In  the  matter  of  land  titles  they  fared  better,  for  ul- 
timately those  with  any  pretense  to  legality  were  duly 
confirmed.  The  division  of  the  region  between  Louisi- 
ana and  Mississippi  Territory,  the  third  point  for  ad- 
justment in  the  program,  presented  fewer  difficulties, 
and  in  this  respect  Congress  was  ready  to  act  with 

3*  Holmes  to  Monroe,  Sept.  20,  181 1,  Proceedings  Executive 
Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  I ;  Ballinger  to  Monroe, 
Dec.  26,  181 1,  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  47,  Bureau 
of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


604  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

fair  promptness  and  in  a  way  to  meet  Ballinger's  ex- 
pectations. 

Congress  made  no  provision  in  the  enabling  act  for 
Louisiana  to  include  any  part  of  West  Florida  in  the 
proposed  new  State.  The  constitutional  convention 
that  met  pursuant  to  the  act  made  an  attempt  to  in- 
clude the  region  to  the  Perdido  within  the  proposed 
limits,  but  it  was  decisively  defeated.  The  result  may 
indicate  an  unwillingness  to  strengthen  the  Anglo- 
American  element  in  the  new  State.  Some  days  later 
the  convention  adopted  a  memorial  to  Congress  asking 
for  the  annexation  of  West  Florida  to  Louisiana.^^ 
The  opposition  to  this  measure  seemed  to  be  largely 
among  the  Creoles.  This  memorial  attracted  the  at- 
tention of  De  Onis  and  Foster.  The  former  professed 
to  believe  that  Congress  would  pay  no  attention  to  it, 
but  he  did  not  fail  to  protest  against  such  a  possibility. 
Action  under  the  memorial  was  not  necessary  to  re- 
store order  in  the  territory  and  would  preclude  any 
future  negotiation  to  acquire  it.^® 

Undeterred  by  his  protest,  Congress  on  March  19, 
1812,  took  up  the  measure  to  admit  the  State  of  Louisi- 
ana. Before  passing  it  an  attempt  was  made  by 
amendment  to  secure  representation  for  the  region  to 

35  Gayarre,  History  of  Louisiana,  IV,  273. 

36  De  Onis  to  Monroe,  Mar.  2,  1812,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
Ill,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  Foster  to  Wellesley, 
Mar.  13,  1812,  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office,  America,  II,  5, 
Vol.  85. 


INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT  605 

the  Pearl,  which  they  proposed  to  annex  to  it.  This 
was  defeated  on  the  ground  that  it  imposed  a  condi- 
tion on  the  State  without  the  consent  of  its  constitu- 
tional convention.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  John 
C.  Calhoun  was  one  who  held  this  view.  On  April  8 
the  president  signed  the  bill  admitting  the  State.  Six 
days  later  he  signed  another  enlarging  its  limits  to 
the  Pearl.  At  the  same  time  the  remainder  of  the  ter- 
ritory to  the  Perdido  was  bestowed  on  Mississippi. 
Early  in  August  the  legislature  of  Louisiana  con- 
curred in  this  action,  and  gave  to  the  incorporated 
area  a  larger  representation  than  even  its  friends  in 
Congress  had  proposed.^^ 

In  the  legislation  disposing  of  this  territory  there 
was  no  statement  in  regard  to  future  negotiation  over 
its  status.  Foster,  the  new  English  minister,  imme- 
diately wished  to  know  if  this  indicated  an  intention 
to  trespass  still  further  upon  the  rights  of  the  Spanish 
sovereign  in  that  region.  Monroe  evaded  the  issue, 
but  assured  Foster  that  no  orders  had  been  given  to 
disturb  the  Spanish  soldiers  at  Mobile.^^  With  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  less  than 
a  month  away,  the  British  representative  had  far 
weightier  matters  to  occupy  his  attention.     In  August, 

3^^  Gayarre,  IV,  277-281 ;  Annals  of  Twelfth  Congress,  First 
Session,  Part  II,  2270,  2298. 

'8  Foster  to  Wellesley,  Apr.  4,  May  4.  21.  1812,  cf.  note  36; 
Foster  to  Monroe,  May  6,  1812,  MS.,  British  Legation,  MS., 
VII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 
40 


6o6  INCORPORATION    AND    ADJUSTMENT 

i8i2,  De  Onis,  now  single  handed,  protested  against 
the  legislation  as  a  violation  of  his  nation's  rights  and 
as  contrary  to  the  president's  proclamation.  He  de- 
manded its  repeal  and  the  delivery  of  the  territory  to 
Spain  as  a  preliminary  to  negotiation  for  its  ultimate 
possession.  Notwithstanding  his  assurance  that  he 
was  prepared  to  treat  upon  all  points  at  issue  between 
the  two  countries,  the  administration  refused  to  recog- 
nize him  or  to  divest  itself  of  the  debatable  area.^^ 

Following  the  action  by  Congress,  Governor  Holmes 
on  August  I,  1812,  formally  issued  a  proclamation 
organizing  the  region  between  the  Pearl  and  the  Per- 
dido  as  a  county  of  Mississippi.  On  September  17  he 
empowered  the  sheriff  of  Mobile  to  convene  the  free- 
holders on  the  third  Monday  in  October  for  the  pur- 
pose of  selecting  a  representative  in  the  territorial 
legislature.  These  measures  naturally  caused  Gover- 
nor Zuniga  to  make  reflections  little  flattering  to  the 
Americans.  But  Spanish  comment  disturbed  the  Mis- 
sissippi executive  less  than  did  the  uncertainty  of  the 
law  under  which  he  acted.  He  felt  that  he  could  not 
provide  for  the  administration  of  justice  in  the  county 
without  the  sanction  of  the  legislature,  or  designate 
the  place  for  holding  court.  He  was  unwilling  to  ex- 
tend his  jurisdiction  beyond  the  limits  already  recog- 
nized by  Claiborne.     This  made  necessary  the  moving 

39  De  Onis  to  Monroe,  Aug.  ?,  1812,  Spanish  Notes,  MS., 
II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT  607 

of  administrative  control  from  Mobile,  at  least  tem- 
porarily. In  his  uncertainty  he  turned  to  his  usual 
aid,  Toulmin,  and  gave  him  discretion  as  presiding 
judge  of  the  superior  court  to  provide  subordinate 
tribunals  for  criminal  cases.*" 

This  shifting  of  responsibility  by  no  means  relieved 
the  situation.  The  judge  was  perfectly  willing  to  act 
as  if  the  laws  of  the  United  States  were  already  in 
force  at  Mobile,  and  even  to  serve  writs  on  the  Span- 
ish commandant,  employing  military  force  if  neces- 
sary to  carry  them  out.  By  this  measure  his  son-in- 
law  thought  he  might  gain  the  coveted  town.  On  the 
other  hand  the  secretary  of  the  treasury  had  given 
orders  to  consider  Mobile  as  foreign  territory  as  long 
as  the  Spaniards  remained  there.*^  This  naturally 
caused  confusion  in  jurisdiction.  The  embargo  that 
preceded  the  war  with  Great  Britain  created  further 
difficulties.  Prospective  immigrants,  unwelcome  and 
forbidden  as  they  were,  still  harassed  the  Spanish 
officials  by  their  importunities  for  admission. 

4°  Proceedings  Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Territory, 
MS.,  II;  Ziiniga  to  Apodaca,  Sept.  7,  1812,  Legajo  1793,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba;  cf.  Case  of  Sherifif  Brightwell  and  the  Callers, 
May  ID,  1813,  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  40,  Bureau  of 
Indexes  and  Archives;  Holmes  to  Toulmin,  Sept.  28,  1812, 
Proceedings  Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS., 
II ;  Mobile  Transcripts,  Alabama  Department  of  Archives  and 
History,  Montgomery,  Ala. 

41  Wilkinson  to  Hawkins,  Sept.  26,  1812,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  38,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Mobile 
Transcripts. 


6o8  INCORPORATION   AND   ADJUSTMENT 

Among  those  who  accepted  a  county  commission 
from  Holmes  was  James  McBay,  who  bore  the  title  of 
"  Major  "  among  his  neighbors  in  Mobile.  The  Span- 
iards arrested  him  and  confined  him  in  irons  at  Pen- 
sacola.  Toulmin  issued  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  for 
his  release  and  went  to  Mobile  to  serve  it  in  person, 
Perez  refused  to  honor  it  and  claimed  that  McBay 
was  a  spy  in  American  service.  Holmes  then  made 
a  direct  protest  to  Zuiiiga.  The  fact  that  the  United 
States  did  not  extend  its  laws  immediately  over  Mo- 
bile gave  the  commandant  there  no  authority  over 
American  citizens  within  the  declared  limits  of  Mis- 
sissippi Territory.  The  Spaniard's  act  was  probably 
due  to  false  information,  and  Toulmin  confidently  ex- 
pected McBay's  speedy  release.  Fifteen  of  the  pris- 
oner's fellow-citizens  testified  to  his  good  character, 
but  Manrique,  now  in  charge  at  Pensacola,  referred 
the  case  to  the  captain-general  for  decision  and  kept 
him  in  prison  for  some  time  longer.  McBay's  friend, 
E.  Lewis,  urged  his  expenses  thus  incurred  as  a  claim 
against  the  Spanish  government.*'^ 

■*2  Holmes  to  Ziiniga,  Apr.  30,  1813,  Manrique  to  Apodaca, 
May  14,  1813,  Legajo  1794,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  E.  Lewis  to  ?, 
Feb.  3,  1818,  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  61,  Bureau  of 
Indexes  and  Archives. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
Mobile  and  the  Aftermath 

The  outbreak  of  the  second  war  with  Great  Britain, 
even  more  than  the  organization  of  Mobile  County, 
foretold  the  speedy  end  of  Spanish  rule  west  of  the 
Perdido,  if  not  further  afield.  The  ports  of  Mobile, 
Pensacola,  and  St.  Augustine  were  likely  to  prove  too 
tempting  for  Spain's  ally.  The  diplomatic  interest 
that  the  British  authorities  had  already  manifested  in 
their  fate  might  now  serve  as  a  pretext  to  assist  in 
their  defense.  By  this  move  Great  Britain  would 
secure  ports  in  which  to  dispose  of  prizes,  refit  her 
blockading  fleet,  and  incite  insurrection  among  the 
southern  blacks  and  Indians.  The  administration  had 
anticipated  this  possibility,  and  requested  Congress  to 
give  it  the  necessary  power  to  occupy  the  threatened 
points.  The  House  had  complied,  but  factional  dis- 
putes in  the  Senate  defeated  the  program. 

On  the  distant  frontier  the  outbreak  occasioned 
much  concern.  Claiborne  regretted  that  Wilkinson 
was  not  definitely  ordered  to  occupy  Mobile  and  Pen- 
sacola. This  step  was  necessary  to  secure  that  section 
of  the  Union,  especially  since  Zuiiiga,  the  new  gover- 
nor, had,  it  was  reported,  recently  provisioned  these 

609 


6 10  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

posts  and  increased  their  garrisons  by  one  hundred 
and  fifty  colored  troops.^  The  Americans  deter- 
mined to  control  Mobile  Bay  as  a  precautionary  meas- 
ure, and  raised  their  flag  at  Rio  Pescado  and  Dauphine 
Island.  The  small  Spanish  guard  on  the  island  were 
ordered  to  withdraw  or  be  regarded  as  prisoners  of 
war.  The  pilot  was  forbidden  to  aid  Spanish  or 
British  vessels. 

The  council  of  war  that  Zuiiiga  at  once  called  could 
offer  no  relief  to  the  imperilled  guard,  but  the  gover- 
nor advised  the  officer  in  charge  to  remain  there 
quietly,  even  at  the  risk  of  imprisonment.  The  inci- 
dent provoked  spirited  correspondence  with  Claiborne 
in  the  strain  already  familiar.  As  his  predecessors 
had  done  on  like  occasion,  Ziiniga  emphasized  past 
aggressions  of  the  Americans,  their  ingratitude  for  as- 
sistance during  the  Revolution,  and  their  unwilling- 
ness to  extend  favors  on  the  Mississippi  that  they 
demanded  for  themselves  on  the  Mobile.  Knowing 
of  no  declaration  of  war  by  the  United  States  against 
Spain,  and  assuming  that  Claiborne  was  continuing 
his  past  aggressions,  he  warned  the  other  to  withdraw 
his  troops  from  Dauphine  Island.  Otherwise  his  of- 
ficers must  resist  this  new  insult,  even  to  bloodshed ; 
and,  if  there  was  bloodshed,  the  American,  as  the 
aggressor,  would  experience  difficulty  in  justifying 
himself. 

^  Claiborne  to  Monroe,  July  26,  1812,  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  27,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  6ll 

Claiborne  may  not  have  been  directly  responsible 
for  the  incident  that  called  forth  this  censorious  pro- 
test, but  he  did  not  hesitate  to  reply  in  kind.  Refrain- 
ing from  comment  on  the  tone  of  the  Spaniard's  letter, 
although  pointedly  telling  him  so,  he  let  the  other  know 
that  his  unmerited,  reproachful  menaces  would  "  di- 
vert no  American  officer  from  the  course  of  conduct 
enjoined  by  duty."  His  country  claimed  that  the 
Louisiana  Purchase  extended  to  the  Perdido,  had  oc- 
cupied all  of  the  claim  except  a  small  district  around 
Mobile,  and  was  prepared  to  defend  any  part  of  it 
against  all  aggressors.-  He  sent  copies  of  the  corre- 
spondence to  Wilkinson  and  Holmes,  with  whom  he 
must  concert  measures  to  defend  the  territory  if 
Zufiiga  tried  to  carry  out  his  threats. 

Claiborne  doubted  if  Wilkinson  could  effectually  de- 
fend Louisiana  without  occupying  both  Mobile  and 
Pensacola.  Holmes  looked  upon  the  failure  of  Con- 
gress to  authorize  this  as  a  piece  of  criminal  negli- 
gence. Yet  Wilkinson  was  unwilling  to  move  without 
some  such  authorization.  A  council  of  war  in  New 
Orleans  resolved  that  the  United  States  government 
"would  never  submit  to  unmerited  reproaches  or 
quietly  yield  to  the  unwarrantable  pretensions  of  any 
power  on  earth.  Should  the  Spanish  governor  adhere 
to  the  determination  which  he  has  dared  propose,  hos- 

2  Zufiiga  to  Claiborne,  July  12,  1812,  Claiborne  to  Zufiiga, 
July  24,  1812,  ibid.;  Minute  of  Council  of  V/ar,  July  11,  July 
31,  1812,  Legajo  1793,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


6 12  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

tilities  must  undoubtedly  ensue  and  the  points  in  con- 
test be  settled  by  the  sword.  The  people  of  the 
United  States  will  neither  rescind  a  right  nor  abandon 
a  fellow  citizen  in  any  extremity."^ 

These  brave  words  were  uttered  while  a  second 
council  of  war  at  Pensacola  was  pondering  over  Clai- 
borne's missive.  The  Americans,  Morales  thought, 
were  employing  every  device  to  make  the  Spaniards 
fire  the  first  shot.  Such  a  conflict  might  start  an  at- 
tempt to  conquer  the  Floridas,  but  the  enemy  should, 
at  any  rate,  find  them  ready  to  resist  this  irrup- 
tion. But  their  resources  hardly  matched  their  re- 
solves. Sixty  regulars  and  double  that  number  of 
colored  troops  constituted  the  garrison  of  Pensacola. 
Ready  to  defend  themselves  to  the  last  extremity, 
they  promised  to  be  only  a  useless  sacrifice.  Many  of 
the  officers  had  not  been  paid  in  two  years.  The 
council  could  only  advise  the  garrison  on  Dauphine 
Island  to  remain  there  while  they  awaited  the  tardy 
arrival  of  five  hundred  more  soldiers  from  Cuba,  or 
strove  to  rally  to  their  aid  some  four  thousand  Indians, 
largely  from  the  Creeks.'* 

This  Indian  peril  was  a  continual  nightmare  to 
Holmes.  He  was  perfectly  wiUing  to  cooperate  with 
Wilkinson  against  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  but  he  hesi- 

3  Wilkinson,  Memoirs,  I,  499. 

*  Minute  of  Council  of  War,  July  31,  1812,  Legajo  1793, 
Morales  to  Romanillos,  Aug.  26,  1812,  Legajo  267,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  613 

tated  to  employ  in  this  way  the  full  complement  of 
militia  from  the  Tombigbee.  At  Pascagoula  and  Bi- 
loxi  the  Choctaws  aroused  apprehension.  Claiborne 
could  not  keep  them  from  visiting  the  Spanish  posts, 
but  advised  them  to  listen  to  no  bad  talk  there.  If  the 
Spaniards  were  their  true  friends,  they  would  also 
counsel  them  to  keep  the  peace.  The  Indians  on  the 
Apalache  might  aid  the  Americans,  in  order  to  keep 
for  themselves  the  privilege  of  navigating  that  river. 
But  the  Seminoles  were  bitterly  hostile,  and  only  a 
lack  of  artillery  kept  them  from  attacking  the  Amer- 
icans at  Casa  Colorada.^ 

American  levies  were  scattered  along  the  coast  from 
New  Orleans  to  Bay  St.  Louis,  and  were  moving  to- 
ward Fort  Stoddert  from  Natchez  and  Baton  Rouge. 
The  Spaniards  believed  Mobile  to  be  the  real  objec- 
tive of  these  forces.  In  November,  1812,  Zuniga  in- 
formed Claiborne  that  he  would  hold  him  respon- 
sible for  any  further  attempts  against  the  dignity  of 
the  Spanish  flag.  The  American  retorted  that  the 
presence  at  Pensacola  of  British  vessels  with  their 
prizes  invited  such  attempts.  The  Spaniards  offered 
to  give  the  Americans  such  privileges  as  the  British 
enjoyed,  but  the  offer  seemed  to  lack  sincerity.® 

'^  Stiggins  to  McKee,  Aug.  2,  1812,  Talk  of  Claiborne  to 
Choctaws,  Aug.  5,  1812,  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  38, 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

6  Zuniga  to  Apodaca,  July  21,  Aug.  20,  Nov.  17,  1812,  same 
to  Claiborne,  Nov.  2,  1812,  Legajo  1793,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  J. 


6l4  MOBILE   AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

Holmes  and  Claiborne  saw  no  safety  for  the  ex- 
posed frontier  unless  both  Floridas  were  occupied. 
Poindexter,  who  represented  their  views  in  Congress, 
was  uncertain  what  action  that  body  would  take. 
The  president  seemed  unwilling  to  incur  hostilities 
with  Spain  while  engaged  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain, 
but  if  Congress  should  reconsider  and  pass  the  bill 
for  the  occupation  of  East  Florida  that  the  Senate 
rejected  at  the  last  session,  he  would  have  to  execute 
it.  Wilkinson,  according  to  report,  was  ready  to  carry 
out  such  a  measure.  F.  L.  Claiborne  wrote  that  every 
citizen  soldier  anxiously  awaited  the  order  to  drive 
the  British  and  Spaniards  from  Mobile  and  Pensacola. 
Andrew  Jackson  assured  the  secretary  of  war  that  his 
men  would  permit  no  constitutional  scruples  to  deter 
them  in  such  a  task.'^ 

So'me  intimation  of  this  danger  reached  Ziiiiiga, 
but  at  the  end  of  the  year  his  spies  could  learn  of  no 
preparations  at  Fort  Stoddert  to  warrant  his  fears. 
The  possibility  of  an  attack  from  New  Orleans,  due 
to  the  gathering  of  levies  there,  led  him  to  withdraw 
some  men  from  Mobile  to  Pensacola  and  strengthen 

B.  Wilkinson  to  Hawkins,  Sept.  i6,  1812,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  38,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

7  Holmes  to  Wilkinson,  Oct.  29,  1812,  Proceedings  Executive 
Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  H ;  Poindexter  to  Mead, 
Oct.  15,  1812,  Claiborne  Letters,  F,  MS.,  F.  L.  Claiborne  to 
Poindexter,  Nov.  26,  1812,  Claiborne  Letters,  F,  MS.,  Depart- 
ment of  Archives  and  History,  Jackson,  Miss. ;  Parton,  Jack- 
son, n,  372. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  615 

the  defenses  of  the  latter  port.  But  to  garrison  his 
posts,  including  Mobile  and  Apalache,  he  could  mus- 
ter only  two  hundred  and  eighty-eight  men  attached 
to  the  Louisiana  Regiment.  These  were  almost  des- 
titute of  supplies.  The  contractor  refused  to  furnish 
meat,  and  he  had  extreme  difficulty  in  obtaining  other 
provisions.  There  were  only  five  barrels  of  wheat 
flour  in  the  province,  and  this  must  be  reserved  for 
hospital  use.  Each  soldier  was  restricted  to  five  ears 
of  maize  per  day  for  Indian  meal.  He  expected  to 
be  entirely  out  of  provisions  by  the  end  of  February. 
Mobile  had  only  enough  biscuit  and  jerked  beef  to 
last  till  the  fifteenth  of  the  month.  The  Americans 
would  not  sell  provisions  on  account  or  in  exchange. 
Despite  the  firmness  of  his  men,  he  feared  starvation 
would  force  them  to  desperate  measures.  To  this 
moving  appeal  Apodaca,  now  the  captain-general,  re- 
sponded with  only  a  thousand  pesos  in  copper  coin.^ 
In  December,  1812,  the  Senate  adopted  a  resolution 
to  occupy  the  Floridas,  and  on  January  10  its  com- 
mittee reported  a  bill  authorizing  the  president  to  do 
so  provided  the  portion  east  of  the  Perdido  continued 
to  be  "the  subject  of  future  negotiation."  Later  the 
president's  enemies  rallied  and  struck  out  the  provi- 
sion to  occupy  East  Florida.  So  the  act  that  the 
president  signed  on  February  12  authorized  no  move- 

8  Zuniga  to  Apodaca,  Jan.  30,  Feb.  3,  5,  13,  1B13,  Legajo  1794, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 


6l6  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

ment  beyond  the  Perdido,  Yet  this  would  insure  the 
immediate  occupation  of  Mobile,  a  measure,  as  Poin- 
dexter  wrote,  "  of  great  utility  for  our  territory."^ 

Four  days  later  John  Armstrong,  the  new  secretary 
of  war,  forwarded  the  necessary  orders  to  Wilkinson. 
On  March  14  that  general  began  his  preparations. 
Two  weeks  later  the  watchful  Morphy  reported  that 
six  or  seven  hundred  men  had  lately  left  New  Or- 
leans on  pretext  of  establishing  a  post  at  the  Rigolets, 
and  that  Wilkinson  and  his  staff  had  just  embarked  at 
Bayou  St.  Jean.  Evidently  a  movement  of  impor- 
tance was  on  foot,  doubtless  the  favorite  American 
project, — the  occupation  of  Mobile.^" 

The  news  that  Wilkinson  had  reached  Pass  Chris- 
tian caused  a  hurried  council  of  war  at  Pensacola. 
The  impending  attack  had  already  been  indicated  by  an 
embargo  on  all  vessels  trafficking  with  the  Spaniards. 
The  lack  of  men  and  provisions  rendered  it  inadvisable 
for  the  Spaniards  to  reinforce  the  fort  at  Mobile,  had 
its  ruined  condition  not  already  rendered  such  action 
useless.  They  could  only  inform  Havana  of  what  was 
about  to  happen.  Wilkinson  had  eight  hundred  men 
at  Pass  Christian,  with  fourteen  small  transports  and 
four  gunboats.    Ten  other  gunboats  had  already  started 

9  Poindexter  to  Mead,  Feb.  3,  1813,  Claiborne  Letters,  F, 
MS.,  Department  of  Archives  and  History,  Jackson,  Miss. 

10  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  VH,  213,  214; 
Morphy  to  Captain-General,  Mar.  29,  1813,  Legajo  1836,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  617 

for  Mobile  Bay.  Four  companies  were  to  advance  to- 
ward Mobile  by  land.  Against  these  numbers  Zii- 
niga's  divided  and  ill-conditioned  forces  could  make 
little  headway.  He  determined  to  leave  Mobile  to  de- 
fend itself  as  best  it  could,  while  he  prepared  Pensa- 
cola  against  an  attack  that  seemed  inevitable.^^ 

After  a  delay  at  Pass  Christian,  where  he  narrowly 
missed  an  unprofessional  death  by  drowning,  Wilkin- 
son moved  on  toward  Mobile.  On  April  lo  Perez  re- 
ported his  proximity,  and  added  that  he  himself  had 
provisions  for  five  days  only,  and  that  in  case  he  re- 
ceived no  further  aid,  he  would  either  capitulate  or 
evacuate  the  fort.  Giving  him  discretion  to  get  pro- 
visions if  he  could,  Zufiiga  bade  him  abandon  his  evil 
intention  of  surrendering.  He  should  assemble  his 
officers  and  read  them  the  royal  order  of  April  13, 
181 1,  prescribing  the  conduct  for  him  to  follow.^^ 
This  advice  was  not  very  helpful  in  lieu  of  more  sub- 
stantial aid.  On  the  very  day  he  sent  it  the  detach- 
ment from  Dauphine  Island,  ousted  from  that  place 
by  Wilkinson's  orders,  presented  itself  at  Pensacola. 
On  the  same  day  Perez  and  his  fellow-officials  deter- 
mined unanimously  to  surrender  Mobile  to  the  Amer- 
icans. 

Their  decision  was  well  advised.     Wilkinson  had 

^1  Minutes  of  Council  of  War,  Apr.  3,  1813,  Ziiniga  t'o 
Apodaca,  Apr.  5,  8,  12,  1813,  Legajo  1794..  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

12  Perez  to  Zufiiga,  Apr.  10,  1813,  Zuniga  to  Perez,  Apr.  12, 
1813,  Legajo  1794,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 


6l8  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

landed  some  six  hundred  soldiers  below  the  town. 
At  the  same  time  Colonel  Bowyer  brought  a  force  with 
five  pieces  of  artillery  down  the  Tensaw  and  stationed 
it  above  the  town.  A  company  of  volunteers  from 
Mobile  itself  also  joined  Wilkinson  and  afterward  re- 
ceived high  praise  from  him.  Commodore  Shaw  with 
his  gunboats  held  the  bay.  On  few  occasions  in  the 
warlike  operations  of  this  disappointing  period  were 
the  American  forces  so  well  arranged  for  the  task 
before  them.  On  the  other  hand  there  were  few  occa- 
sions when  the  opposing  force  was  so  despicable. 
Perez  had  three  score  starving  and  dispirited  men  and 
three  score  pieces  of  artillery,  but  they  were  in  a  fort 
in  such  ill  repair  as  to  be  useless.  The  whole  cam- 
paign constituted  a  dress  parade  for  Wilkinson,  but  it 
achieved  the  delivery  of  Mobile  without  bloodshed. 

In  keeping  with  the  "  friendly  "  purpose  back  of  his 
demonstration,  Wilkinson  asked  the  residents  of  the 
town  to  take  no  part  in  the  ensuing  events.  At  the 
same  time  he  informed  Perez  that  his  forces  came  by 
order  of  the  president,  not  as  enemies,  but  to  reheve 
his  garrison  from  occupying  a  post  within  the  "  legiti- 
mate limits"  of  the  United  States.  Perez  expressed 
formal  protest  rather  than  profuse  thanks  for  this 
relief,  but  in  accordance  with  the  decision  of  his  coun- 
cil of  war,  proposed  to  retire  beyond  the  Perdido 
with  his  garrison  and  its  public  and  private  property. 
His  action  was  not  to  determine  the  final  status  of  the 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  619 

territory,  which  their  respective  governments  must 
settle.  Upon  this  basis  the  two  commanders  signed 
the  formal  agreement  on  April  13.  Two  days  later 
Perez  evacuated  the  fort,  leaving  the  artillery  in  the 
hands  of  the  Americans.  At  five  o'clock  on  the  after- 
noon of  that  day,  amid  a  salvo  from  batteries  and  gun- 
boats, the  American  flag  rose  over  Fort  Charlotte.^^ 
This  event  marked  the  virtual  decision  of  a  ten  years' 
diplomatic  dispute,  bloodless  but  far  from  amicable. 

In  New  Orleans  the  occupation  of  Mobile  occa- 
sioned great  rejoicing.  Governor  Holmes  learned  of 
it  with  satisfaction,  and  at  once  came  on  to  organize 
the  local  government.  He  wrote  Monroe  that  the 
town  was  destined  to  become  an  important  one,  in 
some  respects  surpassing  New  Orleans.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  establish  promptly  the  proper  revenue  and  ju- 
dicial tribunals  in  order  to  break  up  the  smuggling 
that  had  been  so  prevalent  since  the  outbreak  of  war. 
The  surrender  prevented  the  establishment  of  a  rival 
county  seat  at  Blakeley  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the 
bay.i* 

When  Zufiiga  learned  of  Wilkinson's  presence  from 
the  Dauphine  Island  detachment,  he  sent  Lieutenant 

13  Hamilton,  Colonial  Mobile  (edition  1910),  pp.  411-413; 
Convention  between  Perez  and  Wilkinson,  Legajo  2369,  Pa- 
peles  de  Cuba. 

1*  Holmes  to  Monroe,  Apr.  14,  May  5,  1813,  Proceedings 
Executive  Council,  Mississippi  Territory,  MS.,  H ;  Hamilton, 
Colonial  Mobile,  449. 


620  MOBILE   AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

Bernardo  Prieto  to  demand  an  explanation.  His  mes- 
senger reached  the  American  commander  on  the  fatal 
fifteenth,  and  immediately  returned  to  inform  his  su- 
perior that  the  blow  had  fallen.  Wilkinson  immedi- 
ately began  the  construction  of  Fort  Bowyer  at  the 
entrance  of  Mobile  Bay,  erected  an  outwork  on  the 
Perdido,  and  attempted  to  rebuild  the  bridges  that 
the  Spaniards  had  destroyed.  Zuniga  was  unable  to 
oppose  him,  nor  could  he  obtain  assistance  from  a 
chance  British  vessel  then  at  Pensacola.  Its  captain, 
however,  agreed  to  carry  his  dispatches  to  Apodaca. 
Misfortune  still  dogged  the  footsteps  of  the  unfor- 
tunate Perez.  Wilkinson  furnished  him  with  provi- 
sions and  transports  for  the  voyage  to  Pensacola.  De- 
tained by  contrary  winds,  he  did  not  reach  Fort  Bar- 
rancas till  April  29,  and  in  the  interim  his  men  suf- 
fered for  lack  of  food.  Although  he  had  made  no 
effort  to  relieve  Perez,  Zuniga  bitterly  criticized  him 
for  yielding  the  fort  without  firing  a  shot  in  its  de- 
fense. Perez  had  peremptory  orders  to  bury  himself 
under  its  ruins  rather  than  surrender  it.  On  a  former 
occasion  when  confronted  by  the  enemy  he  had  dis- 
played greater  firmness.  Now  he  had  not  even  at- 
tempted to  gather  provisions  for  a  siege,  and  by  tak- 
ing the  sea  route  to  Pensacola  had  given  his  men  a 
chance  to  desert.  Morphy,  who  had  warned  Zufiiga 
in  full  time,  likewise  regarded  the  incident  as  highly 
indecorous  to  Spanish  arms.     Manrique,  who  shortly 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  621 

succeeded  Zuniga,  told  the  Indians  that  a  faithless 
officer  had  sold  Mobile  to  the  Americans.^^ 

Apodaca  directed  that  the  accused  officers  should  be 
court-martialled.  Manrique  reported  that  Perez  had 
fled  to  avoid  arrest,  but  he  later  submitted  to  the 
authorities,  and  in  1815  the  interminable  process 
against  him,  Morejon,  and  six  others  began.  The 
mass  of  testimony  fills  more  than  1250  folios.  The 
court  did  not  render  its  final  decision  until  November 
18,  1822.  By  that  time  Perez  was  beyond  the  juris- 
diction of  any  earthly  tribunal,  after  having  suffered 
far  beyond  his  deserts,  but  his  judges  did  at  least  clear 
his  reputation.  The  surviving  officers  were  restored 
to  their  rank  and  service,  without  any  mention  of  com- 
pensation for  the  seven  wasted  years.  Truly  the  lot 
of  Perez,  like  that  of  his  fellow  frontier  officials, 
Folch,  Grand  Pre,  and  De  Lassus,  was  a  hard  one, 
but  his  name  is  to  be  recorded  among  those  who  de- 
served well  of  their  afflicted  nation.^** 

The  administration  was  not  a  unit  on  the  question 
of  taking  possession  of  Mobile.  Gallatin,  who  had 
started  abroad  in  an  attempt  to  arrange  a  treaty  with 

15  Perez  to  Zuniga,  Apr.  29,  1813,  Zufiiga  to  Apodaca,  Apr. 
29,  May  2,  1813,  Legajo  1794,  Morphy  to  Captain-General, 
Apr.  28,  1813,  Legajo  1836,  Manrique  to  Apodaca,  June  14, 
1813,  Legajo  1794,  Papeles  de  Cuba;  cf.  Hamilton,  Colonial 
Mobile,  419. 

!«  Prieto  to  Apodaca,  Nov.  17,  1815,  Legajo  1877;  Testi- 
monio,  Ano  de  1813,  Criminal,  etc.,  Legajo  1865,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 

41 


622  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

Great  Britain,  through  the  mediation  of  Russia,  feared 
that  the  act  might  prejudice  both  powers  against  the 
United  States.  The  United  States  could  take  Mobile 
at  any  time.  It  was  an  act  of  war  to  do  so,  what- 
ever her  claims.  Even  if  European  nations  should  not 
support  the  pretensions  of  Spain,  they  might  take 
part  against  her  alleged  despoiler.  Despite  Monroe's 
insistence  that  the  question  was  settled,  Gallatin  still 
maintained  that  the  act  was  an  impoHtic  one  caused 
by  magnified  representations  from  the  frontier.  If  it 
led  to  war  with  Spain,  it  might  disgust  every  man 
north  of  Washington  and  add  to  the  intensity  of 
existing  sectionalism.^'^ 

When  Monroe  told  Serrurier,  the  French  minister, 
that  Mobile  was  occupied,  he  also  mentioned  a  rumor 
that  Spain  had  ceded  the  Floridas  to  Great  Britain. 
If  true,  this  would  cause  a  renewal  of  the  struggle 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  even  if 
the  anticipated  negotiation  should  have  resulted  favor- 
ably. It  would  likewise  lead  the  American  govern- 
ment to  occupy  the  threatened  territory  at  once.^^  But 
as  the  Floridas  had  now  become  an  affair  of  little  im- 
portance to  the  Frenchman's  imperial  master,  he  trans- 
mitted Monroe's  information  without  comment. 

Some  of  the  American  newspapers  compared  Wil- 

17  Monroe  Papers,  MS.,  XIII,  1687,  Library  of  Congress; 
Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  VII,  211-213. 

IS  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS.,  Vol. 
70,  242. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  623 

kinson  to  Napoleon  because  by  surprise  he  had  ac- 
compHshed  a  bloodless  conquest.  This  comparison  led 
De  Onis  to  express  the  fear  that  success  would  lead 
the  American  government  to  even  greater  aggressions. 
He  expected  no  negotiation  over  the  territory  that  had 
already  been  annexed  to  Louisiana  and  Mississippi. 
After  hearing  from  Monroe  through  Dashkoff,  the 
Russian  minister,  he  urged  better  fortifications  for 
Pensacola.  He  could  not  comprehend  such  an  act  as 
the  Americans  had  just  committed  in  the  midst  of 
peace  without  preliminary  complaint.  Very  likely  the 
officers  in  charge  had  exceeded  their  instructions,  and 
he  requested  copies  of  these  in  order  to  make  a  full 
explanation  to  the  Regency.  While  that  body  was  to 
determine  how  far  the  event  was  compatible  with  na- 
tional honor,  his  own  obligation  led  him  to  protest 
against  this  hostile  dismemberment  of  Spanish  terri- 
tory. He  hoped,  however,  that  the  president  would 
interpret  his  protest  as  an  attempt  to  shun  any  warlike 
results. ^^ 

In  addition  to  securing  his  services  as  an  inter- 
mediary, De  Onis  tried  to  get  Dashkoff  to  second  his 
protest  as  Foster  had  formerly  done.  In  answer  to 
his  informal  inquiries  Monroe  told  him  that  the  com- 
missioners to  treat  with  Great  Britain  also  carried  in- 

19  De  Onis  to  Apodaca,  June  3,  1813,  Legajo  1837,  Papeles 
de  Cuba;  De  Onis  to  Monroe,  June  4,  1813,  Spanish  Notes, 
MS.,  II,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


624  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

structions  in  regard  to  Spain.-"  With  this  failure  in 
Washington  to  Hnk  Spain's  wrongs  with  the  Russian 
mediation,  the  Regency  turned  to  London.  Fernan 
Nunez,  who  succeeded  Apodaca  when  the  other  went 
to  Cuba,  asked  Castlereagh  to  demand,  as  prehminary 
to  a  treaty  with  the  United  States,  "  the  recognition 
of  the  legitimate  government  of  Spain  .  .  ,  the  evacu- 
ation of  the  Floridas  and  the  restoration  of  all  terri- 
tory taken  from  Spain  since  the  invasion  of  the  Penin- 
sula by  the  French."  He  asked  this  not  merely  as  an 
act  of  justice,  but  because  British  as  well  as  Spanish 
interests  demanded  that  the  United  States  should  not 
gain  an  ascendency  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Castle- 
reagh evasively  promised  that,  in  keeping  with  the  spirit 
of  alliance  between  them,  he  would  uphold  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Spanish  sovereign  in  all  negotiations  with 
foreign  powers. ^^ 

When  in  June,  1813,  Apodaca  sent  Manrique  to  re- 
place Ziiniga,  he  instructed  him  to  enroll  all  the  able- 
bodied  men  in  his  jurisdiction  in  the  militia.  With 
these  he  should  strengthen  the  defenses  of  Pensacola 
and  try  to  starve  out  the  American  force  on  the  Per- 
dido.  In  his  communications  with  the  Americans  he 
was  always  to  express  peaceful  intentions,  but  clearly 
to  place  the  responsibility  for  hostilities  on  those  who 

20  De  Onis  to  Labrador,  June  14,  1813,  Legajo  5554,  Estado, 
A.  H.  N.,  Madrid. 

21  Fernan  Niinez  to  Castlereagh,  Aug.  23,  1813,  Castlereagh 
to  Fernan  Nunez,  Aug.  23,  1813,  MS.,  British  Foreign  Office, 
Spain,  72,  Vol.  149. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  625 

tried  to  alter  the  existing  situation.^^  Before  Man- 
rique  reached  Pensacola  the  dispatch  of  the  Third 
Regiment  northward  made  it  advisable  for  the  Amer- 
icans to  recall  the  detachment  on  the  Perdido  to  Mo- 
bile. Manrique  ordered  the  abandoned  buildings  and 
stockade  to  be  burned.  Apodaca  approved  this,  and 
told  him  to  occupy  both  banks  of  the  river  if  possible, 
and  secure  its  fords  against  any  invader.^^ 

Still  following  Apodaca's  instructions,  Manrique 
made  a  formal  but  ineffectual  protest  against  the  pres- 
ence of  American  troops  in  Mobile.  Though  couched 
in  pacific  terms,  the  protest  gave  full  evidence  of  the 
outraged  bitterness  that  prompted  it.  The  occupation 
of  Mobile  could  not  be  regarded  as  a  friendly  act.  The 
agreement  with  Perez,  made  under  duress,  was  void. 
Military  officers  had  no  concern  in  diplomatic  affairs. 
While  their  countries  were  at  peace  the  subjects  of 
neither  should  do  anything  to  break  the  harmony. 
Therefore  he  hoped  that  the  American  would  not  erect 
fortifications  on  the  Perdido,  but  would  withdraw 
from  Mobile  and  Baton  Rouge,  which  the  Spaniards 
had  long  ago  legally  acquired  from  Great  Britain.'* 

22  Minute  of  Instructions  to  the  Commandant  of  West 
Florida,  June  i,  1813,  Legajo  1794,  Papeles  de  Cuba. 

23  Manrique  to  Apodaca,  July  9,  1813,  with  enclosures,  Apo- 
daca to  Commandant  of  Pensacola,  Aug.  6,  1813,  Legajo  1744, 
Papeles  de  Cuba. 

2*  Manrique  to  the  Commander  of  the  American  troops, 
June  15,  1813  (Robertson,  5196). 


626  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

Thomas  Flournoy,  Wilkinson's  successor,  did  not 
disdain  Manrique's  challenge  to  renew  the  unending 
controversy.  While  the  Spaniards  had  obtained  Mo- 
bile and  Baton  Rouge  from  England,  as  Manrique 
claimed,  the  latter  omitted  to  state  that  Spain  subse- 
quently ceded  the  region  in  dispute  to  France,  and 
France  in  turn  to  the  United  States.  That  power 
could  take  possession  of  territory,  thus  legally  and 
fairly  acquired,  without  having  its  act  regarded  as 
hostile  or  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations.  Rivalling 
the  Spaniard's  spirit  of  harmony,  which  he  hoped  no 
rash  or  inconsiderate  act  would  break,  he  in  turn  pro- 
tested against  the  destruction  of  the  stockade  on  the 
Perdido.  Flournoy  hoped  that  his  reply  met  with 
Secretary  Armstrong's  approval.  He  had  acted  in 
accordance  with  what  he  thought  was  the  accepted 
national  policy  and  requested  discretionary  powers  or 
more  explicit  instructions  upon  every  point  connected 
with  the  local  public  service.^^ 

Manrique  may  have  intended  his  protest  to  serve  as 
the  forerunner  of  an  expedition  for  the  recovery  of 
West  Florida.  If  the  captain-general  planned  such  an 
expedition,  as  Claiborne  suggested  he  did,  his  council 
of  war  more  prudently  advised  him  to  postpone  it. 
Later  in  the  year  the  home  authorities,  to  whom  the 
project  was  referred,  approved  Apodaca's  measures  in 

25  Flournoy  to  Manrique,  June  27,  1813,  same  to  Armstrong, 
June  27,  1813,  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  41,  Bureau  of 
Indexes  and  Archives. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  627 

general.  They  urged  him  to  repel  aggression  and  to 
attempt  the  reoccupation  of  posts  like  Mobile,  but 
dwelt  more  on  the  difficulty  of  carrying  on  war  against 
the  Americans.  Yet  they  empowered  the  captain-gen- 
eral to  develop  a  naval  force,  and  thus  make  Spain 
redoubtable  on  the  Gulf.  By  this  means  he  could  pre- 
vent further  losses  of  territory,  even  if  unable  to  re- 
cover any.  The  Spaniards  evidently  hoped  to  profit 
from  contemporary  British  operations  in  the  vicinity, 
even  if  they  did  not  openly  countenance  them.^^ 

The  Creek  Indians  aroused  greater  alarm  than  did 
the  Spaniards.  In  May,  1813,  John  McKee  predicted 
hostility  from  them,  but  thought  he  might  line  up  the 
other  tribes  against  them.  By  the  last  of  July  Holmes 
learned  that  the  war  party  among  them  had  gained  the 
upper  hand.  They  were  capturing  the  United  States 
mails  and  resorting  to  Pensacola,  where,  according  to 
report,  the  Spaniards  supplied  them  with  arms  and 
provisions.  Claiborne  thought  that  the  Indians  also 
counted  on  the  aid  of  the  British.  Holmes  trans- 
mitted their  reports  to  Flournoy,  who  used  them  as 
additional  subjects  for  correspondence  with  Manrique, 
The  Mississippi  executive  also  took  steps  to  prepare 
his  militia  and  to  seek  further  aid  from  the  States 
above.     Flournoy  thought  that  the  Spaniards  might  be 

26  Claiborne  to  Madison,  July  9,  1813,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  41,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives ;  Junta 
of  War,  Marine  and  Treasury,  Dec.  9,  1813,  Audiencia  of 
Santo  Domingo,  MS.,  146-3-8,  A.  G.  I.,  Seville. 


628  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

using  the  Indians  to  decoy  the  American  forces  north- 
ward while  they  moved  against  Mobile.  To  defeat 
such  a  stratagem  he  stationed  the  Seventh  Regiment  at 
Pass  Christian  and  sent  F.  L.  Claiborne  with  the  Mis- 
sissippi volunteers  to  Fort  Stoddert.^^ 

Intimations  of  complicity  with  the  savages  still  fur- 
ther aroused  Manrique.  He  was  already  resentful  at 
Flournoy's  protest  against  burning  the  blockhouses  on 
the  Perdido,  and  preferred  to  emphasize  that  issue 
rather  than  the  Indian  situation.  He  did  not  assume 
direct  responsibility  for  the  destruction  of  the  out- 
posts, and  he  claimed  that  it  could  hardly  be  distorted 
into  an  act  of  hostility.  Far  otherwise  were  the 
American  operations  against  Mobile.  The  United 
States  had  made  a  claim  to  the  territory — a  claim  un- 
supported by  French  or  Spanish  evidence,  as  he  dem- 
onstrated— and  then  abandoned  it  after  Monroe's 
failure  in  1805.  Years  later  when  war  between  Spain 
and  France  afforded  the  opportunity,  the  United 
States  revived  its  pretensions  in  order  to  deprive  Spain 
of  her  territory.  If  that  country  wished  to  go  still 
further  and  use  the  burning  of  a  few  tree  trunks  as  a 
pretext  for  beginning  hostilities,  it  was  welcome  to  do 
so,  but  few  would  approve  that  policy.  Moreover  one 
would  not  find  at  Pensacola  an  officer  or  man  as  weak 

27  McKee  to  Monroe,  May  4,  1813,  Flournoy  to  Secretary 
of  War,  July  30,  1813,  Claiborne  to  Monroe,  Aug.  i,  1813, 
Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  41,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and 
Archives. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  629 

as  those  the  Americans  had  unfortunately  discovered 
at  MobiIe.==8 

The  restlessness  of  the  Creeks,  secretly  encouraged 
by  the  British  and  Spaniards,  and  definitely  inflamed 
by  Colonel  James  Caller's  ill-advised  attack  on  a  party 
returning  from  Pensacola,  finally  burst  forth  in  the 
massacre  at  Fort  Mimms  on  August  29,  181 3. ^^  Pos- 
sibly the  Spaniards  interpreted  this  as  the  vengeance 
of  Heaven  upon  the  turbulent  population  of  the  Tom- 
bigbee;  but  in  view  of  the  rage  and  horror  aroused 
along  the  entire  southern  border,  Manrique  knew  that 
he  must  at  once  relieve  himself  of  any  imputation  of 
compHcity.  He  denied  that  he  had  furnished  the  In- 
dians with  anything  but  the  ordinary  regalement,  or 
permitted  them,  when  armed,  to  enter  Pensacola.  He 
did  not  credit  every  wild  rumor  that  came  to  him,  as 
Flournoy  seemed  to  do.  As  a  specific  instance  he 
mentioned  the  report  that  the  insurgent  Gutierrez, 
who  had  recently  invaded  Texas,  had  been  fitted  out 
in  Louisiana,  with  Governor  Claiborne  assisting.  The 
circumstances  suggested  so  clearly  the  methods  em- 
ployed to  occupy  Baton  Rouge  that  he  (Manrique) 
had  as  much  right  to  complain  of  it  as  Flournoy  of 
the  regalement  of  the  Indians.  As  a  parting  sting  he 
referred  to  the  luster  of  the  Spanish  nation,  and  its 

28  Manrique  to  Flournoy,  Aug.  18,  181.3  (Robertson,  5199). 

29  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  VII,  227-231. 


630  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

desire  to  treat  allies  and  "peaceful  neighbors"  with 
justice.^*' 

Flournoy  evidently  felt  that  the  mingled  sarcasm 
and  insolence  of  Manrique's  notes — to  say  nothing  of 
their  truthfulness — demanded  the  direct  attention  of 
his  superiors.  Armstrong  evidently  expected  that 
Monroe,  who  had  so  long  been  identified  with  this 
controversy,  would  rejoice  at  another  chance  to  con- 
tinue it,  and  sent  the  notes  to  him.  The  Spaniard's 
scathing  review  of  the  old  quarrel  and  its  most  recent 
manifestations  evidently  afforded  Monroe  little  satis- 
faction. He  chose  to  regard  it  merely  as  an  expres- 
sion of  the  Spaniard's  individual  views,  and  directed 
Flournoy  to  return  the  notes  to  the  author  in  silent  con- 
tempt. Documents  "  so  replete  with  insolence  and 
falsehood"  must  not  be  retained  in  the  government 
archives.  If  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Regency  should 
finally  force  the  United  States  into  war,  Spain  would 
then  learn  the  difference  between  the  "  magnanimous 
forebearance "  of  the  American  people  and  its  just 
resentment.^^  Evidently  Manrique's  insolence  cut  to 
the  quick,  for  this  was  the  most  bitter  word  that 
Monroe  had  written  in  ten  years  of  irritating  cor- 
respondence. 

In  November,  181 3,  Monroe  received  another  com- 
munication concerning  the  Floridas  that  caused  him 

30  Manrique  to  Flournoy,  Sept.  3,  1813  (Robertson,  5200). 

31  Monroe  to  Flournoy,  Nov.  24,  1813,  Domestic  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  16,  92. 


MOBILE   AND    THE    AFTERMATH  63I 

additional  irritation,  John  H.  Robinson,  whom  he 
had  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  Mexico,  had  returned 
full  of  enthusiasm  for  the  revolutionists  of  that  coun- 
try. When  the  secretary  received  with  coolness  his 
urgings  in  their  behalf,  Robinson  turned  filibuster,  and 
urged  the  young  men  of  the  West  to  join  his  standard. 
He  confidently  predicted  that  he  would  have  a  force 
of  four  thousand  followers  by  April.  To  arm  them 
he  proposed  to  capture  Pensacola  and  East  Florida. 
With  this  in  view  he  naively  asked  Monroe  if  the 
United  States  would  "  hy  capitulation "  permit  his 
force  to  carry  its  munitions  through  American  terri- 
tory to  the  western  frontier.  If  they  were  able  to 
come  to  an  understanding  upon  this  point,  he  believed 
they  could  make  Cuba  independent.  In  that  case  he 
generously  offered  his  services  to  bring  it  into  the 
American  Union.^^ 

The  shocked  Monroe,  just  free  from  an  unpleasant 
experience  with  another  agent,  Matthews,  indignantly 
rejected  this  sanguine  offer.  Moreover  he  lectured 
Robinson  roundly  on  his  course,  for  his  irregularities 
compromised  the  department  that  had  so  recently  em- 
ployed him.^^  He  also  took  pains  to  warn  the  western 
governors  to  keep  their  eye  on  him.     From  New  Or- 

32  Robinson  to  Monroe,  Nov.  5,  1813,  Papers  Relative  to  the 
Revolted  Spanish  Provinces,  MS.,  No.  22,  Bureau  of  Rolls 
and  Library. 

33  Monroe  to  Robinson,  June  25,  1813,  Domestic  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  16,  92. 


632  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

leans  came  the  report  that  General  Humbert,  a  former 
French  officer,  posing  as  a  Mexican  insurgent,  also 
planned  to  attack  Pensacola.^*  The  plans  of  Hum- 
bert, Robinson,  and  others  belong  to  the  age  of  the 
filibuster,  which  was  just  dawning.  Their  careers 
furnished  the  Spaniards  with  an  additional  catalogue 
of  grievances.  Generally  operating  against  Mexico  or 
the  Spanish  main,  they  often  fancied  that  Pensacola, 
St.  Augustine,  or  Amelia  Island  offered  a  tempting 
immediate  prize.  Their  efforts  naturally  increased  the 
suspicion  with  which  the  Spaniards  regarded  all  Amer- 
icans. 

The  Spaniards  for  their  part  could  only  observe  the 
movements  of  the  American  troops  more  closely  and 
insist  more  rigidly  on  passports.  Late  in  1813  the 
home  authorities  instructed  the  captain-general  not  to 
encourage  American  hostility  or  destroy  the  property 
of  their  opponents,  but  to  check  further  aggression  and 
employ  all  legitimate  means  to  recover  Mobile  and 
Baton  Rouge.  Early  in  the  following  year  they  sus- 
pected that  the  Americans  were  about  to  convert  a 
secret  war  into  an  open  one,  hence  the  local  authori- 
ties should  take  pains  to  combat  the  insidious  prac- 
tices of  their  "inquiet  neighbors."  They  should  in- 
crease their  naval  strength,  put  their  frontiers  in  a 
good  state  of  defense,  enlist  the  Indians,  initiate  all 

34  Soto  to  Apodaca,  Dec.  31,  1813,  Legajo  1794,  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  633 

measures  for  pursuing  vigorous  warfare  within  the 
United  States,  and  expel  Americans  from  Spanish  ter- 
ritory, thus  causing  that  government  to  feel  the  evils 
that  other  parts  of  the  new  world  were  then  experienc- 
ing. On  taking  account  of  stock  Apodaca  discovered 
that  his  resources  were  inadequate  for  any  such  war- 
like policy.  He  could  only  mention  the  burning  of  the 
abandoned  American  stockade  on  the  Perdido  and  the 
attempt  to  maintain  patrols  there  as  an  incident  in 
keeping  with  the  above  recommendation.^^ 

With  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  in  Europe,  the 
allies,  Spain  and  England,  expected  the  United  States 
to  suffer  for  its  Machiavellian  policy  of  the  past  ten 
years.  De  Onis  wrote  that  the  "  Republicans  "  feared 
the  loss  not  merely  of  that  part  of  the  Floridas  that 
they  had  recently  occupied,  but  also  of  Louisiana. 
The  sale  of  the  latter  was  void  because  Napoleon  had 
never  carried  out  his  contract  with  Spain.  That  power 
ought  to  repossess  all  this  territory  and  thereby  break 
up  insurrectionary  movements  against  Mexico,  move- 
ments which  found  a  natural  focus  at  New  Orleans. 
He  outlined  a  plan  for  the  conquest  of  this  province 
and  its  separation  from  the  Union,  which  had  been 
suggested  by  a  Louisiana  planter  of  military  preten- 
sions. The  proposed  plan,  whoever  its  author,  was  too 
difficult  for  even  a  Spanish  minister  to  encourage.^^ 

35  Apodaca  to  Luyandro,  May  18,  1814,  Audiencia  of  Santo 
Domingo,  MS.,  146-3-8,  A.  G.  I.,  Seville. 

36  De  Onis  to  Luyandro,  June  8,  1814,  ibid.  Possibly  the 
"  Louisiana  Planter  "  was  Wilkinson. 


634  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

Diplomacy  elsewhere  might  prove  more  effective 
than  domestic  revolt.  In  July,  1814,  Fernan  Nunez 
called  Castlereagh's  attention  to  his  proposals  of  the 
year  before.  There  was  every  prospect  of  peace  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  Before  it 
was  established  he  wished  Spain  and  her  ally  to  form 
some  common  agreement.  The  British  government 
knew  that  the  United  States  had  not  preserved  neutral- 
ity toward  the  revolted  Spanish  colonists  and  that  it 
had  occupied  Mobile  and  continued  to  do  so,  despite 
British  and  Russian  remonstrances.  His  own  govern- 
ment, now  at  the  end  of  its  patience,  wished  by  con- 
certed measures  with  Great  Britain  to  make  the  United 
States  pursue  a  more  regular  policy.  This  course 
would  secure  the  reciprocal  rights  and  possessions  of 
both  allied  powers. 

Castlereagh  brought  the  substance  of  this  note  to  the 
attention  of  the  prince  regent,  who  was  gratified  to 
know  that  Spain  appreciated  previous  British  efforts 
in  her  behalf.  The  minister  also  directed  a  continu- 
ance of  British  efforts  to  make  the  United  States 
realize  its  duty  and  repair  the  wrongs  done  Spain, 
Nothing  would  please  his  government  more  than  to 
see  a  negotiation  between  them  carried  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  If  he  were  thus  non-committal  on  the  eve 
of  negotiations  at  Ghent,  he  became  convinced  in  the 
course  of  the  long-drawn  disputes  there  that  the  at- 
tempt to  turn  a  twofold  parley  into  a  triple  one  would 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  635 

tend  to  "  remove  the  period  of  our  pacification,"  and 
in  that  measure  sacrifice  the  real  interests  of  Spain. 
He  was  interested  in  bringing  about  the  peaceful  union 
of  all  parts  of  the  Spanish  monarchy,  but  he  could 
work  effectually  to  that  end  only  after  resuming  dip- 
lomatic relations  with  the  United  States.^^ 

If  domestic  treason  or  foreign  diplomacy  were  in- 
effectual to  shake  the  American  hold  on  recently  oc- 
cupied territory,  Nicholls's  bombastic  proclamations 
and  Packenham's  veterans  were  equally  so.  Nicholls 
demonstrated  the  annoyance,  if  not  peril,  involved  in 
Spanish  jurisdiction  at  Pensacola  and  St.  Augustine. 
But  his  appeals  to  western  sectionalism,  which  were 
never  feasible  except  in  the  imaginations  of  a  few 
hopeful  Spaniards  or  mercenary  Americans,  fell  on 
deaf  ears.  Kentuckians  and  the  people  of  Louisiana 
alike  rallied  to  Jackson's  support,  and  his  "crowning 
mercy "  at  New  Orleans  justified  their  faith  in  the 
permanency  of  American  control  on  the  Mississippi.^® 

This  control  was  to  be  equally  permanent  in  West 
Florida  and  likely  to  be  further  extended.  Nicholls's 
course  around  Mobile  and  Pensacola  had  aroused  some 
apprehension  of  a  joint  occupation  of  that  region  by 
the  British  and  Spaniards  from  which  the  former 
would  derive  the  lion's  share  of  profit.     Accordingly 

s'^  Fernan  Nunez  to  Castlereagh,  July  6, 1814,  (Castlereagh?) 
Draft  to  Fernan  Nunez,  Sept.  30,  1814,  MS.,  British  Foreign 
Office,  Spain,  72,  Vol.  165. 

38  Gayarre,  History  of  Louisiana,  IV,  333-347.  passim. 


636  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

Monroe  instructed  Jackson  to  expel  the  British,  even 
after  the  ratification  of  peace,  if  he  found  them  west 
of  the  Perdido.  This  region  formed  part  of  the 
United  States  and  was  to  be  defended  as  such. 
Nicholls  had  also  supplied  the  Indians  with  arms,  so  it 
was  reported,  and  had  encouraged  them  to  demand 
the  return  of  the  recent  cessions  that  Jackson  had 
forced  from  them.  Monroe  was  glad  to  note  that  the 
population  flocking  into  this  ceded  territory  not  only 
secured  that  area,  but  was  also  slowly  drawing  the 
residue  of  the  Floridas  from  Spain.^'' 

The  prospect  of  peace  suggested  a  recurrence  to 
earlier  diplomatic  wrangling.  In  1814  George  W. 
Erving  was  made  minister  to  Spain,  but  he  vainly 
waited  at  Paris  for  necessary  passports.  The  failure 
of  the  Spanish  government  to  supply  them  was  vari- 
ously attributed  to  "the  cloven  foot  of  the  British 
government,"  to  the  desire  of  Anthony  Morris  to  sup- 
plant him,  or  to  the  hostile  intentions  of  the  Spanish 
government  should  the  British  occupy  New  Orleans. 
Morris,  who  was  acting  as  American  charge  at  Madrid, 
claimed  that  with  ten  thousand  dollars  for  douceurs 
he  could  initiate  the  purchase  of  the  Floridas.  Both 
he  and  Richard  McCall,  the  consul  at  Barcelona,  re- 
ported that  the  clergy  and  court  favorites,  including 

39  Monroe  to  Jackson,  Mar.  13,  1815,  Jackson  Papers,  MS., 
Library  of  Congress;  same  to  same.  May  9,  1815,  Miscella- 
neous Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  47,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives; 
Hamilton,  Monroe,  V,  341. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  637 

Cevallos,  bitterly  detested  the  United  States,  and  Span- 
ish weakness  alone  kept  them  from  declaring  war 
upon  it.*°  Late  in  November,  1814,  this  feeling  found 
definite  expression  in  a  memoir  presented  to  Ferdi- 
nand VII,  newly  returned  from  exile.*^ 

According  to  McCall,  the  author  of  this  memoir 
was  one  Bruno  Vallerino,  a  member  of  the  Council  of 
the  Indies.  He  mentioned  the  failure  of  Spain,  fol- 
lowing the  independence  of  the  United  States,  to  secure 
the  region  west  of  the  Alleghanies.  This  advance 
might  have  enabled  her  to  avoid  boundary  controver- 
sies with  her  neighbors,  or  to  develop  her  frontier 
areas  so  as  to  arouse  their  respect.  On  the  contrary, 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  in  the  Treaty  of  San  Lorenzo 
was  forced  to  recognize  American  sovereignty  to  the 
Mississippi  and  the  thirty-first  parallel.  Therefore, 
Spain  should  have  redoubled  her  efforts  to  develop 
her  remaining  holdings.  Instead,  her  towns  declined, 
while  American  adventurers,  with  uncanny  foresight, 
occupied  the  best  lands  in  the  Floridas.  It  was  then 
that  France  acquired  Louisiana  by  the  Treaty  of  San 
Ildefonso.     Of  this  the  author  states:  "There  is  in 

■*o  Fuller,  The  Purchase  of  the  Floridas,  217,  218;  A.  Morris 
to  Monroe,  Nov.  22,  Dec.  23,  30,  1814,  Spanish  Dispatches,  MS., 
XII,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  McCall  to  Dallas,  Mar. 
3,  1816,  Letters  in  Relation  to  Burr's  Conspiracy,  MS.,  Bureau 
of  Rolls  and  Library. 

41  Translation  of  a  Memoir  which  appears  to  have  been  in- 
tended for  the  King  of  Spain,  dated  Madrid,  Dec.  23,  1814, 
ibid. 
42 


638  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

diplomacy  no  instance  of  a  stipulation  more  strangely 
enigmatical  than  the  article  of  the  Treaty  in  which  the 
compact  is  made  for  the  retrocession  of  Louisiana  to 
France."  He  believed  that  Napoleon  inserted  it  for 
the  purpose  of  backing  up,  in  good  time,  his  preten- 
sions to  portions  of  Mexico, — pretensions  that  were 
based  on  La  Salle's  expedition  and  the  grant  of  Crozat. 
He  also  thought  that  the  French  government  secretly 
intended  to  possess  West  Florida  on  the  ground  that 
all  the  territory  to  the  Perdido  formerly  belonged  to 
France.  The  author  could  not  explain  why  the  Span- 
ish minister  permitted  such  an  uncertain  stipulation  in 
the  treaty,  but  he  did.  In  due  time  the  territory  thus 
defined  passed  to  the  United  States,  and  that  power 
immediately  made  excellent  use  of  the  enigmatical 
article  "to  forward  its  projects  of  aggrandizement." 
Nevertheless,  during  the  special  mission  of  Monroe 
and  Pinckney,  the  Spanish  government  was  able  to 
present  such  solid  arguments  against  their  claims  that 
the  American  government  never  dared  print  them. 

Notwithstanding  this  diplomatic  success,  he  said, 
Spain  was  unable  to  colonize  the  threatened  territory. 
On  the  other  hand  colonists  from  the  United  States 
enabled  the  LTnited  States  to  seize  West  Florida ;  but 
East  Florida  and  Texas  still  remained  to  Spain.  Now 
that  the  United  States  was  engaged  in  a  disastrous 
war,  Spain  might  utilize  the  British  alliance  to  force 
due  respect  for  her  rights.     He  then  suggested  a  series 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  639 

of  questions  that  brought  up  the  validity  of  Napoleon's 
sale  of  Louisiana,  the  possibility  of  securing  it  in  ex- 
change for  the  Floridas,  the  advisability  of  controlling 
the  Gulf  by  retaining  Pensacola  and  other  ports  in 
West  Florida,  and  the  probable  British  attitude  upon 
this  question.  It  would  be  difficult  to  restrain  the 
Americans  unless  they  set  some  definite  limit  to  their 
ambition.  Spain  had  yielded  such  strong  barriers  as 
the  mountains  and  the  Mississippi,  and  must  now  be- 
stir herself  if  she  wished  to  hold  her  remaining  prov- 
inces. 

Meanwhile  all  was  not  harmonious  among  those 
whom  the  Spaniards  chose  to  regard  as  their  de- 
spoilers.  Squatters  were  being  driven  off  from  the 
land  recently  acquired  from  Spain  and  from  the  In- 
dians. Even  Judge  Toulmin  felt  that  these  irregular 
settlers  were  of  some  service  in  protecting  the  frontier. 
Some  of  the  settlers  beyond  the  Pearl  complained  be- 
cause they  were  not  included  in  Louisiana,  where  they 
rightfully  belonged,  but  were  attached  to  Mississippi, 
"  of  all  governments  the  most  miserable  and  contemp- 
tible." Its  tax  laws  were  confiscatory,  and  its  local  offi- 
cials despicable.  Among  them  Sterling  Dupree  pa- 
raded as  a  recent  appointee  of  Holmes,  and  Lewis 
wrote  that  the  people  would  prefer  the  Dey  of  Algiers 
to  leaders  of  his  sort.  Land  titles  were  still  uncertain 
and  new  settlers  were  usurping  the  claims  of  older 
ones.     If   American   rule  meant  the  confiscation  of 


640  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

their  lands  and  subjection  to  a  gang  of  villains,  the 
older  settlers  would  seek  refuge  among  the  Spaniards. 

Lewis  also  complained  that  Judge  Toulmin  retarded 
a  case  that  he  had  before  his  court  because  he  did  not 
wish  Lewis  to  improve  certain  lands  that  might  come 
into  competition  with  his  own.  This  charge  was  re- 
garded as  so  slanderous  that  even  the  Mississippi  leg- 
islature refused  to  consider  it.  A  more  damning 
charge,  in  Lewis's  estimation,  was  the  fact  that  the 
judge  held  court  in  Mobile  on  Sunday.  This  made 
him  "a  fit  candidate  for  hell  itself,"  and  he  asked 
Monroe  to  call  the  president's  attention  to  the  out- 
rage.*^ A  charge  of  more  serious  import  was  to  the 
effect  that  Toulmin  and  John  Smith  conspired  with 
Francisco  de  Hevia,  the  recent  Spanish  commandant 
at  Pascagoula,  to  lay  claim  to  several  thousand  acres 
of  land  on  the  Pearl,  the  Pascagoula,  and  the  Mobile. 
The  claim  was  duly  entered,  but  William  Crawford, 
the  commissioner  for  the  district  east  of  the  Pearl 
River,  refused  to  allow  it.^^  The  transaction  is  not  at 
all  in  keeping  with  Toulmin's  previous  reputation,  but 
it  does  not  seem  to  have  injured  him  in  the  estimation 
of  his  superiors. 

It  is  more  pleasing  to  note  that  along  with  his 
judgeship,  Toulmin  still  maintained  his  firmness 
against  filibusters.     In  December,   181 7,  Masot,  then 

*2  E.  Lewis  to  Monroe,  July  22,  1816,  Miscellaneous  Letters, 
MS.,  Vol.  51,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 
43  American  State  Papers,  Public  Lands,  III,  20-29. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  64I 

in  command  at  Pensacola,  wrote  him  that  the  men  on 
the  Tensaw  were  planning  an  attack  on  that  town. 
As  the  governor  of  the  new  Territory  of  Alabama  had 
not  yet  arrived,  Toulmin  with  his  old  vigor  took  upon 
himself  the  double  task  of  reassuring  the  Spaniard 
and  investigating  the  rumor.  He  found  that  prepara- 
tions for  such  an  undertaking  undoubtedly  were  on 
foot  and  that  the  local  authorities  were  unable  to 
check  them.  The  land  force  expected  to  be  joined  by 
some  vessels  at  the  mouth  of  the  Perdido.  Evidently 
it  was  one  of  those  semi-piratical  raids  that  were  then 
common  in  the  Gulf.  By  threatening  judicial  process 
against  one  man,  Toulmin  hoped  to  break  it  up  and  to 
convince  De  Onis  that  the  American  authorities  were 
not  wholly  prone  to  such  irregularities.** 

The  admission  of  Mississippi  into  the  Union  in  1817 
and  the  development  of  Alabama  to  statehood  two 
years  later  definitely  determined  the  national  status 
of  the  region  to  the  Perdido.  The  question  of  land 
titles  in  the  disputed  area  was  not  so  readily  settled. 
Among  the  claimants  appeared  prominent  Convention- 
alists, loyal  Spanish  supporters,  both  naturalized  and 
native,  and  steadfast  adherents  of  the  American  gov- 
ernment,— a  fact  that  illustrates  the  universal  preva- 
lence of  land  hunger.  The  presence  of  French,  Eng- 
lish, and  Spanish  claimants,  mingled  with  those  whose 

4<  Toulmin  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  Dec.  10,  1817,  Miscellaneous 
Letters,  MS.,  Vol.  59,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 


642  MOBILE   AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

only  right  was  that  of  occupancy,  compHcated  the 
situation.  In  accordance  with  its  earHer  Louisiana 
legislation,  Congress  at  first  refused  to  recognize  the 
validity  of  any  Spanish  grants  subsequent  to  the 
Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso,  October  i,  1800.  But  it 
discovered  that  this  attempt  to  be  consistent  with  its 
claim  to  West  Florida  would  result  in  substantial  in- 
justice to  many  bona-fide  settlers  in  the  region.  Amer- 
ican acquiescence  in  Spanish  occupation  had  led  many 
of  this  class  to  confide  in  the  legitimacy  of  Spanish 
grants. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  American  government 
should  recognize  these  grants,  especially  those  subse- 
quent to  December  20,  1803,  it  would  favor  a  few  land 
monopolists,  whose  connection  with  Morales  gave 
them  unusual  privileges.  The  course  of  that  official, 
supported  by  orders  from  his  government,  created  the 
impression  that  the  Spaniards  recognized  that  their 
claim  to  the  region  was  precarious,  even  if  proper. 
This  idea  had  provoked  their  determination  to  wring 
the  utmost  profit  from  it  before  they  were  forced  to 
relinquish  it.  American  acquiescence  and  Spanish 
cupidity  had  thus  combined  to  dupe  the  innocent 
purchaser  of  small  holdings,  if  not  the  grasping 
speculator.*^ 

Many  claimants  of  the  former  type  residing  on  the 
Mobile   now  bitterly   criticised   the   national   govern- 

<5  American  State  Papers,  Public  Lands,  III,  35-62,  220-222. 


MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH  64;^ 

ment  for  its  former  equivocal  attitude.  It  should 
never  have  acquiesced  for  ten  years  in  Spanish  occu- 
pation even  to  the  extent  of  paying  customs  duties  at 
Mobile  unless  it  intended  to  recognize  the  validity  of 
Spanish  grants.  The  legislature  of  Louisiana  sec- 
onded this  criticism,  although  those  who  came  from 
the  Florida  parishes  resented  the  insinuation  it  con- 
veyed. The  policy  of  the  American  government,  this 
group  contended,  displayed  its  moderation  toward 
Spain  and  its  determination  to  suppress  the  land 
monopoly  fostered  by  Morales.  Congress,  as  usual, 
settled  the  difficulty  by  a  compromise.  That  body,  in 
the  act  of  March  3,  1819,  recognized  holdings  that  were 
actually  occupied  and  improved,  according  to  Spanish 
regulations,  after  the  Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso.  The 
amount  of  land  in  each  holding  was  limited  to  a  sec- 
tion, but  this  fact  did  not  interfere  with  those  titles 
that  originated  during  British  occupation  and  were 
ratified  by  the  Spanish  after  1783.  No  holdings  were 
to  be  recognized  under  this  act,  unless  they  were  occu- 
pied before  April  15,  1813,  the  date  of  the  surrender 
of  Mobile." 

In  this  way  Congress  showed  that  it  was  not  un- 
mindful of  those  who  had  assisted  in  bringing  under 
the  American  flag  the  region  to  the  Pascagoula  and 
beyond.  Yet  it  steadfastly  refused  to  recognize  the 
validity  of  their  action.     Incidentally  it  included  in  its 

^°  American  State  Papers,  Public  Lands,  III,  346^348,  367. 


644  MOBILE    AND    THE    AFTERMATH 

largess  the  more  quiescent  population  of  Mobile  and 
some  loyal  Spaniards.  Skipwith  temporarily  served 
as  receiver  for  the  land  office  west  of  the  Pearl. 
There,  despite  legislation  and  recommendation,  con- 
fusion in  land  titles  prevailed  for  more  than  a  dozen 
years  after  its  acquisition.*^  As  a  result  the  settle- 
ment of  the  region  was  greatly  retarded  and  the  prob- 
lem of  defending  an  important  frontier  still  further 
complicated. 

47  American  State  Papers,  Public  Lands,  III,  411-421,  446- 
449,  550-554- 


CHAPTER  XVII 
The  Conclusion  of  the  Controversy 

The  reception  of  De  Onis  as  fully  accredited  envoy, 
in  December,  1815,  marked  a  renewal  of  the  diplo- 
matic dispute  of  ten  years  before.  Monroe  as  secre- 
tary of  state  defended  the  claim  to  the  Perdido  with 
the  same  vehemence  that  he  had  formerly  displayed  at 
Aranjuez.  De  Onis  demanded  the  delivery  of  the 
contested  region  to  Spain  before  that  power  would 
consent  to  treat  on  the  now  more  important  western 
boundary,  and  discussed  the  meaning  of  "  retrocede  " 
with  the  customary  Spanish  fulness  and  fervor.  This 
demand  led  the  House,  at  the  instigation  of  Robert- 
son of  Louisiana,  to  ask  the  president  for  the  corre- 
spondence. When  printed,  this  elicited  from  Niles  the 
comment :  "  The  pretensions  of  Spain  are  as  prepos- 
terous as  the  manner  in  which  they  are  urged  is  con- 
temptible."^ 

The  demand  gave  force  to  the  current  presumption 
that  England  was  backing  Spain.  The  French  charge 
repeated  it,  although  his  superiors  supported  the  Span- 
iard's contention.     From  Europe  Erving  interpreted 

1  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  IV,  425  flf. ; 
Annals  of  Fourteenth  Congress,  First  Session,  745;  Niles' 
Register,  IV,  405. 

645 


646         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

the  Spanish  argument  as  "  the  froth  and  scum  of  Ce- 
vallos'  murky  brain,"  but  feared  it  might  result  in  an- 
other special  mission  to  deprive  him  of  prospective 
diplomatic  honors.^  At  the  suggestion  of  De  Onis, 
however,  he  was  empowered  to  take  up  the  unending 
negotiation.  He  found  Cevallos  a  feeble  servant  in  a 
crumbling  house,  but  still  able  to  manifest  his  resent- 
ment at  the  American  occupation  of  West  Florida. 
Erving  discussed  this  only  to  point  out  the  moderation 
of  his  country  in  not  occupying  East  Florida  as  well. 
In  a  few  months  the  corrupt  and  doting  Spaniard, 
whose  chief  asset  was  his  detestation  of  Americans, 
was  forced  out  of  the  office  that,  according  to  Erving, 
he  encumbered  rather  than  adorned.  Before  he  left 
he  took  measures  to  transfer  the  negotiation  to  Wash- 
ington.^ 

As  Great  Britain  had  but  recently  used  the  Floridas 
as  a  military  base,  it  was  only  natural  for  the  Amer- 
ican press  to  charge  her  with  diplomatic  machinations 
in  the  same  region.  It  seemed  probable  that  that 
power  would  claim  Cuba  for  aiding  the  mother-coun- 
■try  against  Napoleon  and  the  Floridas  for  assisting 
to  subdue  the  rest  of  her  colonies.  General  T.  J. 
Jesup,  in  command  of  the  Gulf  Coast,  also  reported 
Spanish  agents  in  New  Orleans,  evidently  to  advance 

2  Roth  to  Richlieu,  Jan.  30,  1816,  Instructions  to  Roth,  Jan. 
29,  1816,  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  £tats  Unis,  MS., 
Vol.  72,  273,300;  Erving  to  Monroe,  Feb.  23, 1816,  Lenox  MSS. 

3  Erving  to  Monroe,  passim,  1816,  Lenox  MSS. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         647 

some  such  cooperation.  In  retaliation  he  proposed  a 
counter-attack  on  Havana,  for  which  a  force  of  three 
thousand  men  with  a  naval  contingent  would  suffice. 
If  England  once  obtained  Cuba,  she  would  dominate 
the  western  hemisphere  and  threaten  the  safety  of 
New  Orleans.  Madison,  however,  refused  to  be 
alarmed  over  the  rumors  or  to  approve  Jesup's  quixotic 
suggestions.*  He  passed  out  of  office,  as  did  his  prede- 
cessor, with  the  West  Florida  question  unsettled. 

The  change  from  Napoleon  to  the  Bourbons  did  not 
necessarily  mean  a  change  in  the  French  attitude  to- 
ward West  Florida.  Fernan  Nufiez,  now  ambassador 
at  Paris,  requested  the  Due  de  Richelieu  to  order  a 
summary  upon  that  "  luxury  of  words,"  the  third  ar- 
ticle in  the  Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso.  He  thought  that 
its  rich  verbiage  might  be  due  to  an  artifice  of  the 
previous  French  government  which  permitted  the 
Americans  to  make  their  pretentious  but  invalid  claim. 
Evidently  the  American  government  was  determined 
to  reiterate  this  until  it  should  force  France  to  its  in- 
terpretation. Taking  advantage  of  Spain's  necessi- 
ties, it  was  legislating  for  the  territory  as  if  already 
its  legal  possessor,  and  thus  postponing  settlement. 

The  French  government  then  preferred  to  withhold 
its  opinion  on  the  article,  but  advised  the  two  coun- 

4  Jesup  to  Monroe,  Sept.  3,  1816,  Miscellaneous  Letters,  MS., 
Vol.  52,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives;  Madison  to  Mon- 
roe, Sept.  22,  1816,  Lenox  MSS. 


648         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

tries  to  determine  by  discussion  the  respective  right 
of  each  and  then  arrive  at  some  definite  settlement.*^ 
Perhaps  Pizarro,  successor  of  Cevallos,  had  this  opin- 
ion before  him  when  in  the  summer  of  1817  he  sug- 
gested the  surrender  of  West  Florida  before  attempt- 
ing to  make  a  formal  treaty.  He  then  repeated  an 
offer  that  De  Onis  had  already  made  Monroe :  to  ex- 
change all  Spanish  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi 
for  all  American  territory  to  the  westward.  The  time 
for  such  a  proposition,  if  it  ever  existed,  had  long 
since  passed  away.  Erving  immediately  rejected  it 
and  likewise  the  proposal  to  submit  all  existing  dis- 
putes to  arbitration.  This  meant  that  the  fertile- 
minded  de  Onis  must  undertake  the  proposed  discus- 
sion,^ 

During  this  period  Monroe's  correspondents  were 
not  backward  in  offering  suggestions.  In  1814  H.  M. 
Brackenridge  reviewed  the  American  interpretation  of 
the  wearisome  third  article.  He  claimed  that  Spain 
and  France  had  jointly  ceded  the  territory  east  of  the 
Mississippi  in  1762.  This  fact  bound  Spain,  when 
she  secured  this  territory  in  1783,  to  restore  it,  as  far 
as  possible,  to  the  original  French  status.  To  do  so 
she  must  extend  Louisiana  to  the  Perdido.  The 
United  States  had  a  perfect  right  to  insist  that  its 
purchase  included  the  land  to  that  stream.     An  anony- 

s  Archives  des  Affaires  fitrangeres,  fitats  Unis,  Supplement, 
MS.,  Vol.  8,  275-296. 
6  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  IV,  445,  446. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         649 

mous  correspondent  in  the  summer  of  1817  sent  Mon- 
roe a  pamphlet,  which  he  claimed  completely  over- 
threw Brackenridge's  labored  defence.  The  uncer- 
tain third  article  was  simply  a  Napoleonic  scheme  for 
further  quarrels.  After  he  sold  the  territory  to  the 
United  States,  he  could  use  it  as  best  suited  his  pur- 
pose, and  had  done  so.  This  correspondent  advised 
Monroe  to  obtain  the  disputed  territory  in  return  for 
our  claims  against  Spain. 

Benjamin  Vaughan,  another  correspondent,  sent 
Monroe  a  geographical  excerpt  from  Malte  Brun  that 
favored  the  American  claim.  Louisiana  in  1800  and 
1803  included  territory  on  both  sides  of  the  Missis- 
sippi "and  the  ancient  and  natural  dependencies  of 
New  Orleans."  Vaughan  suggested  that  mere  legal 
ov;nership  of  the  Floridas  amounted  to  little ;  Amer- 
ican citizens  were  rapidly  occupying  the  whole  region. 
If  Spain  should  give  the  United  States  a  quit  claim 
to  West  Florida,  or  to  so  much  of  it  as  was  necessary 
to  control  the  important  rivers  flowing  from  American 
territory,  and  then  bestow  the  remainder  on  Great 
Britain,  all  three  powers  might  be  satisfied.  Great 
Britain  would  feel  secure  in  her  West  Indian  posses- 
sions; Spain  would  have  a  friendly  neighbor  in  the 
Florida  peninsula;  and  the  United  States  would  con- 
trol absolutely  the  commerce  of  the  Mississippi  and 
the  near-by  streams.    Vaughan  confessed  that  he  knew 


650         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

no  more  of  the  political  situation  than  of  Kamchatka, 
but  thought  the  question  should  be  settled  soon/ 

One  of  J.  Q.  Adams's  correspondents  also  thought 
it  was  high  time  to  settle  this  question,  but  did  not 
believe  that  the  British  government  was  in  a  financial 
position  to  purchase  the  Floridas,  There  was  now  no 
Napoleon  to  hold  them  "  in  reserve  as  a  nestling  place 
whence  he  [might]  serpentize  into  the  Paradise  of 
Talleyrand."  America's  respect  for  Spain's  misfor- 
tunes had  not  received  due  credit  in  Europe,  and  he 
now  wished  an  ending  to  the  controversy  that  would 
show  the  sincerity  of  its  government.^ 

In  his  first  annual  message  the  patient  Monroe  could 
only  report  that  our  negotiations  with  Spain  were 
still  fruitless.  Conditions  did  not  promise  to  improve 
during  the  first  few  months  of  negotiation  between 
Adams  and  De  Onis.  The  Spaniard  displayed  a  fond- 
ness for  wordy  discussion  that  finally  tempted  the 
whilom  professor  of  oratory  to  respond.  It  is  need- 
less to  say  that  the  verbal  and  historical  discussion  ac- 
complished nothing.  De  Onis  was  unco'nvinced  by 
Adams's  defense  of  the  American  claim  to  the  Per- 
dido,  but  Jefferson  congratulated  its  author  on  pro- 

''^  Brackenridge,  Views  of  Louisiana,  p.  24  flf.,  cf.  p.  94; 
Adams  to  Monroe,  Aug.  28,  1817,  Benjamin  Vaughan  to 
Monroe,  Apr.  17,  1817,  Lenox  MSS. 

8  George  Joy  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  Nov.  4,  1817,  General  Corre- 
spondence of  J.  Q.  Adams,  MS.,  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         65I 

duciiig  one  of  the  best  state  papers  he  had  ever  seen. 
From  Philadelphia,  Joseph  Hopkinson  offered  to  send 
Adams  a  copy  of  Moll's  map  to  bolster  up  his  argu- 
ment, and  Alexander  H.  Everett  wrote  that  his  corre- 
spondence with  the  Spanish  minister  attracted  favor- 
able attention  in  Boston.^ 

The  failure  to  come  to  a  diplomatic  settlement  be- 
tokened possible  war.  The  British  minister  offered 
his  mediation,  but  the  American  cabinet  declined  it. 
Yet  England  refused  to  aid  Spain  in  her  difficulty. 
That  power  hoped  for  aid  from  the  reactionary  forces 
in  Europe.  France  coveted  the  Floridas  for  herself 
or  wished  Russia  to  get  them,  but  gradually  schooled 
herself  to  having  the  United  States  possess  them, 
Spain  was  evidently  in  a  critical  condition,  being  un- 
able to  defend  the  territory  herself  or  to  gain  help 
from  her  European  friends.  Yet  when  Adams,  upon 
Monroe's  insistence,  asked  De  Onis  what  his  govern- 
ment would  take  for  East  Florida,  which  he  afifected 
to  believe  was  all  that  Spain  possessed  east  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, the  Spanish  minister  simply  repeated  the  offer 
that  Pizarro  made  Erving  the  year  before.^" 

From  Baltimore,  Adams  received  a  suggestion  to 
pay  Spain  a  milHon  dollars  for  her  territory  east  of 

9  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  IV,  452  ff, ; 
Ford,  Jefferson,  X,  122;  General  Correspondence  of  J.  Q. 
Adams,  MS.,  Massachusetts  Historical  Society. 

1"  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  Zl,  50,  51;  Archives  des  Affaires 
fitrangeres,  Espagne,  MS.,  Vol.  701,  156,  201,  202.     See  p.  648. 


652         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

the  Mississippi.  This  was  more  than  it  was  worth  to 
her  or  to  the  United  States  except  for  its  strategic 
position  and  the  necessity  for  controlling  the  Indians.^^ 
The  Spanish  government  evidently  felt  that  it  was 
playing  a  losing  game,  for  it  began  to  dispose  of  the 
remaining  vacant  lands  there.  In  June,  1818,  de  Onis 
spoke  hopefully  of  an  early  diplomatic  adjustment 
with  the  United  States.  From  Madrid,  Erving  re- 
ported that  Pizarro  was  inclined  to  yield  to  American 
pressure,  but  the  other  members  of  the  Spanish  cabinet 
restrained  him.  As  a  tangible  manifestation  of  his 
compliance,  however,  he  resurrected  Pinckney's  note 
of  February  7,  1803,  offering  to  guarantee  Spain's  pos- 
sessions west  of  the  Mississippi  in  part  payment  for 
her  territory  to  the  eastward.  But  how  Pizarro  meant 
to  use  this  resurrected  offer  never  became  evident. 
When  he  learned  of  Jackson's  unauthorized  invasion 
of  Florida,  he  abruptly  closed  his  parley  with  Erving. 
Soon  after  he  yielded  office  to  Casa  Yrujo.^^ 

Diplomat  and  military  expert  had  alike  anticipated 
such  a  crisis  as  Jackson  now  caused.  At  last  the  fron- 
tiersmen had  found  their  ideal  leader.  He  unquestion- 
ably pointed  out  the  only  solution  to  this  interminable 
controversy.  At  first  the  timorous  Monroe  and  most 
of  his  advisers  were  inclined  to  censure  the  rash  com- 

11  George  Hebb  to  Adams,  Apr.  25,  1818,  Miscellaneous  Let- 
ters, MS.,  Vol.  62,  Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives. 

12  Biddle  to  Monroe,  June  18,  1818,  Lenox  MSS. ;  House 
Document  277,  Twenty-eighth  Congress,  First  Session,  p.  30. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         653 

mander  and  propitiate  the  incensed  Spaniards.  But 
the  resolute  Adams  seized  upon  the  incident  to  demon- 
strate the  folly  of  Spanish  persistence.  Jackson's  ac- 
tion, if  not  Adams's  arguments,  coupled  with  minis- 
terial changes  in  Spain,  finally  triumphed  over  pro- 
crastination and  pride.  The  king  empowered  Casa 
Yrujo  to  part  with  the  Floridas  and  to  settle  the 
boundary  of  Texas.  This  cession  was  now  subordi- 
nated to  the  latter,  but  there  was  still  abundant  op- 
portunity for  tact  and  concession  in  phrasing  the  ar- 
ticles dealing  with  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi. 
The  Spanish  colonies  were  also  measurably  involved, 
as  they  had  been  during  the  past  ten  years,  for  Spain 
wished  to  prevent  the  United  States  from  recognizing 
their  independence  as  soon  as  the  treaty  should  be 
ratified.^^ 

In  the  ensuing  discussions  the  French  minister, 
Hyde  de  Neuville,  proved  a  most  efficient  intermediary. 
Adams  was  firm,  not  to  say  stubborn ;  De  Onis,  proud- 
spirited and  intriguing.  The  American  often  had  to 
vent  upon  the  others  the  ire  aroused  in  unsympathetic 
cabinet  meetings.  The  French  minister  was  inclined 
to  favor  him,  after  Texas  was  eliminated,  except  in 
regard  to  West  Florida.  In  this  he  followed  the 
French  interpretation  of  the  past  fifteen  years.  In 
January,  1819,  a  series  of  articles  in  the  Washington 
City  Gazette  gave  him  and  De  Onis  some  comfort. 

13  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  168,  200,  208. 
43 


654         "^^^    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

The  author,  supposed  to  be  Armstrong,  gave  what  pur- 
ported to  be  a  secret  history  of  the  negotiations  with 
Spain  that  was  far  from  compHmentary  to  Monroe. 
This  attempt  to  defeat  the  negotiation  caused  others, 
including  Clay,  to  regret  the  relinquishment  of  Texas. ^* 
When  the  diplomats  reached  the  stage  of  projets, 
Adams  discovered  that  De  Onis  had  described  the 
Floridas  as  they  were  ceded  to  Spain  by  Great  Britain 
in  1783,  and  with  the  limits  assigned  by  the  Treaty 
of  1795.  Such  a  definition  would  comprise  the  dis- 
puted territory  already  in  American  possession  and 
involve  the  total  surrender  of  the  American  conten- 
tion. Instead  Adams  suggested  that  the  article  should 
read:  "His  Catholic  Majesty  cedes  to  the  United 
States  ...  all  the  territories  which  belong  to  him, 
situated  eastward  of  the  Mississippi,  known  by  the 
names  of  East  and  West  Florida."  In  this  form  De 
Neuville  beheved  it  would  cover  the  honor  of  both 
countries  and  divest  the  transaction  of  all  "mutual 
reservation,  disguise  or  recrimination."  The  phrase 
"  which  belongs  to  him  "  sustained  the  American  con- 
tention, for  one  could  apply  it  merely  to  that  part  of 
British  and  Spanish  West  Florida  between  the  Per- 
dido  and  the  Appalachicola.  The  Americans  had 
never  claimed  this  as  part  of  Louisiana.  On  the  other 
hand  Spanish  susceptibility  might  be  appeased  by  the 
assumption  that  "  East  and  West  Florida  "  included  all 

^*  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  218-221,  237. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         655 

the  territory  south  of  the  thirty-first  parallel  and  east 
of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Iberville.^^ 

With  the  arrangement  of  this  non-committal  article 
the  controversy  of  fifteen  years  was  allowed  to  rest. 
Neither  nation  could  claim  a  victory  in  the  treaty,  but 
each  had  preserved  its  honor.  The  United  States  al- 
ready occupied  the  disputed  territory ;  the  legal  title 
was  a  mere  shadow  that  need  not  trouble  it  longer. 
As  the  Intelligencer  stated,  this  stipulation  "acknowl- 
edges the  United  States  to  be  sovereign,  under  the 
hitherto  contested  Louisiana  Treaty,  over  all  the  ter- 
ritory we  seriously  contended  for."^®  Spain  had 
simply  yielded  to  the  inevitable,  but  De  Onis  could 
felicitate  himself  on  retaining  Texas.  Hyde  de  Neu- 
ville's  part  in  bringing  about  this  settlement  measur- 
ably atoned  for  the  earlier  diplomatic  jobbery  of 
Napoleon  and  his  agents. 

In  the  two  years'  struggle  over  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty  West  Florida  was  not  specifically  involved. 
Late  in  1819,  by  the  act  for  the  admission  of  Alabama, 
the  remaining  portion  to  the  Perdido  became  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  American  Union.  For  a  time  it 
seemed  that  Great  Britain  might  attempt  to  seize  Cuba 
as  a  counterpoise  to  the  rest  of  the  Floridas  and  thus 
separate  the  twin  objects^  of  Jefferson's  diplomacy.^^ 

15  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  IV,  619-623 ; 
Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  249;  Florida  Treaty  and  Correspond- 
ence, MS.,  48,  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library. 

16  National  Intelligencer,  Feb.  24,  1819. 

"  Niles'  Register,  XVII,  305,  353,  XVIII,  46,  47- 


656        THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

The  American  government  avoided  this  danger  by  re- 
fraining from  seizing  the  peninsula  by  force.  Finally 
Spain,  deserted  by  the  other  powers  and  torn  by  revo- 
lution, resumed  for  a  time  a  constitutional  form  of 
government.  In  October,  1820,  the  short-lived  Cortes 
consented  to  ratify  the  treaty,  and  on  the  twenty- 
second  of  the  following  February,  the  American  Sen- 
ate again  accepted  it  with  only  four  dissenting  votes.^^ 
The  long-drawn  dispute  was  diplomatically  settled. 

This  settlement,  however,  in  no  wise  determined  the 
rightfulness  of  the  American  contention.  Late  in  the 
following  decade  a  case  involving  a  land  grant  in 
Feliciana  gave  Chief-Justice  Marshall  a  chance  to  ex- 
press his  opinion  upon  this  point,  had  he  chosen  to 
avail  himself  of  it.  Something  of  the  animosity  dis- 
played toward  Jefferson  in  Marbury  v.  Madison  or  at 
the  Burr  trial  might  have  led  him  to  undo  the  argu- 
ment upon  which  the  third  president  and  his  advisers 
had  based  their  specious  claims.  But  a  decision  of 
this  sort  would  have  run  counter  to  the  national  policy 
of  a  quarter  century.  In  the  region  involved  it  would 
favor  the  land  speculator  at  the  expense  of  the  actual 
settler.  Marshall,  therefore,  rendered  a  decision  in 
keeping  with  national  interpretation,  but  he  threw  upon 
the  earlier  Republican  administrations  the  responsibil- 
ity for  a  condition  that  left  the  court  no  other  alter- 
native. 

18  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  288. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         657 

According  to  Marshall's  dictum  in  Foster  v.  Neilson, 
France  made  no  declaration  on  the  limits  of  Louisiana 
until  after  she  had  sold  it  to  the  United  States.  Vital 
political  considerations  then  prevented  the  latter  from 
accepting  her  declaration.  We  have  already  noted  at 
length  what  these  "vital  considerations"  were.  In  a 
controversy  over  boundaries,  the  chief-justice  con- 
tinued, the  courts  of  each  country  must  be  guided  by 
the  measures  of  their  own  government.  The  judi- 
ciary cannot  decide  international  questions ;  its  func- 
tion is  to  decide  individual  rights.  If  the  course  of  the 
United  States  was  a  plain  one,  the  court  would  hesitate 
to  pronounce  it  erroneous.  Whatever  the  opinion  of 
the  individual  judge  may  be,  it  is  his  duty  to  conform 
his  decision  to  the  will  of  the  legislature  clearly  ex- 
pressed. A  treaty  in  the  United  States  is  equivalent 
to  an  act  of  legislation,  and  is  thus  part  of  the  law 
of  the  land.  The  Louisiana  court  had  dismissed  the 
case  on  the  ground  that  Spain  had  no  right  to  grant 
land  in  West  Florida,  on  January  2,  1804.  Marshall 
ruled  that  in  so  doing  the  court  had  committed  no 
error.^^ 

In  the  case  of  Newcombe  v.  Skipwith  the  superior 
court  of  the  Territory  of  Orleans  under  Judge  Martin 
had  already  decided  that  West  Florida  formed  part 
of  the  Louisiana   Purchase.^"     Evidently  the  courts, 

1^2  Peters,  253-317,  January  term  of  1829. 
20  Martin,  Louisiana  Reports,  p.  151. 


658         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

both  local  and  national,  were  unwilling  to  override  the 
actio'n  of  executive  and  Congress.  That  body  was  less 
careful  to  remain  consistent.  In  the  Nineteenth  Con- 
gress the  House  of  Representatives  favored  a  claim  of 
De  Lassus  for  the  money  that  the  convention  seized, 
but  the  Senate  refused  to  concur.  In  1849  the  gov- 
ernment finally  paid  the  heirs  of  a  certain  De  la 
Francia  for  the  arms  that  he  had  furnished  Kemper, 
but  only  because  Jackson  had  later  used  them  in  the 
defense  of  New  Orleans.-^ 

With  these  partial  exceptions  the  government  con- 
sistently maintained  its  attitude  upon  this  mooted  ques- 
tion. More  than  thirty  years  after  the  above  inci- 
dent, certain  citizens  of  Louisiana  resident  in  the  Flor- 
ida parishes,  now  by  subdivision  numbering  eight,  at- 
tempted a  more  extensive  raid  on  the  federal  treasury. 
Under  the  plea  that  these  parishes  constituted  the  heirs 
of  the  defunct  State  of  West  Florida,  they  claimed 
the  domain  which  their  reputed  ancestor,  in  1810,  con- 
quered from  the  king  of  Spain.  The  American  occu- 
pation of  that  year  was  due,  they  said,  to  the  invitation 
extended  by  that  State,  and  not  to  the  reasons  urged 
in  the  president's  proclamation.  The  American  gov- 
ernment had  virtually  abandoned  its  contention  that 
West  Florida  was  part  of  Louisiana  in  1805,  at  the 
close  of  Monroe's  mission.     Strategic  reasons  urged  it 

21  Favrot,  in  Publications  of  the  Louisiana  Historical  So- 
ciety, I,  Pt.  Ill,  23,  24. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         659 

to  take  the  country  before  Great  Britain  should  do  so 
and  cut  off  New  Orleans.  Unless  the  American  gov- 
ernment wished  to  follow  precedents  established  in 
India  rather  than  in  America,  it  could  justify  the  occu- 
pation only  by  the  invitation  of  its  inhabitants. 

In  further  support  of  this  claim  the  attorney,  Henry 
Skipwith,  urged  that  those  who  took  part  in  this  move- 
ment were  the  only  successful  revolutionists  in  the 
New  World  who  had  failed  to  retain  the  prize  for 
which  they  had  risked  their  necks.  The  territory  of 
West  Florida  was  the  only  part  of  the  vast  public  do- 
main held  merely  by  a  president's  proclamation  and 
an  act  of  Congress.  Moreover  the  petitioners  claimed 
that  Kemper's  services  gained  Mobile  for  Alabama; 
that  the  arms  purchased  for  him  were  of  material  as- 
sistance to  Jackson  at  New  Orleans  ;  and  that  the  Ten- 
nesseean  recruited  the  horses  for  his  force  in  the  pas- 
tures of  Baton  Rouge  and  Feliciana.  The  revolt  in 
West  Florida  ushered  in  a  series  of  victories  from 
San  Jacinto  to  the  City  of  Mexico.  In  view  of  these 
facts  Skipwith,  as  attorney  for  the  interested  parishes, 
asked  for  a  restoration  of  title  to  the  lands  within 
those  parishes  or  some  other  suitable  reward.  Thus 
the  national  government  might  requite  the  services  of 
those  who  formed  the  short-lived,  independent  State 
of  West  Florida.  Needless  to  say  his  appeal  fell  on 
deaf  ears.     His  efforts,  however,  may  have  been  in- 


660         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

strumental  in  preserving  for  us  some  of  the  records 
of  that  embryo  government.^^ 

"  Honest  friendship  with  all  nations,  entangling 
alliances  with  none."  Thus  in  his  first  inaugural  ad- 
dress Jefferson  tersely  stated  his  ideal  foreign  pohcy. 
One  need  only  read  the  foregoing  pages  to  perceive 
that  in  the  case  of  the  Floridas  the  third  president 
violated  both  of  these  cardinal  principles.  In  his  let- 
ters he  often  seemed  disingenuous  toward  Spain ;  and 
on  more  than  one  occasion  he  was  ready  to  ally  him- 
self with  France,  or  even  his  old  enemy,  England,  in 
order  to  gain  the  coveted  territory.  Nor  was  he 
straightforward  in  his  methods.  As  secretary  of  state 
and  as  vice-president  he  was  willing  to  encourage  the 
mistaken  policy  of  the  Spaniards  in  attracting  Ameri- 
can emigration,  and  to  ignore,  if  he  did  not  openly 
encourage,  filibustering  projects  against  their  domin- 
ions. He  was  bound  to  suppress  these  illegal  projects, 
and  he  must  have  known  that  both  emigration  and  fili- 
bustering were  closely  allied  to  western  separatism 
and  were  fraught  with  peril  to  the  newly-formed 
Union. 

22  Cf .  the  following  pamphlets  in  the  Library  of  Congress : 
Historical  Summary  and  Argument  in  support  of  the  claim 
of  the  Louisiana  Parishes,  etc.,  Washington,  1884,  and  Three 
Epochs,  a  Pocket  Memorandum  to  aid  Congress  and  the  Presi- 
dent in  Arbitrating  the  Rights  of  the  Florida  Parishes,  New 

Orleans,   187 .     The  three  epochs  referred  to  were  1803, 

i8io,  1846. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY  66l 

Jefferson  was  a  many-sided  individual ;  and  some 
may  attribute  to  his  sympathetic  touch  with  the  fron- 
tiersmen the  leniency  that  he  exhibited  toward  emi- 
grants and  filibusters.  But  his  foreign  policy  is  less 
easily  defensible.  He  was  willing  to  guarantee  Spain's 
possessions  beyond  the  Mississippi,  to  bear  meekly  Na- 
poleon's financial  extortions,  to  submit  to  England's 
humiliating  commercial  demands,  and  to  preach  the 
gospel  of  Pan- Americanism — and  all  that  he  might 
thereby  gain  the  Floridas.  For  the  same  reason  he 
gave  willing  ear  to  Livingston's  specious  argument 
that  West  Florida  was  part  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase, 
and  speedily  surpassed  his  preceptor  in  advocating  it. 
In  due  time  this  advocacy  included  his  Virginian  asso- 
ciates and  his  loyal  henchmen  everywhere.  Once  sure 
of  their  leader's  position  his  supporters  continued  to 
champion  the  argument,  even  though  it  caused  a 
schism  in  the  party  and  morally  weakened  their  chief 
in  his  encounter  with  the  Federalists. 

A  few  at  this  day  may  contend  that  by  maintaining 
the  specious  plea  he  saved  the  country  from  open  war- 
fare with  Spain.  There  are  measures  that  are  worse 
than  war,  and  among  them  we  may  reckon  the  Florida 
controversy.  Yet  that  dispute  did  not  wholly  prevent 
war.  Jefferson's  course  and  the  course  of  his  succes- 
sor may  be  classed  among  the  minor  causes  of  the 
second  war  with  Great  Britain.  In  that  conflict  Spain 
was  as  much  the  other's  ally  as  she  dared  be.     It  was 


662         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

manifestly  her  weakness  that  had  kept  her  from  as- 
suming the  role  of  open  combatant  in  1810,  or  long 
before.  It  was  distrust  of  her  British  ally — a  distrust 
that  the  latter's  policy  toward  her  colonies  did  much 
to  warrant — that  prevented  her  more  effective  partici- 
pation in  the  actual  conflict.  She  had  been  likewise 
hampered  when  the  nominal  ally  of  Napoleon.  The 
United  States  profited  from  the  Corsican's  chicane ; 
but  it  also  reaped  advantage  from  the  distrust  aroused 
in  Spanish  councils  by  its  traditional  antagonist,  Eng- 
land. Spain,  helpless  in  the  hands  of  her  forceful 
allies,  often  had  to  yield  to  the  contentions  of  the 
United  States.  We  may  assume  that  such  easy  suc- 
cesses stimulated  in  no  small  measure  the  Jeffersonian 
attitude  toward  national  preparedness. 

It  may  be  urged  that  the  commercial  situation 
abroad  during  the  Napoleonic  wars  left  Jefferson  no 
other  diplomatic  course  than  the  one  he  pursued. 
Henry  Adams  has  pointed  out  the  possibility  of  a  more 
friendly  understanding  with  Great  Britain,  especially 
after  1808.  Such  an  understanding,  if  no  closer  union 
resulted,  would  have  placed  the  United  States  squarely 
in  the  conflict  against  Bonaparte,  and  that  at  least 
would  have  been  preferable  to  Jefferson  and  Madison's 
miserable  truckling  to  the  Napoleonic  system.  While 
it  might  have  involved  some  subserviency  to  the  Mis- 
tress of  the  Seas,  this  would  have  been  but  tempor- 
ary, and  in  any  event  would  have  been  preferable  to 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         663 

the  alternate  truculent  and  timorous  bullying  that 
shaped  their  Spanish  policy.  It  was  not  this  attitude 
but  the  tacit  abandonment  of  Spain  by  her  European 
neighbors  that  gave  their  successor,  Monroe,  or  rather 
his  secretary  of  state,  Adams,  the  measure  of  success 
registered  in  the  Florida  Treaty.  Not  even  Adams 
could  defend  all  the  steps  leading  up  to  that  apparent 
triumph — and  he  generally  did  it  passing  well — with- 
out more  than  one  violent  wrench  to  his  Puritan 
conscience. 

The  men  who  opposed  the  American  diplomats — 
Godoy  and  Talleyrand,  Cevallos  and  Champagny,  Tur- 
reau  and  Casa  Yrujo,  De  Onis  and  Hyde  de  Neuville 
— received  their  training  in  an  environment  where 
intrigue,  craftiness,  and  mendacity  were  the  accepted 
weapons.  Their  American  competitors  claimed  to  be 
men  of  another  stripe.  Yet  even  when  diplomacy  de- 
scended to  the  plane  of  sordid  bribery,  the  executive 
and  his  counsellors  were  willing  to  profit  by  it.  To 
such  depths  did  his  obsession  for  the  Floridas  entice 
Thomas  Jefferson. 

One  must  not  criticise  thus  far  without  some  at- 
tempt to  point  out  another  possible  course.  The  won- 
der is  that  Jefferson,  with  his  predilection  for  the 
frontiersman,  did  not  perceive  it  more  clearly.  His 
utterances  show  that  he  had  occasional  inklings  of  the 
influence  ultimately  to  be  exerted  by  American  expan- 
sion, but  he  seemed  unwilling  to  rely  upon  it  implicitly. 


664        '^^^    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

It  is  not  necessary  to  center  this  movement  about 
Zachariah  Cox,  William  Blount,  Reuben  Kemper, 
and  Joseph  Pulaski  Kennedy,  and  others  of  irregular 
deed,  although  they  represent  one  of  its  less  favor- 
able phases.  It  is  also  unnecessary  to  overestimate 
the  work  of  Andrew  Ellicott,  Harry  Toulmin,  William 
C.  C.  Claiborne,  George  Matthews,  and  David  Holmes, 
who  wrought  under  direct  official  sanction.  But  there 
were  hundreds  of  humble  pioneeers,  whose  names  not 
even  a  land  grant  has  preserved,  whose  collective 
agency  in  American  expansion  was  more  potent  than 
either  group  of  the  above  men,  or  even  those  who  di- 
rected their  common  government.  In  Texas,  and  to  a 
less  degree,  in  California,  they  later  demonstrated 
what  they  could  do  without  direct  governmental  initia- 
tive. They  were  undertaking  the  same  in  the  Floridas, 
and  particularly  in  West  Florida,  when  Jefferson  and 
his  associates  unadvisedly  tried  to  hasten  the  process. 
It  is  doubtful  if  they  hastened  it  to  any  extent.  It 
required  ten  years  for  them  to  occupy  the  land  to  the 
Perdido,  and  almost  another  decade  passed  before  the 
peninsula  rewarded  their  efforts.  Texas  was  peopled 
in  less  than  a  score  of  years,  and  a  like  period  sufficed 
to  preoccupy  California.  In  these  later  instances,  im- 
patient diplomacy  sought  to  hasten  the  process,  as  it 
did  in  Florida,  and  war  actually  followed,  with  a  most 
unfortunate  emphasis  on  sectionalism  and  its  attendant 
evils. 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         665 

Although  actual  warfare  did  not  mark  the  earlier  ac- 
quisition, its  avoidance  brought  no  laurels  to  the  diplo- 
mats of  the  period.  Moreover  the  prolonged  discus- 
sion over  specious  claims  served  to  engender  a  hatred 
and  suspicion  that  became  the  chief  diplomatic  heritage 
of  our  Spanish-American  neighbors.  The  earliest 
suggestions  of  state  policy  presented  to  the  embryo 
Mexican  nation  were  marked  by  suspicion  of  the 
United  States.  In  1830  Alaman  warned  his  country- 
men against  the  designs  of  its  government  as  already 
shown  in  West  Florida.  Thirteen  years  later  Almonte 
and  Santa  Anna  vainly  attempted  to  forestall  a  like 
peril  in  California.-^  It  is  fair  to  assume  that  later 
professions  of  Pan-Americanism  often  failed  to  arouse 
an  enthusiastic  response  because  such  early  exponents 
as  Jefferson  and  Wilkinson  used  that  cult  as  a  bait  to 
secure  the  Floridas. 

If  the  diplomat,  then,  played  only  the  part  of  blun- 
derer in  the  acquisition  of  the  Floridas,  to  whom  is  due 
the  major  credit  for  that  deed?  Obviously,  to  the 
American  pioneer.  Miro  and  Carondelet  feared  him 
and  bribed  his  reputed  leaders  to  keep  him  back. 
Morales  and  Folch  declaimed  against  him  but  were 
unable  to  stay  his  course.  Time  and  the  river  cur- 
rents were  all  in  his  favor.  The  hostile  savage,  se- 
cretly abetted  by  a  few  scattered  Spanish  garrisons, 
could  not  terrorize  him.     Virgin  soil,  almost  unoccu- 

23  American  Historical  Review,  XVII,  290. 


666         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

pied,  had  for  him  an  irresistible  attraction.  A  com- 
placent De  Lassus  gave  him  his  opportunity.  Under 
the  circumstances  it  was  only  necessary  to  leave  him 
alone  and  to  profit  by  his  onward  course.  Not  all  his 
acts  while  in  progress  were  defensible,  but  more  can 
be  said  in  their  favor  than  in  behalf  of  the  diplomacy 
that  dogged  his  footsteps  in  West  Florida. 

It  was  this  pioneer,  holding  his  own  on  the  exposed 
frontier,  who  rightly  claimed  the  assistance  of  his  gov- 
ernment. Confusion  and  anarchy  in  the  neighboring 
Spanish  province  might  affect  his  negro  slaves  or  the 
near-by  Indians.  This  situation  formed  a  real  reason 
for  action  by  the  American  authorities.  In  a  lesser 
degree  the  pioneer  was  concerned  over  the  prospect 
of  foreign  intervention.  The  peril  of  French  pres- 
ence, before  1803,  was  very  pronounced.  After  that 
date  there  was  a  possibility  that  Great  Britain  might 
be  invited  to  establish  herself  in  the  Floridas,  but  it 
was  a  very  remote  possibility.  The  British  faction 
there  was  not  strong  numerically,  although  it  included 
some  of  the  most  influential  men  of  the  region.  But 
it  did  not  suit  British  policy  to  assume  political  con- 
trol of  an  area,  unless  it  were  absolutely  necessary. 

As  long  as  Spain  retained  Cuba  and  British  com- 
mercial interests  in  the  Gulf  were  not  jeopardized, 
England  was  only  mildly  interested  in  the  fate  of  the 
Floridas.  Of  course  she  preferred  to  have  them  re- 
main in  the  nominal  possession  of  Spain.     As  long  as 


THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY         667 

they  maintained  that  status  her  merchants  had  a 
chance  in  time  of  peace  to  monopoHze  their  restricted 
markets ;  in  time  of  war  to  blockade  their  few  ports ; 
or  in  the  later  American  conflict,  to  use  those  ports  as 
best  suited  her  military  and  naval  purposes.  Even 
with  the  American  government  absorbing  the  territory 
piecemeal,  England  retained  some  of  these  advantages  ; 
and  when  that  government  obtained  all  of  the  Floridas, 
Spain  still  kept  Cuba,  and  British  interests  in  her 
other  former  colonies  were  superior  to  those  of  the 
United  States.  With  such  substantial  advantages  se- 
cured by  a  peace  policy,  it  were  madness  to  arouse 
American  hostility  and  possibly  Latin-American  dis- 
trust by  seizing  territory  that  strategically  was  un- 
necessary. 

By  registering  a  claim  to  West  Florida,  therefore, 
the  American  diplomats  did  nothing  to  advance  the 
popular  desire  for  the  whole  of  the  Florida  region. 
Rather  it  confused  the  issue  and  hampered  those  resi- 
dents of  the  region  who  wished  for  American  control. 
The  argument  for  frontier  defense  against  neighbor- 
ing anarchy  or  possible  foreign  intervention  had  more 
weight,  but  it  played  no  conspicuous  part  in  the  train 
of  events  that  brought  the  territory  into  the  Union. 
Of  commanding  influence,  however,  was  the  wish  of 
the  people  themselves,  particularly  those  who  dwelt  in 
the  Baton  Rouge  jurisdiction.  It  was  necessary  to 
express  this  wish  covertly  and  to  carry  it  through  in 


668         THE    CONCLUSION    OF    THE    CONTROVERSY 

a  roundabout  way.  This  they  did  successfully  only 
to  find  that  the  American  government  would  not  rec- 
ognize their  agency,  but  must  base  its  action  on  a  dis- 
carded diplomatic  puzzle.  There  is  little  cause  for 
wonder,  therefore,  that  the  story  of  how  West  Florida 
was  acquired  has  remained  a  perpetual  tangle,  inex- 
plicable, discreditable,  and  generally  ignored  by  the 
very  people  who  should  have  been  most  interested  in 
its  details. 

That  this  is  so  is  largely  the  result  of  the  unfor- 
tunate diplomatic  controversy  that  raged  over  the  re- 
gion between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Perdido.  As 
a  phase  of  frontier  expansion  its  acquisition  can  be 
more  readily  understood.  The  various  steps  that  led 
up  to  it  were  not  wholly  praiseworthy,  but  they  were 
the  natural  phases  of  a  popular  movement  into  the 
wilderness.  The  pioneers  who  took  part  in  it  had 
pressed  into  an  area  that  physiographically  belonged 
to  the  United  States  and  they  undertook  to  make  this 
relation  a  political  one  also.  They  occupied  the  terri- 
tory by  peaceful  means,  dispossessing  few  that  had 
any  legitimate  claim  for  redress.  They  outstripped 
the  diplomat  and  forced  his  hand,  and  in  the  final 
settlement  their  deeds,  though  obscured  under  a  cloud 
of  words,  formed  the  determining  factor.  If  the  pre- 
ceding chapters  have  made  this  clear,  the  writer  has 
accomplished  his  purpose. 


INDEX 


Adair,  John:  on  the  Tombigbee, 
204,  208;  reports  on  the  Flor- 
ida border,  326-328;  suc- 
ceeded by  Clay,   546. 

Adams,  John:  favors  separate 
treaty  with  Great  Britain,  16; 
attitude  toward  France,   66. 

Adams,  John  Quincy:  discussion 
with  De  Onis,  650;  firmness 
in  negotiation,  653;  defends 
the  claim  to  West  Florida, 
663. 

Adet:  attitude  of  toward  Louisi- 
ana, 38,  39,  T2. 

Alabama  River:  American  claim 
to  the  navigation  of,  590;  see 
also  Tombigbee  and  Mobile. 

Alabama,  State:  admission  of,  641, 

6SS- 

Alaman,  Lucas:  warning  of,  665. 

Alcudia,  el  duque  de;  see  Godoy, 
Manuel. 

Almonte,  Mexican  minister:  warn- 
ing of,   665. 

Alvina;   see    Davilmar. 

Amelia  Island:  occupation  of,  562; 
possible  French  expedition 
against,    568. 

American  diplomats:  jealousy 
among,   z^y,   246,  258. 

American  government  (adminis- 
tration): ambition  of,  68,  639; 
charged  with  complicity,  154, 
324,  406,  459,  512,  536;  non- 
interference with  Spanish  col- 
onies, 303;  criticism  of,  362, 
449.  S19.  53°.  536,  S38,  548- 
551.   S97>  642;  opposes  Mobile 

44 


Society,  462,  466;  policy  to- 
ward Spain,  13,  102,  170,  185, 
526. 

American  intervention  in  West 
Florida:  character  of,  331; 
measures  to  bring  about,  578; 
justified  by   Monroe,   579. 

American  migration:  after  1783, 
22;   perils  of,  439. 

American  party  in  West  Florida 
convention:  purpose  of,  382; 
measures  for  protection  of, 
388. 

American  protection:  offer  of,  266, 
459;  Spaniards  advised  to  ask 
for,  470. 

American  troops:  suspicious  move- 
ments of,  148;  clandestine 
passage  of,  196;  Foronda's  in- 
quiries concerning,  290;  con- 
centration of,  at  New  Orleans, 
306;  Skipwith  requests  aid  of, 
496;  threaten  Mobile,  510; 
confused  with  filibusters,  511; 
withdraw  from  Mobile,  521; 
threatening  movements  of, 
553;  occupy  Mobile,  613. 

Amite  River:  volunteers  from, 
158;  site  for  proposed  arsenal 
on,   431. 

Apodaca,  Juan  Ruiz  de:  asks  aid 
of  the  British  government, 
554;  relations  as  captain- 
general  with  Ziiniga,  615,  620, 
624;  orders  court  martial  of 
Mobile  officers,  621;  plans  to 
oppose  the  Americans,  626, 
633- 


669 


670 


INDEX 


Appalachicola  River:  as  boundary, 
II,  12,  74,  272;  Ellicott  on, 
62. 
Armstrong,  John,  minister  to 
Paris  and  secretary  of  war: 
succeeds  Livingston,  113;  has 
disappointing  interview  with 
Talleyrand,  128;  advises 
seizure  of  Texas,  129, 
136,  227;  forwards  Tal- 
leyrand's project,  232;  op- 
poses the  sending  of  Erving 
to  Madrid,  238;  appeals  to 
Talleyrand,  248;  second  ap- 
peal of,  251;  disputes  with 
Bowdoin,  258,  260-264;  tem- 
porary absence  from  Paris, 
274;  unsuccessful  in  submit- 
ting "  hypotheses "  for  ne- 
gotiation, 272-274;  advises  im- 
mediate rupture  with  France, 
278;  unsatisfactory  negotia- 
tion with  Champagny  and  re- 
call, 278-280;  receives  trucu- 
lent instructions  from  Madi- 
son, 534 ;  orders  the  occupa- 
tion of  Mobile,  616;  trans- 
mits note  of  Manrique  to 
Monroe,  626,  630 ;  supposed 
author  of  attack  on  the  Flor- 
ida Treaty,  654. 

Assembly  in  West  Florida:  peti- 
tion for,  319,  336,  342;  re- 
sents Madison's  proclamation, 
496-498;  resolution  of,  498, 
573- 

Audibert,  C.  M. :  defends  French 
refugees,  429;  West  Florida 
agent  at  New  Orleans,  431, 
43  S- 

Aurora,  abuses  Skipwith,  573. 

Bahamas:      reported      mission      of 

Kemper  to,   163. 
Bainbridge,    Lieutenant:    in    com- 


mand of  American  convoy  at 
Mobile,   589,    591. 
Baker,   Joshua   G. :    personal   agent 

of   Governor   Holmes,    363. 
Baldwin,   Samuel   H. :   naval   agent 

of  West  Florida,  432,  435. 
Balearic    Islands:    Godoy's    resent- 
ment over,   254,   256. 
Ballinger,    John:    immigrant    from 
Kentucky,       388;       commands 
West  Florida  grenadiers,  397; 
reports  flight   of   enemy,   400; 
writes    Toulmin    about   annex- 
ation, 418,  470;  organizes  the 
West    Florida    regulars,     420, 
428;    makes    appeal    in    behalf 
of  Hargreave  and  Sibley,  484; 
arrests      Claiborne's      messen- 
ger,   502;    submits    to    Ameri- 
can   authority,    504;    proposes 
the    Pearl    as    boundary,    599; 
agent    for    the    West    Florida 
claimants,    599-601. 
Barbe-Marbois:    attitude   regarding 
claim  to  Mobile,   81;   suggests 
payment  of  money,   114. 
Barlow,    Joel,    American    minister 
in  Paris:  related  to  Kennedy, 
445;      Madison's     instructions 
to,    531;    negotiations    regard- 
ing   the    Floridas,     554,     568- 
571;  dies  in   Poland,   570. 
Barrow,    William:    reports    condi- 
tions   in    West    Florida,    338; 
member   of   the   West   Florida 
convention,   349;  urges  Amer- 
ican   intervention,     340,     364, 
418;      member      of     executive 
committee    of    West    Florida, 
428;   reports  conditions,    536. 
Bassano,  Due  de:  succeeds  Cadore, 

565.    569. 
Baton    Rouge:    importance    of,    4; 
assemblage    of   militia   at,    46; 
mentioned     by     Salcedo,     89, 
149;     Grand    Pre    placed    in 


INDEX 


671 


charge  of,  150;  character  of 
population  surrounding,  151; 
attacked  by  the  Kempers,  156; 
military  road  to,  161;  threat- 
ened by  American  forces,  191, 
202,  284;  Jefferson  advises  its 
occupation,  308;  threatened  by 
French    and    Americans,    335, 

341,  360,  378,  392;  ruinous 
condition  of  fort  at,  371,  375; 
petition  for  assembly  at,  342; 
compared  with  other  centers 
in  Spanish  America  388;  oc- 
cupation of  by  insurgents, 
395-408;  attempted  mutiny  in, 
412;  formal  inquiry  into  cap- 
ture of,  413;  occupation  of, 
by  Americans,  489,  495-506; 
reports  of  dissatisfaction  in, 
526,  572;  few  British  adher- 
ents in,  531;  occupation  of, 
discussed  by  the  Spaniards 
and  British,  510,  557,  562, 
592;  American  garrison  at, 
597;  temporary  government 
for,  601;  later  mention  of, 
62s,  632,   667. 

Bayou  Manchac:  proposal  to 
deepen  channel  of,  74,  325; 
mention  of,  89;  blockade  of, 
219. 

Bayou  St.  Louis:   disorder  at,  580. 

Bayou  Sara:  outrages  of  banditti 
at,  157;  complaint  of  turbu- 
lence at,  333;  movement  for 
holding   an   assembly   in,    334, 

342,  358;  alarming  reports 
from,  371,  374.  395- 

Beauharnais,  Eugene  de:  not  to 
act  as  intermediary,  267;  ad- 
vice of,   to   Erving,   268. 

Bedford,  J.  R. :  correspondent  of 
William  Barrow,  338,  352, 
418;  favors  the  incorporation 
of  West   Florida,   353. 


Bernaben  (Bernabue,  Bernabeu), 
Spanish  consul  at  Baltimore: 
spelling  of  name,  455;  assured 
by  Smith  in  regard  to  Mobile 
Association,  531;  controversy 
with  Monroe,  532,  541,  551- 
553;  demands  evacuation  of 
West  Florida,   555. 

Beurnonville,  French  charge  at 
Madrid:  appeal  of  Spaniards 
and  Pinckney  to,  106;  re- 
ceives instructions  from  Tal- 
leyrand, 107;  attitude  toward 
the  joint  negotiation,   120. 

Bienville:  encounters  English  ves- 
sel, 7;  leads  expedition  against 
the   Chickasaws,  9. 

"Bigbians":  antipathy  inspired 
by,  583- 

Biloxi,  Bay  of:  habitations  on,  4; 
Iberville  establishes  garrison 
at,  7;  plan  to  organize  a  par- 
ish at,  580;  establishment  of 
American  authority  at,  585; 
prevalent  fear  of  Choctaws  at, 
613. 

Blount,  William:  plans  to  invade 
Louisiana  and  the  Floridas, 
37;  relations  of,  with  Wilkin- 
son and  Jefferson  and  the 
Spaniards,  38;  Ellicott's  ef- 
forts to  circumvent  the  con- 
spiracy of,  52;  reputation  as  a 
frontier  bogie,  53;  mention 
of,   664. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph:  as  diplomatic 
intermediary,  76,  129;  atti- 
tude toward  the  United  States, 
279;  accredited  with  proposal 
to  sell  the  Floridas,  297,  455, 
553'  566;  mention  of,  441;  re- 
fusal to  receive  minister  of, 
453;     demands    the    Floridas, 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon;  see  Napo- 
leon. 


672 


INDEX 


Boundary     survey:     delayed,     54; 

completed,  62. 
Bourbon   County:   organization  of, 

18,  42. 
Bourbons:   fail  to   check   the  Eng- 
lish,  10,   26. 
Bowdoin,  James:   commissioned  as 
minister    to    Spain,    118;    goes 
to  Paris,  237;  opposes  money 
jobbers,     239,     258;     criticises 
Armstrong,  239,  242,   258,   269, 
27s;    reports    plan   of    Parker, 
241;   criticises  executive,   269; 
diplomatic    measures    of,    243, 
262,    263,    266;    lacks   recogni- 
tion   by    the    French    govern- 
ment,   263,    276;    warning    to 
Erving,     2TT,     regrets    course 
of   Skipwith,   574. 
Bowles,   W.   A.:   offers  to  conquer 
the   Floridas,   20;   projects  or- 
ganization of  the  Creeks,   140; 
assisted  by  Ellicott,    140;   cap- 
ture  of,    140. 
Brackenridge,    H.    M. :    favors   the 
claim    to    West     Florida,    94, 
648. 
Brissot      de      Warville:      predicts 
American        success        against 
New    Orleans,    20;    initiates   a 
universal  revolutionary  propa- 
ganda,   24. 
British  adherents  and  agents:   37. 
300,   322,   327,    341,   450,   491. 
507,    557,    609,    627,   636,   666. 
British  alliance:   suggested  by  Jef- 
ferson, 71,  228,  229;  by  Mon- 
roe, 123,   131;  feared  by  Clai- 
borne,   210;    by    Folch,    224; 
considered     by     Godoy,     266; 
use  of,  to   Spain,   638. 
British    fleet:     to    cooperate    with 
Blount,    37;    sent    from    Hali- 
fax to  the  West  Indies,   288; 
reported     at     Pensacola,     521, 
613. 


British  minister:  protests  against 
the  occupation  of  Baton 
Rouge,  523 ;  notes  controversy 
over  Mobile,  596;  offers  me- 
diation, 651. 

British  titles  to  land  in  West 
Florida:  confused  condition 
of,  367- 

British  West  Florida:  proposal  to 
revive,    598. 

Brown,  Shepherd,  commandant  at 
St.  Helena:  opposes  the  meet- 
ing of  an  assembly,  343.  408; 
offers  to  help  De  Lassus,  360, 
385,  386;  appointed  associate 
justice,  380;  attempt  of 
Crocker  to  reach,  403;  flight 
of,   409-411. 

Buford,  Major:  467,  476. 

Burr,  Aaron:  object  of,  doubtful, 
188;  activities  in  New  Or- 
leans, 189;  connection  with 
West  Florida,  190;  reported 
movements  of,  194;  Wilkin- 
son's warning  against,  19s; 
reaches  Natchez,  197;  reasons 
for  flight,  203;  arrest  of,  204; 
effect  of  conspiracy,  209;  ru- 
mors of  revival,  288;  later 
proposals  of,  311;  mention  of, 
313.  346,   656. 

Cadore,  Due  de:  see  Champagny. 

Calhoun,  John  C:  on  Louisiana, 
60s. 

California:   382,   664. 

Caller  brothers:  threaten  Span- 
iards, 169. 

Caller,  James:  relations  with  Du- 
pree,  427,  580;  with  Kennedy, 
445,  583;  appeal  of  Holmes 
to,  446;  force  under,  451;  ar- 
rested by  Toulmin,  483;  car- 
ries Madison's  proclamation, 
508;   suspects   Matthews,    526; 


INDEX 


673 


occupies  Pascagoula,  581;  at- 
tack on  Creeks,  625. 

Caller,  John:  closes  Mobile,  185; 
associated  with  Dupree,  423; 
Toulmin  appeals  to,  476. 

Caller,  Robert:  adherent  of  Kemp- 
er, 468. 

Campbell,  of  Georg^ia:  219. 

Caracas:   361,   489. 

Carmichael,  William,  American 
minister  at  Madrid:  instruc- 
tions to,  21,  25;  associated 
with  Short,  26;  quits  Spain, 
28. 

Carolina  Charter:  27. 

Carondelet,  Baron  de:  fears  propa- 
ganda of  Genet,  25;  attempts 
to  revive  western  separatism, 
25,  46;  attitude  towards  Elli- 
cott's  mission,  34,  43 ;  advises 
delay  in  delivering  forts,  36; 
takes  measures  to  suppress 
dissatisfaction  at  Natchez,  45; 
effect  of  proclamation  of,  49; 
fears  the  American  pioneer, 
665. 

Carson:  adherent  of  Kemper,  445; 
ordered  to  prepare  militia, 
508;  messenger  to  Folch,  519. 

Carter,   C.  E.:    12,   note. 

Casa  Calvo,  el  Marques  de,  Span- 
ish boundary  commissioner: 
compared  with  Ellicott,  34; 
appeals  to  French  commis- 
sary, 89;  opposes  American 
troops  on  the  Mobile,  143; 
character  of,  147;  position  of, 
in  regard  to  the  Kempers,  153, 
160;  disapproves  land  sales, 
174;  aroused  by  Jefferson's  mes- 
sage, 17s;  expelled  from  New 
Orleans,  183,  230,  252;  re- 
sents Burr's  actions,   189. 

Casa  Yrujo,  el  Marques  de:  rela- 
tions with  Madison  and  Mer- 
ry, 98;  aided  by  Turreau,  107, 


116;  reports  attitude  of  Amer- 
ican government,  112,  129, 
note;  rumored  connection  of, 
with  land  sales,  174;  warns 
against  Burr,  191;  position  in 
negotiation,  242,  256,  267; 
succeeds  Pizarro,  652;  men- 
tion of,  663. 

Castlereagh:  receives  Spanish  pro- 
test, 624;  avoids  joint  action 
with  Spain,  634. 

Castor,  sloop:   detained,  207. 

Cazeaux:  urges  occupation  of 
Floridas,    567. 

Cevallos,  Spanish  minister  of 
state:  rejects  proposal  to  buy 
the  Floridas,  79;  obduracy  of, 
104;  negotiates  with  Monroe 
and  Pinckney,  119,  126,  130, 
131,  13s.  559;  complains  of 
American  actions,  225,  252; 
detests  Americans,  637;  char- 
acter of,  646;  mention  of,  663. 

Chambers,  Joseph:  at  St.  Steph- 
ens, 144;  protests  against  du- 
ties,  168. 

Champagny  (Due  de  Cadore) : 
succeeds  Talleyrand,  274;  ne- 
gotiates with  Armstrong,  277- 
280;  advised  to  settle  Amer- 
ican claims,  532;  instructs 
Serrurier  in  regard  to  the 
Floridas,  535;  succeeded  by 
Bassano,  565;  mention  of, 
663. 

Chaterpe  Line:  established  with 
the   Indians,    13. 

Cherokees:  18. 

Chesapeake  outrage:  effect  of,  210, 

275- 
Chickasaw   Bluffs    (Memphis) :   4°- 
Chickasaws:   13,    18. 
Chifonte:  385.  435,  439- 
Chisholm,  John  D.:  38. 
Choctaw  s:   English  traders   among, 

9;    Spanish  treaties  with,    18; 


674 


INDEX 


Ellicott's  relations  with,  42, 
57;  cession  by,  113;  difficulty 
in  restraining,  141;  possible 
combination  of,  with  Creeks, 
438;  relations  with  Spaniards, 
447,  450;  with  British,  492; 
Claiborne's  advice  to,   613. 

Claiborne,  F.  L. :  plots  against 
Mobile,  222;  advices  to  Cal- 
ler, 509;  in  War  of  1812, 
614,    628. 

Claiborne,  W.  C.  C. :  publication 
of  letter  books  of,  x,  146, 
note;  favors  claim  to  Per- 
dido,  88,  89;  attacked  by  Wil- 
kinson and  Clarke,  143;  as- 
sociated with  Wilkinson,  145, 
188,  198,  294,  609;  attitude 
toward  Kempers,  153,  160, 
164;  toward  Mobile  commerce, 
168,  178;  reports  discontent  in 
West  Florida,  210;  interviews 
V'idal  and  Folch,  296;  urges 
intervention,  330;  appoints 
Wykoff  agent,  332,  551;  fa- 
vors amnesty,  366;  intercedes 
for  American  captives,  484; 
directs  American  intervention, 
490-505;  "palatine  methods" 
of,  506;  explains  action,  508, 
517;  warns  Sparks,  518;  suc- 
ceeds Matthews  and  McKee, 
528;  reports  conditions  in 
West  Florida,  536;  relations 
of,  with  Skipwith,  500,  502, 
572,  574,  577;  measures  of, 
to  organize  the  Mobile  Dis- 
trict, 584,  593,  606;  contro- 
versy with  Folch  over  Mobile, 
588-590;  proposes  the  Pearl 
as  boundary,  599;  measures 
of,  for  frontier  defense,  609, 
614,  626,  627;  replies  to 
Zunig^a,  611;  charged  with 
complicity,  629;  mention  of, 
664. 


Clark,  Daniel,  Jr. :  Gayoso's  state- 
ment to,  about  the  treaty,  35; 
informs  Ellicott  concerning 
the  Spaniards,  47,  61;  views 
of,  on  the  boundaries  of 
Louisiana,  88;  advises  meas- 
ures against  the  French,  142; 
exposes  Wilkinson  to  Madi- 
son, 142;  appeals  in  behalf  of 
the  Kempers,  158;  reported 
intimacy  of,  with  Burr,  189, 
195;  publicly  exposes  Wilkin- 
son, 220;  "intriguing  devo- 
tion "   of,   to   England,    536. 

Clark,  Daniel,  Sr. :  corresponds 
with   Wilkinson,   59. 

Clark,  George  Rogers:  prevents 
cooperation  of  British  forces, 
15;  resents  treatment  accord- 
ed him,  23 ;  offers  to  the 
French,  24;  visited  by  Ful- 
ton.  39. 

Clay,  Henry:  defends  administra- 
tion,  546;   regrets  Texas,   654. 

Collell,  Francisco:  commands  at 
Mobile,  185;  disputes  passage, 
587,    591 

Collins,  Joseph:  against  Dupree, 
426,  580;  commander  of  the 
naval  force,  435. 

Collot,  Victor:  reports  of,  39; 
Livingston  opposes,   72. 

Colorado  River:  as  western  bound- 
ary of  Louisiana,    134,   273. 

Colufnbian  Sentinel:  publishes  es- 
says of  John  Lowe,  539. 

Commerce:  threatened  reprisals 
against,  132;  mutual  conces- 
sions concerning,  183;  affect- 
ed by  British  attitude,  537, 
662;  see  also  Mobile  River, 
commerce   on. 

Commercial  claims:  associated  by 
Livingston,  with  the  Floridas, 
73;  Talleyrand's  views  on,  76, 
249;       Cevallos      refuses      to 


INDEX 


675 


ratify,  106;  American  use  of, 
in  negotiation,  120,  532,  558, 
S66;  Cevallos  discusses,  122; 
Americans  offer  to  relinquish, 
134,  231,  251;  serve  as  pre- 
text,   560. 

Commercial  route:  Tennessee  to 
Mobile,   140. 

Commissioners:  to  Mobile,  421;  to 
New  Orleans,  430;  financial 
difficulties  of,   431. 

Committee  of  Public  Safety  at 
Baton  Rouge:  382,  421. 

Committee  of  Safety  at  Natchez: 
SI. 

Congress,  American:  early  atti- 
tude of,  14,  15;  suggested  ap- 
peal to,  354,  382,  531;  me- 
morial to,  506;  authorizes  the 
occupation  of  the  Floridas, 
523;  discusses  the  West  Flor- 
ida question,  544,  551;  secret 
action  of,  553. 

Convention  in  West  Florida:  sug- 
gested by  Claiborne,  330;  or- 
dered by  Esteban,  338;  mem- 
bership, organization,  and 
powers  of,  346,  348,  351;  de- 
sires harmony  with  De  Las- 
sus,  348;  statement  of  griev- 
ances by,  349;  address  of,  to 
De  Lassus,  351;  Barrow  re- 
ports uncertainty  in,  352; 
true  purpose  of,  360,  384;  re- 
assembles, 363;  De  Lassus 
approves  its  proceedings,  368, 
370;  criticised  by  Lopez,  369; 
adopts  financial  measures  and 
appoints  officials,  378,  380; 
final  adjournment  of,  380; 
orders  attack  on  Baton 
Rouge,  394;  opposition  to, 
408;  wishes  incorporation  in- 
to the  Union,  415;  possible 
division  among  members  of, 
418;    governmental    and    mili- 


tary measures  of,  420;  in- 
vites participation  of  Mobile 
and  Pensacola,  421;  execu- 
tive committee  of,  428;  agents 
of,  at  New  Orleans,  429; 
debt  of,  494,  602;  submits  to 
the   United    States,    500. 

Convention  of  1802:  failure  to 
ratify,    106,   257. 

Cooper,  William:  complaints  of, 
349;  addresses  De  Lassus, 
351;  refuses  joint  agreement, 
379;  opposes  independence, 
386;  property  of,  plundered, 
412. 

Cortes,  Spanish:  Americans  re- 
ferred to,  525 ;  opposes  alien- 
ation of  territory,  561;  Lab- 
rador's report  to,  563;  con- 
sents  to   treaty,   656. 

Council:  in  West  Florida  as- 
sembly, 340. 

Council  of  War:  considers  Baton 
Rouge,  409;  determines  on 
defense,  611. 

Covington,  Colonel:  cooperates 
with  Claiborne,  493;  at  Baton 
Rouge,  504;  succeeds  Cush- 
ing,    521. 

Cox,  Zachariah:  aided  by  Gayoso, 
59,  140;  plans  of,  140,  444; 
mention  of,  664. 

Crawford,  William,  land  commis- 
sioner:  640. 

Creek  Indians:  at  Natchez,  17; 
Washington  loses  patience 
with,  26;  oppose  bounr"  y 
survey,  62,  141;  access  of 
English  to,  492;  possible  aid 
from,  612;  hostility  of,  627- 
629. 

Crocker,  Raphael:  secretary  of 
De  Lassus,  333;  at  confer- 
ences, 370,  393;  remonstrates 
with  De  Lassus,  371,  389; 
complaints      of,       391,       392; 


676 


INDEX 


course  of,  39S-403;  punish- 
ment of,  413. 

Crocker,  Samuel:  346. 

Crozat,  grant  to:  mention  of,  9, 
546. 

Cuba:  early  connection  with  the 
Floridas,  6;  Turreau  advo- 
cates seizure  of,  231,  268, 
281,  307;  revolutionary  party 
in,  288;  connected  with  the 
Floridas,  294,  304,  655;  Brit- 
ish influence  therein,  488, 
534,  646,  655;  attitude  of, 
toward  annexation,  545;  rein- 
forcements from,  612;  possi- 
bility of  independence,  631. 

Cuban  Papers;  see  Papeles  de 
Cuba. 

Cuming,    justice   of   peace:    581. 

Cushing,  Colonel  Thomas  P.:  fur- 
nishes troops,  436,  452,  473; 
operations  of,  near  Mobile, 
508,  512,  520;  disbands  mili- 
tia, 520,  583;  court  martial 
of,  SSI- 
Dallas,  A.  J. :  as  intermediary, 
S32.  SSo. 

Darrington,    Major  John:    581. 

"  Dashers  ":  544. 

Dauphine  Island:  fortification  of, 
594;  occupied  by  Americans, 
610;  Spanish  garrison  ousted 
from,  617,  619. 

Dautremont:  interviews  of,  with 
Skipwith,  247,  258. 

Davidson,  R. :  requests  protection, 
405- 

Davenport,  John:  reports  on 
Bayou  Manchac,  325;  agi- 
tates for  assembly,  342. 

Davilmar  (Alvina),  Napoleonic 
agent:  character  of,  313;  at 
Baton  Rouge,  313,  317;  ar- 
rested, 314. 


Davis,    Colonel   Hugh:   406. 

Dayton,  Jonathan:  on  Louisiana 
limits,  93;  intermediary  for 
Burr,   190. 

De  Clouet,  Louis:  relations  of, 
with  Wilkinson,  194,  note; 
Folch    indorses    plan    of,    205. 

De  Lassus,  Carlos  Dehault,  com- 
mandant at  Baton  Rouge:  ap- 
points committee  to  examine 
Bayou  Manchac,  325;  com- 
plaints concerning,  333  s 
warned  against  the  French, 
33S;' permits  convention,  342, 
344;  acquiesces  in  its  action, 
347-382;  Folch's  opinion  of, 
358,  361,  377;  rejects  offer  of 
salary,  3S9;  complains  of 
resources,  359;  address  of,  to 
junta,  375;  defends  his  course, 
383;  charged  with  complicity, 
385;  neglects  the  fort,  389; 
holds  social  conferences,  370, 
393;  appeals  to  Folch  for  aid, 
394;  fails  to  take  precautions, 
39S-400;  apprehended,  401; 
house  of,  ransacked,  402;  cen- 
sured by  Spaniards  and 
Americans,  413;  Claiborne's 
course  toward,  508;  Skip- 
with's  relations  with,  S74; 
mention  of,  621,  658,  666. 

De  Lisle:   suggests  boundary,   10. 

De  Luna:  settles  at  Pensacola,  6. 

De  Onis,  Don  Luis,  Spanish 
minister  to  the  United  States: 
fails  to  secure  recognition, 
309,  561;  reports  French  emis- 
saries, 335;  complains  of  Mo- 
bile Society,  454;  doubts 
Smith's  assurances,  4S6; 
learns  of  the  capture  of  Baton 
Rouge,  532;  distrusts  the 
American  government,  532, 
541,  S96,  641;  publishes 
"  Verus,"         548;         protests 


INDEX 


677 


against  the  annexation  of 
West  Florida,  604,  606;  pro- 
tests against  the  occupation  of 
Mobile,  623;  demands  re- 
linquishment of  West  Florida, 
645;  part  of,  in  Florida  nego- 
tiation, 648-652;  character  of, 
653- 

Dearborn,  Henry:  272. 

Definition:  period  of,  in  West 
Florida,    10. 

Delimitation:  period  of,  in  West 
Florida,  2,    10. 

Deposit,  right  of,  at  New  Orleans: 
28,  75,  124,  17s. 

Deserters:  Americans  request  re- 
turn of,  222,  437;  patrol  to 
apprehend,  406;  pardon  for, 
416;  in  Mobile  district,  442; 
immunity  for,  498,   502,   572. 

Dinsmoor,  Silas:  agent  to  Choc- 
taws,  144;  part  in  arrest  of 
Kemper,    483,   note. 

Dog  River:  rendezvous  at,  435; 
site  for  garrison,  384;  tem- 
porary limit,  593. 

Dos  de  Mayo:  political  effects  of, 
280,  283. 

Du  Passau,  George:   158,  398. 

Du  Pratz:  summarizes  territorial 
claims,  10. 

Doyen:  247. 

Duane,  William:  573. 

D^  '"'T,  William:  55. 

Duncan,  Abner  L. :  assists  Folch, 
220;  relations  with  Davidson, 
405;  with  convention,  429, 
431,  465- 

Duplantier,   Armando:    158. 

Dupont   de   Nemours:   72,   304. 

Dupree,  Sterling:  course  of,  at 
Pascagoula,  423-427,  580; 
Kemper's  instructions  to,  424; 
opposed  as  office-holder,  639. 

Duvall,   Richard:   346. 


East  Florida:  boundary  of,  11; 
proclamation  by  governor  of, 
24;  proposal  to  incorporate 
with  West  Florida,  353;  Brit- 
ish influence  in,  492,  534,  560; 
work  of  Matthews  in,  528; 
discussed  in  Congress,  544, 
554;  protests  against  occupa- 
tion, 550,  554,  556;  as  com- 
pensation for  commercial 
claims,  568;  bill  to  occupy 
modified,  614;  Adams  makes 
offer  for,  651. 

Ellicott,  Andrew,  boundary  com- 
missioner: instructions  to,  33; 
relations  with  Gayoso,  40-44; 
opposes  Power,  47;  conflict- 
ing testimony  of,  regarding 
Wilkinson,  47,  note;  meas- 
ures of,  at  Natchez,  50-52; 
on  the  boundary  survey,  54; 
predicts  annexation,  61 ;  op- 
poses claim  to  West  Florida, 
540;   mention  of,   664. 

Ellis,   John:    312. 

Embargo:  effect  of,  217-220; 
Folch  seeks  to  modify,  218, 
220;  continuance  of,  288,  291; 
established  at  Mobile,  607. 

England:  enlarges  her  sphere  of 
influence,  10;  more  vigorous 
policy  toward,  235;  warned 
by  Merry,  245;  attitude  of, 
Turreau  reports,  280-282; 
possible  mission  to,  364;  meas- 
ures to  circumvent,  537;  joint 
guarantee  of,  564;  influences 
Spain,  645;  Jefferson's  atti- 
tude toward,  666. 

Erving,  George  W.,  American 
representative  at  Madrid:  dis- 
cusses Spanish  complaints, 
225;  charges  of,  against  Arm- 
strong and  French  agents, 
238-240;  favors  vigorous  pol- 
icy,   240;    relations    of,    with 


678 


INDEX 


Vandeul,  261;  threatens  to 
leave  Spain,  268;  possible  mis- 
sion of,  to  Havana,  488;  de- 
tained in  Paris,  636;  negoti- 
ates at  Madrid,  646-648. 

Escorial:  treaty  of,  3,  64;  migra- 
tion of  court  to,  30. 

Espiritu  Santo:  controversy  over, 
6. 

Estevan,  Thomas:  proceeds  against 
the  Kempers,  153;  opposes  as- 
sembly, 322;  administration 
oi,  333-336;  requests  rein- 
forcements, 371;  reports  dan- 
ger at  Bayou  Sara,  374;  with- 
draws guard,  391-396;  re- 
tires,  405. 

Eubanks,  William:  423. 

Europe:  influence  of,  285,  297; 
intervention  of,  530;  diplo- 
macy of,   663. 

Eustis,  William,  secretary  of  war: 
449- 

Evening  Post,  New  York:  492. 

Everett,  Alexander  H. :  651. 

Extradition:  223. 

Farragut,  George:   580,  592. 

Fauchet,   French  minister:   25,   38. 

Federalists:  attack  Madison,  538: 
publish  letter  to  Wykoff,   551. 

Feliciana  District:  settlement  of 
Americans  in,  59;  mention  of, 
157;  meeting  of  people  in, 
340;  people  of,  favor  an  ap- 
peal to  United  States,  341; 
disturbances  in,  374;  mention 
of,  380. 

Ferdinand  VII:  proceedings  in 
name  of,  324,  343,  346,  351, 
392;  party  of,  352;  interests 
of,  mentioned,  358;  rights  of, 
369;  toasts  to,  370;  loyalty  to, 
376-378,  414;  refusal  to  rec- 
ognize,    453;     contempt     for. 


531;     return    of    from    exile, 
637- 

Fernan  Nunez,  Spanish  minister 
at  London  and  Paris:  pre- 
sents demands  of  the  Re- 
gency, 624;  proposes  common 
action  to  the  British,  634; 
requests  opinion  of  the 
French  government,  647. 

Filibusters:  warning  of  Holmes 
to,  451;  desperate  character 
of,  494;  operations  of,  in 
Floridas,  632;  Jefferson's  atti- 
tude toward,  660. 

Fiscal   at   Havana:   report  of,   413. 

Florida  parishes:  claim  of,  658- 
660. 

Florida  peninsula:  extent  and  de- 
fense of,  9;  exchanged  for 
Cuba,  10. 

Floridas:  possible  cession  of,  21; 
population  of,  21;  mention  of, 
25,  27,  35 ;  invasion  of,  29; 
attitude  of  Americans  toward, 
32;  Blount's  plan  to  invade, 
37;  Americans  plan  to  seize, 
45;  rumor  that  French  pos- 
sess, 64;  constitutionality  of 
incorporating,  68;  Spain  un- 
willing to  alienate,  69;  French 
attempt  to  acquire,  69;  desire 
to  force  cession  of,  102 
French  desire  to  profit  from, 
129;  Folch  proposes  a  cap 
taincy-general  in,  214;  Tur 
reau  advocates  seizure  of,  231 
254;  stipulated  price  for,  232 
251;  Jefferson's  attitude  to 
ward,  255,  284,  661,  663 
Armstrong  and  Bowdoin  ad 
vise  seizure  of,  267,  278;  ne 
gotiation  at  Paris  for,  277- 
280,  290;  specious  attitude  of 
Napoleon  toward,  278,  283; 
Robin's  position  toward,  282; 
American      troops      threaten, 


INDEX 


679 


284;  opposition  to  English  in, 
292,  533;  destined  to  the 
United  States,  296;  American 
intrigues  in,  306,  308;  as  re- 
ward for  subserviency  to  Na- 
poleon, 309;  Burr's  purpose 
to  seize,  311;  threatened  by 
the  Mobile  Society,  456;  pos- 
sible transfer  of,  471,  475, 
524,  527,  53^;  British  protest 
concerning,  543;  course  of 
American  government  toward, 
563,  565,  596,  614,  633;  com- 
pensation to  France  for,  566; 
British  views  concerning,  567, 
609,  622;  ceded  to  Spain  by 
Great  Britain,  654;  ceded  by 
Spain  to  United  States,  653, 
6S4.  656. 

Flournoy,  General  Thomas  J.: 
succeeds  Wilkinson,  626;  con- 
troversy with   Spaniards,   627. 

Folch,  Vizente :  "  crooked  talks  " 
of,  62;  views  of,  on  limits  of 
Louisiana,  68;  on  Wilkinson's 
proposals,  92;  official  title  of, 
149,  note;  character  of,  150; 
operations  of,  against  the 
Kempers,  161;  in  New  Or- 
leans, 162;  criticises  Ameri- 
cans, 173;  unwilling  to  re- 
ceive Morales,  183;  deter- 
mines to  visit  Baton  Rouge, 
19s;  refuses  to  meet  Wilkin- 
son and  Claiborne,  207;  plans 
to  oppose  British  and  Amer- 
ican influences,  211-213;  dis- 
cusses claims  with  Claiborne, 
215;  censures  Grand  Pre,  223; 
opinion  of  Wilkinson,  287- 
289;  third  journey  to  Baton 
Rouge,  294;  interviews  Clai- 
borne, 296;  proposals  of  Wil- 
kinson to,  299 ;  purpose  of, 
•  regarding  West  Florida,  302; 
criticises  De  Lassus,  345,  3^2, 


385,  401;  aroused  by  reports 
from  Baton  Rouge,  361,  367; 
invited  to  St.  Helena,  387, 
408;  appeal  of  Toulmin  to, 
420;  suggests  abandonment  of 
province,  422;  plot  to  assas- 
sinate, 437;  visits  Havana, 
440;  advises  appeal  to  Amer- 
ican government,  448;  re- 
quested not  to  interfere  with 
Indians,  450;  asks  Americans 
to  break  up  Kemper's  project, 
462;  comes  to  Mobile,  469; 
advises  the  transfer  of  Flor- 
ida to  the  United  States,  471, 
480;  authorizes  American 
troops  to  enter  West  Florida, » 
474;  attacks  Kemper's  forces, 
482;  reinforced,  494;  reverses 
position  in  regard  to  delivery 
of  West  Florida,  508-519;  re- 
lations with  Matthews  and 
McKee,  522-528;  discussion  of 
his  offer,  553-556;  attitude  of, 
toward  the  American  govern- 
ment, 585;  final  discussion 
with  Claiborne,  589;  charac- 
ter of,  592;  mention  of,  621, 
66s. 

Foronda,  Spanish  charge:  com- 
plains of  blockade,  219;  sup- 
ports Folch,  224;  complains  of 
Wilkinson,  291;  attacks  Flor- 
ida assembly,  324;  denies 
right  to  navigate  the  Mobile, 
438. 

Fort  Adams:  Kempers  at,  166; 
measures  of  Claiborne  at,  494; 
court-martial  at,   521. 

Fort  at  Baton  Rouge:  attempt  of 
Kempers  against,  156;  neg- 
lected by  De  Lassus,  389,  392; 
capture  01,  398-400;  occupied 
by  Americans,  505. 


68o 


INDEX 


Fort  Charlotte  (Mobile) :  mention 
of,  15;  occupied  by  Ameri- 
cans, 619. 

Fort   Mimms:   massacre   at,    629. 

Fort  Stoddert:  threatened  by  Mo- 
bile Society,  442,  444;  rein- 
forcement of,  450,  597;  men- 
tion of,  466,  614. 

Fortier  and  Son:  205. 

Forts  on  the  Mississippi,  Spanish: 
attitude  of  Kentucky  toward, 
35- 

Foster,  Augustus  J.,  British  min- 
ister to  United  States:  in- 
structions to,  S54;  cooperates 
with  Bernaben,  555;  discus- 
sion of,  with  Monroe,  555- 
5S9;  complains  of  Matthews, 
561;  protests  against  occupa- 
tion of  Baton  Rouge,  605. 

France:  possible  intervention  of, 
3;  desires  to  regain  Louisi- 
ana, 20;  Jefferson  tries  to 
gain  influence  of,  25;  at  war 
with  Spain,  28;  Monroe 
wishes  assistance  of,  123;  du- 
bious position  of,  233,  261; 
measures  to  gain  approval  of, 
565;  attitude  of,  toward  Flor- 
idas,   651. 

Franklin:  willing  for  Great  Brit- 
ain to  seize  the  Floridas,  16, 
note. 

Freeman,  Thomas:  service  on 
boundary    commission,    33. 

Freeman's  Journal:   492. 

French  agents:  to  Spanish  colo- 
nies, 288. 

French   commercial  interests:    567. 

French  Directory:  attitude  toward 
Pinckney,  29. 

French  element  in  Louisiana:  9, 
57S. 

French  emissaries:  plan  revolt  in 
Florida,  335,  384. 

French  force:  for  Mexico,  531. 


French  government:  financial  ex- 
pectations of,  113,  118,  136; 
unpopular  in  West  Florida, 
382. 

French  intrigues:  measures  to  op- 
pose in  the  West,  65,  142; 
against  Spain,  276;  warning 
against,  356;  menace  of,  in 
the  Floridas,   377. 

French  refugees,  from  Cuba:  pre- 
cautions against,  310;  ex- 
pelled from  Baton  Rouge, 
335 ;  danger  from,  374,  384; 
loyalty  of,  defended,  429. 

"Friend  of  the  People":  broad- 
side  of,   371. 

Frontier  disputes:  intensified  by 
the  purchase  of  Louisiana, 
139- 

Frontier:  officials,  139,  464;  prob- 
lems,   146. 

Frontiersmen:  influence  of,  663. 

Fulton,  Samuel;  visits  Clark,  39; 
agent  to  the  Creeks,  65;  part 
in  suppressing  the  Kemper 
uprising,  158;  entrusted  with 
the  mails  in  West  Florida, 
171;  in  controversy  over  de- 
serter, 222;  on  committtee  at 
Bayou  Manchac,  325;  offers 
services  to  Madison,  328;  as- 
sembly at  house  of,  342; 
made  lieutenant-colonel,   380. 

Gaines,  E.  P. :  in  command  at 
Fort  Stoddert,  185;  at  Mo- 
bile, 196;  releases  Spanish 
vessel,  224;  interview  with 
Folch,  474;  near  Mobile,   512. 

Gaines,   George  T. :   Indian  factor, 

293- 
Gallatin,  Albert:  dissents  from 
views  of  cabinet,  10 1;  ex- 
plains amendment  to  Mobile 
Act,  219;  wishes  to  modify 
demands  on  Spain,  228;  inter- 


INDEX 


68l 


views  Turreau,  307;  sugges- 
tions from,  331;  disapproves 
the  occupation  of  Mobile,  621. 

Galvez,  Bernardo  de:  friendliness 
to  Americans,  14;  reduces 
British  establishments,  15; 
reference   to,  465. 

Gardoqui,  Diego  de,  Spanish  rep- 
resentative: demands  aban- 
donment of  the  Mississippi, 
15;  ill  success  of,  19;  asso- 
ciated with  Morgan,  22;  atti- 
tude of,  toward  American  en- 
voys, 28;  reference  to,  552. 

Gayoso  de  Lemos,  Manuel:  delays 
the  delivery  of  the  Natchez 
district,  35-37.  40,  43;  retalia- 
tory measures  of,  42;  procla- 
mation of,  43 ;  attempts  to 
secure  American  neutrality, 
44;  precipitates  insurrection, 
50;  delays  the  survey,  S4; 
voices  his  distrust  of  Ameri- 
cans, 56-58;  permits  Wilkin- 
son on  Bayou  St.  Jean,   143. 

Genet,  French  minister  to  United 
States:  24,  25. 

Georgia:  founding  of,  9;  mention 
of,  12;  Creek  war  in,  17;  land 
agents  of,  18;  migration  from, 
439,   460. 

German  coast:  slave  insurrection 
in,  575- 

Giles,  W.  B. :  544,  583. 

Girondists:  24. 

Godoy,  Manuel,  Duke  of  Alcudia, 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace:  not 
inclined  to  treat  with  the 
Americans,  28;  negotiates 
with  Pinckney,  30;  gains 
title,  31;  measures  of,  against 
treaty,  31,  33,  54;  unmoved 
by  Pinckney,  104;  negotia- 
tions with  Monroe,  119,  13s; 
land  claims  of,  241,  269; 
"Prefect"    of    France,    243; 


unwilling  to  negotiate,  252; 
attempts  to  break  with  Na- 
poleon,  266;   mention  of,  663. 

Graham,  John:  relations  with 
Charles  Pinckney,  70,  104; 
secretary  of  Orleans  Terri- 
tory, 172;  mission  to  Folch, 
173,  179;  interviews  Morales, 
186;  in  the  State  Department, 
417;  corresponds  with  Skip- 
with,   573,   578. 

Grand  Pre,  Carlos  de:  refusal  to 
receive  at  Natchez,  52;  in 
command  at  Baton  Rouge, 
150;  advises  caution  with  the 
Americans,  152;  appeals  for 
aid  against  the  Kempers,  154; 
distrusted  by  Folch,  161,  201, 
312;  controversy  of,  with 
Williams,  166;  measures  of, 
to  defend  Baton  Rouge,  191; 
disregards  Wilkinson's  warn- 
ings, 197;  protests  against 
violation  of  territory,  223;  im- 
plicated with  Davilmar,  314; 
death  of,  325 ;  mention  of, 
334,  392,  602,  621. 

Grand  Pre,  Louis  de:  mention  of, 
370,  375,  392;  dies  defending 
Baton  Rouge,  396-399. 

Gravina,    Admiral:    107. 

Great  Britain:  possible  interven- 
tion of,  3 ;  object  of,  in  dis- 
pute over  Natchez,  17;  in- 
trigues of,  in  West,  20;  trea- 
ties with,  26,  27,  30;  allied 
with  Spain,  28;  Gayoso  fears, 
57;  unwilling  to  aid  the 
United  States,  64;  attitude 
toward  the  French,  73; 
Americans  fear  designs  of, 
96,  121;  neutral  position  of, 
231;  commercial  interests  of, 
involved,  251,  261;  Napoleon 
demands  American  aid 

against,  278;  warnings  against 


682 


INDEX 


influence  of,  285,  294;  atti- 
tude of,  towards  West  Flor- 
ida, 282,  329,  417;  policy  of, 
in  Spanish  colonies,  555;  pos- 
sible interference  of,  in  East 
Florida,  560;  second  war  with, 
560,  60s,  609;  proposal  to 
cede  part  of  Floridas  to,  649; 
see  also  England  and  British. 

Green,  Thomas:  attempts  to  or- 
ganize Natchez,    18,  42. 

Guarantee,  of  Spanish  colonies: 
•25,  67,  yj,  652. 

Guion,  Captain  Isaac:  at  Natchez, 
52. 

Gutierrez   expedition:    629. 

Hamilton,  Alexander:  position  of, 
in  the  Nootka  Sound  contro- 
versy, 20;  plans  to  invade 
Spanish  colonies,  66. 

Hamilton,  Paul:  secretary  of  the 
navy,  488. 

Hampton,  General  Wade:  409, 
450,  576. 

Hargreave:  agent  of  Kemper,  424; 
captivity  of,   484. 

Harris,  George:  z^Z,  342>  349- 

Harris,   William:   318. 

Hawes,   Edward:   421. 

Hawkesbury,  Lord:  attitude  to- 
ward the  Floridas,  71. 

Hawkins,   Benjamin:  444. 

Henry,  Patrick:   14. 

Hevia,  Francisco  de:  commandant 
at  Ticfau,  374,  385;  land 
claims  of,  640. 

Hickey,  Philip:  protest  of,  222; 
member  of  committee  on 
Bayou  Manchac,  325;  sent  to 
advise  Estevan,  336,  342,  385; 
doubtful  attitude  of,  337;  re- 
ports plot  to  attack  Baton 
Rouge,  341;  activities  of,  in 
convention,  349-351;  influ- 
ence of,  over  De  Lassus,  367; 


member  of  special  committee, 
382,  428. 

Holmes,  David,  governor  of  Mis- 
sissippi Territory:  describes 
conditions  in  West  Florida, 
339;  instructed  by  Smith  and 
Madison,  332,  355;  views  of, 
concerning  the  West  Florida 
assembly,  341,  361-367;  pre- 
dicts rupture  with  De  Lassus, 
381;  adopts  precautions,  405; 
supports  appeal  to  United 
States,  416;  proclamation  of, 
disregarded,  427;  attitude  to- 
ward Indian  peril,  444,  612; 
works  against  the  Mobile  So- 
ciety, 446-451;  mention  of, 
470,  478,  536,  664;  chagrin  of, 
at  Kemper  episode,  485;  part 
taken  in  intervention  at 
Baton  Rouge,  493-505;  rela- 
tions with  Skipwith,  499;  or- 
ganizes territory  beyond  the 
Pearl,  606;  protests  to 
Zimiga,  608;  measures  of,  for 
defending  frontier,  611-614; 
measures  to  organize  Mobile, 
6ig. 

Hooke,  Captain  Moses:  commis- 
sioned to  seize  Burr,  202. 

Horry,  Pinckney:  writes  memoir 
on   the   Floridas,    254. 

Horsey,  senator  from  Delaware: 
545- 

Horton,  James:   421,  438. 

Howard,  Carlos:  opinion  of,  re- 
garding American  officials, 
169;  commandant  at  Pensa- 
cola,    185. 

Hughes,  Daniel:  interviews  Folch, 
198. 

Humbert,  General:  plans  to  at- 
tack  Pensacola,   632. 

Humboldt:  reputed  agent  of  Na- 
poleon, 310. 


INDEX 


683 


Humphreys,  David:  vouches  for 
Americans,   53. 

Hundred  thousand  dollar  bribe: 
ofifered  by   Spaniards,   46. 

Hutchins,  Anthony:  leader  of 
Tories  at  Natchez,  14;  identi- 
fied with  Blount,  43;  opposes 
committee  of  safety,  52;  ex- 
cluded from  West  Florida, 
59- 

Hyde  de  Neuville,  French  minis- 
ter to  United  States:  653, 
6SS,    663. 

Iberville,  LeMoyne  d':  settle- 
ment of,  7;  plans  to  check 
English  advance,   10,   533. 

Iberville  River;   11,  74,  97,  325. 

Immigration:  Gayoso's  opinion  of, 
58. 

Independence  of  West  Florida: 
proclaimed  by  Kempers,  155; 
premature  report  of,  347; 
possible  declaration  of,  360; 
formally  declared,   413. 

Indians:  policy  toward,  17;  ob- 
ject to  Americans,  35,  37; 
Gayoso  threatens  to  employ, 
51;  Wilkinson's  treaties  with, 
141;  French  agents  among, 
142;  rumors  that  Spaniards 
were  tampering  with,  173, 
210,  389,  411,  444,  521,  612, 
632;  danger  of  combining 
with  Americans,  439;  fron- 
tiersmen resent  privileges 
given,  443 ;  recognized  as 
barriers,  539;  Folch  unwilling 
to  use,  586;  effect  of  Jack- 
son's treaty  with,  636;  see 
also  separate  tribes. 

Innerarity,  James:  represents 
Forbes  and  Co.,  180;  opinion 
of  Kennedy,  448;  attitude  re- 
garding annexation,  459,  473; 
grateful     to     Toulmin,      46B; 


urges  acceptance  of  Folch's 
offer,  472;  attitude  toward 
American  occupation,  582- 
584. 

Innerarity,  John:  views  of,  on  an- 
nexation, 473. 

Insurgents:  at  Baton  Rouge,  158; 
vessels  of,   586. 

Insurrection:  causes  of,  at  Baton 
Rouge,   152. 

Intervention:  in  Spanish  colo- 
nies, 109;  by  Napoleon,  260; 
in  West  Florida,  572-575. 

Isaacs,  Ralph:  interview  with 
Folch,   525. 

Izquierdo:  agent  'of  Godoy,  247; 
diplomatic  relations  of,  with 
Americans,   256-270. 

Jackson,  Andrew:  reference  to, 
136;  views  of,  regarding  the 
Floridas,  614;  at  New  Or- 
leans, 635;  effect  of  his  in- 
vasion of  Florida,  652;  uses 
arms  purchased  for  Kemper, 
659- 

Jackson,  T.  J.,  British  minister: 
instructions  of,  289;  views  re- 
garding New  Orleans,  309; 
blustering  course  of,   554. 

Jay,  John:  failure  of,  at  Madrid, 
is;  willing  for  Great  Britain 
to  seize  the  Floridas,  16, 
note;  ill-success  of,  with 
Gardoqui,  19,  28;  treaty  of, 
with  Great  Britain,  29,  31; 
example  of,  263. 

Jefferson,  Thomas:  Pan  American 
view  of,  5 ;  in  Nootka  Sound 
episode,  20;  proposes  to  guar- 
antee Spanish  colonies,  21; 
attitude  toward  migration  in- 
to Spanish  territory,  24;  in- 
structions of,  to  Carmichael 
and  Short,  26;  attitude  of,  on 
French  in  Louisiana,  71;  P^e- 


684 


INDEX 


pares  pamphlet  on  limits,  87 ; 
attitude  regarding  navigation 
of  the  Mobile,  118,  182;  criti- 
cised by  Clark  and  Wilkinson, 
142;  attitude  of,  toward  peo- 
ple of  Baton  Rouge,  151;  uses 
Kemper  and  Flannigan  inci- 
dents, 167;  measures  of,  for 
border  defense,  181;  answers 
complaints  of  Foronda,  225; 
indecision  of,  towards  Spain, 
227-233;  attitude  of,  toward 
the  Spanish  uprising,  284; 
note  of,  to  Someruelos,  291; 
desires  to  profit  from  Na- 
poleon's intervention,  304;  re- 
sponsibility for  situation  in 
West  Florida,  312,  331,  537, 
563;  congratulates  Adams  on 
defense  of  American  claim, 
650;  twin  objects  of  his 
diplomacy,  655;  violates  his 
own  principles,  660. 

Jesup,  T.  J. :  proposes  attack  on 
Cuba,   646. 

Jobbery,  financial:  in  negotiation 
at  Paris,  133,  239. 

Jones,  "Captain":  with  Kemper, 
469. 

Jones,  Michael:  Tory  partisan, 
158;  opposes  convention,  387, 
408;   joins  insurgents,   412. 

Jones,   Walter:   540. 

Johnson,  Isaac:  380. 

Johnson,  John,  Sr. :  465. 

Johnston,  John  H. :  part  taken  in 
summoning  convention,  338; 
visited  by  Baker,  365;  part 
taken  in  capture  of  Baton 
Rouge,  324,  393,  397,  403; 
member  of  committee  of 
safety,  421;  of  executive  com- 
mittee, 428;  senator  in  as- 
sembly, 432;  messenger  for 
Skipwith,   500. 


Junta  de  Guerra  :  375-377,  587, 
592. 

Keene,  R.  R. :  warns  against  Burr, 
19s;  memoir  attributed  to, 
564- 

Kemper  brothers:  agents  of  John 
Smith,  152;  insurrectionary 
attempt  of,  154;  seized  at 
Pinckneyville,  165-168;  fur- 
ther projects  of,  324;  feuds 
of,  438. 

Kemper,  Nathan:  mention  of,  152, 
15s,    158,    165. 

Kemper,  Reuben:  mention  of,  152, 
153,  160,  163,  165,  313;  com- 
missioner of  the  convention  to 
Mobile,  421,  435-465;  rela- 
tions with  Pascagoula,  422; 
American  attitude  toward, 
449.  457;  operations  of,  on 
the  Mobile,  457-480,  494,  583, 
588,  659;  arrest  of,  482;  ef- 
forts in  behalf  of  Hargreave, 
485,  522;  relations  with  Toul- 
min,  486,  516;  reassembles  fol- 
lowers, 511;  opposed  by  Skip- 
with, 574;  represents  the 
West  Florida  convention,  600; 
mention  of,  664. 

Kennedy,  Joseph  Pulaski:  oppo- 
nent of  the  Spaniards,  180; 
threatens  Mobile,  216,  222, 
445-447,  526;  commissioned 
by  Kemper,  423,  460;  charac- 
ter of,  463,  476;  arrest  of, 
483;  reference  to,  485,  494, 
583,    664. 

Kennedy,  William:  physician  at 
Mobile,    180. 

Kentuckians:  references  to,  58, 
193.  459- 

Kentucky:  mention  of,  21,  34, 
124:  rumors  of  insurrection 
in,  200;  Spanish  intrigues  in, 
58,  454- 


INDEX 


685 


King,   Rufus:   94. 
King,  messenger  of  Claiborne:  ar- 
rested,  502. 
Koskiusko:   offers  services,    137. 

Labrador,  Pedro:  report  of,  to 
Cortes,    562. 

Land  bounties:  dissatisfaction 
over,  506. 

Land  claims:  of  Hutchins,  52; 
waived  by  the  United  States, 
416;  American  policy  regard- 
ing, 498,  553,  643;  Toulmin's, 
640;  character  of,  602,  641. 

Land  grants:  uncertainty  of,  584; 
confirmation  of  desired,   597. 

Land  sales:  by  Morales,  174; 
Armstrong's  connection  with, 
269;  difficulties  connected 
with,  494;   recognition  of,  572. 

Land  tax:  levied  by  convention, 
420. 

Land  titles:  stipulations  regard- 
ing, 366;  confusion  among, 
603,  639;  final  settlement  of, 
641-644;  status  of  British, 
643- 

Land  values:  337. 

Lansdowne:  proposes  to  ex- 
change Gibraltar  for  Floridas, 
16,  note. 

Las  Casas,  Eulogio  de:  magazine 
guard,  369;  refuses  to  attend 
meetings,  310;  yields  kes's  of 
magazine,  403;   diary  of,   404. 

Laussat,  French  commissioner: 
views  of,  on  limits  of  Louisi- 
ana, 89,  95. 

Lennan,  Francisco,  curate  at 
Bayou  Sara:  mention  of,  335, 
341;  accompanies  Estevan, 
393;  later  movements  of,  404. 

Leonard,  Gilbert:  civil  comman- 
dant, 380;  present  at  junta, 
375.  393;  later  career  of,  404. 

45 


Leonard,  John  W. :  adherent  of 
De  Lassus,  346;  loyalty  of, 
suspected,  369;  member  com- 
mittee of  safety,  421;  presid- 
ing officer  of  senate,  432. 

Lewis,  E. :  attacks  Toulmin,  478, 
640;  complains  of  Dupree, 
639- 

Lilley,  Thomas:  presides  over  as- 
sembly, 318;  corresponds  with 
Grand  Pre,  322;  signs  peti- 
tion, 342;  work  in  conven- 
tion, 349,  358,  382;  at  Baton 
Rouge,   398. 

Liston,   British  minister:  38. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.:  attitude 
of,  concerning  French  pos- 
session of  the  Floridas,  72 ; 
charged  with  corrupt  dealings, 
73,  note,  228,  246,  263;  re- 
verses position  on  West  Flor- 
ida, 77,  83,  661;  doubts  suc- 
cess of  negotiation,  105;  un- 
willing to  work  with  Monroe, 

113- 

Loan:  requested  by  the  West 
Florida   convention,    416,   496. 

Louisiana,  province  of  (or  Louisi- 
ana Purchase) :  reference  to 
purchase  of,  21,  34,  no;  atti- 
tude of  western  settlers  to- 
ward, 25,  37;  transfer  of,  to 
France,  31,  38,  64-66,  71;  ces- 
sion of,  to  United  States,  76, 
80,  124,  145,  250,  439,  499. 
546;  proposal  to  exchange  for 
Floridas,  77,  81,  91,  123,  131, 
146,  212,  234,  527,  639,  648; 
limits  of,  81,  93,  95,  97.  231, 
235.  257,  270,  577;  militia  of, 
to  invade  Mexico,  193;  Folch 
proposes  to  invade,  224;  rela- 
tion of  West  Florida  to,  489; 
shifting  of  diplomatic  interest 
in,  274,  564;  American  title 
to,     fraudulent,     563 ;     monar- 


686 


INDEX 


chical  government  for,  564; 
plan  for  separation  and  con- 
quest of,  633. 

Louisiana  Regiment:   396,  398,  615. 

Louisiana,  State  of:  enabling  act 
for,  547,  548,  604;  Florida  as 
counterpoise  to  French  in, 
567,  601;  relation  of  West 
Florida  to,  598,  658;  exten- 
sion of,  to  the  Pearl,  598, 
604,  60s;  criticism  by  legisla- 
ture of,   643. 

Lopez,  Manuel:  member  of  the 
West  Florida  convention,  346, 
350,  382;  protests  against  its 
work,  369. 

Lowe,  John:  attacks  policy  of  ex- 
ecutive,   539. 

Lyonnet,   Pierre:   24. 

McBay,  James:  arrested  by  the 
Spaniards,    608. 

McCall,  Richard:   636. 

McCurtin'g  Bluff  ("  Bunker 
Hill  "):  469,  474,  477. 

MacDermott,    Bryan:    380. 

McDonough,  John:  431. 

McGillivray,  Alexander:  treaty 
with  Spaniards,  17;  mention 
of,  26;  opposed  by  Milfort, 
39- 

McHenry,   James:    540. 

McKee,  Colonel  John:  opposes 
Kemper,  463 ;  furthers  Folch's 
offer,  480,  522-526,  550;  re- 
ports hostilities  of  the 
Creeks,    627. 

Madison,  James:  explains  Mobile 
Act,  98;  urges  claims  against 
Spain,  no; 'favors  abandon- 
ment of  claita  to  West  Flor- 
ida, 118;  instructs  Monroe, 
138;  discusses  commerce  on 
the  Mobile,  178;  attitude  of, 
regarding  Monroe's  failure, 
228;   instructs  Armstrong  and 


Bowdoin,  243-245,  257;  pro- 
tests against  subserviency  to 
Napoleon,  271;  moderates  his 
views  on  the  Floridas,  305 ; 
reverses  Jefferson's  policy, 
308;  intervention  of,  328-332, 
487.  555;  communications 
from  Bedford  to,  339,  353; 
fails  to  mention  communi- 
cations from  Holmes,  416; 
views  of,  on  Mobile  expedi- 
tion, 449,  467;  transmits 
Folch's  offer  to  Congress, 
523;  mention  of,  563;  op- 
posed to  Napoleon's  pecuniary 
views,  567;  fails  to  settle 
Florida  question,   647. 

Malte  Brun:  649. 

Manrique,  governor  of  West  Flor- 
ida: arrests  McBay,  608;  suc- 
ceeds Zutiiga,  621;  measures 
of,  against  the  Americans, 
624;  corresponds  with  Flour- 
noy,   628-630. 

Marshall,  Humphrey:   56. 

Marshall,  John:   656. 

Martinez,   Andres:    399,  410. 

Mary,  schooner:  dispute  over,  180. 

Mason:  intermediary  for  Skipwith, 
417,   536,  578. 

Masot,   Spanish  commandant:   640. 

Masserano,  Spanish  ambassador: 
245.  252. 

Mather,  George:  advises  Estevan, 
335;  signs  petition  for  as- 
sembly, 342;  strives  to  influ- 
ence De  Lassus,  367;  made 
judge  in  Baton  Rouge,  506. 

Mather,    George,   Jr. :   380. 

Matthews,  General  George:  Yazoo 
agent,  53;  border  mission  of, 
458,  463,  481,  488,  565;  as- 
sociated with  McKee,  522- 
526,  550;  interviews  Folch, 
527;  superseded,  561,  631; 
mention  of,  664. 


INDEX 


687 


Mead,  Cowles:  warns  against  the 
Spaniards,  201;  distrusts  Wil- 
kinson, 202. 

Mears,  John:   156. 

Medical  society  of  West  Florida: 
380. 

Mendoza,   Mexican  viceroy:   6. 

Merry,  Anthony,  British  minister: 
reports  attitude  of  American 
government  on  Floridas,  96, 
112;  position  regarding  Mo- 
bile Act,  98;  attention  to, 
228,  231. 

Metzinger,  Lieutenant  Juan:  opin- 
ion regarding  West  Florida, 
334;  course  of,  in  regard  to 
social  gatherings,  370;  in 
charge  of  ordnance,  391; 
presence  in  fort,  392,  396; 
wounded,  399;  later  career  of, 
404;    sentence   against,   413. 

Mexican  Association:  plan  of,  189; 
warning  against,  195;  re- 
newed activity  of,  224. 

Mexico:  mention  of,  6;  offer  to 
guarantee,  8;  possible  inva- 
sion of,  107,  188,  191,  193, 
311,  633;  Jefferson  threatens, 
271;  possible  attitude  of, 
294;  subsidy  from,  410,  518, 
596;  French  and  American 
agents  in,  563,  567,  631. 

Milfort:  French  agent  among 
Creeks,  39,  65. 

Militia:  character  of,  186;  rally 
of,  192;  convention  proposes 
to  arm,  363;  superseded  by 
regulars,  420;  officers  of, 
from  Tombigbee,  enter  serv- 
ice of  West  Florida,  467; 
operations  of,  around  Mobile, 
509-516,   613. 

Mills,  John:  member  of  com- 
mittee, West  Florida  conven- 
tion, 360,  428;  commissioner 
in  New   Orleans,   431,   435. 


Mills,   Major  John:   465. 

Minor,   Stephen:  51,   54. 

Miranda,  Francisco  de:  urges  the 
occupation  of  New  Orleans, 
20;  project  of,  250;  effect  of 
expedition  of,  269. 

Miro,  Estevan:  invites  American 
settlers,  22;  fears  the  pioneer, 
66s. 

Mississippi  River:  relation  to 
Espiritu  Santo,  6;  mention  of, 
II,  36;  proposal  to  forego 
navigation  of,  19;  American 
claim  to  navigation  of,  zy,  32, 
41;  Spanish  commerce  on, 
170,  179,  187,  589,  610; 
French    commerce    on,    532. 

Mississippi,  Territory  and  State  of: 
mentioned,  6,  139,  143,  160, 
164,  165,  176,  201,  202,  329, 
421;  controversy  with  Louisi- 
ana over  West  Florida,  547, 
576,  588;  receives  territory  to 
Perdido,  605;  admitted  as 
State,   641. 

Mobile  Act:  passage  of,  89;  pro- 
visions of,  97;  Casa  Yrujo 
protests  against,  98;  inter- 
preted by  Jefferson,  99,  112; 
counterpoise  to  claims,  106; 
explained  by  Livingston,  108; 
Cevallos  objects  to,  122; 
amended,  210;  reference  to, 
219. 

Mobile  Bay  and  River:  mention 
of,  4,  6,  8,  12,  14,  18,  75 ;  on 
growing  importance  of,  66 
request  for  commercial  privi- 
lege on,  70;  Wilkinson's  ef- 
forts in  behalf  of  settlers, 
143;  duties  levied  on,  162 
168,  170,  177,  182,  216;  regu 
lation  of,  by  Morales,  183 
concessions  affecting,  179 
187,  191,  216,  487,  591;  con 
troversy  between  Morales  and 


688 


INDEX 


Folch  over,  183-187;  condi- 
tions of,  affecting  transfer  of 
troops  on,  196,  206,  584; 
Burr's  adherents  near,  203; 
Madison  predicts  trouble  over, 
271;  Turreau's  views  con- 
cerning, 282;  Macon's  resolu- 
tion concerning,  438;  duties 
levied  on,  443,  472,  474; 
threat  to  obtain  commercial 
privileges  on  by  force,  585, 
587. 

"Mobile  Society":  Americans 
manifest  hostility  toward  Mo- 
bile, 192,  220,  410,  419,  422, 
428,  437;  American  govern- 
ment charged  with  complicity 
therein,  453,  481,   531. 

Mobile,  Town  of:  ceded  to  Eng- 
land, 1 1 ;  postal  facilities  at, 
122;  disturbances  near,  164; 
attitude  of  West  Florida  con- 
vention toward,  421,  435, 
457>  470;  senators  from,  432; 
popular  attitude  toward  an- 
nexation, 458,  473;  Kemper's 
operations  in  vicinity  of,  457- 
486;  American  preparations 
to  occupy,  494;  danger  threat- 
ening, S14;  Morier  advises 
British  occupation  of,  533; 
Folch  retains,  551;  surrender 
of,  urged,  554;  prospective 
officials  of,  583;  possible 
blockade  of,  586;  dispute  over 
claim  to,  594;  proposed  an- 
nexation of,  to  Mississippi, 
599;  confusion  in  jurisdiction 
at,  607;  occupation  and  or- 
ganization of,  607-611,  615- 
625;  projects  to  recover,  632; 
land  titles  in,   643. 

Moll's  Map:   651. 

Monroe,  James:  mentioned,  29; 
memoir  of,  on  West  Florida, 
84;     special     mission     of,     to 


Spain,  102-138;  difficulties 
confronting,  113,  128;  com- 
plaints of,  130;  indecision  of, 
133)  138;  submits  final  pro- 
posals to  Cevallos,  134;  ad- 
vises seizure  of  area  claimed, 
136;  accepts  Armstrong's  ad- 
vice, 137;  effect  of  failure  of 
his  mission,  173,  227;  posi- 
tion of,  during  the  Paris  ne- 
gotiation, 237,  247;  replaces 
Smith,  551;  negotiates  with 
Bernaben  and  Foster,  552, 
555,  558,  s6i,  605;  instructs 
Barlow,  568;  corresponds  with 
Skipwith,  573,  577,  600;  views 
of,  on  occupation  of  Mobile, 
622;  lectures  Robinson,  631; 
instructs  Jackson,  636;  de- 
fends claim  to  Perdido,  645; 
fruitless  negotiation  of,  650; 
ready  to  censure  Jackson, 
652;  mention  of,  663. 

Montcalm:   suggests  limit,    10. 

Morales,  Juan  Ventura:  suspends 
deposit  at  New  Orleans,  75; 
restricts  Mobile  commerce, 
145;  character  of,  146;  land 
sales  of,  162,  602,  642;  opposes 
Americans  on  the  Gulf,  175; 
commercial  controversy  of, 
with  Folch,  178-186;  forced 
from  New  Orleans,  182,  252; 
appeals  for  funds,  199;  advo- 
cates the  cession  of  West 
Florida,  211;  criticises  De 
Lassus,  362,  385;  plot  to  as- 
sassinate, 437;  criticises 
American  government,  509, 
519,  612;  fears  the  pioneer, 
66s. 

Moreau:  presence  in  New  Or- 
leans, 211;  attitude  of  Ameri- 
can government  toward,  231; 
confers  with  Davilmar,  313. 


INDEX 


689 


Morejon,  Francisco:  mention  of, 
370.  375.  392;  at  attack  on 
Baton  Rouge,  396,  401;  sub- 
sequent career  of,  404. 

Morgan,  Colonel  George:  22. 

Morgan,   Edward:   465. 

Morgan,   John:   351,   428. 

Morier,  J.  P.,  British  charge: 
charges  Americans  with  fa- 
voring insurgents,  532;  cham- 
pions Spanish  cause,  536;  aids 
De  Onis,  541,  544;  criticises 
American  government,  549, 
554- 

Morphy,  Diego,  Spanish  vice-con- 
sul: reports  presence  of 
French  emissaries,  335,  337; 
describes  conditions  at  New 
Orleans,  587;  warns  against 
Wilkinson,  596;  criticises  sur- 
render of  Mobile,   620. 

Morris,   Anthony:   636. 

Murdock,  John:  secretary  of  as- 
sembly, 318;  letter  of  Este- 
van  to,  323;  discovers  broad- 
side,   371;    warns   De   Lassus, 

395- 
Muscle  Shoals:   171,   196,  450. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte:  commer- 
cial system  of,  5;  declines 
to  aid  Monroe,  81;  wishes 
subsidy  from  the  United 
States,  102;  favors  Spain  in 
the  claim  to  West  Florida, 
109,  112,  116,  127;  influence 
of,  on  Paris  negotiation, 
242,  254,  274;  attitude  of, 
toward  Spanish  colonies,  288- 
296,  304,  335.  525;  rejects 
Burr's  proposals,  311;  atti- 
tude toward  the  Floridas, 
417.  545!  reference  to,  441, 
461,  650;  influence  of,  on 
American  policy,  455,  493, 
550,     575;     commercial     exac- 


tions of,  538;  possible  effect 
of  overthrow  of,  633;  preten- 
sions of,  638;  Spain  ham- 
pered by,  662. 

Natchez:  mention  of,  9,  12,  14, 
18;  American  claim  to  dis- 
trict of,  26;  relation  to  New 
Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  33, 
41,  62;  Ellicott  in,  33;  delay 
in  delivering,  40;  insurrec- 
tion at,  50;  Spaniards  evacu- 
ate, 55;  Wilkinson  reaches, 
59;   Americans  occupy,    139. 

Matches  Weekly  Chronicle:  re- 
views situation  in  West  Flor- 
ida,   355-357- 

National  Intelligencer:  propaganda 
of,  in  behalf  of  annexation, 
491;  publishes  premature  re- 
port of  evacuation  of  Mobile, 
508;  supports  Madison,  540; 
abuses  Skipwith,  573;  opinion 
of,  concerning  Florida  Treaty, 

655. 

Navigation :  of  the  Mississippi,  34, 
215.  257. 

Negotiation,  joint,  at  Paris:  pros- 
pects of,  134;  course  of,  227; 
effect  of  peace  on,  259. 

Neutrality:  during  Genet  episode, 
25;  assumed  by  Madison, 
278. 

New  Madrid:  22,  40. 

New  Orleans:  mention  of,  8,  15, 
18,  23,  25,  30,  33,  492;  ces- 
sion of,  II,  21;  Casa  Calvo 
in,  34;  possible  presence  of 
French  at,  37,  64;  plan  to 
seize,  45,  60;  American  con- 
trol established  at,  139;  ex- 
citement at,  198;  commercial 
control  of,  215;  defense  of, 
298;  inaccurate  reports  from, 
361;  center  of  control  for 
Florida,  546;  rivalry  with  Mo- 
bile,    583;    American    council 


690 


INDEX 


of  war  at,   611;   rejoices  over 

occupation     of     Mobile,     619; 

British  at,  636. 
Newcombe  v.  Skipwith:  657 
Nicholls,  British  official:  635. 
Nicholson,  John:   511. 
Nictalbany    River:    fort    on,    408, 

412,  431. 
Nolan,    Philip:    joins    Ellicott,    40; 

course  at  New  Orleans,  45. 
Nootka  Sound  Affair:  20. 


O'Fallon,    Dr.    James:   23. 

Oglethorpe,  General  Edward:  9. 

Ordinance  of  West  Florida  Con- 
vention: proposed,  363;  ac- 
cepted,  369. 

Orleans  Gasette:  libels  Grand  Pre, 
319. 

Orleans  Legislature:  gives  Clai- 
borne extra  power,  490 ;  re- 
fuses to  seat  delegates  from 
West  Florida,  576;  extends 
limits  of  Louisiana  to  the 
Pearl,  605. 

Orleans  Territory:  Burr  and  the 
governorship  of,  188;  Baton 
Rouge  desires  annexation  to, 
416;  Skipwith  favors,  416, 
575 ;  controversy  with  Missis- 
sippi Territory  over  West 
Florida,  547;  temporary  union 
of  Mobile  with,  583 ;  petition 
against   annexation   to,    597. 

Orso,  Zenon:  440,  441,  447,   511. 

Osborne:  messenger  of  Claiborne, 
478,  SCO. 

Osorno,  Joaquin  de:  in  command 
at  Mobile,  169;  attitude  to- 
ward American  commerce, 
184. 

Ouvrard  (or  Ouvras) :  agent  of 
Talleyrand,  23;  financial  pro- 
posals of,   242. 

Owens,  John:  222. 


Paine,  Thomas:  in  France,  24;  re- 
lation with  the  Directory,  29. 

Pan  American  Mission:  fiasco  of, 
303;   misuse  of,   665. 

Papeles  de  Cuba:  35,  note. 

Paris  negotiation:   245,  259. 

Parker,  Daniel:  views  regarding 
French  interference,  238; 
proposes  sale  of  the  Floridas, 
241;  responsibility  of,  for 
failure   of    negotiation,    261. 

Parma,  Duchy  of:  offer  to  ex- 
change for  the  Floridas,  69, 
75- 

Pascagoula  River:  mention  of,  4, 
97,  164,  171,  643;  course  of 
insurrection  at,  410,  422-427; 
Spanish  garrison  leaves,  424; 
attitude  of  French  residents 
of,  426;  artillery  from,  466; 
Kemper's  survivors  on,  484; 
disorder  at,  526;  difficulties  in 
establishing  American  juris- 
diction over,  580-582,  585; 
Claiborne  meets  St.  Maxent 
at,  590;  parish  created  in, 
593;  annexed  to  Mississippi, 
599;  fear  of  Choctaws  in, 
613. 

Pass     Christian:     mention     of,     4, 
409;       Wilkinson       at,       616; 
Seventh   Regiment  at,  628. 
Patterson,     George     W. :     petition 

of,    597-599. 

Pearl  River:  mention  of,  4;  set- 
tlement on,  59;  insurgents 
near,  410,  422;  measures  to 
suppress  lawlessness  near, 
580;  increased  American  pop- 
ulation near,  582;  as  bound- 
ary of  Louisiana,  598,  605; 
dissatisfaction  over  land 
titles,    639,   644. 

Pensacola:  capital  of  West  Flor- 
ida, 4,  149;  Spanish  estab- 
lishment    at,     7,     9;     capture 


INDEX 


691 


and  recapture  of,  8;  cession 
of,  11;  surrendered  by  Eng- 
lish, is;  mention  of,  18; 
council  of  war  at,  192,  616; 
condition  of  garrison  at,  327 ; 
Folch  prepares  to  defend,  410, 
429;  address  to  people  of, 
424;  views  of  people  of,  438, 
466;  attitude  of  Kemper  to- 
ward, 469;  possible  blockade 
of,  586;  possible  occupation 
of,  609,  611;  strength  of 
Spaniards  at,  612,  614;  Brit- 
ish at,  613. 

Percy,   Robert:   380. 

Perdido  River:  as  boundary  line, 
8;  mentioned  by  Du  Pfatz,  10; 
claimed  as  eastern  boundary 
of  Louisiana  Purchase,  85-87, 
loi,  493,  558;  Livingston  ex- 
plains claim  to,  108;  papers 
relating  to,  128;  proposed  as 
divisional  line,  229,  245;  re- 
port that  Spaniards  were 
crossing,  520;  disposal  of  ter- 
ritory to  eastward  of,  523;  bill 
to  extend  Orleans  Territory 
to,  544,  593,  604;  agreement 
to  observe  as  boundary,  546; 
claim  to,  reiterated,  S9S; 
mention  of,  609;  Qaiborne 
asserts  right  of  jurisdiction  to, 
611;  Wilkinson  fortifies,  620; 
American  property  on,  de- 
stroyed, 624-628,  632;  views  of 
French  government  concern- 
ing, 638;  outlaws  on,  641; 
status  of  claim  to,  641,  643, 
650;   occupation  to,  664. 

Perez,  Cayetano:  commandant  at 
Mobile,  440,  594;  reports 
force  under  Caller,  451;  holds 
Mobile  against  the  Americans, 
511-514,  521;  reports  Ameri- 
can flag  at  Pass  Christian, 
581;  refuses  to  honor  writ  of 


habeas  corpus,  608;  surren- 
ders Mobile,  617-619;  misfor- 
tunes of,  620;  character  of, 
621. 

Petry,  French  minister:  advises 
Champagny,  532;  subordinate 
of  Bassano,  567. 

Pickering,  Timothy:  suspects  the 
French  in  Louisiana,  38; 
opinion  regarding  limits  of 
Louisiana,  93 ;  criticises  course 
of  Madison,  540;  charges 
government  with  subserviency 
to  France,  546. 

Pickett  Papers:  404,  note. 

Piernas,  Captain  Luis:  brings 
subsidy  from  Mexico,  361, 
518;  visits  Baton  Rouge,  383- 
386;  messenger  to  Havana, 
S90. 

Pike,  Z.  M. :  on  the  Florida 
frontier,  310;  in  American  in- 
tervention,  493. 

Pinckney,  Charles:  early  negotia- 
tions in  Spain,  66;  offers  to 
guarantee  the  Spanish  colo- 
nies, T7,  652;  threatens  in- 
vasion of  the  Floridas,  78; 
preliminary  negotiation  of, 
103-106;  recalled,  iii;  asso- 
ciated in  negotiation  with 
Monroe,    118-138. 

Pinckney,  Thomas:  special  envoy 
to  Spain,  29;  negotiation  with 
Godoy,  30;  comparison  with 
Jay,  32. 

Pinckney  ville:  refuge  for  out- 
laws, 159,  163,  360;  measures 
to  protect,   405. 

Pifieda:  6. 

Pinkney,  William,  minister  to 
England:  instructions  to,  534, 
544;  fails  to  explain  West 
Florida,  559. 


692 


INDEX 


Pintado,    Vizente:    154-156. 
Pioneers:  part  of,  in  acquiring  the 

Floridas,  665. 
Pizarro,  Spanish  minister  of  state: 
demands     the     surrender     of 
West    Florida,    648;    offers   to 
exchange     territory,     651;     in- 
clined   to   yield    the    Floridas, 
652. 
Poindexter,     George:     attitude    of, 
regarding  West   Florida,    547; 
reports     failure     of      Barlow, 
569;     wishes     to     incorporate 
West     Florida     with     Missis- 
sippi, 598;  reports  uncertainty 
in  Congress  over  Mobile,  614- 
616. 
Pollock,   Oliver:    14. 
Pontchartrain,    Lake:    11,    12,    219. 
Pope,  Lieutenant  John:  42,  50-53. 
Porter,   Captain   David:   437. 
Postal  routes:  through  Mobile  and 

Baton  Rouge,   171,   185. 
Power,   Thomas:    agent   of   Caron- 
delet    to    Sebastian    and    Wil- 
kinson,  46-48;    revelations  of, 
220. 
Preble,      messenger     of     Monroe: 
views  of,  on  negotiation,    132. 
Prieto,    Bernardo:   620. 
Prince     of     the     Peace,     the:     see 

Godoy,  Manuel. 
Printing      press:      authorized      in 

West  Florida,   380. 
Privateers:     in     service     of    West 

Florida,  430. 
Proclamation:  Jefferson's,  195; 
Madison's,  427,  489,  512; 
preparations  to  distribute,  493 ; 
defense  of,  499;  see  also 
Royal  Proclamation  of  1763. 
Project  for  a  treaty:    120,  654. 

Randolph,  Edmund:  29. 


Randolph,       Edward:       associated 
with    the    Kempers,    155,    159, 
163,  465. 
Randolph,  John:  views  of,  93;   in- 
troduces  Mobile   Act,   97;   op- 
poses   Two-Million     act,     234, 
245;  "heterodoxy"  of,  266. 
Raynor,  Daniel:  380. 
Regency,     Spanish:     appoints     De 
Onis,      310;     not     recognized, 
416;     orders    defense    of    the 
Floridas,    554;    thanks    Foster 
for    services,    560;    order    of, 
disregarded,     592;     exculpates 
Folch,    593;    demands   restora- 
tion of  the  Floridas,  623. 
Revolutionary   agents:    in    Spanish 

colonies,  307. 
Rhea,   John:   chairman   of  conven 
tion,   346;   appeals  of,   for  an 
nexation,   364,  416,   419;   com 
munication   of,   to   De  Lassus 
379;  senator  in  West  Florida, 
432;      second     communication 
of,  491. 
Rio  Pescado   ("  Fish  River  ")  :  oc- 
cupied, 610. 
Rio    Grande    del    Norte    (Bravo) : 
point  for  invasion  of  Mexico, 
193;    as    limit    of    Louisiana, 
272;  claim  to,  570. 
Robertson,    F.    Boiling:   cooperates 
with    Holmes,     332;    interme- 
diary for  Skipwith,   417,   578; 
reports     from,     536;     presents 
resolution   for   diplomatic   cor- 
respondence,  645. 
Robin:  memoir  of,  282. 
Robinson,  John  Hamilton:  mission 
of,    564;    proposes   to    capture 
Pensacola,  630-632. 
Rodney,  Judge  Thomas:    167,  203. 
Russell,         Jonathan,         American 

charge:  535,   565. 
Royal    Proclamation    of    1763:    2, 
II,   12,   27. 


INDEX 


693 


Saavedra,  Spanish  minister  of 
state:  53,  57. 

Sabine  River:   as  limit,  229,  273. 

St.   Augustine:   9,    11,    188,   609. 

St.  Francisville :  on  mail  route, 
171;  independence  declared 
at,  413;  meeting  place  for  ex- 
ecutive committee,  428;  for 
the  legislature  of  West  Flor- 
ida, 493;  Claiborne  takes 
possession  of,  495,  501;  un- 
rest at,   575. 

St.  Helena  (Ticfau  Region)  :  men- 
tion of,  158,  380;  loyalty  of 
people  in,  161,  343,  374,  383, 
403,  409;  delegation  from, 
344;  overthrow  of  opposition 
in,  412;  difficulty  in  obtaining 
officials  in,   506. 

St.  John's  Plains:  346,  358. 

St.  Maxent,  Celestino:  mention 
of.  370.  375.  392;  remon- 
strates with  De  Lassus,  371; 
arrested,  405. 

St.  Maxent,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Maximiliano,  commandant  at 
Mobile:  mention  of,  177,  180, 
183;  ordered  to  prevent  pas- 
sage of  troops,  206,  521;  sub- 
stitutes for  i"olch  at  Pensa- 
cola,  440-442;  advises  Collell, 
587;  interviews  Claiborne, 
590 ;  protests  against  Ameri- 
can claim  to  Mobile,  594. 

St.  Stephens:  Indian  factory  at, 
144;  mentioned,  466,  511, 
530. 

St.  Tammany:  506. 

Salazar,  commandant  at  Mobile: 
223. 

Salcedo,  Manuel,  governor  of 
Louisiana:    88,    149. 

Salcedo,   Manuel,   Jr.:    150. 

San  Ildefonso,  Treaty  of:  signed, 
6s,  127;  character  of  Third 
Article  of,  79,  82;  Randolph's 


views  on,  94;  Lowe  favors 
Spanish  interpretation,  539; 
enigmatical  character  of,  637; 
connected  with  land  grants, 
642. 

San  Lorenzo  el  Real  (Escorial) : 
Treaty  of,  32,  637. 

Santo  Domingo:  proposed  joint 
agreement  regarding,  130; 
trade  with,  interdicted,  213, 
250.  305- 

Saw  Mill  Creek:  attack  on  out- 
laws at,  483,   594. 

Sebastian,  Judge  Benjamin:  22, 
49.   56. 

Sedella,    Father   Antonio   de:    195. 

Seminoles:    586,    613. 

Separatism:  failure  of  proposals 
to  bring  about,  49;  Gayoso's 
belief  in,  58;  favored  as  a 
precaution  against  the  Ameri- 
cans, 176;  stimulated  by  com- 
mercial rivalry,  250;  allied 
with   filibustering,    660. 

Serrurier,  French  minister  to 
United  States:   53s,  622. 

Sharp,  Joseph:   325,   342. 

Shaw,  Commodore:  furnishes  con- 
voy, 580,  585;  on  Mobile 
Bay,   618. 

Short,   William:   26-28,   270. 

Sibley,   Cyrus:   484. 

Sibley,  John:  88,  484. 

Simpson,    William:    474. 

Six  Thousand  fund:  sent  to  De 
Lassus,  361;  seized  by  insur- 
gents, 402,  420;  used  for  ex- 
pedition   against   Mobile,    429. 

Skipwith,  Fulwar:  Monroe  re- 
quests documents  from,  123, 
note;  attacks  Armstrong,  246; 
relations  with  Dautremont, 
247,  259;  appears  in  West 
Florida,  342;  made  associate 
justice,  380;  mention  of,  388, 
566;    measures    of.    in    behalf 


694 


INDEX 


of  annexation,  417;  becomes 
governor,  432,  433-43S;  de- 
fends his  course,  432,  497- 
504.  536,  573-577.  601;  writes 
in  favor  of  annexation,  436 
relations  of,  with  Claiborne 
506,  572,  574;  gives  adminis 
tration  information,  536;  op 
poses  Kemper's  plan,  574 
proposed  address  of,  to  Louisi- 
ana legislature,  577;  Monroe's 
explanation  to,  600;  receiver 
for  land  office,  644. 

Skipwith,  Henry:  attorney  for 
West  Florida  Claim,  659. 

Slave     insurrection:      reports     of, 

411.  575- 

Slaves:  trade  in,  171,  220;  plan 
to  stir  up,  389;  repeal  of  tax 
on,  420;  Morier  suggests 
propaganda  among,  549;  in- 
troduction of,  through  Mo- 
bile,   585. 

Smith,  John,  Senator  from  Ohio: 
152,  208,  209,  640. 

Smith,  Robert:  secretary  of  the 
navy,  229;  reassures  Jackson 
about  New  Orleans,  310;  in- 
competence of,  331;  advises 
Holmes,  332;  opposes  "Mo- 
bile Society,"  455;  instruc- 
tions of,  to  Claiborne,  490;  to 
Holmes,  491;  assurances  of, 
to  Bernaben,  531,  541;  re- 
fuses to  discuss  Baton  Rouge 
with  Morier,  533;  denies 
American  complicity,  536;  re- 
placed  by   Monroe,    551. 

Someruelos,  el  Marques  de,  cap- 
tain-general of  Cuba:  views 
on  limits  of  Louisiana,  88; 
permits  passage  of  American 
troops,  196;  character  of,  286; 
Wilkinson's  mission  to,  286, 
290-292;  relations  of,  with 
Folch,     301,     410,     437,     482, 


593;  complains  of  "Mobile 
Society,"  454;  Claiborne's 
message  to,  508;  mention  of, 
509- 

Spain:  dispute  of,  with  United 
States  over  West  Florida,  3; 
declares  war  against  Great 
Britain,  15;  opposes  the 
American  claim  to  the 
Natchez  District,  17;  in- 
trigues of,  19;  mention  of, 
27,  35;  attitude  toward  Pinck- 
ney,  29;  breaks  with  England, 
iii;  territory  of,  violated, 
222-224;  subserviency  to 
France,  243 ;  Napoleon's 
views  regarding,  272;  desires 
friendly  relations,  297;  ne- 
gotiation with,  promised,  534; 
attempt  to  involve  in  war 
with  United  States,  561;  men- 
tion of,  564;  critical  condi- 
tion of,  651;  Jefferson's  atti- 
tude toward,  660;  abandoned 
by  European  powers,  663. 

Spaniards:  jealous  of  Americans, 
15;  reopen  negotiation  with 
France,  28 ;  fear  American 
hostility,  53;  weakness  in 
provinces,  60;  oppose  claim 
to  Perdido,  86;  forbid  en- 
trance of  Americans,  164;  ob- 
ject to  president's  message, 
167;  favor  military  precau- 
tions, 175;  oppose  Burr, 
204;  subserviency  of,  to 
Napoleon,  227;  alarmed  by 
movements  of  American 
forces,  288;  vessels  detained, 
438;  efforts  of,  to  strengthen 
Mobile,  444;  pretended  neu- 
trality of,  562;  plan  to  defend 
possessions  against  the  Ameri- 
cans, 632;  dispose  of  lands 
in  the  Floridas,  652. 


INDEX 


695 


Spanish  America:  plan  to  revolu- 
tionize, 52;  French  attitude 
toward  independence  of,  S35'> 
suspicious  of  United  States, 
66s. 

Spanish  colonies:  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with,  301;  loyalty  of, 
302,  305 ;  American  attitude 
toward,  306,  308;  attitude  of 
Great  Britain  toward,  488, 
561;  France  favors  independ- 
ence of,  532,  534;  involved  in 
the  Treaty  of  1819,  653. 

Spanish  Council  of  State:   562. 

Spanish  garrisons:  rumor  of  rein- 
forcements to,  148,  173;  in- 
crease in,  495,  610;  inade- 
quacy of,  542;  scarcity  of 
provisions  in,   615. 

Spanish  officials:  forced  from  New 
Orleans,  182,  230;  deprived 
of  power,  386;  oppressive 
course  of,   600. 

Spanish  patriots:   commended,  315. 

Spanish  pretensions:  character- 
ized by  Niles,   645. 

Sparks,  Colonel  Richard:  mention 
of,  166,  449,  451,  463,  588; 
proceeds  against  "  Mobile  So- 
ciety," 442-445;  preserves 
good  understanding  with 
Spaniards,  462;  relations  with 
Kemper,  468,  482,  512;  rela- 
tions with  Folch,  481,  494, 
509;  judgment  of,  doubted, 
515- 

Special  mission:  determined  on,  to 
Spain,  26;  Monroe  appointed 
for,  75;  instructions  to,  100; 
hopelessness    of,    116,    638. 

Spoliations:  damages  for,  102; 
balanced  against  the  Floridas, 
569- 

Springfield:  assemblage  at,  397; 
fort  at,  408,  411;  armament 
at,   435- 


Squatters:  expulsion  of,  opposed, 
639- 

"  Star  "  (emblem  of  West  Flor- 
ida) :  mention  of,  6,  423;  first 
use  of,  156;  Kemper  plans  to 
raise,  on  Mobile,  464,  468, 
475 ;  disappears,  484;  Skip- 
with  refers  to,  498. 

Status  Quo:  administration  de- 
sires to  retain,  137,  148,  196, 
228,  257. 

Steele,  Andrew:  signs  petition  for 
assembly,  342;  secretary  of 
convention,  346;  appointed 
registrar,  380;  associated  with 
Skipwith,   433,    574,    578. 

Steele,   Richard:   506. 

Sterling,   Alexander:    152,   340. 

Stock  jobbers:  242. 

Stoddart,  Amos:  94. 

Stoddert,  Fort:   169,  452,   530. 

Stuart,  John:   13. 

Sullivan,    James:    246. 

Sullivan,   John:   23. 

Sumpter,  Thomas,  Jr.:  73,  note, 
573,    578. 

Swain,  Thomas:   196. 

Talleyrand:  favors  acquisition  of 
West  Florida  alone,  76;  atti- 
tude on  limits  of  Louisiana, 
81;  instructs  Turreau,  107; 
Monroe's  attitude  toward, 
113,  125,  127,  559;  report 
submitted  to  emperor  by,  115; 
supports  Spain,  128-130,  533; 
proposal  of,  to  bargain  for 
the  Floridas,  230-232;  dubious 
propositions  of,  240,  245, 
249;  reports  on  claims  and 
West  Florida,  249;  rebukes 
Vandeul,  253;  motives  of, 
253,  264;  views  of,  on  bound- 
ary dispute,  273;  Pickering 
quotes  letter  of,  547;  mention 
of,  650,  663. 


696 


INDEX 


Tanchipaho   River:   374,   506. 

Tennessee,  State  of:  settlement  of, 
21,  34;  inclusion  in  French 
Louisiana,  124;  commercial 
connection  of,  with  Mobile, 
487;  mention  of,  598. 

Tensaw  River:  seizure  of  Spanish 
vessels  on,  223;  settlers  on, 
support  Kemper,  466,  511; 
navigation  of,  590,  591,  618; 
filibusters  on,   641. 

Terry,   Champney:    155,   432. 

Texas:  linked  with  West  Florida, 
7;  Armstrong  advises  seizure 
of,  129,  227;  crisis  on  border 
of,  187;  comparison  of,  with 
West  Florida,  382;  Spaniards 
fear  seizure  of,  554;  meas- 
ures to  settle  boundary  of, 
653;  retained  by  Spain,  655; 
influence  of  pioneers  in,   664. 

Thirty-first  parallel:  as  limit  to 
West  Florida,  2,  12,  14,  16; 
British  attitude  toward,  32; 
survey  of,  55;  Kemper's 
operations  below,  423. 

Thomas,  Joseph:  343,  346,  note, 
3S0. 

Thomas,  Philemon:  commands 
West  Florida  militia,  370, 
380,  420;  signs  joint  agree- 
ment, 379,  393;  part  in  cap- 
ture of  Baton  Rouge,  388, 
395-400;  intercepts  letter  of 
De  Lassus,  394;  campaign  of, 
411;  against  Mobile,  428; 
senator  of  West  Florida,  432; 
the  "Ajax"  of  the  revolt, 
506;   mention  of,   536. 

Ticfau  Bayou:  374,  380. 

Tilsit,  Peace  of:  references  to, 
270,  273,  275. 

Tombecbe,  Fort:  9. 

Tombigbee  River:  American  forts 
on,  17s;  restrain  people  on, 
454;    work    of    Kemper    near. 


457;  of  Matthews,  522; 
Americans  claim  navigation 
of,  590;  turbulent  population 
on,  629;  see  also  Mobile 
River. 

Toulmin,  Judge  Harry:  concern 
for  the  country,  176;  efforts 
in  behalf  of  commerce,  177, 
293;  ready  to  arrest  Burr, 
203;  proposes  joint  suppres- 
sion of  bandits,  222;  efforts 
of,  in  behalf  of  intervention, 
418,  459;  against  Hargreave, 
425;  opposes  "  Mobile  So- 
ciety "  and  Kennedy,  442, 
446;  instructions  of  Madison 
and  Holmes  to,  445,  451; 
charge  of,  to  grand  jury,  452- 
454;  opposes  Kemper,  461, 
467,  470,  478,  526,  583;  post- 
master at  St.  Stephens,  465; 
writes  to  Ballinger,  467;  ef- 
forts of,  to  secure  concession 
from  Folch,  474,  476;  dis- 
trusts Sparks,  509;  persuades 
Gushing  to  disband  militia, 
515;  altercation  with  Caller, 
515-517;  reports  conditions  at 
Pascagoula,  580;  advises  Clai- 
borne to  extend  jurisdiction, 
584;  court  proceedings  of,  at 
Mobile,  607;  opinion  of,  con- 
cerning squatters,  639; 
charges  of  Lewis  against,  640; 
efforts  to  break  up  filibuster- 
ing, 650;   mention  of,  664. 

Treaty  of  1782:  secret  article  in, 
16,  26. 

Treaty  of  1795:  terms  of,  30; 
pretexts  for  disputes  over,  35; 
of  no  profit  to  Spaniards,  57; 
mention  of,  654. 

Treaty  of  San  Ildefonso:  Ameri- 
can rights  under,  78;  third 
article  of,  84. 


INDEX 


697 


Treaty  of  1803:  American  title  to 
West  Florida  under,  553. 

Treaty  of  18 19:  mutual  honor 
preserved  in,  655. 

Trinidad :  effect  of  cession  of,  68. 

Troup,   of  Georgia:   448,   547. 

Turreau,  French  minister  to  the 
United  States:  instructed  to 
curb  American  pretensions, 
107;  interview  of,  with  Madi- 
son, 1 16;  threatens  French  in- 
tervention, 257;  aroused  by 
Wilkinson's  toast,  291;  with- 
draws from  Washington,  306; 
charges  the  Americans  with 
complicity,  324;  explanations 
of  Smith  to,  536;  expects 
United  States  and  Great  Brit- 
ain to  act  together,  537;  men- 
tion of,   663. 

"Two-Million  Act":  proposed 
and  passed,   234-236. 

United  States:  southeastern  por- 
tion of,  I ;  claim  of,  to 
Natchez  District,  26-31;  pos- 
sible alliance  of,  with  Great 
Britain,  107;  measures  to  in- 
crease respect  for,  133;  views 
toward  the  Floridas,  250;  ter- 
ritorial pretensions  of,  271; 
Convention  wishes  annexation 
to,  347.  352;  danger  of  at- 
tack on,  489,  530;  proposed 
union  with  the  Spanish  colo- 
nies, 522;  attitude  of,  ex- 
plained, 544;  influenced  by 
Bonaparte,  548,  552;  war  by 
Great  Britain  against,  561; 
anonymous  memoir  attacking, 
563;  proposal  to  check  expan- 
sion of,  624. 

Urquijo:   succeeds  Godoy,   65. 

Vallerino,  Bruno:  attacks  United 
States,  636-639. 


Vaughan,   Benjamin:   94,   649. 

Vera   Cruz:   205,   494. 

Vergennes:  attitude  toward  Ameri- 
can and  Spanish  pretensions, 
16. 

"Verus":  pamphlet  of  De  Onis, 
548. 

Vezmonnet:  reports  attitude  of 
United  States,  255. 

Vicksburg  ("  Walnut  Hills  ") : 
23,  40,  55- 

Victoria,  schooner:  detention  of, 
293- 

Vidal,  Jose,  Spanish  vice-consul: 
suspects  purpose  of  United 
States,  29s;  interviews  of, 
with  Claiborne  and  Wilkin- 
son, 296,  298;  warned  against 
Davilmar,  313. 

Virginia  Patriot:  criticises  Madi- 
son, 538. 

Vivora,  schooner:  searched  by 
Americans,   221. 

Washington,  George:  mention  of, 
17.  25;  proclamation  of, 
against  the  Yazoo  settlers, 
23;  attitude  of,  toward  the 
Creeks,  26;  the  "modern 
Fabius,"  60;  fears  the  French 
as  neighbors,  64;  name  used 
as  battle  cry,  399,  401,  403. 

Washington,  Mississippi:  resolu- 
tions passed  in  Washington 
County,   184. 

Washington  City  Gazette:  653. 

West,  Cato:   157. 

West  Florida:  legatee  of  interna- 
tional claims,  2;  areas  of  set- 
tlement in,  4;  reasons  for  im- 
portance, 5;  absorption  of,  6; 
claimed  by  England  under 
Carolina  grant,  7;  tripartite 
dispute  over,  8;  first  bound- 
aries of,  12;  prototype  for 
Texas     and      California,     41; 


698 


INDEX 


Parma  offered  for,  69;  con- 
nection of,  with  Louisiana 
Purchase,  74,  80,  82,  88;  Liv- 
ingston asserts  claim  to,  83; 
American  designs  and  claims 
on,  95,  101,  178;  controversy 
over,  102,  124,  126,  146;  con- 
nected with  Burr  Conspiracy, 
188;     proposal     to    cut    down 

*  garrison  in,  211;  wording  of 
proposed  article  on,  244;  offer 
to  abandon  claim  to,  135;  first 
declaration  of  independence 
in,  155,  note;  insurrection  in, 
157,  162;  Wilkinson  proposes 
to  seize,  274,  298,  302;  Tal- 
leyrand's report  on,  115,  249; 
Claiborne  reports  dissatisfac- 
tion in,  312;  connection  of, 
with  Spanish-American  Revo- 
lution, 312,  325,  415;  expres- 
sions of  loyalty  among  people 
of,  315-317;  first  attempt  to 
organize  assembly  in,  318- 
325;  meeting  in,  to  consider 
Bayou  Manchac,  326;  reports 
of  conditions  in,  327,  329, 
340;  names  of  members  of 
convention  in,  346,  note;  tem- 
porary government  for,  353; 
Holmes  reports  conditions  in, 
354;  proposed  annexation  of, 
to  United  States,  366,  416- 
419;  declaration  of  independ- 
ence in,  414;  government  or- 
ganized in,  428,  432;  Skip- 
with  urges  annexation  of, 
436>  495;  discussion  of 
American  claim  to,  437,  453, 
510;  congressional  action  on, 
451;  Napoleon's  policy  to- 
ward,   45s;    Folch   gives   hints 

•  of  its  surrender,  471-473;  ex- 
ternal interest  in,  487 ;  Ameri- 
can intervention  in,  489-505; 
discontent    with    Spanish    rule 


in,  498;  debt  of,  498,  506, 
572,  599;  Claiborne's  course 
in.  594.  507,  573;  character 
of  population  in,  507,  530;  in- 
terest of  diplomats  in,  530; 
discussion  of  American  title 
to,  539.  545,  559,  S66,  568, 
598,  602,  625,  628,  647; 
Morier  protests  against  seiz- 
ure of,  542;  Mississippi  and 
Orleans  dispute  over,  547, 
603;  Bernaben  demands 
evacuation  of,  552;  occupa- 
tion of,  by  Americans,  de- 
fended, 558,  567;  discontent 
of  people  in,  575-577;  as- 
sumption of  debts  and  claims 
in,  599;  plan  to  receive,  626, 
638;  views  of  De  Neuville  on, 
653 ;  non-committal  article 
concerning,  654;  effect  of 
American   claim   to,    661-668. 

West:  genuine  loyalty  of,  20;  ef- 
fect of  Treaty  of  1795  on,  33. 

Western  Company:  9. 

Western    separatism:    49. 

White,  Joseph:   421. 

Wilkinson,  General  James:  ne- 
gotiations of,  with  Indians, 
13,  141;  disunion  plans  of, 
checked,  19;  opposes  settle- 
ment at  New  Madrid,  23;  op- 
poses Genet's  projects,  25; 
Ellicott  to  watch,  33;  Caron- 
delet  renews  intrigues  with, 
34,  46-49,  56;  suggests  uni- 
fied control  in  Mississippi 
Valley,  39,  note;  charged 
with  trying  to  prevent  sur- 
vey, 52;  arrival  of,  at 
Natchez,  59;  relations  of, 
with  Spaniards,  60,  89-92, 
196-199,  206,  221;  relations 
of,  with  Claiborne,  139,  143, 
185;  efforts  of,  in  behalf  of 
Mobile    commerce,     143,     185; 


INDEX 


699 


relations  of,  with  Burr,  188- 
194;  congressional  investiga- 
tion of,  220;  Pan-American 
mission  of,  285-309,  564;  ad- 
vises strengthening  of  fron- 
tier, 29s,  298;  courtmartial 
of)  303;  warns  against  Davil- 
mar,  313;  correspondence  of, 
concerning  transfer  of  troops, 
437;  enquiry  concerning,  521; 
measures  of,  to  defend  the 
southern  frontier,  596,  609- 
614;  occupies  Mobile,  616- 
623;  possibly  identified  as 
"  Louisiana  Planter,"  634, 
note. 

Wilkinson,  James  B. :  459. 

Williams,   Benjamin   C. :   346,   350. 

Williams,  Robert,  governor  of 
Mississippi  Territory:  164, 
166,   208. 

Willing,  James:    14. 

Wilson,    Elizabeth:    426. 


Wykoff,  William,  Jr.:  requested 
to  act  as  agent  in  West  Flor- 
ida, 330;  mention  of,  332, 
338,  342;  publication  of  Clai- 
borne's letter  to,  551,   577. 

Yazoo   Land   Companies:    23,   454. 

Yazoo  Line:  mention  of,  3,  26; 
West  Florida  extended  to, 
12;  secret  article  on,  16; 
Poindexter  proposes  State  be- 
low,   598. 

Zufiiga,  governor  of  West  Florida: 
criticises  Americans,  606; 
Holmes  protests  to,  608;  dis- 
cusses Dauphine  Island,  610; 
warns  Claiborne,  613;  meas- 
ures of,  to  defend  province, 
614,  617;  protests  to  Wilkin- 
son, 619;  crticises  Perez, 
620. 


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405  Hilgard  Avenue,  Los  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

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Series  9482 


3   1205  00215   1429 


.r>^ 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000  880  214    2 


